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This work charts the evolution of soteriology among Franciscan friars 
working at the University of Paris up to 1300. It examines in turn each of 
their extant soteriological works from this period to demonstrate the 
development of a distinct and uniquely Franciscan approach to soteriology. 
This study considers the written forms in which these Franciscan theological 
opinions were expressed, the scholastic genres of commentaries upon the 
Book of Sentences along with quaestiones disputatae, quodlibets and 
summae. It situates those soteriological innovations and their genres of 
expression in their historical context, the developing engagement of the 
Franciscans with the University of Paris and the tensions that came with this, 
especially the secular-mendicant controversy of the 1220s to 1250s and the 
Aristotelian conflict with Stephen Tempier in the 1270s. 
These three elements, Franciscan theological ideas, the literary forms 
in which they were articulated and the historical setting in which they were 
expressed, played upon each other to produce theology particular to the 
Franciscans. The friars discarded much of the soteriology inherited from 
Anselm of Bec and marginalised the significance of satisfaction and divine 
punishment for the fall. Figures like Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta 
and Richard of Middleton gave greater emphasis to human fulfilment in a 
plan unrelated to the events of the fall. Despite obstacles to their theological 
work from both the university and the wider church, the Franciscans were 
not dissuaded from their ideas, adjusting the expression of those notions to 
ensure their acceptance. 
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This interplay of ideas, genres and events provides evidence that 
supports a claim for the existence of a distinctive ‘Franciscan school’ of 
theology in operation in Paris in the thirteenth century. This school recast the 
doctrine of redemption as more than the appeasement of a God angered by 
disobedience and demanding a suitable sacrifice. The Franciscans advocated 
instead for salvation as God generously furthering and advancing the final 
culmination of human creation. 
ix 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Franciscan Soteriology at the University of Paris to 1300 .................................... i 
Abstract ............................................................................................................ vii 
Table of Contents .............................................................................................. ix 
Notes on the text ............................................................................................... xi 
1  The Locus and Genres of Thirteenth-Century Theology in Paris.................. 1 
1.1  Scholasticism ...................................................................................................... 5 
1.2  Studia among the Franciscans ......................................................................... 10 
1.3  University of Paris ............................................................................................ 12 
1.4  A Friary with both Studium and University Chair ........................................... 14 
1.5  Sentence Commentaries .................................................................................. 27 
1.6  Quaestiones Disputatae ................................................................................... 41 
1.7  Quaestiones Quodlibetales ............................................................................... 46 
1.8  Summa ............................................................................................................. 50 
2  Alexander of Hales and the Legacy of Anselm of Bec ................................. 59 
2.1 Anselm and Penal-Substitution ....................................................................... 60 
2.2  Alexander of Hales and the Incorporation of Anselm ..................................... 62 
2.3  The Works of Alexander of Hales .................................................................... 64 
2.4  The Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi ....................... 66 
2.5  Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’ .......................................... 69 
2.6  The Role of Human Affectivity in Salvation .................................................... 73 
2.7  Summa Fratris Alexandri ............................................................................... 76 
2.8  The Role of the Human Nature of Christ ........................................................ 77 
3  Eudes Rigaud and the Secular-Mendicant Controversy ............................. 83 
3.1  Secular-Mendicant Controversy ...................................................................... 84 
3.2  Franciscan Chairs at the University of Paris ................................................... 87 
3.3  The Chirographum .......................................................................................... 92 
3.4  The ‘Door’ ........................................................................................................ 96 
3.5  The Role of Resurrection ................................................................................. 99 
3.6  Incarnation in the Absence of the Fall .......................................................... 100 
3.7  The Reception of Eudes’ Theological Writing ............................................... 103 
4  Bonaventure and an Alternative to Penal-Substitution ............................ 107 
4.1 The Commentary on the Book of Sentences ................................................... 109 
4.1.1  The Absolute Freedom of God in Salvation .............................................. 113 
4.1.2  From Necessity to Fittingness .................................................................. 115 
4.1.3  Pseudo-Dionysius and Hierarchies .......................................................... 117 
4.1.4  Locus of Suffering ................................................................................... 120 
4.1.5  Passion and Compassion ......................................................................... 125 
4.1.6  The Secular-Mendicant Controversy and Bonaventure .......................... 127 
4.2  Breviloquium .................................................................................................. 131 
4.2.1  A New Role for Satisfaction ..................................................................... 133 
4.2.2  Christ as Middle, Medium and Mediator ............................................... 136 
4.2.3  Remedy by Opposites ............................................................................. 138 
x 
 
4.3  Collationes in Hexaëmeron ............................................................................ 141 
4.3.1  ‘Moral-Legal’ or ‘Physical-Mystical’ Soteriology ..................................... 146 
4.3.2  Non-Christian Authors in Theology ....................................................... 149 
5  Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Revival of the Secular-Mendicant 
Controversy ................................................................................................ 157 
5.1  The Works of Richard Rufus .......................................................................... 159 
5.2  The Secular-Mendicant Controversy Revives ................................................ 161 
5.3  Franciscan Schools of Oxford and Paris ........................................................ 166 
5.4  Abbreviatio Bonaventurae ........................................................................... 169 
5.5  Richard’s Soteriological Writing in the Franciscan School ............................ 173 
6  Matthew of Aquasparta and the Reworking of Anselm ............................. 177 
6.1  The Works of Matthew of Aquasparta ........................................................... 178 
6.2  Quaestiones Disputatae de Christo ............................................................... 180 
6.3  Christ’s Obligation to Die .............................................................................. 184 
6.4  Quaestiones Disputatae de Incarnatione ...................................................... 187 
6.5  The Benefits of Salvation Through the Incarnate ......................................... 190 
6.6  Matthew the Scholastic ................................................................................. 196 
6.7  Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia ................................................................. 198 
7  Richard of Middleton and the Episcopal Condemnations of the 1270s ... 203 
7.1  The Tempier Decrees ..................................................................................... 203 
7.2  Paris at the Arrival of Richard of Middleton .................................................. 211 
7.3  The Writings of Richard ................................................................................ 215 
7.4  The Wills of Christ ..........................................................................................217 
7.5  Distinguishing Redemption and Salvation .................................................... 221 
7.6  Diabolic Power ............................................................................................... 224 
7.7  The Congruity of Salvation for God ............................................................... 229 
7.8  Satisfaction .................................................................................................... 231 
8  Roger Marston, Peter Falco and the Physical Consequences of the Fall . 237 
8.1  Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae ...................................... 240 
8.2  Peter Falco and the Source of Human Suffering........................................... 244 
8.3  Human Restoration ....................................................................................... 247 
8.4  Incarnation in the Absence of the Fall .......................................................... 251 
8.5  If Adam Had Resisted Temptation................................................................ 257 
8.6  The Salvific Role of Christ’s Death ................................................................ 258 
9  Conclusion ................................................................................................. 265 
Bibliography .................................................................................................. 281 
Appendix 1  Comparative Table of Sentence Commentaries ......................... 317 
Appendix 2  Excerpt from the Sentence Commentary of Eudes Rigaud...... 329 





Notes on the text 
 
1. All English Biblical quotations are drawn from the New Revised Standard 
Version of the Bible (NRSV), The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard 
Version (London: Harper Collins, 1998). Where the text of the Vulgate in 
use in the Middle Ages differs materially from the NRSV, the Douai-
Rheims translation has been preferred: The Holy Bible: Douay-Rheims 
Version (Charlotte, NC: Saint Benedict Press, 2009). 
2. The names of historical figures have, wherever possible, been anglicised. 
Thus, for example, the usage of ‘Eudes Rigaud’ and ‘Stephen Tempier’ has 
been preferred to ‘Odo Rigaldis’ and ‘Étienne Tempier’. 









1  The Locus and Genres of Thirteenth-
Century Theology in Paris 
 
The last words in the life of Francis of Assisi were, according to Thomas of 
Celano, directed to his brothers. ‘I have done what was mine to do, now do 
what is yours to do’.1 The friars gathered around his expiring body certainly 
took that injunction to heart. Whatever Francis may have done in his life, in 
short order the Friars Minor forged new directions and developments in his 
order that Francis himself had neither anticipated nor even, in some 
instances, desired. 
The account of how his group of ill-educated wandering lay preachers 
observing strictest poverty transformed, in the space of scarcely a generation, 
into an urban order of clerics and scholars making use of property has been 
told in other places and with far greater detail.2 This work looks rather at 
intellectual changes in theology among the Franciscans and specifically at 
how those changes developed in the context of this reorientation by the 
disciples of Francis. It does so through a consideration of their soteriology, 
the Christian theories of salvation, and it explores how soteriology changed 
and how such changes occurred. In tracing those theological developments, it 
considers whether it is truly possible to speak in the thirteenth century of a 
                                                   
1 Thomas of Celano, ‘Memoriale Desiderio Animae de Gestis et Verbis Sanctissimi Patris 
Nostri Francisci’, in Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, ed. and trans. by Regis J. 
Armstrong, J. A. Wayne Hellman and William J. Short, 3 vols (New York: New City Press, 
1999), II: The Founder, pp. 223-396, ch. 214, p. 386.  
2 This change in the direction of the Franciscans has been subject to many studies. See, for 
example, Théophile Desbonnets, From Intuition to Institution: The Franciscans (Chicago 
IL: Franciscan Herald Press, 1988); Lawrence C. Landini, The Causes of Clericalization of 
the Order of Friars Minor, 1209-60, in the Light of Early Franciscan Sources (Chicago: 
Pontifica Universitas Gregoriana, 1968); Neslihan Şenocak, The Poor and the Perfect: The 
Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order 1209-1310 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2012) and Rosalind B. Brooke, Early Franciscan Government: Elias to Bonaventure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959). 
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‘Franciscan school’ of theology. Such a school would need a stable, 
institutionalised continuity making it possible for ideas to pass and develop 
among its members even across generations. Members of such a school 
would manifest a shared and identifiably common approach to particular 
topics. In later centuries, the Franciscan assertion that Christ did not become 
incarnate for the salvation of humanity was a distinctive element of their 
teaching. An examination of the initial shift in their understanding of the 
doctrine of salvation thus is a useful area to test for such a school and also to 
observe how Franciscan theology was shaped and fashioned by the time and 
setting in which it took place.  
The thirteenth century saw the first flowerings of the Friars Minor but 
it was equally a time that brought about great upheaval in Franciscan life. 
The friars were beleaguered with internal issues around their own identity, 
such as whether to be itinerant or sedentary, clerical or lay and seeking a 
common understanding of poverty.3 Similarly, external issues came to bear 
upon them such as their corporate engagement with the universities, the 
episcopal condemnations against teaching or employing certain ideas of non-
Christian thinkers and the secular-mendicant controversy, a coalition of 
opponents arrayed against the order and agitating for its suppression. Much 
of what has later been identified as particular to Franciscan theology, such as 
the unfettered sovereignty of God, the intrinsic goodness of creation, Christ’s 
                                                   
3 For an overview of this, see John Moorman, A History of the Franciscan Order from its 
Origins to the Year 1517 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), Maurice Carmody, The 
Franciscan Story (London: Athena Press, 2008). 
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absolute primacy and the relationship of the will and freedom, arose from 
these struggles.4 
Conversely, that which the friars believed and taught theologically had 
consequences for their understanding of themselves and God and how they 
engaged with the secular world in which they ministered, preached and 
studied. Otherwise put, what they believed moulded how they engaged with 
these questions and issues. Unlike much of the rest of the Church, they came 
to eschew ideas of divine punishment and asserted a more optimistic 
conception of fundamental human nature. This brought about quite different 
conceptions of what it means to be human, of the human relationship with 
God and of humanity’s place in the cosmos. 
The best location in the thirteenth century to witness this mutual 
shaping of Franciscan history and theology is Paris. Paris was where the 
order dispatched for study the best minds it possessed and it was Paris that 
enjoyed the uncontested premier faculty of theology in Christian Europe, 
enticing in the greatest theologians of the age. Paris was the heart of that 
movement within the order that favoured the move to educated and ordained 
friars in conventual settings. Paris was the birthplace of the secular-
mendicant controversy, which later was to spread across Europe.5 Paris 
produced the most significant theological works of the era and it was Paris 
that was the centre of the theological world at this time.6 
                                                   
4 See, for example, Kenan B. Osborne, A History of Franciscan Theology (St Bonaventure, 
NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1994) or Michael Blastic, ‘“It Pleases Me that You 
Should Teach Sacred Theology”: Franciscans Doing Theology’, Franciscan Theology, 55 
(1998), 1-25. 
5 See pages 84-86 below. 
6 As to the significance of Paris as a theological location, see William Courtenay, ‘The 
Parisian Faculty of Theology in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries’, in Nach 
der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im 
letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts – Studien und Texte, ed. by Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, 
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Within that theological world, soteriology is a particularly useful field 
for this type of study because, unlike its closely related doctrines of 
Christology and the Incarnation, soteriology in the thirteenth century had 
never been beset by definitive dogmatic decrees, such as those of the 
Christological councils. This left scholars in the field greater freedom to 
innovate and develop ideas of their own. Accordingly, Franciscans were at 
greater liberty to advance ideas such as the absolute primacy of Christ, that 
Christ’s incarnation was not contingent upon any human act and, of course, 
in soteriology. Many of these ideas later became defining elements of 
Franciscan theology. This present study concludes prior to the 1302 
formulation by John Duns Scotus of Christ’s absolute primacy.7 It was in that 
period and in Paris that the elements were put in place that enabled a 
genuine and identifiably Franciscan theological school to emerge. 
Jacopone da Todi may have been correct in his lament that ‘Paris had 
destroyed Assisi’ but if so then it is also true that Paris constructed an 
impressive edifice in its place.8 Through the lens of soteriology, this present 
work examines that new intellectual endeavour raised not in Assisi but in the 
University of Paris. The intellectual mortar in this new constructions was the 
approach to instruction that throve in the nascent universities, scholasticism. 
The examination of these various elements commences with a review 
of this scholasticism. It considers the scholastic context for early Franciscan 
intellectual activity before examining the scholastic geography and genres 
that both shaped and were shaped by this activity. It looks at the institutional 
                                                                                                                                                
Jr, and Andreas Speer, Miscellanea Medievalia, 28 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), pp. 
235–47. 
7 John Duns Scotus, ‘Opus Oxoniense’ in Opera Omnia, ed. by Maurice O’Fihely, 12 Vols 
(Hildesheim: Olms, 1968-69), III (1968), d. 20., q. 1. 
8 George T. Peck, The Fool of God: Jacopone da Todi (University of Alabama: University of 
Alabama Press, 1980), Laud 31, p. 123. 
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structures of the new Franciscan educational centre at the Grand Couvent 
des Cordeliers in Paris, where this learning took place and it proceeds to 
discuss the forms of output of that intellectual activity, the principal genres of 
scholastic theological writing. Four of these will be of particular important to 
this essay: the sentence commentary, the summa, disputed questions and 
quodlibets. 
 
1.1  SCHOLASTICISM 
Scholasticism was less a set of beliefs as it was a pedagogical method by 
which learning was transmitted. As its name suggests, it was the favoured 
technique ‘of the schools’ and it was especially in these schools, those of the 
cathedrals and monasteries, that it first flourished. It was through 
scholasticism that Franciscans received and passed on their intellectual 
formation. 
Cathedral and monastic schools of prior centuries gave pupils 
exposure to the theological learning and insight of ‘authorities’, the great 
thinkers and influential writers, along with the decrees and resolutions of 
synods and councils.9 Students applied themselves to the study and 
understanding of these authorities and what they had taught. A consequence 
of this method was that such education therefore tended to be rather 
retrospective and to place lesser value on the creation of new knowledge; the 
                                                   
9 Far greater detail concerning the transition to scholasticism is in John Marendon, 
‘Philosophy and Theology’, in European Transformation: The Long Twelfth Century, ed. by 
Thomas F. X. Noble and John Van Engen, Notre Dame Conference in Medieval Studies 
(Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2012), pp. 403-25; C. Stephen Jaeger, Envy 
of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950-1200 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Philadelphia Press, 1994). 
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great and mighty thinkers were in the past and a true scholar was one who 
assiduously mastered and knew these past authorities.10  
This became less so as, through better and expanded use of dialectic 
and rhetoric, scholasticism evolved among the schools. As much as to know 
what was held by past authorities, scholastics met a desire to understand how 
authorities came to hold what they did. This was a period of eagerness to 
learn why, as well as what, authoritative figures believed. This was passed to 
students and scholasticism, as its name suggests, was the development of a 
means of doing so in these cathedral and abbey schools and their 
descendants, the universities. These were schools that had grown into 
autonomous corporations, enforcing and implementing their own 
educational standards.11 
Scholasticism brought with it a greater use of philosophy and 
especially dialectic in teaching. Philosophy received more attention both as a 
discipline for itself and even more as a tool for the advancement of other 
disciplines, particularly theology.12 Concepts were analysed and evaluated 
through such philosophical means such as disputation and argument, 
                                                   
10 Richard C. Dales, The Intellectual Life of Western Europe in the Middle Ages (Leiden: 
Brill, 1995), pp. 152-4 and Constant Mews, ‘Scholastic Theology in a Monastic Milieu in the 
Twelfth Century: The Case of Admont’, in Manuscripts and Monastics Culture: Reform and 
Renewal in Twelfth Century Germany, ed. by Alison I. Beach, Medieval Church Studies, 13 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), pp. 217-39. 
11 Dales, Intellectual Life of Western Europe in the Middle Ages, p. 152. There was no abrupt 
switch to independence; the University of Paris began life as a cathedral school of the bishop 
of Paris that later acquired privileges of self-governance. Richard Southern, ‘The School of 
Paris and the School of Chartres’, in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, ed. 
by Robert L. Benson, Giles Constable and Carol D. Lanham, Medieval Academy Reprints for 
Teaching, 26 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 113-37. Similarly, the 
cathedral schools were not displaced by the universities and some are still with us. 
12 A move by philosophers to see their discipline as worthy of study and mastery in its own 
right caused considerable friction within the university and with the church in the latter half 
of the thirteenth century. See pages 203-04 below. Nevertheless, it was not the scholastics 
but rather Philo of Alexandria who first called philosophy the ‘ancilla theologiae’: Hent de 
Vries, ‘Philosophia Ancilla Theologiae: Allegory and Ascension in Philo’s “On Mating with 
the Preliminary Studies (Congressus Quaerendae Eruditionis Gratia)”’, trans. by Jack Ben-
Levi, Bible and Critical Theory, 5 (2009), pp. 41: 1-19, p. 41: 1. 
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employing skills from dialectics and logic. A scholastic writer’s assertions had 
to be capable of withstanding counter-argument that probed and tested not 
only the knowledge of authority but the ability to reason from it. Hence 
authority came to play a somewhat different role in the theological exercise of 
the scholastic classroom than it had in early pedagogy. Since all knowledge 
derived from the realm of ultimate truth, scholasticism strove to demonstrate 
the harmonious unity of all knowledge. Its great goal was to display the 
concord among seemingly different and even contrary authorities, as well as 
their agreement with the conclusions of reason. Truth could be verified by 
this great work of bringing all knowledge to the same point. While earlier 
ages had tended to choose the ‘correct’ or at least the superior answer to an 
issue, scholasticism sought to show that all answers were but the one answer 
and that all the authorities of the past could be brought into consonance.13 
Such heavy reliance upon dialectic meant that scholastic pedagogy was 
typified by an analysis of issues through use of questions and answers. The 
subject matter of a proposition was posed as a question admitting only of a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer and then broken down into ever smaller and more precise 
questions to be considered in ever narrower bounded terms.14 For example, 
in his commentary on the Book of Sentences, Bonaventure of Bagnoreggio 
considered the topic of the Incarnation of the Word and human 
redemption.15 To do so, he broke his consideration of the third book into 
                                                   
13 Constant J. Mews, ‘Communities of Learning and the Dream of Synthesis: The Schools and 
Colleges of Thirteenth-Century Paris’, in Communities of Learning: Networks and the 
Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe, 1100-1500, ed. by Constant J. Mews and John N. 
Crossley, Europa Sacra, 9 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), pp. 109-135. 
14 George Makdisi, ‘The Scholastic Method in Medieval Education: An Inquiry into its 
Origins in Law and Theology’, Speculum, 49 (1974), 640-61 (p. 642). 
15 Bonaventure, ‘Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum’ in Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium 
S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), III 
(1887), d. 19, a. 1, q. 4.  
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forty distinctiones of which one, the nineteenth, looked at ‘our redemption 
done through the passion of Christ’. This in turn he considered in two 
articula of which the first looked at the efficacy of Christ’s passion. This was 
addressed through four quaestiones and it is the last of these that asks if 
Christ’s passion absolved humanity from the penalty of sin. In some 
instances these quaestiones would be broken into even smaller membra and 
capitula but, at whatever level or field, the process of considering proposition 
through ever narrower questions obtained through dialectical analysis of a 
problem, a process known as tranching, remained the same. Two 
consequences of this process were that even important and broad questions 
were always considered as an accumulation of smaller, finer questions. The 
other is that this process allowed, even before the common use of indices in 
books, the ability to pinpoint a particular argument with great precision in 
the text through this tranching.16 
Having arrived at a suitably narrow and manageable question, the 
enduring influence of the educational system of the cathedral schools made 
itself felt as the scholastic author would adduce an array of authorities from 
scriptural, patristic, conciliar, saintly and other sources. These authorities 
would be arranged into arguments for and against a possible answer to this 
now narrowed question and, in the light of these authorities, the author 
would make a response, his own resolution of the question posed. He would 
set forth his reasons for his position and then would return to the authorities 
that were counter to his resolution. With each in turn he would resolve any 
inconsistencies, either by showing that, once properly read, there was no 
                                                   
16 Thus, the reference to Bonaventure’s text above can be cited precisely in a taxonomy of 
tranched questions: Bk. III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1. Any reader could locate an exact point and 
argument in the text, whoever the copyist had been. 
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actual disagreement among them or by showing that the two authorities were 
dealing with different matters. Thereby all would be brought back once more 
into concord. Such an approach expanded emphasis in the classroom from 
the mere transmission of past learning established in older authority to 
include the acquisition of philosophically and dialectically tested insight 
derived from these authorities.17 Where once it had been sufficient to say that 
something had been written by Augustine, now it was necessary to show how 
that which Augustine had written was harmonious with all other authority. 
This pursuit of concord between authority and reason came to be a 
significant characteristic of scholasticism.18  
It is possible to see scholasticism evolving over time. In its earliest 
period, scholastics were content to transmit the knowledge of the past. As 
mastery of dialectics and rhetoric deepened, to this familiarity with the 
knowledge from the past was added an effort to synthesise it, unifying the 
corpus of authority. Thence it moved to a further point, the addition of new 
knowledge, especially the new insights of contemporary authors. This process 
was abetted by the recovery of Aristotelian material into western thought and 
the integration of its reclaimed techniques and approaches. 
It should not be thought that this exercise was solely one of university 
lecturers in their chairs before students. This was a pedagogical usage that 
extended to educational settings from the cathedral and monastic schools to 
the university and then beyond, finding expression in written as well as 
verbal forms. As such, these written scholastic forms were the vectors of 
                                                   
17 Bernardo Bazàn, John W. Wippel, Gérard Fransen and Danielle Jacquart, Les Questions 
disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de 
médecine, Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental, 44-5 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), 
p. 27. 
18 Makdisi, ‘Scholastic Method in Medieval Education’, p. 643. 
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transmission for the intellectual advances of the later Middle Ages. 
Understanding these settings and forms of scholastic expression is 
fundamental to comprehending Franciscan thought in this period and how 
such Franciscan thought to evolve.  
 
1.2  STUDIA AMONG THE FRANCISCANS 
For the Franciscans, this scholastic trend was driven forward by primarily 
two institutions in the newly constructed Grand Couvent des Cordeliers in 
Paris, their house of studies.19 The earlier of these with which the Franciscans 
engaged was the studium. A studium, an institution modelled on an idea of 
the Dominicans, was an internal school of the order, designed to provide an 
education for new friars to meet the practical needs of their life and 
ministry.20 Studia gave young friars the fundamentals of scripture study, 
philosophy and theology and what was practically necessary for preaching, 
hearing confessions and providing pastoral care.21 The scholastic tools used 
in studia like disputation and oral argument well met the needs of an order 
directed to popular preaching and missionary activity. Studia covered such 
basics as learning to read and write where that was necessary. Such 
education lasted approximately four years until the lector, or teacher, of the 
studium and the friar’s Minister Provincial were satisfied the student had 
                                                   
19 The Franciscans had finally settled there in 1231 on land donated by the Abbey of St 
Germain des Prés and held on the friars’ behalf by the king. John C. Murphy, ‘The Early 
Franciscan Studium at the University of Paris’, in Studium Generale: Studies Offered to 
Astrik L. Gabriel, ed. by L. S. Domonkos and R. J. Schneider (Notre Dame, IN: The Medieval 
Institute of the University of Notre Dame, 1967), pp. 159-204 (p. 168) 
20 William A. Hinnebusch, History of the Dominican Order, 2 vols (New York: Alba House, 
1965-73), I (1965), pp. 5-10. Cf. Hans-Joachim Schmidt, ‘Les Studia Particularia de l’ordre 
dominicaine’, in Die regulierten Kollegien im Europa des Mittelalters und der Renaissance, 
ed. by Andreas Sohn and Jacques Verger (Bochum: Winkler, 2012) pp. 87-107. 
21 Bert Roest, A History of Franciscan Education (c. 1210-1517), Education and Society in the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance, 11 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 123. 
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sufficient knowledge and competence to be entrusted with an appointment of 
his own.22 Such a studium was not limited to Paris and the 1260 General 
Chapter of Narbonne mandated the presence of studia in every province of 
the order. In reality, this statute was extending a practice that had already 
been in existence in many provinces, including France, as early as the 
1220s.23 
These were the studia provincialia, a network of schools across the 
order for the training of young friars, each with its own lector to undertake 
this training and employing the methods of scholasticism to do so. These 
lectors were themselves trained and educated for that role by a second and 
higher class of studia, the studia generalia. The brightest and most 
promising of the students in a studium provinciale were selected for a 
further four years of training as lectors and given additional education at 
these special higher schools, of which that of Paris was an example.24 
                                                   
22 Chapter 9 of the Franciscan Rule permits only those examined and licensed by the 
Minister General to preach publicly: ‘Et nullus fratrum populo penitus audeat praedicare, 
nisi a ministro generali huius fraternitatis fuerit examinatus et approbatus, et ab eo officium 
sibi praedicationis concessum’. (‘And no friar should dare to preach on the interior life to the 
people unless he has been examined and approved by the Minister General of this 
brotherhood and been approved and received from him a commission to preach’.) This 
faculty was swiftly extended to Minsters Provincial and in practice served, and still serves, as 
a general assessment of a friar’s competency to minister. 
23 Neslihan Şenocak, ‘The Franciscan Studium Generale: A New Interpretation’, in 
Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal 
Courts: Acts of the Fifteenth Annual Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude 
de la Philosophie Médiévale, University of Notre Dame, 8-10 October 2008, ed. by Kent 
Emery, Jr, William J. Courtenay and Stephen M. Metzger, Société internationale pour l’ 
étude de la philosophie médiévale – Rencontres de philosophie médiévale 15 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2012), pp. 221–36, pp. 223-5. Michael Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis Edita in 
Capitulis Generalibus Celebratis Narbonnae an. 1260, Assisii an. 1279 atque Parisiis an. 
1292, Editio Critica et Synoptica’, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 34 (1941), 13-94 (p. 
16). 
24 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, pp. 65-87. In the case of Paris it is not clear at 
what date its studium was raised to general status but the general statutes of 1239 already 
spoke of the studium of Paris as holding that status. Cesare Cenci, ed., ‘De Fratrum Minorum 
Constitutionibus Praenarbonensibus’, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 83 (1990), 50-
95, Article 82 (p. 93). As to the duration of study, see Art. 13 of the 1279 general 
constitutions. ‘Taliter autem missi studeant quattuor annis ad minus, nisi adeo fuerint 
provecti quod merito iudicentur idonei ad lectoris officium exsequendum’. (‘In such a cases 
those sent should study for four years at least unless they be judged so advanced that they 
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These general studia were established over the course of the thirteenth 
century in major centres and often, but not exclusively, in towns already 
possessing a university. Studia generalia were to be found in Paris, Oxford, 
Cambridge, Bologna and Padua but also in Rome, Münster and Florence.25 
Thus the friars constructed for their own needs a network of schools that 
trained both friars for general ministry and lectors for those schools, all of 
them educated in the new pedagogy of scholasticism and trained to think, 
argue and express themselves in scholastic fashion.26 
 
1.3  UNIVERSITY OF PARIS 
The second institution that promoted the use of scholasticism in Franciscan 
theology, and the more significant for the purposes of this study, was the 
university. These first appeared at the end of the twelfth century and Paris 
was one of the first of these. In contrast to the studia, these university 
schools did, especially in Paris, have a greater focus on abstract speculation.27 
A further element that distinguished them from the studia, and from 
the cathedral schools, was the granting of degrees. A degree was simply a 
formal and verifiable public attestation by an acknowledged and learned 
master that a person had undergone a defined course of study, met the 
requisite standards and had reached the required competency in a 
                                                                                                                                                
are suitable for carrying out the role of lector.’) Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis’, 
Constitutiones Assisienses of 1279, Art. 13, p. 72. This was reiterated in 1292 in statutes 
governing the Paris studium - Heinrich Denifle and Émile Chatelain, eds, Chartularium 
Universitatis Parisiensis, 4 vols (Paris: Frères Delalain, 1889-97), II (1891), no. 580, p. 57. 
25 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, pp. 27-28; Roest, Franciscan Learning, 
Preaching and Mission, p. 53. 
26 Some provinces, lacking resources to provide their own studium, shared facilities with a 
neighbouring province through means of another studium, the studium custodiae. Roest, A 
History of Franciscan Education, pp. 64-81. 
27 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 28. 
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discipline’s skills and knowledge.28 With the development of the university 
degree, the acceptance of credentials was no longer a matter of whether a 
particular scholar’s teacher was known and considered competent.29 The new 
degree structure meant that university qualifications were readily 
transferrable and accepted across the continent. As such, even though a 
theology degree, for example, was never formally required for ecclesiastical 
office or even ordination, the possession of a degree advanced acceptance 
into ecclesial positions across Europe, a most useful feature in an order of 
itinerants like the Friars Minor.30 The Franciscans made use of these degrees 
for their best students but the requirements of these degree could be 
onerous. 
Meeting the degree requirements constrained students to express 
their ideas in certain defined forms and to undertake precise tasks. Writing 
theology for the grant of a degree in theology demanded of them that they 
made use of particular scholastic genres. For example, from the 1230s 
onwards every Franciscans candidate for a higher degree was required to 
compose a commentary upon the Book of Sentences by Peter the Lombard.31 
All of these formal commentaries had to address the matters that had been 
raised by Peter the Lombard and to do so in the sequence and manner laid 
out by him. As a consequence, students were habituated to the scholastic 
                                                   
28 William J. Courtenay, ‘Institutionalization of Theology’, in Learning Institutionalized: 
Teaching in the Medieval University, ed. by John Van Engen (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame 
University Press, 2000), pp. 245-56 (p. 254). 
29 See, for example, Southern, ‘The School of Paris and the School of Chartres’ pp. 113-37. 
30 Courtenay, ‘Institutionalization of Theology’, p. 254. A Parisian degree swiftly became a 
necessity de facto for any prelacy. During the later secular-mendicant controversy in the 
1250s, the secular masters of the university prepared an apologia for their actions in the 
dispute, addressing it to the prelates of Christendom. It reminded them that they were 
formerly ‘sons of the university’ and remained so in ‘paternal affection’, Denifle and 
Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I (1889), No. 30, pp. 257. 
31  Peter the Lombard, Sententiarum Libri Quatuor, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4-5 
(Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii Sancti Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971-81). 
14 
 
form of expression and manner of conducting theology, approaches that 
lingered with them even after their university studies. Further, due to the 
transferability of these new degrees that enabled graduates to be readily 
accepted in posts throughout Europe, scholars could carry their ideas and 
also their way of expressing them all across the continent. A common 
academic discourse in the language and genres of scholasticism came into 
being and it facilitated a growth in the internationality of theological 
endeavour. To engage in academic theology in that age of universities 
required the ability to do so in the manner and form of the discourse of the 
age of universities. Participants in this system, Franciscan thinkers found 
themselves expressing their theological ideas in scholastic terms and 
similarly, these scholastic terms shaped how they thought about theological 
questions. They wrote less of how humanity was saved and more of what St 
Anselm had said about humanity being saved and how that could be 
reconciled with what St Ambrose and St Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius 
had said on the matter. Beyond ideas of one’s own, scholastic emphasis lay 
upon bringing together ideas already in existence. 
 
1.4  A FRIARY WITH BOTH STUDIUM AND UNIVERSITY CHAIR 
Scholasticism was employed in both halves of the Franciscan educational 
system: the lectoral programme of the studia and the degree programme of 
the university. These two programmes came together in a unique way in 
Paris. Needing to engage an outside lector to train the first generation of 
students through the studium before they had produced a suitable lector of 
their own, the Franciscans engaged the services of the Englishman Alexander 
of Hales, a secular master within the faculty of theology. He agreed to provide 
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this service until the friars had sufficient lectors of their own to undertake 
such training themselves.32 
Alexander took it upon himself to go significantly further. Despite 
being in his fifties, in 1236 Alexander surrendered his benefices and 
professed the Rule of St Francis and joined the Franciscan order.33 This was 
more than just an act of personal piety for it had substantial consequences. 
When Alexander joined the order, he retained his university chair and 
transferred it and his students to the Grand Couvent. With that act it became 
possible for the friars not only to control their own studium but also to 
engage in university instruction and even to obtain degrees under their own 
regent master.34 The structural changes did not cease there for it was the 
usage of the university that regent masters chose their own successors, 
selecting them from among the most promising of their students. In the case 
of the now professed Brother Alexander, he could pass his chair to a fellow 
Franciscan who in turn could do the same when he came to retire. The 
effective result of this was that the Franciscans had acquired for themselves, 
in perpetuity, one of that faculty’s twelve chairs.35 
                                                   
32 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 97; Moorman, A History of the Franciscan 
Order, pp. 100-01. 
33 Sophie Delmas, ‘Alexandre de Halès et le studium franciscain de Paris. Aux origins de la 
question des chaires franciscaines et de l’exercices quodlibétiques’, in Die regulierten 
Kollegien im Europa des Mittelalters und der Renaisance/ Les collèges réguliers en Europe 
au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance, ed. by Andreas Sohn and Jacques Verger, Aufbrüche, 4 
(Bochum: Winklet, 2012), pp. 37-47 (p. 38). He took this step in a rather theatrical public 
gesture while attending a sermon on evangelical poverty. In truth, it was an act of imitating 
John of St Giles, an early Dominican regent master had similarly been a secular master and 
then publicly took the habit of the Friars Preacher during Sunday Mass. Hinnebusch, 
History of the Dominican Order, I, p. 38. 
34 Bert Roest, Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission c. 1220-1650: Cum sciential sit 
donum Dei, armature ad defendam sanctam fidem catholicam, Medieval Franciscans, 10 
(Leiden: Brill, 2015), p. 32. 
35 Chairs similarly passed into the control of the Dominicans and the effective loss by the 
secular masters of these chairs to the mendicants was one of the critical issues in what 
became known as the ‘secular-mendicant controversy’ that endured for a quarter of a century 
and threatened to end those orders. See pages 84-86 below. 
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Accordingly, when Alexander of Hales came to retire, he nominated a 
friar, John of La Rochelle, to succeed him.36 The development of continuity 
in Franciscan control of that chair coupled with the presence of both 
Franciscan and secular students under their regent master resulted in the 
effective creation for the Franciscans of their own ‘school’ of theology, based 
at the Grand Couvent and within the University of Paris but with an 
institutional permanency that no secular master working for himself could 
ever achieve. Hereafter, there was a fixed locus of Franciscan theological 
education. 
The influence of this new school extended considerably further than 
Paris. At the General Chapter of Narbonne in 1260, it was decided that every 
province in the order was entitled to send two students to the studium in 
Paris, the cost of whose education would be borne by the general order. 
Furthermore, provinces were free to send additional students if that province 
were prepared to meet the expense itself.37 Under these provisions, the order 
gathered together in one place those considered to be the brightest minds of 
the order and, to train them, it naturally employed its finest lectors. The one 
complex now housed candidates for degrees and, from across the whole 
order, the best candidates for lectorships in the studia of the order. 
This centralisation of these thinkers in Paris came to shape those 
scholars of the future. As well as the fine education the studium could 
provide, the mixing of friars from so many provinces was a unique chance for 
many of them to know and be known by the future leaders of the order. The 
                                                   
36 Palémon Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle, Études de 
philosophie médiévale, 17-18, 2 vols (Paris: Vrin, 1933) pp. 25-30. See pages 64 and 87 
below. below concerning the historiographical issues concerning the subsequent fate of 
Alexander’s chair. 
37 Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis’, Constitutiones Narbonenses, art. 19, p. 72.  
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influence of this factor of the Paris studium was profound; from 1240 until 
the Great Schism, regardless of his home province, every Minister General of 
the order had been a student in Paris.38 Even though few men became 
Minister General, the lectors of the provinces were largely drawn from the 
studium generale in Paris and so its influence was diffused around the entire 
order. This Parisian influence was not limited to ministers, masters and 
lectors of the order but touched the rank and file of the brothers also. 
Whether a student in Paris or not, due to the influence of all these Parisian 
trained lectors, friars across the order were being trained and formed in ideas 
and methods that flourished in Paris. 
Theological study likewise tended to centralise in Paris. Far fewer 
friars undertook university studies than were in the studium but the prestige 
and pre-eminence of the Parisian faculty gave those few great prominence. At 
this point in history, there was no finer school of theology in Europe and here 
were to be found the best theological teachers.39 So popular was the course 
among the order despite its rigour that it proved necessary to limit the 
number of students who could embark on a university degree course. By the 
close of the thirteenth century it had been established by the order that only 
one friar could be matriculated annually into each of the Parisian faculties 
(i.e. arts and the higher faculties of law, medicine and theology) and each 
third year these positions were reserved for French candidates.40 That meant 
                                                   
38 Laure Beaumont-Maillet, Le Grand couvent des cordeliers de Paris – Études historiques 
et archéologiques du XIIIe siècle à nos jours (Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1975), p.36. 
39 See, for example, Gordon Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History, New Dimensions in 
History: Essays in Comparative History (New York: John Wiley, 1968); Courtenay, ‘The 
Parisian Faculty of Theology’ pp. 235–47; and Roest Franciscan Learning Preaching and 
Mission, p. 54. 
40 This statute of the General Chapter of Paris in 1292 governing the Paris studium provided: 
‘Placet tamen generali capitulo quod illorum qui Parisium sunt lecturi Sententias vel ad 
18 
 
a maximum of four positions each year, and often less as the order frequently 
chose not to sponsor friars for degrees in arts or medicine. As significant and 
influential as this cadre of graduate friars was, they were only ever a small 
minority of the total student body. 
Their small number is borne out by a census of the Grand Couvent 
conducted in 1303 at the request of Philip IV of France, the ‘spiritual friend’ 
who owned the friary for the benefit of the order. The census discloses that 
173 friars were living in the Grand Couvent in that year. Of these about thirty 
were engaged in the work of the house itself (cooks, chaplains, teachers, 
handymen and quaestors to beg for the sufficient resources to sustain the 
rest). About fifty were friars from around France studying in the school in its 
capacity as studium provinciale of the French province. Eighty friars from 
beyond France studied at the studium generale under the provisions from 
the General Chapter of Narbonne subsidising foreign friars.41 Only ten friars 
were actually matriculated into the university and formally pursuing a 
                                                                                                                                                
magisterium presentandi tertius semper de Provincia Francie, alii vero duro de aliis 
provinciis Ordinis magis ydonei assumantur, ita tamen quod propter hoc non promoveantur 
aliquis insufficiens ad officia supradicta, nec potestati generalis ministeri prejudicetur in 
aliquo quin in provisione huiusmodi libere facere possit et preferre unum alteri sicut Ordini 
viderit expedire’. ‘However, the general chapter resolves that those who are more suitable are 
to be selected to be read the Sentences in Paris or to be presented as masters, but always 
from the Province of France in the third year, but from the other provinces of the Order in 
the other remaining years. No one on account of this is to be put forward in this way who is 
otherwise unfit for the aforesaid role, nor are the powers of the Minster General prejudiced 
in any way so that he lacks the freedom to put forward a man just as others in the order seem 
to do’. Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis Edita in Capitulis Generalibus’, Paris 1292 (Art. XI. 
11), p. 77; Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, III, No. 580, p. 56.  
41 Neslihan Şenocak, ‘The Franciscan Studium Generale’, p. 234, identifies a third type of 
student who is neither preparing for a degree nor student training as a lector and hopes for 
greater attention to understand what this group might be doing in Paris. Bert Roest has 
proposed that this third group were those pre-empting their eventual matriculation: Roest, 
Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission, p. 55. Rather than see these students as a 
third group, they are surely those who, in their earlier lectoral studies in some studium 
generale other than Paris, had been identified as being likely to profit from completing their 
preparation in Paris. Here they could benefit from participating in the exceptional 
opportunities for education that being in the heart of the university allowed as well as from 
access to the best teachers of the order. Naturally, fitting students for this training could only 
be identified after they had had this lectoral training elsewhere. Such transfers to Paris seem 
to be anticipated by Art. 15 of the 1292 General Chapter. Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis 
Edita in Capitulis Generalibus’, Paris 1292 (Art. XV), p. 78. 
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degree.42 The actual number of Franciscans at the university, even at the 
close of the thirteenth century, was quite small and at no stage had ever been 
substantial.43 
Though few in number, these graduates certainly exerted a 
considerable influence on the development of Franciscan theology. Being 
identified as the brightest of the young friars gave them a certain standing 
among their Franciscan peers but they had also a wider influence. Obliged as 
they were to compose specific texts to meet the requirements of their degree 
courses, they thereby also generated a number of formal theological 
academic works that entered into circulation among friaries. This circulation 
of assessment tasks was not something that commonly occurred among those 
enrolled in the studium.  
Unlike older orders and institutions, the Franciscans tended to have 
younger and poorly equipped libraries and so they appear to have made use 
of what they had to hand: the notes and texts of their recent graduates of 
Paris, filled with all the latest ideas.44 For example, Eudes Rigaud studied at 
Paris in the late 1230s and is generally today not numbered amongst the 
foremost of theologians; indeed his sentence commentary is yet to be 
published.45 Nevertheless, that same commentary survives in seventeen 
extant manuscripts which attests to a quite liberal distribution and 
                                                   
42 William J. Courtenay, ‘The Parisian Franciscan Community in 1303’, pp. 155-73. See also 
William J. Courtenay, ‘The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris in 
the Early Fourteenth Century’, in The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy and the 
Religious Life’, ed. by Peter Biller and Barrie Dobson, Studies in Church History, Subsidia 11 
(Woodbridge: Ecclesiastical History Society, 1999), pp. 77-92 (p. 86). 
43 Roest argues that at no time in the thirteenth century did the total number enrolled in the 
university among the Parisian friars number beyond six to ten. Roest, A History of 
Franciscan Education, p. 17. 
44 Neslihan Şenocak, ‘Circulation of Books in the Medieval Franciscan Order: Attitude, 
Methods and Critics’, Journal of Religious History, 28 (2004), 146-61. 
45 For further on Eudes, see page 84 below. 
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diffusion.46 These texts from the graduates had a life beyond mere 
assessment tasks in the university; they also moved around the provinces and 
were read by young impressionable minds at the studia provincialia. 
Libraries were not the only point of difference between the friars and 
other students in Paris. Certainly both groups followed the same established 
syllabus from the faculty of theology. Students began with a first phase, 
which lasted for about four years, and was focused on the study of sacred 
scripture and led at its completion to the status of ‘Biblical Bachelor’. It is to a 
degree misleading to describe it as the study of the Bible. The impetus of 
older pedagogy from the cathedral schools and the influence of the new 
scholastic techniques were frequently as concentrated upon the study of 
commentaries and glosses on the scripture as on the biblical text itself.47 In 
this phase the student was to show himself adept at the knowledge, exegesis 
and interpretation of scripture but also the writings of the significant 
authorities in the field. He pursued that great scholastic goal of bringing 
those authorities into agreement and he demonstrated this by participating 
in a formal academic disputation in scripture over which his master would 
preside and also by preaching a formally assessed sermon. A student who 
satisfactorily completed those tasks would then move into the second phase, 
that leading to the status of ‘Sentence Bachelor’.  
At this point a student would be trusted to ‘read’, that is teach, 
comment and expound upon scripture to the students of a master under his 
                                                   
46 Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie, II, pp. 31-32 and Friedrich Stegmüller, 
Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, 2 vols (Würzburg: Schöning, 
1947), I, pp. 90-93. Of course, some Franciscan masters from Paris, like many other authors, 
slid into obscurity. See the discussions in W. Lampen, ‘Liste alphabétique des manuscrits de 
Richard de Mediavilla’, La France Franciscaine, 20 (1937), 73-75 and Victorinus Doucet, 
‘L’Enseignement parisien d’Aquasparta (1278-1279)’, Archivum Franciscanum 
Historicum, 28 (1935), 568-70. 
47 Jaeger, The Envy of Angels, pp. 285-7. 
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supervision.48 While that was taking place, he proceeded with his own studies 
in dogmatic theology. Again, the emphasis lay on the ability to master the 
opinions and reasoning of the important authorities in each branch of 
theology. The standard work for theology had come to be in the scholastic 
period the Book of Sentences of Peter the Lombard, a former bishop of Paris, 
and each student was required to compose his own commentary on the work 
as an exercise to master the material. In this the student amassed a body of 
authorities for each ‘sentence’ or proposition in the work and showed how 
these authorities could be reconciled.49 This period was generally of about 
two year’s duration, meaning that each semester was given to the study of 
one of the four Books of Sentences. Once again, the candidate was obliged to 
participate in a formal academic disputation on theology over which a master 
presided. Should he meet all those requirements, a candidate moved to the 
third phase of his studies, that of a ‘Formed Bachelor’. 
There was no longer any formal class and reading for the student to 
attend. Rather this period, of roughly three to four years, was spent in 
completing an array of assessment tasks and in demonstrating that a 
candidate possessed the skills and knowledge needed of a master.50 As he had 
done with scripture, the candidate now read the sentences to his master’s 
                                                   
48 William J. Courtenay, ‘Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic Theological Production 
in the Fourteenth Century’, in Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement 
dans les universités médiévales: Actes du colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve (9-11 
Septembre 1993), ed. by Jacqueline Hamesse, Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales, 
16 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d'études médiévales de l'Université Catholique de Louvain, 
1994), pp. 325-50 (p. 331). 
49 Courtenay, ‘Institutionalization of Theology’, p. 250. It was Alexander of Hales who not 
only established the Book of Sentences as the standard medieval text for the study of 
theology but also began the practice of requiring of students their own commentary upon it. 
Both these practices remained in observance until the Reformation. Philipp Rosemann, ‘The 
Tradition of the Sentences’, in Mediaeval Commentaries of the ‘Sentences’ of Peter 
Lombard, ed. by Philipp W. Rosemann, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2002-10), II (2010), pp. 495-
523 (pp. 496-8). 
50 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 99. 
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students and used this time to complete the lengthy exercise of completing 
his own commentary on the Book of Sentences. As the responsibility of 
admitting a student to the degree of master fell to the faculty as a whole but 
to this point only his own master was in any way familiar with him, the 
statutes required that formed bachelors were to dispute twice before each 
master of the faculty in turn.51 Above that, he was to participate in a public 
quodlibetal disputation, give another assessed public sermon and finally, 
obtain the approving vote from each regent master.52 He could then be 
presented to the bishop or the chancellor of the university for the grant of a 
licentia docendi.53 This full process of obtaining a master’s degree in 
theology, to which must be added the prior arts degree, resulted in a 
statutory minimum age for licensing of thirty-five.54 
The friars’ experience was somewhat different at the university. 
Firstly, in recognition of their preparation in a studium and generally greater 
age before starting university study, mendicant candidates were permitted to 
                                                   
51 Palémon Glorieux, ‘L’Enseignement au moyen âge: techniques et méthodes en usage à la 
Faculté de Théologie de Paris, au XIIIe siècle’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du 
moyen âge, 43 (1968), 65-186 (pp. 124-5) and Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium 
Universitatis Parisiensis, II, p. 691, No. 1188, art. 18. While this is a later, and much more 
demanding, statute, it clearly is codifying existing practice: ‘Item, nota, quod bachalarii in 
theologia tenentur respondere de questione in locis publicis aliis bachalariis quinquies ad 
minus, antequam licencientur’. (‘Note that bachelors in theology are bound to dispute in 
some public place with other bachelors at least five times before being licensed’.) See further 
A.G. Little and F. Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians c. A.D. 1282-1302, Oxford 
Historical Society, 96 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), p. 33. 
52 Quodlibets are discussed in greater detail on pages 46-50 below. 
53 Or, more formally, licentia ubique legendi, disputandi, praedicandi et quoslibet actus 
excercendi theologica facultate (‘license for reading, disputing, preaching and carrying out 
in all places any act whatsoever of the faculty of theology’).  
54 Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I (1889), p. 79, No. 20. See 
too Courtenay, ‘Programs of Study’, p. 330 and Gordon Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities 
in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History, New 
Dimensions in History: Essays in Comparative History (New York: John Wiley, 1968), p. 




matriculate directly into the higher faculty of theology.55 The lectoral course 
provided a respectable and competent initial level of instruction to prepare 
friars for theological studies in a university but it was not the same grounding 
in philosophy, logic and dialectics that the arts graduates had obtained. In 
contrast, the studia, and the preparation they offered their students had 
greater focus upon the pastoral and missionary needs of the order.56  
A second distinction was that while a secular student would have 
proceeded directly from his arts degree to his theological studies, a typical 
mendicant student would have entered the order, completed his time of 
probation, undertaken some initial academic preparation in a studium 
provinciale, then travelled to Paris to participate in the lectoral programme 
in the studium generale there before returning to his home province and 
been appointed to some ministry of his own, quite often a post as lector in a 
studium provinciale, for some time. Only then would he have been eligible 
for selection for the degree programme in Paris.57 Accordingly, such a 
mendicant candidate was normally older than a typical secular student and 
possessed of more experience beyond the university environs.58 Lectors 
normally were aged between twenty-four years and twenty-nine, thus after a 
                                                   
55 This was a privilege granted by the university and not a right and it could be withdrawn, as 
indeed it was during the more contentious moments of the secular-mendicant controversy. 
Little, ‘The Franciscan School at Oxford’, p. 825. 
56 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 123. 
57 As early as the Constitutions of Narbonne in 1260 it was legislated (Art. 12) that friars 
should spend two or three years ‘in aliquo studio suae provinciae vel viciniae, nisi adeo 
fuerint litterati’. Exceptional cases could be dispatched directly to Paris. Bihl, ‘Statuta 
Generalia Ordinis’, p. 72. Benedict XII in November 1336, codified this practice and formally 
mandated a period of teaching in a studium prior to enrolling in the degree programme in 
Paris – in the decree Redemptor Noster of 28 November 1336 reproduced in Denifle and 
Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, II, No. 1006, p. 469. See too Roest, A 
History of Franciscan Education, pp. 102-3.  
58 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 97.  
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standard term, the earliest age at which a friar could ordinarily commence 
degree studies was twenty-seven.59 
This period as a lector meant that these Franciscan degree candidates 
had, in effect, been ‘reading’ both the Bible and the sentences to students in a 
studium provinciale for some time prior to coming to Paris. These former 
lectors would often have independently prepared some comments on the 
Bible and sentences for this role. It follows that a Franciscan candidate’s 
initial thoughts and comments on the sentences had originated in a quite 
different setting to his secular counterparts and, to some degree, had been 
formed even prior to his formal university studies commencing in Paris. The 
initial direction of his thought was laid down before even his first formal 
lecture. 
One further obvious but often overlooked difference between secular 
and mendicant students should also be recalled. In the thirteenth century, 
secular students would have possessed their own lodgings and have attended 
classes and other events as they needed and have done so in such locations as 
their master could provide. Mendicants, on the other hand, lived, slept, ate, 
prayed and worked with their teachers in the same, albeit large, dwelling 
which also served as their place of instruction. Thus they would generally 
have had far greater interaction and contact with their masters than was 
common for a secular student and so tended to be more greatly influenced 
and intellectually fashioned, for good or ill, by those masters. 
                                                   
59 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 92. The General Chapter of Lyons in 1325 
put an upper age limit of 40 for students to be sent to Paris, which would suggest that some 
earlier students had exceeded that age. A. Carlini, ed., ‘Constitutiones Lugdunenses’, 
Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 4 (1911), 527-36 (p. 530). 
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A chronology of a ‘typical’ progression to a master’s degree by a friar 
minor can be reconstructed. Of course, no friar is truly typical nor did any 
follow a truly ‘standard’ progression but the exercise is both illuminating and 
helpful. Following St Francis’ death, the trend continued for younger men to 
enter the order and the late teens was common for entering the order 
although oblation was never practiced among the friars.60 As the vows of a 
friar could not be received until his canonical majority and the time of 
probation had since 1220, been fixed at one year, the earliest a young man 
would be accepted into probation in the order was fifteen, although there 
were many older friars.61 
Franciscans habitually had brief tenures as regent masters and then 
were moved so that their expertise would be used in other places while a new 
graduate was appointed as regent master. The appointment could be to 
anywhere but was usually an academic role. It followed that former masters 
in Paris rarely returned to regular pastoral tasks, for their training was 
considered too useful to the order and they frequently were appointed to a 




                                                   
60 Bert Roest, ‘Franciscan Educational Perspectives: Reworking Monastic Traditions’, in 
Medieval Monastic Education, ed. by George Ferzoco and Carolyn Muessig (London: 
Leicester University Press, 2000), pp. 168-81. 
61 Honorius III (Cencio Savelli), Cum Dilecti, Papal Bull of 11 June 1218, reproduced in 
Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, ed. and trans. by Regis J. Armstrong, J. A. Wayne 
Hellman and William J. Short, 3 vols (New York: New City Press, 1999), I: The Saint, p. 558. 
62 Adam J. Davis, ‘The Formation of a Thirteenth Century Ecclesiastical Reformer at the 
Franciscan Studium in Paris: The Case of Eudes Rigaud’, in Medieval Education, ed. by 
Ronald B. Begley and Joseph W. Koterski (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005) pp. 
101–15 (p. 105). Studia coupled with a university chair as in Paris were also established in 
Oxford in 1253 and in Cambridge, Padua and Bologna shortly after. This offered a number of 
avenues for friars with degrees to teach at the university level. Little and Pelster, Oxford 
Theology and Theologians, p. 38 and Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 62. 
26 
 
PROGRESSION TO A DEGREE IN THEOLOGY AMONG FRANCISCANS 
IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 
Year Minimum 
Age 
Location Status Assessment 
1 15 Novitiate Novice Evaluation by Minister Provincial 
Profession of vows followed at age 16 
2-5 16-19 Studium 
Provinciale 
Studies Lector of Province 
Covered the intellectual preparation needed for life as a friar, from learning 
to read to such skills as preaching, hearing confession and cure of souls. Most 
friars go on to take up such roles. 
6-9 20-23 Studium 
Generale 
Studies General Lectors 
Gifted candidates were sent to a studium generale for preparation as lectors. 
At completion the candidate returned to his province to serve as a lector. 
10-12 24-26 Studium 
Provinciale 
Lector  
The new lector reads to his own students. If sufficiently capable, a candidate 
may be chosen for degree studies in Paris or elsewhere. 
13-16 27-30 Faculty of 
Theology 
Studies The Master of the Franciscan School 
A candidate begins with four years of biblical studies. 




He ‘reads’ scripture to younger 
candidates, usually one year on each 
testament. Takes part in a scriptural 
Disputata Ordinaria. Gives one 
assessed sermon. 
He aids his master in the teaching of scripture while studying dogmatic 
theology through the sentences. He begins preparing his own Sentence 
Commentary. 




‘Reads’ sentences to younger 
students. Is participant once in a 
theological Disputata Ordinaria.  
He aids his master in teaching theology to students while he works on his 
own assessment tasks. 




He completes his commentary on 
the Book of Sentences and gives a 
public lecture and disputes twice 
before each other master. He gives 
one Disputata Quodlibetale and 
another Ordinaria. He gives an 
assessed sermon and obtains a final 
approval from each master. 
His instruction is completed but he is required to perform a number of 
assessment tasks. 





He now has a license to teach and is engaged in instruction of higher 
candidates and assessing those of other masters. He has some administrative 





1.5  SENTENCE COMMENTARIES 
The key elements of a sentence commentary and how Alexander of Hales 
began the practice of requiring from theological degree candidates a 
commentary upon the Book of Sentences have already been noted.63 The 
Book of Sentences had been a well known and established work but by no 
means dominated theological education when Alexander became a regent 
master of theology in Paris in 1221. He was greatly impressed by its breadth 
of coverage and its clear and systematic argumentation so readily adapted to 
scholastic pedagogy.64 Alexander did some of this adaption himself and in 
about 1224 took the broad chapters of Peter the Lombard and broke them 
down into the familiar smaller distinctions, articles, questions and membra 
used in studying the book ever after.65 It was in this form that the work 
became familiar to theology students. By the time that Alexander entered the 
order and moved to the Grand Couvent in 1236, the use of the sentences, and 
the composition of a commentary upon them, was already becoming well 
established pedagogic practice.66  
The Book of Sentences itself (actually four books) was a systematically 
arranged series of propositions, or ‘sentences’, traversing the full ambit of 
                                                   
63 Philipp W. Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard’s ‘Sentences’, 
Rethinking the Middle Ages, 2 (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2007), pp. 60-1. Roest, 
A History of Franciscan Education, p. 125; Courtenay, ‘Institutionalization of Theology’, p. 
250 and Glorieux, ‘L’Enseignement au moyen âge’, p. 112. See page 21 above. 
64 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 124. 
65 Marcia L. Colish, ‘From the Sentence Collection to the Sentence Commentary and the 
Summa: Parisian Scholastic Theology, 1130-1215’, in Manuels, programmes de cours et 
techniques d'enseignement dans les universités médiévales: Actes du colloque international 
de Louvain-la-Neuve (9-11 Septembre 1993), ed. by Jacqueline Hamesse, Publications de 
l'Institut d'Études Médiévales, 16 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d'Études Médiévales de 
l'Université Catholique de Louvain, 1994), pp. 9-29 (p. 26) and Ignatius Brady, ‘The 
Distinctions of Lombard’s “Book of Sentences” and Alexander of Hales’, Franciscan Studies, 
25 (1965), 90-116 (p. 91). 
66 Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, pp. 60-64. 
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theology.67 Each proposition was considered in typical scholastic fashion: 
issues were phrased as questions, arguments both for and against each 
proposition were considered, a resolution proffered, and possible arguments 
opposing the solution were distinguished or reconciled. All this produced an 
answer to the question that was in accord with existing authority and with 
reason. A ‘commentary’ on the sentences is a mildly deceiving name as the 
work produced did not truly comment on the text as much as expand upon it. 
Commentators added to the array of authorities already assembled by Peter 
the Lombard and reconciled their new material with the arguments already 
assembled. Additionally, it was commonplace for commentators, while 
adhering to the broad structure of the topics that had been set out by Peter 
the Lombard, to alter the precise wording of questions in the commentary. 
They would shift the emphasis of questions, introduce new questions in areas 
of interest to them and expand or contract sections depending on their own 
particular interests and ability.68 Such tinkering with the received text 
provides opportunities to see an author’s individual ideas and emphases in 
his theological work. 
This preparation of a commentary on the sentences met the needs of 
the theological faculty well for it attested to a student’s theological knowledge 
in all its branches.69 It showed both that a student had covered the wide 
breadth of theology and that he possessed a good command of earlier 
authorities.70 As a benefit, the completed commentary frequently served as 
                                                   
67 Courtenay, ‘Institutionalization of Theology’, p. 250.  
68 Appendix 1 below provides an example of this sort of adjustment to the Book of Sentences 
but some Franciscan commentators, page 317-28 below.  
69 Courtenay, ‘Institutionalization of Theology’, p. 250. 
70 Russell Friedman, ‘The “Sentences” Commentary, 1250-1320: General Trends, the Impact 
of Religious Orders and the Test Case of Predestination’, in Mediaeval Commentaries of the 
‘Sentences’ of Peter the Lombard, 2 vols, ed. by G. R. Evans (Leiden: Brill, 2002-10), I 
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the author’s future lecture notes for use both when reading theology to 
candidates as a bachelor and later, when a master, to students of his own.  
It is not entirely clear how a student’s commentary was assessed but it 
does not seem to have been the case that a board of examiners read it or 
directly evaluated it as being of a suitable standard, as in the manner of a 
modern doctoral thesis, although individual masters may have done so and 
Alexander himself certainly did. It seems clear that a student’s master bore 
the responsibility to ensure that the commentary was prepared in the course 
of instruction in systematic theology. The mere coverage of so many topics in 
a commentary ensured the breadth of his study. As for the assessment of its 
quality by other masters, the requirement in university statutes for each 
formed bachelor to dispute before each master provided the principal 
opportunity for their skill and knowledge to be evaluated.71 As the subject 
matter in these exercises was chosen by the master concerned, and would be 
at least in part drawn from some proposition from Peter the Lombard’s 
sentences, the quality of a student’s preparation in his commentary could 
then be tested.72 
As genres of scholastic discourse, there was evolution in these 
sentence commentaries especially in their earliest phases. The initial 
sentence commentaries, such as those of Alexander himself and his first 
pupils like Eudes Rigaud, amounted to little more than glosses on the Book of 
                                                                                                                                               
(2002), pp. 41-128 (p. 85). Friedman there notes that this altered in the fourteenth century 
where commentators often were selective as to the sentences upon which they commented. 
See, as a good example of such a ‘selective commentary’, William de la Mare’s Quaestiones in 
Tertium et Quartum Librum Sententiarum, ed. by Hans Kraml (Munich: Verlag der 
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2001). 
71 See page 22 above.  




Sentences.73 The emphasis of these earliest commentaries was upon the 
expansion and further exposition of concepts that are already present in the 
original of Peter the Lombard, in the style of a gloss, rather than on the 
development of new ideas or even in the improved quality of argumentation 
behind a commentator’s own opinions.74 Initially, the exercise concentrated 
upon adding to what was in the Book of Sentences and not upon developing it 
with new ideas or taking it in new directions, although this did eventuate 
later. 
As an instance of this, Peter the Lombard’s third article of the 
eighteenth distinction of the third book of sentences asks whether Christ had 
the capacity to merit in his earthly life. Alexander’s commentary on this 
question, composed in the late 1220s, is of sixty-four lines in length, made up 
of twenty-four lines discussing three new arguments in favour of that 
proposition and twelve lines setting out two new opposing arguments, along 
with twenty-eight lines resolving the inconsistencies between them all. 
Alexander gives no response of his own to the argument at all and only 
amends the conclusion to accommodate his new authorities.75 Eudes Rigaud 
in his commentary from about 1240 is similar. He allocates thirty-two lines 
to his consideration of the question: fourteen giving three new arguments in 
favour of the proposition, six lines giving two new opposed arguments and he 
provides ten lines as setting out his reconciliation of those arguments, 
meaning that what he identifies as his own opinion fills but two lines.76 
                                                   
73 When Alexander’s commentary was eventually published in the 1950s, the editors gave it 
the title Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. 
74 Friedman, ‘The “Sentences” Commentary’, p. 88. 
75 Alexander of Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, ed. by 
Collegium S. Bonaventura, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 14 
(Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1951-57), III (1954), d. 18, pp. 189-92. 
76 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III., d. 18, a. 3, q. 1; see Appendix 2, pages 341-42 below. 
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The thought and opinion of a commentator himself were considered of 
much less importance than developing further what was already present in 
the reasoning of the Book of Sentences. The emphasis lay upon the ability to 
adduce further authorities and, thereafter, to bring them into harmony with 
existing material in the Book of Sentences. Consequently, this process was as 
much an exercise in dialectic and scholastic method as ever it was about the 
philosophical and theological conclusions reached. The ideas of the 
commentator are present, but subjected to little attention and frequently 
discoverable only in the choice of new authorities and the manner in which 
the commentator goes about resolving apparent discord. 
It follows then, that an author’s opinions can be derived not from what 
he says, much of which will be a recapitulation of the material assembled by 
Peter the Lombard, but from the new material added to it, the favoured 
writers quoted and the direction of argumentation. How a commentary alters 
the Book of Sentences can reveal much of an author’s thought.77 It was 
previously noted that from the beginning, commentators felt quite at ease in 
slightly altering individual questions in the sentences, adding, deleting or 
rewording them.78 Observing the manner in which a particular author does 
this, the matters omitted or expanded and developed, also discloses an 
author’s interests and manner of argumentation. As can be seen in Appendix 
1 below, it is uncommon for an author to ask exactly the same questions as 
those posed by Peter the Lombard or even other commentators. Observing 
                                                   
77 For example, Appendix 1, pp. 317-28 below, reveals that many authors greatly elaborated 
the question in chapter 51 of the Book of Sentences so it could be considered in greater 
detail. That of chapter 54, by contrast, was moved around and pondered in different 
contexts. 
78 See page 28 above. 
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how successive generations of commentators phrase the question to be 
addressed about the same topic is enlightening.79 
However, the nature of these early sentence commentaries altered 
substantially in less than a generation and they took on a quality quite 
different to the quasi-glosses that they had once been. As an example, in 
answering that same question concerning Christ’s capacity to merit in his 
earthly life, Bonaventure in his commentary, written in the early 1250s, 
almost trebled the size of the treatment by the earlier commentators like 
Alexander and allocates 189 lines to his discussion. Thirty-six of these 
present five new arguments in favour of the proposition and twenty-five lines 
deal with five new opposed authorities. The real differences occur in what 
follows, in which Bonaventure’s own opinion and the reasons for it consume 
sixty-three lines of text and the reconciliation of all this new material cover 
sixty-five. Significantly, that reconciliation is not merely to resolve discord 
among the added authorities but also between Bonaventure’s own opinion 
and the authorities.80 There is an interval of only about fifteen years between 
the composition of Eudes’ commentary and that of Bonaventure but in that 
time, the sentence commentary has moved from merely adding new 
authorities to a pre-existing argument and now taken on the additional 
function of being a means for a commentator to convey his own opinion 
while still remaining within the structural framework of a commentary.81 The 
ideas of the author came to engage with authority and this new approach 
remained a feature of sentence commentaries thereafter. 
                                                   
79 See page 317-28 below. 
80 Bonaventure, Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: 
Typographia Collegii Sancti Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), III (1887), Sent. III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 1. 
81 Friedman, ‘The “Sentences” Commentary, 1250-1320’, p. 84. 
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This is a swift and substantial change in the nature of these 
commentaries and a number of factors were significant in this evolution of 
the genre.82 The first of these was the expanding practice of scholastic 
disputation in the university. As new times brought with them new questions 
which the authorities of the past were ill suited to address, it proved 
necessary at times to provide more modern and even personal solutions to 
these areas brought to light through disputation. Not only were there the 
‘new logic’ and new philosophical tools acquired through the recovery of the 
works of Aristotle but there were rapid developments in the natural and 
social sciences which theology had now to incorporate and with which much 
of the theology of the preceding millennium, dominated as it had been by 
Neoplatonism and Biblical exegesis, was ill-equipped to contend.83 Holding 
qualifications in the ‘queen of sciences’ created an expectation of ability to 
address issues in fields that might not strictly fall in the purview of theology. 
As an instance, the friar Roger of Marston took part in a series of quodlibetal 
disputations in England in about 1281 in which questions were put to him on 
topics as diverse and novel as the taxes upon doctors and lawyers, whether 
Edward the Confessor should be considered a martyr, the nature of rainbows 
and if it ever would be permissible for an indigent father to sell his son. None 
of these were questions for which the traditional authorities provided 
satisfying answers, if any at all, and Roger, like all disputants of the era, 
however much he may try to ground it upon the usual authorities of the 
                                                   
82 A. J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later 
Middle Ages, Middle Ages Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), pp. 
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83 Jacques Verger, ‘L’Exégèse, parente pauvre de la théologie scolastique?’, in Manuels, 
programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universités médiévales: Actes 
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Christian tradition, was obliged by the nature of the questions to be creative, 
to adduce his own reasoning and to express his personal opinion.84 Likewise, 
a consideration of Appendix 1 below shows many new or altered questions in 
Franciscan sentence commentaries. Among them are speculative 
consideration that had received scant attention from earlier generations of 
scholars. 
In like fashion, as skills grew in the art of disputation and disputations 
became increasingly public events, both masters and students seeking to 
shine desired to move outside the known and anticipated authorities. They 
became more innovative and creative in their argumentation, developing 
newer ideas of their own with which to outshine opponents. This 
development also operated as a legitimation of the expression of personal 
opinion in sentence commentaries. Such new opinions became both 
necessary, because of the newer questions being posed, and more common as 
disputants vied with each other. Early commentaries like that of Eudes 
Rigaud reconciled ideas of authorities; later commentaries like those of 
Bonaventure and beyond did the same but the ideas of the author himself 
often became an opinion to be reconciled. The great undertaking of writing a 
sentence commentary moved from being a task merely to comment on the 
Book of Sentences to become an exercise to integrate a scholar’s own ideas, 
logically and philosophically derived, with the existing corpus of established 
                                                   
84 Roger of Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, ed. by Ignatius Brady and Girard Etzkorn, 
Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 26 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. 
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authorities and in this integration it is possible to reveal something of the 
author’s own thoughts. 
The swiftness of that change had consequences for Franciscan 
ministry and academic endeavours. At just the time in which the friars were 
assembling libraries and establishing their network of educational 
institutions, their best scholars were creating theological texts that not only 
brought together the most important theological ideas of the past but they 
coupled to them ideas and insights that were novel to the earlier scholars. 
Quite early after the establishment of the school in Paris, new Franciscan 
students were witnessing the production of texts that incorporated an 
author’s own opinions. It was acceptable to create one’s own material in a 
way that had not been so a few generations earlier. 
Such use of novelty happily coincided with a belief shared by many in 
the order that God had favoured the friars and was creating something new 
in them. There was a conviction among friars that they had been divinely 
given a ‘new’ way and a ‘new’ vocation in the Church as they followed the 
‘new’ type of saint, Francis of Assisi.85 Many Franciscans took to heart 
Francis’ affirmation from his Testament that ‘Nemo ostendebat mihi quid 
deberem facere, sed ipse Altissimus revelavit mihi’ and that they were to be 
unlike what had preceded them.86 They believed that this choice of a new way 
                                                   
85 See for example, Thomas of Eccleston, De Adventu Fratrum Minorum, XIII, pp.92-4 and 
Bonaventure, Legenda Maior, II. 8 or IV. 4. Thomas of Celano’s first life of Francis takes this 
idea of the ‘newness’ of Francis and his community as one of his central motifs - Raimondo 
Michetti, Francesco d’ Assisi e il paradosso della minoritas: La ‘Vita beati Francisci’ di 
Tommaso da Celano, Nuovi Studi Storici, 66 (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio 
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Hagiography: Thomas of Celano‘s Life of St. Francis’, in Francis of Assisi: History, 
Hagiography and Hermeneutics in the Early Documents, ed. Jay M. Hammond (New York: 
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86 ‘No one showed me what I should do, but the Most High himself revealed it to me’. 
Kajetan Esser, ed., Die Opuscula des heiligen Franziskus von Assisi: neue textkritische 
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had received divine approbation in the imprinting of the stigmata upon St 
Francis.87 It followed that it would seem only appropriate, then, that they 
should bring with them a ‘new’ way of undertaking theology as well.88  
This attitude in writing theology seems consonant with the 
documentary records of sentence commentaries. William Courtenay has 
noted that nearly every surviving sentence commentary of the thirteenth 
century is from a mendicant theologian and that those of secular masters do 
not appear with any frequency until after 1350 and that, even then, they 
never exceeded the numbers of surviving commentaries coming from 
mendicant sources.89 The secular masters produced quodlibets, disputed 
questions and other types of scholastic tracts but their sentence 
commentaries seem to have been kept only for their own use and to have 
been little published; it is the mendicants who seem to have seized upon the 
sentence commentary as a favoured vehicle for distribution of their new 
ideas.90 While all candidates for a degree produced a commentary and 
lectured from it when reading the sentences, it would seem to have been 
peculiar to the mendicants, at least in the thirteenth century, to exploit the 
broader possibilities of the genre as a vehicle for the reproduction and 
                                                                                                                                                
Edition, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 13 (Grottaferrata: Typographia Collegii S. 
Bonaventurae, 1976), p. 439. 
87 Chiara Frugoni, ‘St Francis, a Saint in Progress’, in Saints: Studies in Hagiography, ed. by 
Sandro Sticca, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 141 (Binghamton, NY: Medieval 
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37 
 
distribution of their own ideas. They copied, distributed and circulated 
sentence commentaries in great number and Stegmüller’s data relating to 
extant manuscripts from this period testifies to this practice.91 Filling the 
void in the new libraries being created in their studia, the friars made do with 
what literary resources were at hand; namely, the sentence commentaries 
which returning friars brought with them from their studies in Paris; either 
their own if they had proceeded to a degree, or a copy of one in the Paris 
collection if they had been there in the lectoral programme and were on the 
way to teach.92 
Thus commentaries are texts serving a number of different functions. 
From the perspective of the writer, these commentaries were composed in 
order to meet the requirements for a degree and to serve as private notes for 
his own subsequent teaching, but not principally for dissemination in a 
published form. That was the work of later scholars, ‘secondary authors’, who 
came frequently to reproduce these works for the purposes of their own study 
and teaching, making use of the authorities given therein, reviewing the 
manner in which they were reconciled and studying the personal insights of 
the original author. This often occurred in a setting far distant from Paris, as 
can be seen from the publication of the commentary of the Parisian graduates 
Richard of Middleton in Naples, and Matthew of Aquasparta in Florence.93 
Manuscripts of Bonaventure’s commentary were produced across Eastern 
                                                   
91 Cf. the thirteenth-century authors listed in Stegmüller, Repertorium Commentariorum in 
Sententias Petri Lombardi, and the paucity of non-mendicant authors among them. 
92 Courtenay, ‘The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris’, pp. 84-5. 
93 Lampen, ‘Liste alphabétique des manuscrits de Richard de Mediavilla’, p. 73 and Doucet, 
‘L’Enseignement parisien d’Aquasparta’, p. 568. 
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Europe in areas into which Bonaventure himself never went.94 Thus, in these 
written commentaries we deal with what one writer may have held but was 
not prepared to publish, preserved in a work produced by others who may 
not necessarily have held the same beliefs but who did wish to say it in 
published form. Even further, for the mendicants with their early meagre 
libraries, these commentaries in newer styles with expanded sections in 
which an author might express his own opinions and ideas, came to function 
as more than a simple commentary to assist in the understanding of the Book 
of Sentences. It would appear to be a common event for students to lack a 
copy of the Book of Sentences and yet possess a commentary upon it, 
frequently written by one of their own confreres. The commentaries became 
theological sources and textbooks in their own right, providing opportunities 
to study the theological thought and insight of eminent Franciscan teachers 
and well-regarded friars who were marking out the trail of this ‘new’ path of 
the mendicant way of life and along which the student hoped to follow.95 
Sentence commentaries served well as such text books; they were 
comprehensive, systematically structured assembled for readers all requisite 
authorities for ease of reference. 
A further factor advanced the development of sentence commentaries. 
As noted, while secular students proceeded directly from their first degree to 
theology and thus the work of composing sentence commentaries, this was 
                                                   
94 Bonaventure, Opera Omnia, I, pp. XX; Stegmüller, Repertorium Commentariorum in 
Sententias, I, pp. 60-7; Glorieux, Répertoire des Maitres en Théologie de Paris, II, pp. 37-51. 
Consider the list of holdings given on page 270 below. 
95 Consider, for example, the Abbreviatio of Bonaventure by Richard Rufus of Cornwall, 
pages 169-72 below. There is considerable work yet to be done on the reception of sentence 
commentaries beyond the theology faculties of the universities. Some interesting first steps 
in this investigation can be found in Sylvain Piron, ‘Franciscan Quodlibeta in Southern 
Studia and at Paris 1280-1300’, in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The 
Thirteenth Century, ed. by Christopher Schabel, Brill’s Companions to the Christian 
Tradition, 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 403-38, especially pp. 406-13; and Roest, A History of 
Franciscan Education, pp. 87-97. 
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not so for friars whose statutes mandated a term of ministry, usually as a 
lector, before going to university.96 Even so, when a lector, they did need to 
teach systematic theology of an appropriate level and often prepared a sort of 
‘proto-commentary’ on the sentences for their own teaching needs. While 
secular students prepared their commentaries under supervision of a master 
while studying the sentences, friars often did so in a studium of their own far 
from Paris, without the supervision of a master, forming their own ideas on 
the sentences well before they began their formal studies and with a practical 
outlook more suited to their audience in the studium.97 Accordingly, if and 
when a former lector went to Paris, he did so with this ‘proto-commentary’ 
under his arm.98 This explains how mendicants often produced sentence 
commentaries before matriculating, the most famous of which is Duns 
Scotus’ Oxford commentary, commenced before he went to Paris for his 
degree. Similarly William of Ware and Peter of John Olivi and the 
Dominicans Durand of St Pourçain and James of Metz all worked upon such 
‘proto-commentaries’ before they had yet begun their university studies.99  
These practices by the mendicants advanced the primacy of systematic 
theology in the university at the expense of biblical studies. It was the former 
that grew in this period to become the pre-eminent activity of the Parisian 
theologian.100 In a further development, by the century’s end, the 
composition of a sentence commentary had ceased to be exclusively an 
                                                   
96 See page 23 above. 
97 Roest, Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission, p.52. 
98 Courtenay, ‘The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents’, pp. 81, 84.  
99 Glorieux, Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie, II p. 130, II p. 144, I pp. 214-15 and I p. 
197. 
100 Verger, ‘L’Exégèse, parente pauvre de la théologie scolastique?’, pp. 31-56 and Gérard 
Marie Paré, Adrien Marie Brunet and Pierre Tremblay, La Renaissance du XIIe siècle: Les 
Écoles et l’enseignement, Publications de l’Institut d’Études Médiévales d’Ottawa, 3 (Ottawa: 
Institut d’Études Médiévales, 1933), p. 117. 
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exercise for students readying themselves for a degree. These commentaries 
had begun to evolve into a favoured genre of theologians generally to give 
expression to their own ideas and theories.101 An interplay of these trends 
caused commentaries, as the century ended, less frequently to expound upon 
the entire Book of Sentences but only certain distinctions.102 
However, since in the early part of the century every master produced 
a sentence commentary and it covered the same material laid out in the same 
pattern, sentence commentaries provide a superb point of comparison 
between authors. Soteriology will regularly and predictably be treated in the 
third book of the sentences, somewhere between distinctions seventeen to 
twenty-one, although individual authors may shift their treatment about 
within those bounds.103 Such constancy lets one compare expositions on 
soteriology with relative ease. Yet further, this commonality allows a 
comparison of texts from one generation of scholars, and in this case even 
from master to student, so as to trace the evolution of ideas. Sentence 
commentaries can shed light on how theological concepts are moving over 
time. 
This feature can also be a weakness in sentence commentaries 
obscuring the understanding of soteriology. Because the matters to be treated 
in a commentary were fixed, the mere presence of a topic in a commentary 
signifies little. Equally, as authors are always building upon and synthesising 
existing knowledge in their commentaries, it can prove very hard to 
distinguish save in the case of fresh material what an author himself actually 
                                                   
101 Friedman, ‘The “Sentences” Commentary, 1250-1320’, p. 100. 
102 An instance of this trend can be seen in William de la Mare, Quaestiones in Tertium et 
Quartum Librum Sententiarum, from the end of the 1270s. See also Schabel, ‘Reshaping the 
Genre’, pp. 73-6. 
103 See, for example, the comparion in Appendix 1, pp. 317-28 below. 
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held and what he was merely reproducing because it was in the corpus of 
authority he had inherited. 
 
1.6  QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE 
The sentence commentary was a genre that made clear the 
comprehensiveness of an author’s theological knowledge and his ability to 
assimilate new arguments into existing reasoning. Other genres aimed less at 
displaying the breadth of knowledge and more at its depth in a particular 
topic and of these the most significant were the quaestiones disputatae. 
Another form that arose from the classroom, the core of disputed questions 
was still a dialectical exercise that demonstrates an ability to muster 
authorities and to reach a reasoned and philosophically defensible 
conclusion. However, in the case of disputed questions, this is done in a 
much narrower field and in far greater detail. 
In quaestiones disputatae, as before, a broad question is analysed 
dialectically and tranched into smaller questions but in this instance this is 
done not to surmount the broad expanse of material to be covered but rather 
to establish a chain of sequential reasoning to support a complex final 
conclusion. For example, Bonaventure in his disputed questions De Scientia 
Christi asks first whether the uncreated Word possessed infinite 
knowledge.104 On reaching the conclusion that it did, he next asks whether 
God knows a thing through its likeness to similar things or through its own 
essence. Concluding it is the latter, he goes on to ask whether anything can be 
known with certainty in its own self, and yet further questions then follow. 
None of these, of course, directly consider what knowledge the Incarnate 
                                                   
104 Bonaventure, ‘Quaestiones Disputatae de Scientia Christi’, pp. 3 ff. 
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Jesus Christ possessed but it does allow Bonaventure to pose a sequential 
series of questions that lay the necessary groundwork for his ultimate 
answer. Eventually his chain of reasoning leads to his seventh and final 
question: whether the incarnate Christ understood all things. Each question 
in its turn observes the scholastic pattern of argument and counter-argument 
and a resolution of apparently discordant material. In quaestiones 
disputatae these resolutions build upon each other enabling a more complex 
conclusion to be reached than in a sentence commentary or summa. It also 
makes it possible to develop a conclusion in much more detail than the far 
briefer answers of those other genres.  
By means of illustration, Bonaventure considered this same issue in 
his sentence commentary, Book III, d. 14, a. 2, q. 3, where he asked whether 
Christ, the incarnate word, knew what he had known as Christ, the uncreated 
word. In the course of his answer, Bonaventure cites sixteen authorities and 
gives his complete answer in five pages of text. By way of contrast, the 
disputed question considers and reconciles 240 distinct authorities in the 
course of forty-three pages of text, permitting a much more detailed and 
thorough consideration of the topic. In many ways the disputed question was 
the zenith of the dialectician’s art and so became a fixed and public feature of 
the academic year, required of both students and masters.105 It became the 
most common and most widespread of all the academic disputations, often 
going by the name of the disputata ordinaria when publicly conducted.106  
                                                   
105 Glorieux, ‘L’Enseignement au moyen âge’, p. 123. See also Berando C. Bazàn, Gérard 
Fransen, John W. Wippel and Danielle Jacquart, Les Questions disputées et les questions 
quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine, Typologie des sources 
du moyen âge occidental, 44-5 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), pp. 21-149 (pp. 59-62) and 
Schabel, ‘Reshaping the Genre’, pp. 61-63. 
106 Bernardo Bazàn, ‘La Quaestio Disputata’, in Les Genres littéraires dans les sources 
théologiques et philosophiques médiévales: Définition, critique et exploitation – Actes du 
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Disputed questions evolved hand in hand with the university and well 
predated the coming of the friars.107 They had their origin in the classroom as 
simple dialectic exercises of a master with his students as a useful way to 
demonstrate certain points.108 Often these questions were employed to 
resolve seeming theological contradictions among the authorities considered 
in class.109 Thence it was a small step to formalise them in a more scholastic 
fashion where both sides of an argument would adduce authorities in support 
of their position and reconcile apparently contradictory authorities to show 
that one position had the support of better argument. In the classroom this 
was frequently done with a master presiding over a group of bachelors who 
did the disputing and then he would offer his magisterial determinatio or 
even, at times, participate as a disputant himself.110 A single exercise 
displayed all at once skills in the knowledge of authority, dialectics, rhetoric, 
reasoning and philosophy.111 It did this so well that, as has been seen, each 
student at Paris was required to engage twice in a disputata ordinaria in 
front of each master in turn, on topics of that master’s choosing, so that the 
masters might assess a student’s fitness to be licensed. 
Masters also engaged in the production of disputed questions. Lent 
and Advent each year had periods for public disputations by the masters and 
                                                                                                                                               
colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve 25-27 Mai 1981, ed. by R. Bultot, Publications 
de l’Institut d’Études Médiévales 2e série: Textes, Études, Congrès, 5 (Louvain-la-Neuve: 
Institut d’Études Médiévales, 1982), pp. 31-49 (p. 35).  
107 The earliest published disputed questions are from 1190 and oral disputations must have 
preceded that. Bernardo Bazàn, ‘La Quaestio Disputata’, p. 34. 
108 Glorieux, ‘L’Enseignement au moyen âge’, p. 124. Bazàn draws a distinction between the 
solemn disputations conducted publicly and the private ones of the classroom: Berando C. 
Bazàn ‘Les Questions disputées, principalement dans les facultés de théologie’, pp. 21-149 
(pp. 40-41). 
109 Bazàn et al., Les Questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques, p. 25. 
110 Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, pp. 36-42. 
111 Glorieux, ‘L’Enseignement au moyen âge’, p. 124. 
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regular classes were suspended.112 Frequently these disputations were put 
into writing by scribes and then reviewed for publication by the master. 
These are the bulk of the quaestiones disputatae passed now to us. As well as 
public academic exercises and examples of the art for the benefit of students, 
they also served something of an ‘advertisement’ for masters.113 As students 
chose their own master and paid him directly, for many secular masters their 
income reflected their ability to attract students through their reputation and 
performance.  
The pervasiveness of disputed questions may well be due to this 
threefold purpose of the genre: it was well suited, better than a sentence 
commentary, to providing a detailed examination and instruction on a 
particular issue, it provided useful practice for a young scholar and it could 
also work as validation of professional competence on the part of a master.114  
Beyond purely academic writing, disputed questions also lent 
themselves to more polemical purposes. A master was free to choose the 
topic of these disputations and so the topics chosen could reflect his own 
particular interests and fascinations.115 On some occasions the topic chosen 
was a response to earlier arguments of other scholars or they engaged with 
the topics of the day. For example, Bonaventure’s Quaestiones Disputatae de 
                                                   
112 Bernardo Bazàn, ‘La Quaestio Disputata’, p. 40. These were the times for the disputata 
ordinaria. 
113 A solemn form of this genre, the vespery, was conducted when a new master assumed his 
chair in a precursor of the modern inaugural lecture, Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and 
Theologians, pp. 44-5. 
114 Bernardo Bazàn, ‘La Quaestio Disputata’, p. 32. See also Bazàn et al., Les Questions 
disputées et les questions quodlibétiques, pp. 93-98. 
115 Matthew of Aquasparta’s Quaestiones Disputatae de Cognitione (Matthew of Aquasparta, 
Quaestiones Disputatae Selectae, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, Bibliotheca Franciscana 
Scholastica Medii Aevi, vols 1-2 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1903-14)) 
and Roger of Marston’s Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima (Roger of Marston, Quaestiones 
Disputatae, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii 




Perfectione Evangelica and de Paupertate, composed at the height of the 
secular-mendicant controversy in the University of Paris are at least as much 
political pieces against William of St Amour and those opposed to the friars 
as they are theological discussions on the evangelical counsels. Nevertheless, 
whatever prompted their composition, they remain genuine efforts to resolve 
theological issues by the rigorous application of the scholastic tools of 
philosophy and dialectics. 
Disputed questions provide a number of benefits to the task of 
attempting to understand the thought of authors. Foremost among these is 
that they are the product of the author’s own choice. A sentence commentary 
demanded the treatment of all topics but there was no such compulsion in 
the case of disputed questions. The mere presence or absence of a topic 
reveals something of an author’s attitude to an issue. 
Further, disputed questions allow for much greater depth of treatment 
of a topic and more subtle argumentation. So much had to be covered in a 
sentence commentary or summa that authors were unable to provide detail 
in argument at a level similar to quaestiones disputatae. The disadvantage of 
the disputata ordinaria is that while they did provide far better coverage of a 
topic, this was only so if the author chose to consider the topic. A given 
author may not engage in this format with many topics, soteriology included, 
at all. Matthew of Aquasparta has quaestiones disputatae on soteriology 
multiple times but Bonaventure never. The usefulness of this genre depends 




1.7  QUAESTIONES QUODLIBETALES 
Similarly, the choice of question is again a factor in the usefulness of the next 
genre of scholastic discourse relevant to this study, quaestiones 
extraordinariae or more commonly, quodlibetales. These too were born in 
the classroom, for naturally questions arose from students there that they put 
to the masters and bachelors. Questions of greater complexity might even at 
times be disputed in dialectic fashion with bachelors taking either side and 
then the presiding master offering a final determinatio and solution.  
 Having come from the students and not the masters, the questions 
were often not strictly confined to those in the Book of Sentences. Rather 
they were expressions of the students’ curiosity and often reflected greater 
speculation on their part.116 In time, this questioning too took on a public 
character as the quaestio quodlibetalis, in which students, other masters and 
even members of the public could pose questions of their own choosing on 
any topic, as the name of the genre indicates.117 Quodlibets further acquired a 
public nature by their being recorded in written form and their subsequent 
circulation.118 These written quodlibets survive in varied form. The majority 
are notes, either private or official, taken during the disputation in the 
manner of a transcript but there also exist redacted accounts of quodlibetal 
proceedings that show the editing hand of a disputant, as questions have 
been sorted into themes rather than left in the haphazard order in which they 
were asked. These also show signs of editing in the use of fuller quotations 
from authorities and a greater polish to the finished text.119  
                                                   
116 Bazàn et al., Les Questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques, p. 31.  
117 Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, p. 31. 
118 Makdisi, ‘Scholastic Method in Medieval Education’, p. 653. 
119 Palémon Glorieux, La Littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320, Bibliothèque Thomiste, 
5, 2 vols (Le Saulchoir, Kain: Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 1925-35), I 
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Whether edited or not, the object of the quodlibet lay less in the 
comprehensiveness of theological knowledge, as with a sentence commentary 
and summa, nor in the detailed depth of knowledge, as in the quaestio 
disputata. With quodlibets the object lay rather in the expanse of knowledge 
over many fields. ‘All subjects, near and far, touching on sacred knowledge 
can be seen here: Sacred Scripture, theology, canon law, philosophy, ethics, 
casuistry etc.’120  
In quaestiones quodlibetales the format of the answer was again given 
in the standard scholastic pattern of argument pro and contra but, as 
befitted the nature of the exercise, all of the review of authorities, resolution 
of contrary material and final determination were substantially more 
succinct. This exercise evolved to manifest a disputant’s ability to think 
swiftly and to display the range of knowledge that he had acquired.  
As can be readily imagined, these quodlibetal disputations demanded 
considerable skill in dialectic and theology, as well as a trained memory; it is 
‘scholastic thought at its full state of maturity’.121 Quodlibets swiftly became a 
statutory requirement for any candidate hoping to become a master122 and, 
                                                                                                                                               
(1925), pp. 51-55. Glorieux there gives numerous instances of both types of written 
quodlibet. See also Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, p. 40. 
120 ‘Tous les sujets qui de près ou de loin touchent à la science sacrée, peuvent s’y voir 
aborder: Écriture Sainte, théologie, droit canonique, philosophie, morale, casuistique etc.’ 
Glorieux, ‘L’Enseignement au moyen âge’, p. 128. 
121 Jacqueline Hamesse, ‘Theological Quaestiones Quodlibetales’ , in Theological Quodlibeta 
in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century, ed. by Christopher Schabel, Brill’s Companions 
to the Christian Tradition, 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 17-48, (p.17). 
122 These requirements were ‘scilicet in aula Episcopi Parisiensis, quando fit ibi aliquis novus 
magister in theologia, item in vesperis alicuius magistri, item semel in aula Cerbonitarum, 
tempore quo magistri in theologia non legunt, scilicet inter festum apostolorum et festum 
exaltacionis Sancte Crucis; item semel de Quolibeto in Adventu vel circiter; item semel in 
disputationibus generalibus, antequam permittantur sibi legere sententias’, ‘namely in the 
hall of the Bishop of Paris when one is made a new master of theology, at the Vespery of 
certain masters, likewise in a Sorbonica at the time in which masters in theology are not 
lecturing, that is between the feast of the apostles [29 June] to the exaltation of the Holy 
Cross [14 September]; likewise at the Quodlibets in Advent or thereabouts; likewise at the 
general disputations before lecturing on the Sentences in permitted’. Denifle and Chatelain, 
eds., Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, II (1894), Charter 1188. As to the other formal 
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due to their public character, became significant events in civic life.123 
Nevertheless, and one is not without sympathy for their decision, on 
attaining their degree some masters declined ever to take part in a 
quodlibetal disputation again and the Dominicans eventually placed limits on 
the sorts of questions that they were prepared to answer in this format.124 
Generally, though, the quodlibet was enthusiastically embraced by the 
mendicant orders and there is some evidence that the quodlibet had its origin 
in the mendicant studia rather than the university itself, however ardently it 
came later to be embraced there.125 The earliest quodlibet we possess is one 
from the Dominican studium of Paris dated about 1230 and composed by the 
friar Guerric of Saint-Quentin.126 Not only did the mendicants seem to 
originate the quodlibet but they seemed to dominate its production as a 
written genre; over half of all surviving quodlibets are by mendicant friars,127 
it was the Franciscan John Pecham who spread the custom of quodlibets 
beyond Paris to Oxford128 and the only surviving texts of quodlibeta outside 
Paris, Oxford, Cambridge and Rome are from mendicant studia.129  
It has been suggested that for both orders of friars, by opening 
disputations to the public beyond a purely academic audience, it may have 
been a help in partially disarming the hostility of secular masters in their 
                                                                                                                                                
university events of this time, such as vesperies and Sorbonica mentioned here, see also 
Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, pp. 33 and 56. 
123 Piron, ‘Franciscan Quodlibeta in Southern Studia and at Paris’, p. 434. 
124 Glorieux, ‘L’Enseignement au moyen âge’, p. 129 and p. 139; Hamesse, ‘Theological 
Quaestiones Quodlibetales’, p, 43. 
125 Glorieux, ‘L’Enseignement au moyen âge’, p. 132; Hamesse, ‘Theological Quaestiones 
Quodlibetales’, p. 26.  
126 Guerric of Saint-Quentin: Quaestiones de Quolibet, ed. by W.H. Principe, Studies and 
Texts, 143 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002). 
127 Hamesse, ‘Theological Quaestiones Quodlibetales’, p. 22. 
128 Piron, ‘Franciscan Quodlibeta in Southern Studia and at Paris’, p. 404. 
129 Christopher Schabel, ed., Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth 
Century, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p. 2. Schabel 
has also noted that Paris seemed the stronghold of the quodlibet and it did not long flourish 
in other universities, Schabel, ‘Reshaping the Genre’, p. 59. 
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questioning.130 Little and Pelster attribute the mendicant predilection for the 
quodlibet to the orders’ poverty; their libraries were smaller and less 
endowed than those elsewhere in the university and the high cost of skins 
meant that friars were less able in the thirteenth century to engage in 
bookwork than their secular counterparts and so made greater use of oral 
activities such as these disputations.131 While those are credible possibilities, 
it seems more likely that the determining factor for both orders was the skills 
in preaching in the ministry for which the student friars of both orders were 
being prepared. Whether that preaching be popular preaching in towns or 
combatting heresy, the ability to think on one’s feet, to adduce clear 
argumentation that can be followed by those outside as well as inside 
academia and to respond with composure to challenges from an audience, 
the quodlibet showed itself a most useful practical and pedagogic tool.  
Rather like disputed questions, its usefulness in this present work is 
dependent on whether an appropriate question is posed by an audience 
member. Even when such a question was posed, the recorded answer was 
brief and tended to be expressed in terms readily comprehended by the 
nature of the audience being addressed, which is to say at a lesser academic 
level than something like a summa. Quodlibets do, however, admirably 
disclose what an author thought on a topic when under pressure, with little 
time to marshal his thoughts and under pressure to express himself 
succinctly. The shortcoming of the quodlibet was its brevity and that it did 
                                                   
130 Piron, ‘Franciscan Quodlibeta in Southern Studia and at Paris’, p. 435. One must, of 
course, explain why the Dominicans chose to admit public questions but only in certain 
topics.  
131 Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, p. 29. 
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not disclose the interests and favoured topic of a master but rather of an 
audience.132 
 
1.8  SUMMA 
The final genre to be considered is the summa. It is less closely tied to the 
classroom and unlike the preceding forms was not a compulsory form asked 
of all students. The composition of a summa was the free choice of an 
academic, usually well established in their careers. The summa like the 
sentence commentary was a broad and comprehensive coverage of theology, 
arranged in systematic fashion.133 It too, gave expression to the personal 
insights of the author but it differed from a sentence commentary in that it 
sought not to comment or to gloss upon the Book of Sentences but to imitate 
it; to produce a comprehensive system giving a complete overview of 
theology but in a pattern different to that set out by Peter the Lombard.134 In 
a commentary, an author’s own ideas enhanced but did not supplant 
established authority, in a summa his own ideas lay at its heart. It did 
everything that the Book of Sentences, or a commentary upon it, did but in a 
structure entirely of the author’s choosing. In a summa, the author was free 
to arrange the discussion of theology however its author saw fit. A second 
significant distinction lay in the maturity of an author; a sentence 
                                                   
132 For example, Friar Roger of Marston considers fallen human nature in the thirteenth 
question of his second set of quodlibets. It is three pages long and raises one authority on 
either side of the argument: Roger of Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, II. xiii, pp. 190-3. In 
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133 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 126. 
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commentary was generally the work of a bachelor before obtaining a license 
to teach, but a summa was generally produced by a seasoned master.  
There had certainly been precursors to the summa that were similarly 
ambitious in attempting to traverse systematically all of theology and give a 
commentary on each element; Peter Abelard’s Theologia Scholarium and 
Honorius of Autun’s Elucidarium are among the better known.135 However, it 
is not until the 1240s that the summa regularly appears as a distinct genre of 
scholasticism regularly employed by authors. Not every theological scholar 
wrote a summa but it was frequently encountered among the ‘professional’ 
theologians of the universities, well into their careers, as an expression of 
their own approaches to theology. One of the earliest, and one of the first 
under the name of summa, was that of Alexander of Hales from about 1245. 
That of Thomas Aquinas is probably the most famed but others had also been 
produced by Ulrich of Strasbourg, Albert the Great and, in a highly 
condensed form, by Bonaventure in his Breviloquium.136  
In the case of Alexander’s summa, his hand was, at best, but one 
among many in its composition. If he wrote any of it at all, it was a small 
portion, and the bulk of it was composed posthumously by his students and 
disciples, principally John of La Rochelle, William of Meliton and Eudes 
Rigaud, though quite clearly drawing upon Alexander’s own ideas, notes and 
                                                   
135 Peter Abelard, ‘Theologia Scholarium’ in Opera Theologica, ed. by E. M. Buytaert, Corpus 
Christianorum, Continuatio Mediavalis 12, 3 vols (Turnout: Brepols, 1969) and Honorius 
Augustodunensis, Elucidarium, ed. by J. Morris Jones and John Rhys, Anecdota Oxoniensis, 
Medieval and Modern Series, 6 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894). On the precursors to Peter 
the Lombard’s Book of Sentences, see Marcia L. Colish, ‘From the Sentence Collection to the 
Sentence Commentary and the Summa’, pp. 9-16. 
136 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 61 vols (London: Blackfriars with Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1964-81); Ulrich of Strasbourg, De Summo Bono, ed. by Burkhard Mojsisch, 
Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi, 1. 4 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989-2005); 
Albertus Magnus, Summa Theologiae sive Scientia de Mirabili Scientia Dei, ed. by 
Dionysius Siedler (Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff, 1978); and Bonaventure, 
‘Breviloquium’, in Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: 
Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), V (1891), pp. 199-291. 
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lessons.137 While it may seem strange to modern readers to do so, the work 
from its earliest times was attributed to Alexander and known variously as 
the Summa Halensis, Summa Halesiana or the Summa Fratris Alexandri 
and yet was equally known to have been written by other authors. In 1255, 
Pope Alexander IV issued De Fontibus Paradisi in which the summa of 
Alexander of Hales was commended to the friars and the pontiff praised the 
brilliance of Alexander’s scholarship in the text, noting ‘in tanto verborum 
agmine, quod immensa videtur divinae profunditatis eloquia continere’.138 
Nevertheless, Pope Alexander then went on to acknowledge and thank 
William of Meliton and his colleagues without whose efforts the work would 
never have been accomplished!139  
It is an intriguing question to ask how such a text came to be, 
especially as it is the peculiarly personal approach to organising theology of a 
man whose name was made through the establishment of Peter the 
Lombard’s structure as normative for theological education. Much remains to 
be done in this area; for example, it remains unclear whether the initiative for 
this work came from Alexander himself or from his close disciple John of La 
Rochelle. John does not appear to have left a sentence commentary or 
                                                   
137 See Victorinus Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa’, 
Franciscan Studies, 7 (1947), 26-41, 274-312 and the expansive analysis of the authorship of 
the summa in Summa Fratris Alexandri, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 4 vols 
(Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1938-51), IIIA (1948), a special volume 
dedicated to that question. 
138 ‘… in such a cavalcade of words, that it seems to contain the immeasurable eloquence of 
the divine depths’. Alexander IV, De Fontibus Paradisi, Bull of 7 October, 1255, reproduced 
in Summa Fratris Alexandri, IIIA, pp. vii-viii. See also, Robert Prentice, ‘The “De Fontibus 
Paradisi” of Alexander IV on the “Summa Theologica” of Alexander of Hales’, Franciscan 
Studies, 5 (1945), 350-1. 
139 ‘… dilecto filio fratri Guillelmo de Milletona, huic sollicitudini deputato, sedule assistentes 
ipsumque ac se mutuo adiuvantes sine dilationis dispendio praedictae Summae opus 
finaliter exequantur.’ Alexander IV, De Fontibus Paradisi, p. 351. ‘… to our beloved son 
Brother William of Meliton, to whose meticulous care and attentive aid and with his help on 
it, without inconvenience of delay, the work of the aforementioned Summa was finally 
brought to completion’. 
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summa of his own and it is arguable that his energies were instead poured 
into the editing of the Summa Fratris Alexandri, later to co-opt his confreres 
into assisting him. Whoever may have been responsible for initiating the 
project, it is equally difficult to know their reason for doing so. It is, however, 
possible to say with certainty that it was viewed as an important project to 
see through to completion, as the task was picked up following the deaths of 
both Alexander and John of La Rochelle and completed by others. Perhaps it 
was the case that Alexander saw the great advantages and merits in such a 
systematic approach to theological education as the sentence commentary, 
but that he felt a text specifically written for that purpose might serve better 
than the Book of Sentences. It may also be the case that, confronting the 
death of a teacher as influential and so foundational to their own studies to 
that point as Alexander, the friars were moved to capture and preserve, as 
well as they could, his ideas and instruction. They may also have wished to 
preserve a record of the instruction from Alexander, a former secular master, 
to validate the orthodoxy of Franciscan positions during the secular-
mendicant controversy which was still raging at the time of the work’s 
production.140 The scholarship is presently lacking to say with certainty.141 
A summa came to be viewed as the magnum opus of a scholar and a 
chance to show his thought in the fullness of its development. The two 
instances to be considered in this work, the Summa Fratris Alexandri and 
                                                   
140 See pages 128-29 below, discussing Bonaventure invocation of Alexander’s name for just 
this purpose. 
141 The Prolegomena to the Summa Fratris Alexandri (Vol. IIIA) prepared by Victorinus 
Doucet and the other editors of the summa remain still the only thorough consideration of 
the origins of the work. Pages lix-lxxxi provide a good overview of the historical issues 
around its composition and the status quaestionis is summarised on pp. lxxx-lxxxi. Their 
view as to the scholarship that remains to be done is set out on p. ccclxx and most of that 
remains valid today. Like the bulk of scholarship to date on this topic, we understand how 
the work was composed far better than why it was composed. 
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the Breviloquium of Bonaventure, are somewhat atypical. The former is only 
partially the work of its putative author and the latter is uncharacteristically 
succinct.142 Despite this, they both possess the strength of the summa. All 
material is covered so an author’s thoughts on soteriology can readily be 
considered. Moreover, since the structure used in a summa is unique, it 
offers a fresh aspect through which to consider an author’s writing. It is also a 
useful point of contrast with an author’s sentence commentary, revealing the 
matters an author thought of greater or lesser importance in his exposition. 
Thus, while Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo had found itself at the core of 
the treatment of soteriology in the Book of Sentences and its commentaries, 
including Bonaventure’s sentence commentary, when Bonaventure wrote the 
Breviloquium, he omits reference to Anselm’s works in his discussion of 
salvation in favour of an approach of his own. His summa helps give a better 
sense of Bonaventure’s true thoughts on Anselm. 
Like a sentence commentary, the mere presence of a consideration of 
soteriology in a summa signifies little as its inclusion is obligatory. Yet 
further, the summa itself was not compulsory and far from every academic 
author composed one, so even its existence cannot be presumed. The greatest 
utility for the purposes of this present study in summa lies, if it were 
composed, in demonstrating how a theologian would argue a position free of 
the strictures of the Book of Sentences.  
 
Amid this array of genres and forms, none of the authors to be considered 
here wrote a text expressly and solely on the topic of soteriology. What they 
                                                   
142 Bonaventure’s text amounts to 110 pages of text. The summa of Thomas Aquinas, his 
contemporary, is thirty times that length and runs to five volumes. 
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believed about that topic will need to be gleaned from their theology as it was 
couched in these various genres of scholastic writing. Two issues arise from 
this. Firstly, in the absence of explicitly soteriological texts, none of these 
works to be considered expresses the full thought of any author on the topic 
of salvation. At best, we know only some part of their ideas. It follows that at 
times it will prove necessary to extrapolate from such writings as are 
possessed what would be a reasonable expression of their thinking on the 
topic.  
Secondly, just as the development of these scholastic genres evolved to 
meet the needs of the scholars employing them, so too did what these 
scholars wish to say find itself shaped by the format of the specific scholastic 
genre in which it was expressed. What Alexander of Hales had to say on 
salvation in his disputed questions is expressed in terms quite different to 
what was said in his summa. The mere fact that he says much less on an issue 
in the former does not, in the light of the nature of a quaestio disputata, 
necessarily mean that Alexander had grown less interested in a topic or had 
less to say. The genre itself must be understood if the thought expressed in 
that genre is to be fully appreciated. 
As has already been seen, when that first generation of Franciscan 
lectors and graduates, like Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, came 
to write works of their own, they were doing something familiar and 
established but doing it in a setting and context that was fresh and 
unfamiliar. Theologians had always written tracts on Christian belief and had 
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even couched those tracts in scholastic terms for generations.143 These first 
Franciscans were, however, carrying on this tradition in a brand new 
foundation that, employing scholastic pedagogy, united the practical goals of 
a studium with the more theoretical interests of an institute de facto of the 
university’s faculty of theology. This creation had been born of the evolving 
needs of the Franciscans for better training for their preachers, missionaries 
and teachers and it channelled the production of that education into 
formalised expressions of their understanding.144 The Franciscans eagerly 
embraced the genres and forms of academic discourse and it was those 
genres, from sentence commentary to quodlibet and the rest, that were the 
manner in which they said what they believed. So enthusiastic were they and 
the other mendicant friars at doing so that they advanced and helped 
entrench the use of these genres not only in the university but in schooling 
elsewhere, in public disputations, in polemical quarrels and in popular 
instruction. There was a hylomorphic mutuality of influence as the form and 
the substance of this learning shaped each other. 
The literary setting for the Franciscan expression of their ideas about 
salvation prompted the friars both to adduce and to reconcile new opinions 
about salvation. This process gave rise to new ideas far less centred on 
human fault and sin. Likewise, these new Franciscan notions drove those 
textual forms to be used in new ways: sentence commentaries ceased to be 
works simply for the evaluation of students and quodlibets spread to settings 
well outside the classroom. Much of the formalisation of those scholastic 
                                                   
143 See, for example, the overview of scholars and works of this period in Herman-Emiel 
Mertens, Not the Cross but the Crucified: An Essay in Soteriology, trans. by Gert Troch, 
Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs, 11 (Louvain: Peeters, 1990), pp. 63-84. 
144 Roest, Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission, p. 51. 
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genres, of the institutionalisation of Franciscan education and of the interest 
in soteriology are all due to the figure of Alexander of Hales and in his 











2  Alexander of Hales and the Legacy of 
Anselm of Bec 
 
To appreciate the novelty that Franciscans were introducing into the 
systematic consideration of soteriology, an appreciation of what had 
preceded it is needed. The starting point in the scholastic era for soteriology 
were the theories of St Anselm of Bec in his Cur Deus Homo, written in 1098 
and later incorporated into the Book of Sentences.1 While still a secular 
master, Alexander of Hales had further championed the use of Anselm in 
soteriology.2 In theology, soteriology was in some respects the ‘poor cousin’ 
of Christology and had received scant patristic attention. No major text in the 
west were composed on the topic after Irenaeus of Lyons in the late second 
century until Anselm.3 A combination of Anselm’s own considerable intellect 
and of relatively little competition in the field of soteriology meant that 
Anselm’s theories dominated the topic and could not readily be ignored by 
any writer in the field. This was so even though the expressed purpose of the 
Cur Deus Homo was not soteriology but as an apologia for the Incarnation. 
 
                                                   
1 Anselm of Bec, ‘Cur Deus Homo’, in Opera Omnia, ed. by Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 6 
vols (Rome: Sansaini et Soc., 1940-51), II (1940), pp. 37-133.  
2 Michael Robson, ‘The Impact of the Cur Deus Homo on the Early Franciscan School’, in 
Anselm – Aosta, Bec and Canterbury: Papers in Commemoration of the Nine-Hundredth 
Anniversary of Anselm’s Enthronement as Archbishop, 25 September 1093, ed. by D. E. 
Luscombe and G. R. Evans (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), pp. 334-47 (p. 345). 
Robson’s very enlightening statistical analysis demonstrates well how swiftly Anselm’s work 
attained authoritative status. Cf. Jacques Guy Bougerol, ‘Saint Bonaventure et Saint 
Anselme’, Antonianum, 47 (1972), 333-61 (p. 334) and the interesting comparison between 
the Franciscan use of Anselm and other theological traditions. 
3 Irenaeus of Lyons, Adversus Haereses, ed. by Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, 
Sources Chrétiennes, 264 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979). 
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2.1 ANSELM AND PENAL-SUBSTITUTION 
Anselm declares in the work’s preface that the purpose of the book is to show 
that ‘naturam humanum ad hoc institutam esse, ut aliquando immortalitate 
beata totus homo id est in corpore et in anima fruetur; ac necesse esse ut hoc 
fiat de homine, propter quod factus est; sed nonnisi per hominem Deum, 
atque ex necessitate omnia quae de Christo credimus, fieri oportere’.4 The 
later reception of the work at times obscured that this was the purpose of 
Anselm’s work and not the creation of some text of soteriology. There was 
often quite a distance from the original intent of the Cur Deus Homo to its 
reception.5  
Put crudely, Anselm’s reasoning in the work was understood thus: God 
is all-powerful, all good and all just. Any transgression against such perfect 
goodness must therefore offend the divine dignity in an infinite way. The 
perfection of justice, therefore, demanded either penalty for that wrong or 
satisfaction in recompense to be made for that fault. Yet the great and infinite 
price to be paid for that infinite wrong was beyond the ability of a finite 
humanity. All humanity could do, at best, was to return to an observance of 
God’s laws but this is what it was already bound to do. Justice required some 
recompense beyond that which humanity was bound to do yet unable to 
accomplish. Humanity was thus trapped in its own fault. Because it had 
                                                   
4 That ‘human nature was established in order that the whole human being, both body and 
soul, should at some time enjoy blessed immortality and that it was necessary that the 
purpose for which human beings were made should, in fact, be achieved but only through the 
agency of a God-Man and that it was necessary that everything we believe about Christ 
should take place’. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, praefatio. 
5 John McIntyre, Saint Anselm and his Critics: A Reinterpretation of the Cur Deus Homo 
(Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1954); Inos Biffi, Anselmo d’Aosta e dintorni: La Construzione 
della teologia medievale’ (Milan: Jaca, 2007); Frederick van Fleteren, ‘Twenty-Five Years 
(1969-1994) of Anselm Studies in the English-Speaking World’, in Twenty-Five Years (1969-
1994) of Anselm Studies: Review and Critique of Recent Scholarly Views, ed. by Frederick 
van Fleteren and Joseph C. Schnaubelt, Texts and Studies in Religion, 70 (Lewiston, NY: 




wronged God, humanity must pay a price but the price was so great that only 
God was able to pay it. Humanity should give the satisfaction but could not; 
God could give the satisfaction but should not. The solution was therefore a 
God-Man: Jesus Christ. As a man, he could atone for the wrongs of his fellow 
human kind and, as God, he was capable of paying the price required for the 
transgression against the Father.6  
Anselm: Hoc autem fieri nequit, nisi sit, qui solvat Deo 
pro peccato hominis aliquid maius quam omne, quod 
praetor Deum est.  
Boso: Ita constat.  
Anselm: Illum quoque, qui de suo poterit Deo dare 
aliquid, quod superest omne, quod sub Deo est, 
majorem esse necesse est quam omne, quod non est 
Deus.  
Boso: Nequeo negare.  
Anselm: Nihil autem est supra omne, quod Deus non 
est, nisi Deus.  
Boso: Verum est.  
Anselm: Non ergo potest hanc satisfactionem facere 
nisi Deus.  
Boso: Sic sequitur.  
Anselm: Sed nec facere illam debet nisi homo. 
Alioquin non satisfacit homo.  
Boso: Non videtur aliquid justius.  
Anselm: Si ergo, sicut constat, necesse est, ut de 
hominibus perficiatur illa superna civitas, nec hoc esse 
valet, nisi fiat praedicta satisfactio, quam nec potest 
facere nisi Deus nec debet nisi homo, necesse est, ut 
eam faciat Deus homo.  
Boso: Benedictus Deus!7 
                                                   
6 McIntyre, Saint Anselm and his Critics, p. 76. 
7 Ans: But this work cannot be accomplished unless there be someone who pays to God for 
humanity's sin, something greater than all things existing outside God. Boso: This is 
established. Ans: Further, whoever can give to God something of his own which surpasses 
everything that is less than God, must be greater than everything that is not God. Boso: I 
cannot deny this. Ans: But there is nothing that surpasses everything that is not God – 
except God. Boso: This is true. Ans: Therefore, no one can make this satisfaction except 
God. Boso: That follows. Ans: But no one ought to do this except a human being. Otherwise 
humanity would not be making satisfaction. Boso: Nothing seems more just. Ans: If 
therefore, as has been settled, it is necessary that the Heavenly City be completed from 
among humanity, and if this can occur only if the aforementioned satisfaction be made, and 
if no one but God can perform this satisfaction and no one but a human ought to perform it: 
then it is necessary that a God-man perform it. Boso: Blessed be God!’, Anselm of Bec. Cur 
Deus Homo, II. 6. 
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This neat and satisfying solution came to be known as the penal-
substitutionary model of salvation and, for medieval minds at least, 
attractively gave explanations to both the Incarnation and salvation in one 
theory, frequently summarised in a catchphrase drawn from the work: ‘Ipse 
factus est homo ad hoc ut moreretur’.8 
 
2.2  ALEXANDER OF HALES AND THE INCORPORATION OF ANSELM 
Alexander incorporated this Anselmian model into his own teaching and 
writing.9 In many ways, even though he saw and corrected what he perceived 
to be shortcomings in the approach in Cur Deus Homo, Alexander was 
responsible for raising Anselm to the status of an ‘authority’.10 He achieved 
this even though Anselm lacked the antiquity of many others of equal status. 
Yet further, it has already been seen that Alexander established the Book of 
Sentences as the principal text for the university study of systematic 
theology.11 As place and genre came together in the instance of Alexander, he 
produced a particular expression of his teaching in theology, one in which he 
was prompted to make greater use of Anselm’s ideas. Certainly Peter the 
Lombard had given prominence to the Cur Deus Homo in the sentences, but 
Alexander’s redaction of that work with a greatly expanded discussion of 
soteriology and greater use of Anselm in it, made Cur Deus Homo the 
principal soteriological work for students of the discipline for the remainder 
                                                   
8 ‘For this was he made man, that he might die.’ Anselm of Bec, Cur Deus Homo, II. 16. 
9 Jean Rivière, Le Dogme de la Rédemption au début du Moyen Âge (Paris: Vrin, 1934) p. 
421-2 and Biffi, Anselmo d’Aosta, p. 58. 
10 Robson, ‘The Impact of the Cur Deus Homo on the Early Franciscan School’, p. 338.  
11 See page 22 above. 
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of the Middle Ages and beyond.12 Scholastic soteriologians began with 
Anselm even if, like Alexander, they would move on from his ideas. 
Alexander’s own starting point was with his birth some time between 
1180 and 1186, possibly in the village of Hales Owen in Shropshire or, 
alternatively, in Hailes in Gloucestershire while some scholars have argued 
that he merely received his initial schooling in Hailes and that any attempt to 
locate his birthplace is a work of pure speculation.13 He appears to have 
begun his studies in Arts at Oxford, supported by a canonry of St Paul’s in 
London, but it is recorded by Roger Bacon that by 1210 he was at the 
University of Paris and lecturing there in the Faculty of Arts.14 He established 
a considerable reputation for himself in both the content of what he taught 
and, as noted, in his use of the Book of Sentences, as an innovative 
pedagogue. 
In 1231, after some years of having taught them, Alexander chose to 
enter the Friars Minor and famously moved his chair to the Grand Couvent, 
effectively establishing the Franciscan school within the University of Paris.15 
He remained there a teacher and lecturer for the remainder of his life until 
his death on 21 August 1245. During his time there he influenced and taught 
such significant figures as Bonaventure, Eudes Rigaud, Roger Bacon and 
John of La Rochelle, as well as others in the wider Faculty of Theology and, 
through his use of the Book of Sentences as both text and assessment, he 
                                                   
12 Ctirad Václav Pospísĭl, ‘La Soteriologia di San Bonaventura nel periodo parigino della sua 
opera’, Antonianum, 74 (1999), 661-83 (p. 665). Anselm’s ideas still enjoy currency: John R. 
Sheets, The Theology of the Atonement: Readings in Soteriology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall, 1967), p. 19 and John McIntyre, The Shape of Soteriology: Studies in the Doctrine of 
the Death of Christ (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1992), p. 44. 
13 Christopher Cullen, ‘Alexander of Hales’, in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle 
Ages, ed. by Jorge J. E. Garcia and Timothy B. Noone, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, 
24 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 104-08 (p. 104). 
14 Roger Bacon, Opus Minus, ed. by J. S. Brewer, Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi 
Scriptores, 15 (London: Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, 1859), pp. 325-6. 
15 See page 15 above. 
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established a pattern for theological education that would be normative for 
the remainder of the Middle Ages.16 He earned for himself such medieval 
epithets as the Doctor Irrefragabilis, the Doctor Doctorum and the 
Theologorum Monarcha. 
 
2.3  THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER OF HALES 
Alexander left three major works of theology. The first, making use of the 
Book of Sentences, was his Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri 
Lombardi written between 1223 and 1227.17 This gloss is a comparatively 
concise and by no means an exhaustive gloss. There are numerous chapters 
of the Sentences on which Alexander makes no comment at all nor is it a 
comprehensive commentary upon all of the Book of Sentences, thoroughly 
and systematically treating each of theological issues raised. Rather it is, as it 
proclaims, merely a gloss on the sentences. The second of Alexander’s works 
is a series of disputed questions, now gathered together and published as the 
Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’ but composed over the 
decade prior to 1231.18 Finally, Alexander began composition on a Summa, 
known variously as the Summa Halensis or Summa Fratris Alexandri yet, 
despite its name, it is at best only partially the work of Alexander’s hand. The 
majority of it was completed following Alexander’s death in 1245 by students 
and protégés of his, principally John of La Rochelle, William of Meliton and 
                                                   
16 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 124. Friedman, ‘The “Sentences” 
Commentary’, pp. 41-51. 
17 Alexander of Hales, Glossa Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, ed. by 
Collegium S. Bonaventura, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 14 
(Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1951-57), III (1954). 
18 Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, ed. by Collegium S. 
Bonaventura, 3 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19-21 (Quaracchi: 
Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1960). 
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Eudes Rigaud.19 The editors of the summa considered that the internal 
stylistic evidence was compelling for the view that its Book III, which deals 
with Christ and salvation, was unlikely to have been written directly by 
Alexander, although they did concede that certain early portions may have 
been overseen by Alexander. Their conclusion was that Book III was 
predominantly the work of John of La Rochelle but it nevertheless does 
reflect Alexander’s thought more or less faithfully.  
Ipse Alexander quodammodo Summam fecit (critica 
externa), sed collaborantibus aliis (critica interna); 
item, ex propriis maxime scriptis, sed etiam ex alienis. 
Quare et authentica et halesiana quodammodo Summa 
dici potest, non autem simpliciter.20 
 
This was not the first Summa to have been composed but was still 
uncommon. Whoever the authors may have been, they were certainly moved 
to preserve Alexander’s teaching in this particular genre. The Summa did 
come into being during one of the increasingly acrimonious phases of the 
secular-mendicant controversy and it is quite possible that its compilation 
facilitated the friars’ ability to gird their theological positions with the ideas 
of a genuine Franciscan scholar but one who had also been a secular master 
and so less likely to be criticised by his former colleagues.21 Whether its 
composition was for that purpose or not, the Summa Fratris Alexandri 
shows itself to be an instance of interplay between locus and genre in his 
soteriological study. Brought together into the one place of the Grand 
                                                   
19 See further the discussion on pages 51-53 above and the references there of the work of 
Doucet. For further on the authorship of the Summa Fratris Alexandri, see also Ignatius 
Brady, ‘The Summa Theologica of Alexander of Hales (1924-1948)’, Archivum 
Franciscanum Historicum, 70 (1977), 437-47 (p. 444) and Colish, ‘From the Sentence 
Collection to the Sentence Commentary and the Summa’, pp. 17 and 26. 
20 ‘In a certain way, Alexander himself created the Summa (external analysis), but by means 
of other collaborators (internal analysis); this is especially so for certain passages but even so 
by extrinsic material. In a certain way, the Summa can be called authentic and Halesian, but 
not absolutely’. Summa Fratris Alexandri, III A, Prologomena, p. CCCCLXIX. 
21 As to the secular - mendicant controversy, see pages 84-86 below. 
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Couvent, these Franciscan scholars assembled a text that perpetuated a 
distinctly Alexandrine theological approach. Further, possessing such a text, 
it was used not only by scholars generally, but it also served new Franciscans 
specifically for the purposes of their training there. Having a common course 
of studies, drawing on a common theological compendium, fostered a 
common approach and trajectory to their theological activities.22 
 
2.4  THE GLOSSA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM PETRI LOMBARDI 
The soteriological sections of the Book of Sentences itself appear in 
distinctions 18 to 21 of Book III and observing which and in what fashion 
these passages were glossed by Alexander reveal something of his approach 
to the topic.23 It discloses Alexander’s marked reliance on the works of 
Anselm. With the exception of one reference to Bernard of Clairvaux, 
Alexander’s only cited author after the patristic age is Anselm. He is all but 
the lone ‘modern’ voice. Moreover, Alexander’s generous use of him would 
indicate that, in this topic at least, he considers Anselm to be an authoritative 
voice and he sets aside more established patristic figures in this topic as John 
Damascene and Gregory the Great. Furthermore, in the material that 
Alexander introduces to these soteriological sections, no author is used more 
frequently than Anselm, whom he cites in these distinctions eighteen times, 
ahead even of Augustine.  
In none of those references does Alexander disagree with the 
reasoning or conclusions of Anselm; each of the references made to his 
writing is for the purpose of employing them as authority for Alexander’s 
                                                   
22 Alexander IV, De Fontibus Paradisi, exhorts just such activity among Franciscan scholars. 
23 Of course, the precise distinctions in various commentaries could vary from author to 
author. See page 40 above. 
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argument. The densest concentration of reliance on Anselm is in Distinction 
20, De Christi Passionis Congruentia.24 In it, Alexander agrees with Anselm 
that it was fitting for humanity to pay the price of redemption since it was 
humanity that had sinned.25 He sides with Anselm against Augustine in 
noting the congruence of the way in which humanity was redeemed:26 
mortality sprang from disobedience but was restored by Christ’s obedience, 
sin arose from a woman saying yes to Satan but salvation arose from a 
woman saying yes to God, and Satan wrought suffering through offering the 
fruit of a tree, while Christ conquered death and suffering by offering himself 
as fruit upon the tree of the cross.27 Alexander employs Anselm as authority 
for the proposition that human suffering does not derive from any power of 
Satan over humanity but merely that this suffering is permitted in God’s 
omnipotence and that, likewise, Christ’s death at the hands of the wicked did 
not mean that evil prevailed over good.28 Alexander again prefers Anselm 
over Augustine in discussing whether Jesus’s persecutors knew that he was 
the Son of God. Alexander quotes Augustine’s observation that, ‘Maiores 
                                                   
24 ‘Concerning the appropriateness of Christ’s passion’. 
25 Alexander of Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, III, d. 20, n. 1. ‘Redimere est 
rem suam pro iusto et condigno pretio recuperare’. ‘To redeem and recover his item for a just 
and fitting prioce’. 
26 Specifically, Augustine of Hippo, De Trinitate, ed. by John E. Rotelle, The Works of Saint 
Augustine, 5 (Brooklyn NY: New City Press, 1991), XIII, c. 18, n. 23 in which Augustine 
asserts that this means best suited the action of God’s power in order to effect human 
redemption. 
27 Alexander of Hales, Glossa III, d. 20, n. 3. ‘Sicut per hominis inobedientiam mors in 
humanum genus intraverat, ita oportebat ut per hominis obedientiam vita restitueretur; et 
quemadmodum peccatum, quod fuit causa nostrae damnationis, initium habuit a femina, sic 
nostrae iustitiae auctor nasceretur de femina; et sicut diabolus qui, per gustum ligni quem 
persuasit, hominem decepit et vicerat, sic per passionem ligni quam intulit ab homine 
vinceretur’. ‘Just as through human disobedience death entered into the human race, so it 
was fitting that through an obedient man life be restored; and in like fashion sin, which was 
the cause of our damnation, has its origin in a woman for the author of our justification was 
born of a woman; and just as the devil deceived humanity and succeeded, through the taste 
of the tree which tempted, so through the passion upon a tree victory was brought about 
through a man’. See also Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I. 3. 
28 Alexander of Hales, Glossa III, d. 20, n. 5 and n. 8(i), ‘Quamvis homo iuste a diabolo 
torqueretur et Deus iuste permitteret, non tamen diabolus iuste eum sed iniuste torquebat.’ 
‘Although a man is justly tormented by the devil, and God justly allows this, yet the Devil not 
justly but unjustly torments him.’ 
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Iudaei, ut scribae, cognoverunt ipsum esse Christum et in lege promissum’, 
but dismisses it in favour of Anselm’s reasoning that, ‘Nullus homo unquam 
potuit scienter velle occidere vel interficere Deum’.29 On the basis of that, 
Alexander notes approvingly Anselm’s reasoning that Jesus died not through 
the efforts of his persecutors or even through his own desire to die but rather 
through his pursuit of true justice, whereby the original sin is redeemed by 
original justice.30 Anselm is Alexander’s authority for the proposition that the 
Second Person of the Trinity was the fitting person to act as redeemer and 
mediator and that human redemption in the manner in which it occurred 
was the product of God’s will rather than of necessity.31  
This pattern is consistent throughout all those occasions in these 
distinctions in which Alexander employs Anselm’s writings; on matters 
dealing with human redemption, Anselm is the favoured authority and in any 
disagreement among the authorities, Anselm is preferred even over figures 
like Augustine, whom Alexander even omits at times.32 The significance of 
this for future theological consideration of soteriology is marked, for no 
subsequent theological student could or would consider the workings of 
salvation without addressing the theories of Anselm. Alexander’s actions had 
effectively ‘canonised’ the penal–substitutionary theories of Anselm about 
                                                   
29 Alexander of Hales, Glossa III, d. 20, n. 8(ii). ‘The leaders of the Jews, like the scribes, 
knew he was the Messiah, the one promised in the Law’... ‘No one would ever be able 
knowingly to want to kill or slay God’.  
30 Alexander of Hales, Glossa III, d. 20, n. 10, 235. ‘Non coegit Deus ipsum mori, in quo 
nullum fuit peccatum; sed ipse sponte sustinuit mortem; non per obedientiam deserendi 
vitam, sed sequendi iustitiam, in qua perseveravit’. 
31 Alexander of Hales, Glossa III, d. 20, n. 11, 235 and n. 13, 236. ‘Est necessitas quae 
benefacienti gratiam aufert vel minuit. Est etiam necessitas qua maior gratia benefacienti 
debetur. Cum enim aliquis ex necessitate cui subiacet invitus facit, aut nulla aut minor gratia 
debetur; cum vero sponte necessitati benefaciendi se subdit, maiorem beneficii gratiam 
meretur, ut cum quis vovet sponte conversationis sanctae propositum. Improprie tamen de 
Deo dicitur necessitas’. 
32 For example, in just the twentieth distinction, Alexander in his gloss makes use of the Cur 
Deus Homo in nn. 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 17, 19, 22, 23 and 24. Augustine’ De Trinitate in 
contrast is listed among the authorities ‘contra’ in n. 3 
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salvation as a topic with which future theologians working in soteriology had 
to contend.  
 
2.5  QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE ‘ANTEQUAM ESSET FRATER’ 
Alexander’s Glossa is useful to discover how he incorporated Anselm’s 
thought into his commentary on the Book of Sentences but to discover 
Alexander’s own soteriology requires a consideration of his other works. It 
has already been observed that the Summa Fratris Alexandri is the work of a 
number of other hands such as John of la Rochelle and William of Meliton 
but only minimally of Alexander, if at all.33 For this reason, it is proposed not 
to consider the Summa Fratris Alexandri directly as ideas from the Summa 
cannot be attributed to Alexander with sufficient certainty. Instead, 
consideration of Alexander’s ideas will be through use of the earlier but 
incontestably authentic work of his, his Quaestiones Disputatae.34 These will 
be the primary source for reading Alexander’s approach and use of the 
Summa Fratris Alexandri will instead be confined to verification of these 
ideas. Nevertheless, before putting aside the Summa, there is merit to be 
gained from examining the structure of the questioning within it, especially 
in the areas that the Summa expands.  
Appendix 1 below reveals that Alexander includes nearly everything 
soteriological that Peter the Lombard had previously raised; with the 
exception of the hypothetical questions dealing with possible alternate means 
of salvation, everything that Peter the Lombard considers, so too does 
                                                   
33 See pages 51-53 above. See also Victorinus Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the 
Authenticity of the Summa’, Franciscan Studies, 7 (1947), 26-41, 274-312.  
34 Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, specifically 
questions 15 and 16. 
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Alexander.35 The great difference is not in the omissions from the Summa 
but rather in the additions to it. Alexander introduces greatly expanded 
discussions on how exactly Jesus Christ earned merit, how and where it was 
that Christ suffered and the necessity for Christ’s suffering. Put in other 
terms, while he broadly accepts Anselm’s model, Alexander displays a 
particular interest in exploring in greater detail how Christ suffered, why 
Christ suffered and to what end Christ suffered.  
For Anselm, it is only the divinity of the God-Man that is capable of 
making the satisfaction that achieves salvation: ‘redemptio hominis non 
potuit fieri per aliam quam per Dei personam’.36 It can be said that the 
function served by his humanity is simply to be present as a nature of the 
God-Man so that satisfaction can be attributed to it. In the words of McCord 
Adams, ‘his identification with us is for legal purposes – to make satisfaction 
without being a middle man’.37 In the questions that Alexander poses and in 
the structuring of the Summa, he demonstrates discontent with this notion, 
greatly expanding the role and place for Christ’s humanity and what that 
humanity endures in making satisfaction for the fall.  
Alexander begins by establishing that Christ was passible. He argues 
that the human flesh in which the Word was incarnated was not the perfect 
humanity of the initial creation but the humanity of the time and place in 
which it took flesh. Thus it suffered from what Alexander termed the ‘defects 
of punishment’ and was frail and mortal as a result of the fall. However, 
being sinless, Jesus was free of the ‘defects of guilt’ and so enjoyed the 
                                                   
35 See page2 317-28 below. 
36 ‘Human redemption could not have been brought about by other than a divine person’, 
Anselm of Bec, Cur Deus Homo, I. 5. See further pages 68-69 above. 
37 Marilyn McCord Adams, What Sort of Human Nature? Medieval Philosophy and the 
Systematics of Christology, Aquinas Lecture 1999 (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University 
Press, 1999), p. 16. 
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communion with God proper to the human state. Thus any passibility in 
Christ came as a result of the nature that he assumed and not from any action 
by him. Further, as an incarnate being, he was subject to both ‘defects of the 
body’, such as hunger and fatigue, and to ‘defects of the spirit’, such as fear 
and sorrow. Unlike the defects of punishment which were of the nature of 
what he had assumed, these latter defects were ones he freely chose to 
accept.38 
In considering how it was that satisfaction was wrought, Alexander 
reasons from the general experience of human contrition: 
Quia in contritione, quando homo plene satisfacit pro 
peccato, tria exiguntur: poenalia opera exteriora; 
praeter hoc etiam exiguntur sensus huiusmodi poenae 
in sensualitate; et praeter hoc oportet quod sit sibi 
voluntas dolendi et patiendi in ratione. Ergo ista 
requiruntur ad perfectam satisfactionem illius peccati 
quod corrupit totum genus humanum vel naturam. 
Ergo oportuit in passione Christi, quae fuit 
satisfactoria, esse poenalia opera exterior, et sensum 
horum in sensualitate, et voluntatem dolendi in 
ratione.39 
 
Alexander is clear that unless all three are present, no true satisfaction is 
made and thus that Christ’s human nature must play a role in the making of 
Anselmian satisfaction, beyond merely being present. He says that there is 
great glory in making satisfaction for the fall of humanity but states explicitly 
that ‘haec gloria aufferetur nisi essent illa tria, quia aliter non esset sufficiens 
                                                   
38 Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 15, d. 2, m. 2; cf 
Summa Fratris Alexandri III, i. 1, t. 1, q. 4, d. 3, m. 3, c. 1. 
39 ‘Because when in contrition a person fully makes satisfaction for sin, three things are 
needed: outward works of penance, further the feeling of this penalty is needed in the 
person’s senses and further it is fitting that there be a choice to sorrow and suffer in the will. 
Thus, these are required for the perfect satisfaction of that sin which corrupts the entire 
human race and human nature. Therefore, it was proper in Christ’s passion, which did make 
satisfaction, that there were outward works of penance, a feeling of them in the senses and a 
choice to sorrow over them in the will.’ Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae 
‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 16, d. 2, m. 5. 
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satisfactio’.40 He argued that if Christ merely went through the necessary 
motions of dying on the cross and rising again to effect human redemption, 
then that would have been insufficient. As true man, Christ had to have been 
emotionally involved in his affect as well, lest the agent of human redemption 
be something less than a true human and so inadequate, in Anselm’s terms, 
to pay the recompense for human sin. As a human, it was essential that 
Christ felt contrition for human sin: ‘Licet patiar poenam in corpore, et 
compatiar illi poenae in anima, nisi adhuc sit dolor de peccato, non est vera 
satisfactio.’41  
Moreover, these three elements are not things that divinity alone is 
able to provide; such emotional engagement is proper solely to the humanity 
of Christ. Such a conclusion creates, however, a complication for Alexander. 
If Christ knew that his act would bring about human redemption, surely in 
his reason there was then no ‘voluntas dolendi’ as Alexander stipulated but 
rather immense joy from human salvation. To surmount this problem, 
Alexander proceeds to distinguish two elements in the higher part of the will 
(i.e. that which is not shared with animals nor concerned with primal drives 
such as the need for shelter, food, self-preservation, etc.): reason as nature, 
which Alexander says apprehends through its union with flesh and innate 
knowledge and so governs matters such as health and self-discipline, and 
reason as reason which apprehends through choice and deliberation. Reason 
as reason knew of its union with divinity and so of the satisfactory purpose of 
                                                   
40 ‘this glory will be borne away unless all three are present, since otherwise it is not 
sufficient satisfaction.’ Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, 
q. 16, d. 2, m. 5. 
41 ‘For even if he suffered punishment in his body and suffered that punishment in his soul as 
well, unless there was also sorrow for sin, there would not be true satisfaction’. Alexander of 
Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 16, d. 4, m. 5. 
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suffering; it was disposed to the ‘passibility that was joy’. Reason as nature, 
however, suffered with the body and willed to sorrow.  
Dico ergo quod secundum superiorem partem ratio 
unibilis est carni, quia secundum omnem partem 
unibilis est ei. Sic, secundum quod est natura quaedam, 
compassibilis est. Secundum vero quod ratio unita est 
deitati, ex illa ordinatione non est compassibilis dolore 
mortis, sed necessitatem habet ad gaudium. Aliter, 
enim non congrue satisfaceret Christus, nisi esset in eo 
summum gaudium de summa poenalitate.42  
 
Alexander has thereby advanced matters. Beyond active engagement 
in satisfaction and the feeling and desire for suffering, Alexander now insists 
that Christ’s humanity must have some engagement with the ‘summum 
gaudium de summa poenalitate’.  
 
2.6  THE ROLE OF HUMAN AFFECTIVITY IN SALVATION 
Alexander reasons that joy must have a soteriological significance, for if 
Christ did not exult fully in his making of perfect satisfaction then either the 
satisfaction was imperfect or Christ was no true man, in which case, again, 
the satisfaction for the sin of the first parents was incomplete. He argues that 
all of Christ must participate in the salvation, act, will and affect, or no true 
human has paid the price of human salvation. Alexander, it can be said, is 
unwilling to let the rendering of satisfaction be reduced to the mere 
fulfilment of some divine formula for aggrieved dignity and justice. If Anselm 
is right and it does indeed fall to humanity to pay the price of the fall, then, 
Alexander maintains, it must be the fullness of humanity that pays. The act 
                                                   
42 ‘Thus I say that it follows, since the higher part of the will is joined to the flesh, each part is 
so joined with it. Thus, that part according to nature suffers with it. But that part which is 
reason united to divinity, by virtue of that arrangement, does not suffer under sorrow of 
death but has a need to rejoice. For otherwise it is not fitting that Christ make satisfaction 
unless there be in him the highest joy over the highest penalty’. Alexander of Hales, 
Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 16, d. 2, m. 3. Cf. membra 6 and 7 also. 
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alone is insufficient and humanity must engage with what was done. Christ’s 
humanity must feel the pain of the fall, the guilt of the wrong, the contrition 
for the sin, the desire for reconciliation, the agony of the cost and the joy of 
what was accomplished.  
It is worth noting here the subtle but profound novelty that Alexander 
has introduced into Anselm’s ideas. By drawing a distinction between the 
‘ratio ut ratio’ and the ‘ratio ut natura’, Alexander has made it possible for 
that part of Christ’s soul that was aware of the union of natures in him to 
rejoice with the greatest joy at the redemption that his suffering and death 
has brought about while, at the same time, that part of Christ’s soul that was 
not aware of the union was able to suffer with his body and will to apply it as 
penitential satisfaction. The significance of this is that the latter function is 
capable of being performed by Christ’s humanity alone.  
As Alexander argued, there must be in him the ‘highest sorrow’ in this 
act or no satisfaction is made.43 Anselm had, conversely, been explicit that 
‘redemptio hominis non potuit fieri per aliam quam per Dei personam’ and 
reasons that:44 
Nullus unquam homo moriendo praeter illum Deo 
dedit quod aliquando necessitate perditurus non erat, 
aut solvit quod non debebat. Ille vero sponte Patri 
obtulit quod nulla necessitate umquam amissurus erat, 
et solvit pro peccatoribus quod pro se non debebat. 
Quapropter ille multo magis dedit exemplum, ut 
unusquisque quod aliquando incunctanter amissurus 
est, pro se ipse reddere Deo cum ratio postulat non 
dubitet, qui cum nullatenus aut pro se indigeret aut 
cogeretur pro aliis, quibus nihil nisi poenam debebat, 
                                                   
43 Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 16, d. 2, m. 3. See 
page 73 above. 
44 ‘Human redemption could not have been brought about by other than a divine person’, 
Anselm of Bec, Cur Deus Homo, I. 5. 
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tam pretiosam vitam, immo se ipsum, tantam scilicet 
personam tanta voluntate dedit.45 
 
For Anselm, the ability to make the satisfaction required for redemption is 
exclusively within the capacity of a Divine person; no human was capable of 
it. This is not the case for Alexander, who argues instead that there is an 
aspect of the satisfaction that a divine person cannot make and that is unique 
to humanity, namely the will to sorrow:  
In poena satisfactoria duo sunt: voluntas et poena; non 
oportet ergo quod poena Christi maior sit quam illa pro 
qua satisfecit. Fuit enim in Christo separatio animae a 
carne, et compassio separationis; et praeterea dolor pro 
peccato humani generis, sine quo non esset satisfactum 
etiam cum aliis duobus, sicut patet in vera contritione. 
Licet patiar poenam in corpore, et compatiar illi poenae 
in anima, nisi adhuc sit dolor de peccato, non est vera 
satisfactio. Licet autem poena Christi non fuit maior 
quam poena pro qua fuit satisfactum, tamen voluntas 
Christi excellebat poenam originalis peccati, quae fuit 
in separatione a Deo. Voluntas autem haec secuta est ex 
coniunctione humanae naturae cum divina; unde 
congrue fuit satisfactoria pro separatione humanae a 
divina. Dico ergo quod haec satisfactio non tantum fuit 
propter separationem quae fuit in carne, vel propter 
compassionem separationis; sed propter voluntatem 
Christi, quae fuit ex coniunctione humanitatis cum 
divinitate, fuit satisfactum pro separatione. Haec enim 
voluntas fuit nobilissima.46 
                                                   
45 ‘In dying, no man ever gave something to God that he was not going of necessity to lose 
anyway, nor repay what he did not owe. Yet he [Christ] by his will offered to the Father what 
was never going to be lost through any necessity and repaid for sinners what he did not owe 
for himself. On account of which he gave much more than an example, so that each person 
that is going to lose something might not hesitate but give it over to God for himself without 
delay when reason requires. Without needing anything at all for himself or being obliged for 
others to whom he owed nothing but punishment, he surrendered so precious a life, or 
rather his very self, which is to say he yielded so great a person with so great a will.’ Anselm 
of Bec, Cur Deus Homo, II. 18. 
46 ‘In satisfaction of a penalty there are two things: the penalty and will. It follows therefore 
that it is not fitting that Christ suffer more than is necessary to make satisfaction. Now, there 
was in Christ separation of the soul from the flesh and suffering at this separation and, 
moreover, sorrow for the sin of the human race, without which there was no satisfaction 
even with those two elements, just as is clear in genuine contrition. Granted, I might suffer 
some penalty in my body and I might suffer with that penalty in my soul, but unless there is 
also sorrow for sin, it is not true satisfaction. But Christ’s penalty was not more than the 
penalty for which he made satisfaction, yet Christ’s will exceeded the penalty for the original 
sin in which there was separation from God. Fittingly, it follows that this will, from the 
conjunction of the human nature with the divine, made satisfaction for the separation of the 
human nature from the divine. I therefore say that this satisfaction was enough not due to 
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Put simply, if Christ did not will to sorrow, an act that could only be done by 
the ‘ratio ut natura’ and was thus unique to his human nature, no true 
satisfaction was accomplished. 
 
2.7  SUMMA FRATRIS ALEXANDRI 
In the light of the foregoing and the heightened role given to the humanity of 
Christ, it is possible now to turn to the questions posed in the Summa Fratris 
Alexandri and appreciate the theological context in which are posed 
questions such as ‘Whether Christ suffered according to his senses?’ and 
‘Whether the passion in Christ was according to his entire will?’ The answers 
to these questions are all instances of the reasoning that Alexander had 
demonstrated in his disputed questions.47  
In the first question of the fifth tractate, the Summa establishes that 
Christ was capable of suffering and then establishes where Christ 
experienced this suffering. It poses four questions about the necessity for 
Christ’s passion and in answering these, it borrows directly from Anselm and 
the Cur Deus Homo.48 The following question asks if Christ’s passion was in 
accord with divine justice and, as to be expected, the Summa again quotes 
from and concurs with Anselm that it was so.49 
                                                                                                                                                
the separation of what was in the flesh nor on account of the suffering from that separation 
but rather because Christ’s will, which was a union of humanity with divinity, made it 
satisfaction for the separation. Hence this will was the most noble.’ Alexander of Hales, 
Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’ q. 16, d. 4, m. 5. 
47 Respectively Summa III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 2, c. 1, a. 1 - which holds that Christ did suffer in 
his senses but as this was part of his lower nature, it was a result of his assumption in power 
and not from weakness (see pages 70-71 above), and Summa III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 2, c. 1, a. 3 
which reaffirms that Christ suffered in his natural will but not his deliberative will. 
48 Summa III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 3: De necessitate passionis Christi. De necessitate passionis 
Christi quantum ad causam inferiorem vel formalem? De necessitate passionis Christi 
quantum ad inferiorem causam finalem. De necessitate passionis Christi quantum ad 
causam superiorem efficientem.  
49 Summa III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 4, c. 1, a. 1. Alexander’s replies quote generously from Cur 
Deus Homo I, chapters 7-9. 
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At this point, the text takes a new tack in posing two questions not put 
by Peter the Lombard: Whether Christ’s passion was in accord with divine 
mercy and whether it was fitting for us.50 For the answer to neither of these 
does the Summa turn to Anselm but reasons rather, after Augustine, that sin 
arises from human desires looking to be fulfilled other than in God and in the 
human appetites for riches, sweetness and honours.51 Alexander puts forward 
that the Incarnate Word despises these things and chooses instead poverty, 
worthlessness and subjection. Divine mercy seeks the happiness of an object 
and this, in turn, requires freedom from sin. Had the Word chosen the 
common human path of prosperity, that could not be said to be in accord 
with mercy since it would in no way draw humanity back from sin. However, 
it did not so choose and humanity was drawn back from sin. Thus, Christ’s 
death was both effective and in accord with divine mercy. While this is a 
notion not seen previously in Alexander’s disputed questions, its harmony 
with the reasoning employed in them is readily apparent. It is insufficient for 
Christ merely to die; to save Christ also ‘appetivit paupertatem, vilitatem et 
subjectionem’.52 Once again Alexander goes beyond Anselm in arguing that 
there must be some affective engagement with the humanity of Christ beyond 
the mere act of satisfaction in order for it to be efficacious. 
 
2.8  THE ROLE OF THE HUMAN NATURE OF CHRIST 
The Summa then turns to a consideration of the efficacy and consequences of 
Christ’s passion and death in which, broadly speaking, it adheres to the 
                                                   
50 Summa III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 4, c. 1, a. 2 and c. 2, a. 1. Utrum passio Christi conveniat 
divinae misericordiae; De Convenientia passionis Christi quoad nos. 
51 Augustine, De Vera Religione, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, 32 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1962), XVI. 31. 




established patristic authorities. Its principal innovation is in respect of 
human engagement with the making of satisfaction.  
The Summa Fratris Alexandri leaves a quite different depiction of the 
Jesus Christ who makes the sacrifice upon the cross than had been left by 
Anselm. As did Alexander, it affords an active role to Christ’s humanity in the 
economy of salvation. Anselm left himself open to the interpretation that it 
was enough merely for humanity to be present in the agent of redemption, so 
that justice could be fulfilled by a divine being rendering the satisfaction. 
Anselm explicitly denies a broader part for humanity in the work of 
redemption.53 
Alexander argues rather that the humanity of Christ must do more 
than merely be present; it must actively engage with the making of the 
satisfaction. Jesus’ will must choose to render satisfaction, his body must feel 
it and his emotions must be moved by it; if he does not, it cannot be said that 
a real human truly and fully made the satisfaction as Anselm’s reasoning 
demands. Accordingly, Alexander does not hesitate to insert an entirely new 
section into the structure of the Book of Sentences dealing with the nature 
and locus of Christ’s passibility and suffering.54 He thereby becomes the first 
writer of the thirteenth century to offer a systematic treatment of Jesus’s 
passions.55 While preserving the divinity of Christ necessary to render 
adequate satisfaction as Anselm has explained it, Alexander goes to great 
lengths to provide the means whereby the humanity of Christ can interact 
                                                   
53 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I 5. 
54 Summa III, i. 1, t. 5, q.1, m.3. Taylor Coolman, ‘Salvific Affectivity of Christ according to 
Alexander of Hales’, The Thomist, 71 (2008), 1-38 (p. 4). 
55 Paul Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 61 (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 2002), p. 90. 
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with the experience of the passion and so contribute to the making of 
satisfaction.  
While Alexander himself does not explicitly make this criticism, he 
does appear to be wrestling with an apparent shortcoming in Anselm’s 
model, that of an ill-developed understanding of the true fullness of human 
nature in Christ. Anselm’s presentation leaves him open, like a sort of 
Apollinarist monophysite, to the accusation that he has portrayed Christ as a 
Divine being inhabiting a human form. The humanity of Christ is present but 
it does little.  
‘Divinam enim naturam absque dubio asserimus 
impassibilem, nec ullatenus posse a sua celsitudine 
humiliari, nec in eo quod vult facere laborare. Sed 
Dominum Iesum Christum dicimus Deum verum et 
verum hominem, unam personam in duabus naturis et 
duas naturas in una persona. Quapropter cum dicimus 
Deum aliquid humile aut infirmum pati, non hoc 
intelligimus secundum sublimitatem impassibilis 
naturae, sed secundum infirmitatem humanae 
substantiae quam gerebat.56 
 
This ‘human substance that he bore’ is all too frequently in Anselm’s 
depiction like a frail garment in which the Second Person clothed itself. 
Whatever the outward vesture, what is within remains divine. In fairness to 
Anselm, he does not deny that Christ suffers in the passion but for him it is of 
secondary importance and certainly of no salvific significance. For Anselm, it 
is Christ’s death and his death alone that renders adequate satisfaction.57 Yet 
                                                   
56 ‘For we claim that the divine nature is without doubt impassible, that it cannot in any way 
be brought down from its lofty heights and that it expends no effort in anything it wills to do. 
But we say that the Lord Jesus Christ is true God and true man, one person in two natures 
and two natures in one person. So when we say that God endured lowliness or weakness, we 
do not understand this according to the sublimity of his impassible nature but according to 
the weakness of the human substance that he bore’. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I. 9. 
57 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, II 14, in which Anselm establishes that Christ’s death outweighs 
human sin and so is the means by which redemption is achieved. ‘Vides, igitur, quomodo vita 
haec vincat omnia peccata, si pro illis detur.’ ‘You see, therefore, how this may overcome all 
sin, if it is given for them.’ 
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even that death and experience of mortality has value for Anselm only 
inasmuch as it pertains to Christ’s divinity. Unlike Alexander, Anselm argues 
that the human nature assumed in the Incarnation was a pure one and thus 
immortal and not a corrupted mortal one; it therefore was not subject to 
death. The death that Christ experienced was a generous act of divine 
omnipotence choosing to lay down life and then take it up again. Anselm 
reasons that since he was divine, ‘poterit igitur nunquam mori si volet et 
poterit mori et resurgere. Sive autem animam suam ponat nullo alio faciente, 
sive alius hoc faciat, ut eam ponat ipso permittente: quantum a potestatem 
nihil differt’.58 Even the suffering of the passion is immaterial, the vileness of 
his betrayal and death has no part and the resurrection plays no role at all; it 
is enough simply that Christ wills to die in order to carry out the justice 
needed to offer recompense for the fall. 
In contrast, Alexander of Hales, while preserving the broad framework 
of Anselm’s penal substitution, has a portrayal of Christ in which his human 
nature is more authentically depicted and now invested with salvific 
significance. For Alexander, Jesus Christ must experience genuine fear, must 
actually suffer and feel pain and his human will, without the benefit of divine 
foreknowledge, must freely choose to undergo these.59 He accepts Anselm’s 
reasoning that justice requires that humanity must offer recompense for the 
wrong done by it, but goes further than Anselm in, while still accepting that 
the aid of divinity is needed to render adequate satisfaction, identifying and 
explaining just what it is that the human nature of Jesus Christ can and does 
                                                   
58 ‘He thus will never be able to die but if he so wills, he will be able to die and rise again. 
Now it makes no difference to his power whether he lays down his life with no one else 
causing him to do so or he permits someone else to cause him to lay down his life.’ Anselm, 
Cur Deus Homo, II. 11. 
59 Summa Fratris Alexandri III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 1-2. Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam 
Esset Frater’, q. 16, d. 2, m. 3. 
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offer in the making of that satisfaction.60 Alexander’s innovation is to 
establish that actions of Christ’s divinity alone are insufficient satisfaction. 
Acts of his humanity are also essential. Further and consequent upon this, 
Alexander disagrees with Anselm and states that the mere death of Christ is 
insufficient; it is necessary also that Christ should suffer and suffer most 
grievously at the hands of human kind.61 It is in this suffering that Christ’s 
humanity engages with the act of salvation and this is essential for human 
redemption.62 Moreover, not just human passibility is required but so too is 
human affectivity and human will to join with the acts of the divine nature in 
order to make sufficient satisfaction.63 
Put otherwise, Alexander does not accept Anselm’s claim, ‘For this he 
was made man, so that he might die’.64 Christ must be human, in Alexander’s 
reasoning, to interact with the experience of his passion and death and 
thereby have humanity truly participate in rendering the satisfaction upon 
which Anselm’s model insists.  
 
Making findings such as these were not simply the fruit of Alexander’s 
ponderings. Answering the questions posed in the Book of Sentences, even if 
they had been revised by Alexander himself, obliged him to turn his mind 
along particular paths and address issues about the redemption effected by 
the Incarnate Word of which Anselm had never previously written. Alexander 
shaped the Book of Sentences and gave it the form by which it would ever 
                                                   
60 Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 15, d. 3, m. 1; 
Summa Fratris Alexandri III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 3. 
61 Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’ q. 16, d. 2, m. 3; 
Summa Fratris Alexandri III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 5, c. 1; m. 4, a. 2, c. 2. 
62 Summa Fratris Alexandri III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 3, c. 2. Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae 
‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 16, d. 3, m. 5. 
63 Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 16, d. 4, m. 5. 
64 ‘Ipse factus est homo ad hoc ut moreretur’. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, II. 16. 
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after be studied but that format moulded Alexander’s theological conclusions 
also.65  
These new conclusions spread from Alexander, who was both lector 
and the first regent master at the Grand Couvent. His eminence as a scholar 
was such that the brothers of the ‘Doctor Doctorum’ chose to commit his 
thought to writing in the Summa Fratris Alexandri. These two systems, that 
of the studium preparing lectos for every province of the order and that of the 
university preparing for degrees the foremost minds of the order and its 
future leaders, both institutionalised by the operation of the Franciscan 
educational system of Paris, gave a durability and prominence to his ideas 
that his colleagues in the faculty of theology did not possess. No Franciscan 
could subsequently undertake studies in theology without engaging with the 
ideas and insights of Alexander of Hales. The confluence of his own abilities 
and the operation of Franciscan education gave longevity to his thinking and 
instruction. Franciscan students hereafter possessed a starting point in 
soteriological study common to them all: Alexander’s development of 
Anselm’s model of penal-substitution. 
That development by Alexander was a greatly expanded emphasis on 
the place of Christ’s human nature in the furnishing of satisfaction. Christ’s 
‘sensualitas’ must endure the pain of the passion, his ‘affectus’ must 
experience grief at this suffering, his ‘ratio ut natura’ must will himself to feel 
sorrow at the human sin for which Christ suffers and his ‘ratio ut ratio’ must 
will him to exalt with the greatest joy at the redemption which these acts have 
fashioned. 
                                                   
65 Ignatius Brady, ‘The Distinctions of Lombard’s Bok of Sentences and Alexander of Hales’, 
Franciscan Studies, 25 (1965), 90-116. 
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3  Eudes Rigaud and the Secular-Mendicant 
Controversy 
 
The first Franciscan student in Paris for whom we possess one of those 
sentence commentary upon which Alexander insisted is Eudes Rigaud. He 
was a pupil of Alexander while the latter was yet still a secular master. Unlike 
many of his confreres, in the case of Eudes there is some certainty of the 
details of his life. He had been born around the year 1210 in Brie-Comte-
Robert to a house of minor nobility, the seigneurs of Courquetaine, an estate 
about thirty kilometres south east of Paris.1 His family had many members 
entering the service of the Church and in the early 1230s, while still a student 
at the University of Paris, Eudes followed them, joining the Friars Minor.2 He 
was an accomplished student and in 1241 was one of the ‘four masters’ who 
wrote the first commentary on the Franciscan Rule.3  
By 1244 he was teaching in Paris but in 1246 he was sent to Normandy 
as guardian of the friary in Rouen and as lector in its studium.4 After just a 
year he was chosen as Archbishop of Rouen. There he showed himself a most 
able and diligent pastor and the meticulous records he kept on episcopal 
visitation have ever since been a rich resource for historians.5 He was a 
                                                   
1 Vincent Tabbagh, ed., Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae: Répertoire prosopographique des 
évêques, dignitaires et chanoines des diocèses de France de 1200 à 1500, 13 vols (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1998), II: Diocèse de Rouen, p. 87. 
2 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae, p. 87-88. Eudes’ brother Adam also joined the Franciscans and 
his sister Marie entered the convent of the Paraclete in Paris, becoming its Abbess in 1249. 
His nephew, also Adam, was dean of the chapter of Rouen. 
3 Livarius Oliger, ed., Expositio Quatuor Magistrorum super Regulam Fratrum Minorum 
(Rome: Edizioni di Storia e letteratura, 1950) and the anonymous Chronica XXIV 
Generalium Ordinis Minorum, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, Analecta Franciscana, 3 
Anonymous, (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1887), p. 261. 
4 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae, p. 88. 
5 See, for example, Adam J. Davis, The Holy Bureaucrat: Eudes Rigaud and Religious 
Reform in Thirteenth-Century Normandy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
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strong supporter of and counsellor to Louis IX of France and, as archbishop, 
he attended the Council of Lyons. He died shortly afterwards on 2 July, 
1275.6 
Eudes has a small but well attested and diffused theological output, 
producing sixteen sets of disputed questions. Most of these are in 
metaphysics but also deal with divine providence and grace. He also has 
sermons and a sentence commentary, his only work to deal with soteriology 
in any detail. They have received scant scholarly attention and one set of 
disputed questions is his only theological work ever to have been published 
in full.7 
 
3.1  SECULAR-MENDICANT CONTROVERSY 
Eudes’ academic career took place in the context of the secular-mendicant 
controversy, which ran from the 1220s to late 1250s. In essence, the dispute 
was over how to fit the new phenomenon of the mendicant orders into the 
settled ecclesiological structures. The mendicants were seen as neither quite 
fish nor fowl and did not readily fall into familiar categories. They enjoyed 
many of the privileges and exemptions of monastic orders but lived, worked 
and ministered in the secular world. The mendicants were not entrusted with 
parishes or the cure of souls, but they still performed many of the functions 
of secular parochial clergy and, to the irritation and financial loss of that 
clergy, received recompense for those services. Into the neat and established 
                                                   
6 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae, p. 89. 
7 François-Marie Henquinet, ‘Les Manuscrits et l’influence des écrits théologiques d’Eudes 
Rigaux O.F.M.’, Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 11 (1939), 324-44. See also 
the comments of Palémon Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe 
siècle, pp. 31-33 and Victorinus Doucet, ‘Maîtres Franciscains de Paris: Supplément au 
“Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle”’ in Archivum Franciscanum 
Historicum, 27 (1934), 531-64 (pp. 541-42). 
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division of the secluded monks who prayed and the secular clergy who taught 
and ministered to the laity intruded the mendicants fulfilling parts of both 
roles. Those secular clergy who objected to the loss of work and income to the 
friars, those burgesses who resented the constant burden of the mendicancy 
of these new orders and those who objected to the ministry of the mendicants 
being beyond the control of the bishops and prelates all came together in a 
coalition of forces opposed to the very idea of the mendicant orders. For 
many, these mendicants were the undisciplined and greedy vagrant monks 
wandering outside obedience against whom St Benedict had warned in the 
prelude to his Rule. At their mildest, this coalition urged greater limitation 
on the work of the friars, preserving the income of the seculars and the 
authority of the bishops. Harsher voices called for the complete suppression 
of the mendicant orders.8 Forceful among these voices were the secular 
masters teaching at the University of Paris who had their own grievances 
against the friars. 
Their quarrel with the mendicants boiled over in 1229 when the 
university masters went, effectively, on strike to protest the illicit punishment 
of students by the civic authorities of Paris. The Dominicans remained and 
continued to teach, weakening the effectiveness of the university protest. 
They also submitted students of theirs to the chancellor for degrees despite 
the absence of a positive vote from the other members of the faculty and even 
filled a vacant chair with one of their own friars while the faculty was taking 
                                                   
8 For a review of these forces in the secular-mendicant controversy and a summary of its 
events, see Robert N. Swanson, ‘The “Mendicant Problem” in the Later Middle Ages’, in The 
Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy and the Religious Life, ed. by Peter Biller and Barrie 
Dobson, Studies in Church History Subsidia 11 (Woodbridge: Ecclesiastical History Society, 
1999), pp. 217-38. See also Andrew Traver, ‘Rewriting History? The Parisian Secular 
Masters’ Apologia of 1254’, History of Universities, 15 (1997-1999), 9-45. See also R. F. 
Bennett, Early Dominicans: Studies in Thirteenth-Century Dominican History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1937), p. 54. 
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part in this ‘great dispersion’ from Paris as part of their protest.9 The 
Franciscans later became similarly embroiled when they too acquired one of 
the chairs of the secular masters, incensing the masters. This occurred when 
Alexander of Hales entered the order in 1237 and transferring his chair to the 
Grand Couvent, effectively establishing the Franciscan school in Paris.10 
Since 1218, it had been established that there would be twelve regent 
masters of theology, three of whom were to be drawn from the canons on 
Notre Dame but the remaining nine were for the secular masters.11 When the 
mendicants took possession of such chairs it posed a difficulty for the secular 
masters because it was the usage of the university that masters appointed 
their own successors from among their students. The mendicants naturally 
chose members of their order. Effectively, the mendicants now controlled 
those chairs in perpetuity and they were lost to the seculars. 
The masters returned to the university and work at the beginning of 
1231 but resentment remained that the mendicants seemed happy to enjoy 
the benefits and privileges of the university and claim its chairs but were 
unwilling to accept the obligations that came with them, such as defending 
those privileges or following the university’s statutes. Moreover, from once 
having controlled the faculty, the secular masters were now left no longer 
                                                   
9 Nathalie Gorochov, Naissance de l’université: Les Écoles de Paris d’Innocent III à Thomas 
d’Aquin, v. 1200 – v. 1245, Études d’Histoire Médiévale, 14 (Paris: Champion, 2012), pp. 
514-46. 
10 See page 15 above. 
11 Letter of Innocent III to Odo, Bishop of Paris, of 14 November 1207 amended by Honorius 
III in decree Super Speculam Domini of 16 November, 1218, in Heinrich Denifle and Emile 
Chatelain, eds., Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 4 vols (Paris: Frères Delalain, 1889-
97), I (1889), No. 5, p. 65, and No. 32, pp. 90-93. 
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possessing the majority of chairs and the ability to determine policy in the 
faculty.12 
 
3.2  FRANCISCAN CHAIRS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS 
It is possible that the situation was even graver for the seculars, as there is 
some historical uncertainty whether the Franciscans had obtained a second 
chair. Some scholars maintain that Alexander of Hales passed his chair to his 
protégé, John of La Rochelle.13 Others hold that John obtained a chair in his 
own right and so the Franciscans had two chairs and that Eudes had 
acquired this second chair from John.14 
Salimbene de Adam (1221-1290?), in his chronicle written in the 
1280s, holds with the latter situation.15 He records that in about 1254, during 
a subsequent eruption of hostilities between the seculars and mendicants, the 
Franciscan Minister-General, John of Parma himself, came to Paris to meet 
with the secular masters. In an act of conciliation, John told the faculty that 
he accounted himself and the brothers in his charge as their servants and 
                                                   
12 Honorius III had in 1218 fixed the number of regent masters in the Parisian faculty of 
theology at twelve, three of which were reserved for the canons of Notre Dame. Denifle and 
Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I (1889), p. 85, No. 27. With two of these 
chairs being claimed by the Dominicans and one by the Franciscans, only six were left for the 
secular masters. 
13 This is the position adopted by, among others, Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en 
théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle, II, p. 31; Doucet, ‘Maîtres Franciscains de Paris’, pp. 541-2; 
Bert Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 14; François Neveux, ‘Les Éveques 
normands et la conquête française’ in 1204: La Normandie entre Plantagenêts et Capétiens, 
ed. by Flambard Héricher and Veronique Gazeau (Caen: Publications du CRAHM, 2007), pp. 
367-388 (p. 369); Sophie Delmas, ‘Alexandre de Halès et le studium franciscain de Paris’, pp. 
37-47. 
14 This is held, among others, by Moorman, A History of the Franciscan Order, p. 132; 
François de Sessevalle, Histoire générale de l’ordre de Saint François, 2 vols (Paris: Le-Puy-
en-Velay, 1935-7), I: Le Moyen âge, p. 432; Adam J. Davis, ‘The Formation of a Thirteenth 
Century Ecclesiastical Reformer at the Franciscan Studium in Paris: The Case of Eudes 
Rigaud’, in Medieval Education, ed. by Ronald B. Begley and Joseph W. Koterski (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2005), pp. 101–15 (p. 105). 
15 Salimbene de Adam, Cronica, ed. by Giuseppe Scalia, Scrittori d’Italia, 2 vols (Bari: 
Giuseppe Laterza e Figli, 1966), II, p. 437. 
88 
 
disciples.16 According to Salimbene, John then yielded to the faculty the 
second chair of the Franciscans and promised that the Friars Minor would 
never seek to hold any more than a single chair. In return, he asked only for 
an undertaking from the secular masters that the Franciscans could retain 
this remaining chair. 
Salimbene’s chronicle is an important source of information from that 
period about events that are recorded nowhere else, but Salimbene has 
acquired a reputation as a gossip monger and many details in his chronicle 
are less than completely reliable.17 Moreover, Salimbene is acknowledged as a 
firm supporter and defender of the friars and of John of Parma especially. 
When the friars are portrayed as possessing the academic ability to attain two 
chairs, like their Dominican confreres, but excelling them in the virtue of 
Christian humility, a certain wariness is to be observed in relying upon 
Salimbene.18  
The argument that there was only ever a single master is also not 
without historiographical difficulties. Palémon Glorieux compiled his list of 
Franciscan regent masters in 1933 and many authors have uncritically 
                                                   
16 'Ego sum generalis minister Ordinis Fratrum Minorum quamvis insufficiens et indignus et 
contra voluntatem meam vos estis domini et magistri nostri, nos vero servi filii et discipuli’. 
‘I am, although inadequate and unworthy and contrary to my will, the minister general of the 
Order of the Friars Minor, and you are our master and teachers, we are but loyal sons and 
students.’ Salimbene, Cronica, p. 436-37. 
17 Salimbene de Adam, The Chronicle of Salimbene de Adam, ed. and trans. by Joseph L. 
Baird, Giuseppe Baglivi and John Robert Kane, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and 
Studies, 40 (Binghamton, NY: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1986), pp. 
x-xvi, provides a useful discussion of the historicity of the Chronicle and also Annette Kehler, 
‘Francis and the Historiographical Tradition of the Order’, in Cambridge Companion to 
Francis of Assisi, ed. by Michael Robson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
pp. 101-14. See also the comments of Marie-Therese Laureilhe from her introduction to 
Salimbene in Placid Hermann (ed.), Thirteenth Century Chronicles (Chicago: Franciscan 
Herald Press, 1961), pp. 194-5 (p. 195). 
18 Salimbene’s admiration for John of Parma can be seen in the next three entries in 




repeated it subsequently.19 Sylvain Piron has identified numerous factual 
errors in Glorieux’s list of masters and their years in office. He also points to 
some problems in Glorieux’s methodology and a tendency to presume that all 
magistri were regent master, when the term could also mean simply 
teacher.20 Confusingly, the term ‘master’ among Franciscans could mean, as 
well as regent master or simple teacher, the friar in charge of the Franciscan 
school of Paris who oversaw the provision of training to students there, both 
in the lectoral and university programmes who was also termed the 
‘magister’. Yet further, it was also a title of courtesy for any scholar. In 1241 
Eudes Rigaud was reckoned among the ‘four masters’ of the commentary of 
that name, even though he had no degree then and was certainly not regent 
master. Deceived by this erroneously inflated list of masters, Piron notes a 
tendency by Glorieux then to adjust dates of the tenures of these ‘masters’ to 
accommodate the list he had compiled. 
Neither approach to the status of Eudes’ chair offers compelling 
evidence but it seems strange that in the midst of the polemical interchanges 
with the secular masters, when the latter made many accusations against the 
friars both factual and otherwise, that the acquisition of a second chair is not 
levelled against them.21 Such silence seems telling. Further, it seems 
improbable that when there was such resentment about the loss of their 
teaching chairs, that one of the secular masters would willingly transfer to 
                                                   
19 Glorieux, Maîtres en Théologie, p. 31. As to its later use, see both Moorman, A History of 
the Franciscan Order, p. 132 and Henquinet, ‘Les Manuscrits et l’influence des écrits 
théologiques d’Eudes Rigaux O.F.M.’, pp. 324-50, both of whom merely cite Glorieux. 
20 Piron, ‘Franciscan Quodlibeta in Southern Studia and at Paris 1280-1300’, pp. 403-38. As 
to Glorieux’s methodology, see especially pp. 407 and 422. Courtenay, ‘The Instructional 
Programme of the Mendicant Convents’, pp. 81-2. See especially Doucet, ‘Maîtres 
Franciscains de Paris’, pp. 534-45 which was an effort to overcome some of Glorieux’s 
deficiencies. 
21 Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’ Apologia of 1254’, pp. 18-22. 
90 
 
the Franciscans a second chair to be held by John of la Rochelle, only for it 
promptly to be sought back again. The better case seems to be that there was 
only ever a single Franciscan chair. Whatever the case may have been, by the 
end of Eudes’ academic career in 1246 and his departure to Rouen, it is 
certainly clear that Franciscans then possessed a single chair.  
Whether it then be five or six chairs held by the secular masters, many 
resented their loss to the mendicants and the prospect of new orders seeking 
similar entitlements.22 These chairs were more than a matter of prestige for 
the secular masters; they carried with them the chance of income from 
students, gave control of the standards and courses of the faculty and great 
opportunity for advancement to prelacies. Moreover, with fewer prospects 
for attaining a chair and thence ecclesial office, the appeal to study under the 
secular masters was lessened and fewer students constituted fewer teaching 
fees. The mendicants had their own reasons for coveting these chairs; they 
provided them with secure access to degree qualification, a constant supply 
of potential teachers for the mendicants’ burgeoning network of studia and 
university posts and a hand in the shaping the direction of Christendom’s 
theological centre. 
In contrast to their secular colleagues, mendicant masters were 
regularly transferred after only brief tenures of about two or three years. This 
practice opened the mendicants to the accusation that they were using the 
chairs as tools for the rapid advancement to the highest academic levels for 
their members. Such actions were said to be encroaching upon the livelihood 
                                                   
22 Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’, p. 14. The Cistercians, Trinitarians and Carmelites were but 
the first of these orders seeking chairs. 
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of secular masters and hampering the advancement of scholarship.23 This, 
coupled with the comparatively young age at which mendicant became regent 
master because of their rapid turnover of personnel, led some secular 
masters to accuse mendicants of poor levels of instruction, laxity in standards 
and of choosing masters according to the needs of the order rather than the 
best interests of the university.24 
This was an inimical setting in which to teach and do theology. Eudes 
had to confront not only umbrage from secular masters that as a friar he held 
one of ‘their’ chairs but also their reservations about his suitability and merit 
for the post anyway, since he was chosen by his order to meet its own needs 
and not by the free and proven choice of his predecessor. Those needs of the 
order were perceived often to conflict with the independence and autonomy 
of the university, as had happened at the time of the university strikes. The 
Franciscans showed greater interest in giving a steady flow of friars the 
chance to hold the office of regent master and to preparing suitable friars for 
roles at the other universities and studia they needed to staff. Paris did not 
rank as the Franciscans’ sole concern. Accordingly, Eudes was in a novel and 
awkward position. While there had been earlier Franciscan masters, 
Alexander of Hales had attained his chair while still a secular master and in 
the usual fashion and even prior to his entry into the Franciscans it was clear 
that he was grooming John of La Rochelle as his protégé and successor. 
                                                   
23 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 16. Although the Franciscan school was 
principally for members of the order, other students were free to attach themselves to the 
Franciscan masters and did so – William J. Courtenay, Parisian Scholars in the Early 
Fourteenth Century: A Social Portrait, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, 
Fourth Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 111.  
24 Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’ pp. 9 and 13. The selection of the Franciscan regent master in 
Paris was never a free choice of the sitting master. Initially it was the prerogative of the 
general chapter but such swift turn over in office meant it was left to the Minister General in 
practice and this usage was ratified and confirmed in the Diffinitiones Argentinae of 1282, 
art. 137. Geroldus Fusseneger, ‘Diffinitiones Argentinae’, Archivum Franciscanum 
Historicum, 26 (1933), 127-40. Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 102. 
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Eudes was arguably the first Franciscan friar to have been appointed in the 
manner to which the secular masters were so opposed. When Eudes took up 
his chair in 1244 and was composing his theological works, his credentials to 
sit in his chair were in question. He was young and only about thirty-five 
when appointed, the minimum age for graduation and was made a regent 
master immediately.25 He faced antagonism and adverse reception of his 
theology just for being a mendicant regent master, at a time when 
Franciscans needed no further provocation of the secular masters. The way in 
which Eudes could carry out his theological work was constrained by the 
locus in which he did it. 
 
3.3  THE CHIROGRAPHUM 
Appreciating the theological works that Eudes produced in this period and 
conflict is hampered by so little of it having been published. For the purposes 
of this study, reference is made principally to Eudes’ unpublished sentence 
commentary, a transcription of the soteriological sections of which is 
provided in Appendix 2. It is not a critical edition but a simple transcription 
of MS 824, held in the Médiathèque d’Agglomeration Troyenne, selected for 
its completeness, accessibility and legibility.26 
Eudes began composition of his sentence commentary around 1241 
and so his is a fairly early example of the genre. His text lacks the expansive 
personal treatment of particular propositions in the style of, for example, 
Aquinas or Bonaventure that would later become the norm. It is more similar 
to the style of Alexander of Hales. The bulk of his commentary is concerned 
                                                   
25 Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I (1889), p. 79, No. 20. 
26 See pages 329-96 below. In cases of doubt, MSS 825 and 1862 of the same collection and 
MS 208 of the Bruges Municipal Library have also been consulted. 
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with adducing new authorities for and against existing propositions and with 
their integration into the arguments of Peter the Lombard.27 Typical of these 
earliest sentence commentaries, Eudes’ own responses to questions are 
frequently a terse few lines and but a fraction of a full treatment of a topic.  
Like his teacher Alexander, Eudes adhered to a soteriology that was 
broadly Anselmian and accepted the fundamental structure of penal 
substitution as the mechanism by which human salvation occurred.28 As 
would be expected, like Alexander, he developed a greater role for the 
humanity of Christ in the work of salvation but he does not develop it in quite 
the same direction that Alexander had done nor adopt any division of the 
higher part of the will into a ratio ut natura and a ratio ut ratio.29 Alexander 
had explored the contribution to the satisfaction of God that was uniquely 
human and that could not be rendered by the divine nature of Christ alone. 
Eudes’ soteriological contribution was to look beyond the effect of Christ’s 
death and resurrection and how satisfaction was rendered. Rather, he 
considered what effect that act had directly upon humanity itself. Eudes is at 
least as interested to examine how humanity was changed by Christ’s 
sacrifice as he was to discuss how that act brought about change in divine 
justice. 
Distinction 19 of the Book of Sentences dealt with how Christ’s death 
redeemed humanity from sin and the devil.30 In the hands of Eudes, this is 
broadened into a more expansive consideration also investigating how 
humanity was changed: ‘Dicendum quod passionis Christi potest considerari 
                                                   
27 As to these earlier commentaries, see pages 30-32 above. 
28 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 18, a. 3, q. 1 (fol. 214.r). In the soteriology sections of Eudes’ 
commentary, he makes thirty-one explicit uses of Anselm as authority. 
29 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 17, a. 1, q. 1 (fol. 213.v); d. 18, a. 1, q. 1 (fol. 213.v). 
30 ‘Qualiter a diabolo et a peccato redemit nos Christus per mortem’. 
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in re ut in quo est in anima sed consideratur in re ut sic passio fuit meritoria 
genere omnibus hominibus cooperantibus quem ad effectum’.31  
Principally there are for Eudes two ways in which Christ’s passion had 
a direct consequence for humanity, both of them achieved through the action 
of grace. The first of these is through the deletion of the ‘chirographum’ 
which is ‘washed in the blood of Christ’.32 The chirographum was a term 
derived from Greek and Roman law and referred to a hand-written document 
that a debtor gave to a creditor, acknowledging a debt. The creditor could 
then trade that document with others in the manner of a modern bill of 
exchange.33 In the context of soteriology, it had been used by St Paul in 
Colossians 2:14 where he spoke of Christ as ‘erasing the record that stood 
against us with its legal demands. He set this aside, nailing it to the cross’.34 
From this, ‘chirographum’ came to encompass the record of the debt of 
human sin transferred by God to the devil that he might have power over 
humanity because of the fall.35 ‘Deletion of the chirographum’ thus meant 
liberation from servitude to the devil.  
Curiously, Eudes professes himself to be following the line of 
reasoning established by Anselm.36 However, Anselm only makes mention of 
the chirographum in the Cur Deus Homo to explain how God could in justice 
permit some limited dominion over humanity by the devil and he certainly 
                                                   
31 ‘It must be said that Christ’s passion can be considered in the manner in which it is in the 
soul or be considered as a matter in which it was generative of merit for all people working 
with it’. Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1 (fol. 215.r). 
32 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 19, a. 2, q. 1 (fol. 215.r-v). Cf Revelations 7: 14. 
33 See, for example, Francis de Zulueta, Institutes of Gaius, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1946-53), II, p. 166 and Paul Krueger, ed., Corpus Iuris Civilis, 3 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 
1900-04), I. xxxii. 102. 
34 ‘… delens quod adversum nos erat chirografum decretis quod erat contrarium nobis et 
ipsum tulit de medio adfigens illud cruci’. 
35 Mertens, Not the Cross but the Crucified, pp. 71-75. The notion had a modern revival in 
Gustav Aulén, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of 
the Atonement (London: SPCK, 1965). 
36 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 19, a. 3, q. 1 (F. 215 v). 
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does not discuss the deletion of the chirographum, let alone how that was to 
occur.37 Anselm did not address the change in humanity, if any, wrought in 
the wake of Christ’s self-offering. In the course of the text, Anselm does 
address the question of recompense and forgiveness for sin but he does so as 
a rationale for the union of natures in Christ.38 This idea is not developed but 
soteriology was not Anselm’s principal concern. He provides no discussion at 
all about how humanity might be changed by Christ’s coming and, despite 
the claims of Eudes, certainly does not discuss any deletion of the 
chirographum. 
This raises the intriguing question of why Eudes should claim that 
Anselm argued otherwise. While it may have been the case that Eudes had a 
flawed understanding of Anselm or perhaps generously attributed to the 
scholastic doctor more than his actual writings justify, this seems improbable 
in a scholar of Eudes’ accomplishments. This consideration by Eudes of the 
chirographum and its removal is a novelty and it had not appeared in the 
works of Alexander of Hales nor even of Peter the Lombard. Even so, it is 
equally clear that Eudes’ treatment of the issue is thoroughly orthodox and 
very much in keeping with the line of reasoning of both those theologians; 
Eudes’ argument is merely the logical consequence of their reasoning and is 
simply tantamount to saying that humanity was freed from sin by Christ’s 
salvific work, a position little open to dispute. As a good scholastic, he was 
                                                   
37 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I. 7. This is the only reference to ‘chirographum’ in all Anselm’s 
authentic writings. The pseudo-Anselmian Meditatio Super Miserere 8, does have a further 
reference to the chirographum and Eudes may have ascribed this to Anselm but once again, 
while the text explores the deletion of the chirographum, it does not explain how this is to be 
done. Pseudo-Anselm, ‘Meditatio Super Miserere’, in Patrologia Cursus Completus, Series 
Latina, ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne (Paris: Migne, 1844-75), 158 (1863), pp. 13-16. 
38 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I. 11 and 12. 
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integrating into the corpus of authority from Peter the Lombard the Pauline 
concept of the chirographum.  
In the face of his detractors, Eudes could not be reproached for 
aligning the accepted authoritative position of Anselm and integrating into it 
biblical material from Paul. Facing both suspicion and hostility, it is not hard 
to see Eudes vesting his ideas with a greater reliance upon Anselm than the 
latter’s texts might justify. Arguably, there is a timidity on the part of the 
young Eudes writing his sentence commentary that shies from being seen as 
too innovative and creative, lacking a more venerable tradition and line of 
authorities behind him. The aid of Anselm affords to Eudes’ ideas greater 
gravity, firmer foundations and sounder scholarship than they might 
otherwise have possessed.39 Likewise, when Eudes does go in new directions, 
such as the human consequence of divine salvific action, he does so in paths 
that Alexander of Hales had already traversed and made acceptable. 
 
3.4  THE ‘DOOR’ 
The chirographum was not Eudes’ sole soteriological metaphor. He argued 
that grace also affected humanity directly by opening the ‘door’ and that this 
was a second consequence upon humanity. Another specialised theological 
term of the time, this referred to the ability to access heaven and enjoy the 
beatific vision. It had been held that, prior to Christ’s coming, the ‘door’ was 
shut and that the rewards of paradise were unattainable to anyone, however 
holy and venerable, and even the patriarchs and prophets of Israel were 
                                                   
39 Michael Robson, ‘Odo Rigaldi and the Assimilation of St Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo in the 
School of the Cordeliers in Paris’, in Saint Anselm of Canterbury and his Legacy, ed. by 
Giles E. M. Gasper and Ian Logan, Durham Medieval and Renaissance Monographs and 
Essays, 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2012), pp. 155-73 (pp. 170-72). 
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barred entry until the harrowing of hell.40 Christ was popularly expressed as 
having ‘opened the door’ to paradise through his sacrifice on the cross.41 
Thereafter, attainment of paradise was possible for all people. Where Eudes 
goes further than most commentators is in arguing not only that Christ 
‘opened the door’ but that his salvific act made available both the grace that 
opened the door and also that by which one might cross the threshold of that 
door. The consequence of Calvary was not a single benefit. Eudes has a much 
broader discussion about the attainment of this door than was common.42 
The salvation wrought by Christ had an impact not only upon God, causing 
God to admit humanity to paradise, but it had influence too upon humanity, 
enabling it to reach and pass through the ‘door’ which Christ’s sacrifice had 
caused to open. 
He first refers to the door in the third article of the eighteenth 
distinction, in which Eudes considers why the door might not be opened 
through some means other than the sacrifice of Christ. Eudes’ ingeniously 
concedes that God could, in charity, have opened the doors for some 
deserving souls prior to the coming of Christ, such as the biblical patriarchs 
and other individuals of great merit. However, Eudes reasons that to have 
opened the door in such cases would have been offensive to divine justice. 
Since, Eudes asserts, only a chosen few knew of the covenant and the law of 
God and thereby the means to earn merit for themselves, while most people 
laboured in ignorance, it would have been unjust to give additional privileges 
                                                   
40 See, for example, Milton McC. Gatch, ‘The Harrowing of Hell: A Liberation Motif in 
Medieval Theology and Devotional Literature’, Variorum, 82 (2000), 75-88; McIntyre, The 
Shape of Soteriology, pp. 51-54; Sheets, The Theology of the Atonement. pp. 14-18. 
41 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 18, a. 1 (ff. 214.r-v). Eudes here has a fairly standard 
consideration of how it was that Christ merited that the doors be opened to humanity. As to 
the ‘door’, see, for example, Rivière, Le Dogme de la rédemption, p. 115. 
42 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 17, a. 1, q. 1 (fol. 213.v); d. 18, a. 2, q. 1 (fol. 214.v); d. 18, a. 3, q. 1 
(fol. 214.r); d. 18, a. 4, q. 5 (fol. 215.r). 
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to those few. The doors must be opened for all or shut for all. Instead, for 
those meritorious few, they were sustained by the knowledge and hope of the 
coming of the redeemer through whom they could attain salvation.43 
From this it follows that, for Eudes, it is not enough for God merely to 
open the doors at the time of Christ’s offering or that same injustice persists, 
that only those with the knowledge of God might make use of the open door. 
Hence Eudes argues also that, with the salvation of Christ, there is an 
outpouring of grace, through Christ’s merits, for the benefit of all humanity 
so that all might be saved and attain paradise.44 Pursuing his line of 
argument further, alone among the Franciscan masters of this period, Eudes 
has a discussion of the soteriological implications upon ideas of limbo.45 He 
thinks of those unable to make use of the salvation won for them. Eudes 
posits that even in the absence of knowledge of God, the action of grace can 
move individuals to the knowledge of wrong doing, sorrow and contrition for 
sin and to a consciousness that people have the capacity to be more than they 
currently are. This, he suggests, is sufficient to achieve the joy of limbo even 
if not the fullness of paradise. Eudes makes himself the first Franciscan not 
only to consider the place of limbo in soteriology but to detail the possibility 
of a salvation for those outside the Christian faith. 
 
                                                   
43 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 18, a. 3, q. 1 (fol. 214. r). 
44 Eudes has a fairly standard understanding of Christ’s ability earn merit and he treats this 
in distinction 17; in essence he holds that Christ was capable of earning merit in all his acts 
and could do so from the moment of his conception. 
45 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 19, a. 2, q. 1 (fols. 215.v – 216.r). Limbo existence was postulated 
to address the issue of those who, due to ignorance, were unable either to choose or reject 
God and so deserved neither heaven nor hell. They experienced instead to limbo, a place 
without either penalty or beatific vision. Jérôme Baschet, ‘I mondi del Medioevo: I luoghi 
dell'aldilà’, Arti e storie in Medioevo: Tempi, spazi e istituzioni, ed. by Enrico Castelnuovo 
and Giuseppi Sergi (Turin: Einaldim 2002), pp. 317-47. See also Christopher Beiting, ‘The 
Idea of Limbo in Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure’, Franciscan Studies, 57 (1999), 3-56. 
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3.5  THE ROLE OF RESURRECTION 
A further discussion unique to Eudes was his consideration of the role played 
by the resurrection in the salvation of humanity. The University of Paris in 
the 1240s was neither the time nor the place for ambitious creativity and 
Eudes played well the role of non-contentious scholar. He did so once again 
in his consideration of the resurrection. Despite Paul’s frequent insistence 
that it was Christ’s suffering, death and resurrection that brought about 
human redemption, the latter featured little in the legacy of Anselm passed to 
Eudes. There the emphasis lay on the need for sacrifice to make satisfaction 
for what had been done by humanity.46 This was not so with Eudes who 
introduced a fresh question to the sentence commentary as to whether the 
resurrection of Christ was necessary for redemption and he concluded that it 
was.47  
Eudes argues that with human beings redeemed through Christ, they 
were released from the baleful consequences of sin, just as Paul had argued 
in the Letter to the Romans; they were ‘set free from [the] bondage to decay 
and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God’.48 As such, 
resurrection and glorification are the necessary culmination of redemption 
and the resurrected Christ is indeed the ‘the first fruits of those who have 
died’.49 Put otherwise, for Eudes, the absence of the resurrection means that 
                                                   
46 See, for example, Romans 5: 10; 10: 9; I Corinthians, 15: 16-17; Ephesians 2: 6 or 
Colossians 2: 12. It is noteworthy that Alexander of Hales does not mention the resurrection 
once in the soteriological section of his sentence commentary. As to the neglect of the 
resurrection in medieval soteriology, see Sheets, The Theology of the Atonement, p. 200 and 
Rivière, Le Dogme de la rédemption au début du moyen âge, p. 422. 
47 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 2 (fol. 216.r). 
48 Romans 8:21. 
49 I Corinthians 15:20. 
100 
 
the act of salvation is incomplete and that there is yet more to accomplish; 
the death of Christ is but part of the salvific act.50 
This idea of the resurrection as the consummation of salvation 
reappears again in the following question where Eudes considers whether or 
not the resurrection had a role in the remission of sins.51 Here Eudes speaks 
of a twofold purpose for the resurrection. The first is, as he had previously 
posited, the natural completion of the act of salvation. The other is a 
contribution to Christ’s ongoing role as saviour, the resurrection physically 
glorifying, changing and marking him as the ‘signum culpae remissionis’, the 
model, as it were, of what humanity should and would be.52 So much was he 
changed that Eudes speculates that this was the reason that Christ was not 
recognised by his disciples following the resurrection.53 Yet in seeing Christ’s 
glorified body they could see and know what it was to be released from the 
consequence of sin. 
 
3.6  INCARNATION IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FALL 
These concepts of the chirographum, door and the resurrection were hardly 
contentious additions to soteriological discourse. They may have been new 
additions that Eudes was making to the soteriological sections of the Book of 
Sentences but it could not be denied they all had incontestable biblical 
foundations. Safe from criticism from the secular masters, Eudes pursued the 
grand scholastic project of integrating all authority together. Yet Eudes 
showed daring in one area of soteriology. In the twentieth distinction, Eudes 
                                                   
50 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 2, (fol. 216.r). 
51 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 3 (fol. 216.r). 
52 ‘The emblem of the remission of sins’ - Eudes Rigaud Sent III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 3, (fol. 216.r). 
53 For example, Luke 24: 16, 37; John 20: 15. 
101 
 
inserts a new question to ask whether Christ would have become incarnate if 
humanity had not sinned.54 In the next century, it is the affirmative answer to 
this question that would set the Franciscans apart and the first of the 
Parisian masters of the order to turn his mind to this question was Eudes.55 
Eudes concedes that there is no explicit authority that has settled this 
question but he does extrapolate some reasoning in favour of the proposition 
from a rather broad array of authorities. As usual, Eudes does not give a 
lengthy response at all and it is dwarfed many times over by his treatment of 
the authorities but his answer is nevertheless illuminating: 
Respondeo dicendum quod nisi videam rationem ut 
auctoritatem magne expressam non credo quod filius 
Dei esset factus homo nisi homo peccasset. Et in hoc 
debemus ei infinitas gratiarum actiones, omne quod 
fecit pro peccatoribus quod non fecisset nec fuissemus 
iusti.56 
 
In reaching that conclusion, Eudes rejects a number of reasons in favour of it 
but in the course of doing so, raises many arguments that will prove 
significant for later generations of Franciscan theologians. The essence of his 
answer is that declines to hypothesise about a situation that never occurred 
and so refrains from engaging with the earlier reasoning that denies that the 
incarnation was contingent on the fall. These include arguments from Hugh 
of St Victor based on the self-diffusive nature of God, a teleological argument 
                                                   
54 ‘Supposito igitur ex praedictis quod decrevit Filium Dei incarnari ad reparandam naturam 
lapsam, quaeritur utrum fuisset incarnatus so homo non fuisset lapsus’. Eudes Rigaud, Sent 
III, d. 20, a. 3, q. 2 (fol. 218.r–v). 
55 Rupert of Deutz writing in about 1127 appears to have been the first theologian to write on 
this matter. Rhaban Haacke, ‘Rupert von Deutz zur Frage: Cur Deus Homo?’, in Corona 
Gratiarum. Miscellanea Patristica, Historica et Liturgica, ed. by A. I. de Smedt (Bruges: 
Sint Pietersabdej, 1975), pp. 143-59. The work in question is Rupert of Deutz, De Gloria et 
Honore Filii Super Matthaeum, ed. by Rhaban Haacke, Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio 
Mediaevalis, 29 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1979). 
56 ‘I respond: It must be said that, unless I see a more explicit reason or authority, I do not 
believe that the Son of God would have been made human unless humanity had sinned. And 
in this we ought to render him boundless thanks when he did for sinners what he would not 
have done if we had been righteous’. Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 20, a. 3, q. 2, (fol. 218.r–v). 
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based on the universe being created to have union with its creator, St Paul’s 
argument that Christ is the head of humanity and so must come to be, a 
Pseudo-Augustinian argument from De Spiritu et Anima that humanity 
remains incomplete in the absence of a union with Christ, St Bernard’s claim 
that the limitation of human happiness is a frustration of the divine will and 
also Scripture’s claim that Christ was destined from the start to become 
incarnate for humanity.57 A number of these arguments will be among those 
to persuade subsequent generations of friars that Christ would have become 
incarnate even if humanity had not sinned. Eudes’ answer, however, is ‘No’; 
Christ would have become incarnate only as a result of the fall. He can 
therefore be counted in a separate and smaller group from his Franciscan 
successors. He does, however, share with them a desire to consider the 
relationship between the fall of humanity, its redemption and the incarnate 
coming of Christ. In fact, Eudes is the earliest Franciscan masters to pose a 
question in these terms, the first to ask if Christ would have come only if 
humanity sinned. 
This question shows a willingness to contemplate the possibility that 
any human need for salvation was not contingent upon the fall. The mutual 
engagement of humanity and divinity could be founded upon much more 
than human shortcomings. Notwithstanding Eudes’ answer to this question, 
the possibilities of this notion were to be taken much further by Bonaventure 
and the Franciscans to follow Eudes. He both reflected and contributed to a 
changing sense of the human place in the cosmos, beyond seeking a celestial 
repairman.  
 
                                                   
57 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 20, a. 3, q. 2, (fol. 218.r–v). 
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3.7  THE RECEPTION OF EUDES’ THEOLOGICAL WRITING 
The unpublished state of Eudes’ works has already been noted, despite his 
creativity. To some degree, that can be explained by his being a ‘modern’ 
thinker whose ideas and reasoning could hardly be considered on a par with 
established authorities for use in a sentence commentary. Further, the rise of 
sentence commentaries was fairly recent to Eudes and there was yet limited 
interest in such texts beyond the author. Nevertheless, that did not preclude 
the works of other contemporary figures such as Alexander of Hales, Albert 
the Great, Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent from circulating works and 
frequently being referenced by writers of their time. Further, while it is true 
that there was a reticence to cite recent authors as authorities, it was far from 
uncommon to make use of their ideas even if those were not expressly 
attributed to them. In this instance, resented by the secular masters, Eudes 
appears also to have been little cited by his own brothers.58 
François-Marie Henquinet has argued for the influence of Eudes’ 
writings upon the theology of Bonaventure yet even he has been unable to 
give a single reference where Bonaventure expressly makes use of the 
writings of Eudes.59 The editors of the critical edition of Bonaventure’s 
sentence commentary have recorded no use of the writings of Eudes nor 
references to him, even though Bonaventure was quite comfortable in 
making use of other more recent authors, especially other Franciscans like 
                                                   
58 It is, however, true that Eudes is cited in a ‘prior’ work, the Summa Halensis. However, as 
has been shown, not only was this a work composed after the death of Alexander of Hales 
but Eudes himself was one of the team of editors working on its completion. Making 
references to his own thought does not challenge the allegation that he is rarely employed by 
later authors. 
59 Henquinet, ‘Les Manuscrits et l’influence des écrits théologiques d’Eudes Rigaux’, p. 324-
50. Henquinet asserts further that ‘in the production of numerous distinctions of the 
commentary, it is Rigaud himself who manifestly serves as his model’ (p. 349) yet again 
Henquinet gives no instance of this in operation.  
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Alexander of Hales.60 At best, it can be said that the thought of the two friars 
might coincide at times but a claim that there is a direct use of Eudes’ ideas 
cannot be substantiated.  
It can be argued that the theology of Eudes had a greater effect upon 
the Cistercians than ever he was on his own order. Eighty per cent of the 
manuscripts of Eudes’ theological output comes to us from Cistercian sources 
and all but two of the extant copies of his sentence commentary come 
through them.61 In 1245 the Cistercians opened their own house of studies in 
Paris to enable young monks to study for degrees at the university and those 
were the year after Eudes began his regency. Given that the Cistercians would 
have yet had no master of their own, they would have needed to attend some 
existing school for instruction, just as the Franciscans had done at first 
engaging Alexander of Hales. Their strong use of Eudes suggests that they 
came initially to the Franciscan school and that their initial generation of 
university trained scholars were formed and instructed by Eudes. In contrast, 
for his own Franciscan brothers, the recently deceased Alexander of Hales 
seemed to have greater significance. 
 
Eudes’ theology may not have influenced the Franciscans as greatly as some 
but he was not without influence on his brothers. His tempered approach to 
his theology in the face of the opposition from the secular masters made 
matters far less contentious for those who followed him, like William of 
Meliton and Bertrand of Bayonne.62 One can wonder if the creativity of 
                                                   
60 Bonaventure of Bagnoreggio, Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols 
(Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907). 
61 Henquinet, ‘Les Manuscrits et l’influence des écrits théologiques d’Eudes Rigaux’, pp. 345-
48. 
62 Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie, pp. 34-36, 52. 
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Bonaventure in the 1250s would have been so easily achieved without the 
restraint of Eudes in the 1240s. As a Neoplatonist who adhered to an 
epistemology of divine illumination, Eudes was well behind the Aristotelian 
fashions of his age, left aground as that philosophical tide withdrew.63 Eudes 
flourished in a period in which there was lessening interest to know and 
understand theology in this fashion, however well Eudes may have done it. 
Perhaps his uniquely negative answer concerning the coming of Christ in the 
absence of the fall is emblematic of this. Subsequent generations of 
Franciscans favoured methods and answers other than those of Eudes.  
None of this is to say that Eudes’ soteriological ideas were not 
insightful, illuminative or even useful; it is simply to say that they do not 
appear to have been much used by subsequent Franciscans of Paris, whether 
they be his own students, such as Bonaventure, Bertrand of Bayonne or 
Gilbert of Tournai, or whether they be later generations of friars who no 
longer favoured Neoplatonism upon which Eudes’ ideas rested.  
Even so, not all of Eudes’ ideas passed into nothingness. He furthered 
the theological trajectory of Alexander of Hales in moving soteriological 
attention more in a direction that considered the change it wrought in 
                                                   
63 See for example, Eudes Rigaud, Sent I, d. 3, a. 1. See also Davis, The Holy Bureaucrat, p. 
28. Vast amounts have been written on the medieval recovery of Aristotelian thought and its 
displacement of Neoplatonism. See Richard E. Rubenstein, Aristotle’s Children: How 
Christians, Muslims and Jews Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Middle 
Ages (Orlando, FA: Harcourt, 2003); Jeremiah Hackett, ‘Aristotle, Astrologia and 
Controversy at the University of Paris (1266-1274)’, in Learning Institutionalized: Teaching 
in the Medieval University, ed. by John Van Engen, Notre Dame Conferences in Medieval 
Studies, 9 (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2000), pp. 69-110; Luca Bianchi, 
‘Aristotle Among Thirteenth-Century Franciscans: Some Preliminary Remarks’, in 
Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal 
Courts: Acts of the Fifteenth Annual Colloquium of the Société internationale pour l’étude 
de la philosophie médiévale, University of Notre Dame, 8-10 October 2008, ed. by Kent 
Emery, Jr, William J. Courtenay and Stephen M. Metzger, Société internationale pour l’ 
étude de la philosophie médiévale – Rencontres de philosophie médiévale, 15 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2012), pp. 237–59. As to the Franciscan retention of Neoplatonism and divine 
illumination, see pages 149-51 below. 
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humanity rather than solely the furnishing of satisfaction to God. In keeping 
with this broader approach, Eudes frequently appeared to struggle with an 
understanding of soteriology that focussed the whole of salvation upon the 
solitary act of the crucifixion, an idea taken up by later friars who accord a 
salvific role to other events in the life of Christ, especially the incarnation. 
Finally, even though Eudes does not believe that the incarnation was an 
event that would have occurred in the absence of human sin, in reaching that 
conclusion he adduces a line of argument that contemplates a broader salvific 
role for the incarnation of the Word. That role was more than simply 
bringing into being the future victim of the crucifixion. However briefly, 
Eudes does entertain the possibility that there is a greater role for the 
incarnation and in that he shares a common and identifiable thread with 




4  Bonaventure and an Alternative to Penal-
Substitution 
 
Bonaventure of Bagnoreggio was another of the students of Alexander of 
Hales at the University of Paris who proceeded in time to occupy his master’s 
chair. He had been born as Giovanni di Fidanza in 1221 in the small 
commune of Bagnoreggio in Latium, not far from Viterbo. Bonaventure 
appears to have made his way to Paris in about 1235 and undertaken studies 
in arts. Unlike his teacher who had become a friar much later in life, 
Bonaventure entered the Franciscans while a youth in 1243 and joined the 
province of France. Following his year of probation, he started his theological 
studies at the University of Paris.1 There he encountered and studied under 
both Alexander of Hales and Eudes Rigaud. 
There are few details of his early studies but he appears to have 
flourished in the university and was a formed bachelor by 1251. He was 
eligible for the degree of Master in 1253 but the conclusion of his studies 
coincided with the renewed turmoil of the secular-mendicant controversy in 
the university.2 The circumstances around the reinvigoration of the conflict 
are dealt with more specifically in the account of Richard Rufus of Cornwall 
but it is sufficient for now to note that as a punitive measure, the secular 
masters of the university had declined not to admit otherwise qualified 
masters from the mendicant orders to their degrees and Bonaventure was 
                                                   
1 Marianne Schlosser, ‘Bonaventure: Life and Work’, in A Companion to Bonaventure, ed. by 
Jay M. Hammond, J. A. Wayne Hellman and Jared Goff, Brill’s Companions to the Christian 
Tradition, 48 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 9-59 (pp. 9-10). See also Christopher Cullen, 
Bonaventure, Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 11. 
2 Moorman, A History of the Franciscan Order, pp. 132-33. More is said of this renewed and 
second phase of the secular-mendicant controversy on pages 161-65 below. 
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among these students.3 When the masters relented at the end of 1256, he 
finally attained his licentia.4 The act was largely symbolic for in that 
February, the General Chapter of Rome, convened early and hurriedly to deal 
with the resignation of the Minister General, John of Parma, after his 
denunciation as a Joachimite, elected in his absence Bonaventure as seventh 
Minister General of the order at only thirty-six years of age.5  
A flurry of academic works from Bonaventure’s pen appeared in the 
next two years in which it would seem that Bonaventure hastened to 
complete works he had already commenced at Paris. The bulk of 
Bonaventure’s later writings dealt with the governance of the order. Despite 
twice rejecting the offer of a bishopric, in 1273 Gregory X successfully 
prevailed upon him to accept the see of Albano and created him a cardinal. 
This obliged Bonaventure to resign as Minister General but he lived only a 
further year and died on 15 July 1274 while participating in the Council of 
Lyons. Sixtus IV canonised him in 1482 and he was declared a Doctor of the 
Church in 1557 by Sixtus V. 
A substantial and well attested body of his texts survive, including 
some writing on the topic of soteriology. While Bonaventure lacks any 
recorded specific quodlibets or disputed questions touching directly on 
salvation, his complete Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum is known to 
us, as well as other general works that do deal with the issue of salvation, his 
Breviloquium and Collationes in Hexaëmeron.6 
                                                   
3 See further page 162 ff. below. 
4 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education p. 264. 
5 Moorman, A History of the Franciscan Order, p. 116. 
6 Respectively, Bonaventure, ‘Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum’ in Opera Omnia, ed. by 
Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-
1907), I-IV (1887); Bonaventure, ‘Breviloquium’, in Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. 
Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), V 
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4.1 THE COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF SENTENCES 
A comparison of the questions posed in the Book of Sentences and 
Bonaventure’s commentary on it, set out in Appendix 1, provides some 
preliminary insight into Bonaventure’s particular concerns in soteriology.7 
An initial consideration discloses that Bonaventure did not slavishly follow 
the questions of the Sentences. In many areas, Bonaventure either omits 
some topics altogether or inserts new sections of his own.  
Bonaventure commences with a fairly standard consideration of merit 
in Christ, which is to say the earning of supernatural reward through good 
deeds.8 In an orthodox discussion, he accepts that Christ could merit from 
the moment of his conception and through acts done after that moment.9 In 
this he agrees with Anselm and, equally, like Anselm he accepted that Christ 
merited not only in what he did but in what was done to him.10 Bonaventure 
concedes that ordinarily one merits only for positive acts but he notes that in 
the case of Christ, who from his love for others was punished for their sins, 
he also merited passively.11 
                                                                                                                                               
(1891), pp. 199-291 and Bonaventure, ‘Collationes in Hexaëmeron’, in Opera Omnia, ed. by 
Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-
1907), V (1891), pp. 327-454. 
7 See page 317-24 below. 
8 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 1. There was a long history of speculation as to what 
degree Christ could earn merit. If he could not sin, does he gain anything for doing good, 
since that is only his nature; could he then merit? Could reward be given to him who was 
God and so already possessed all things? See, for example, Augustine, In Evangelium 
Ioannis Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor, ed. and trans. by John W. Rettig (Washington: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1988-95), XVII. 1; Gregory the Great, Homilia in 
Ezechielis, ed. and trans. by Charles Morel, Sources Chrétiennes, 360 (Paris: CERF, 1986), 
VI. 8. 
9 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 18, a. 1, qq. 1 - 2. 
10 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3. 
11 ‘Dicendum, quod Christus non tantum meruit in actione, sed etiam in passione. Non enim 
passus fuit frustra, sed ex rationabili causa; nec passus fuit propter demeritum culpae, sed 
propter amorem veritatis et iustitiae’, Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3 – ‘It must be said 
that Christ merited not only in what was done, but also in what he suffered. For he did not 
suffer in vain, but for a reason; nor did he suffer due to the debt of sin but for the sake of the 
love of truth and justice’. Cf. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, pp. 37-133, I. 9. 
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In the following distinction, Bonaventure affirms the efficacy of Christ’s 
passion in making satisfaction. He writes of Christ’s role as both mediator 
for, and redeemer of, humanity. In the twentieth distinction, Bonaventure 
addressed himself to the congruence of Christ’s manner of redeeming 
humanity. These notions are all theologically commonplace. 
In fact, there is much where Bonaventure presents himself as being 
thoroughly in keeping with Anselm. The following could easily have been 
written by Anselm himself: 
[…] planum est quod impossible est aliquam puram 
creaturam Deo satisfacere pro humano genere, pro eo 
quod tam gravis est iniuria, quae infertur Deo, ob 
excellentissimam eius dignitatem, quod nulla pura 
creatura potest recompensare aliquid illi aequale [...] Et 
ideo, cum pura creatura non posset pro toto genere 
humano satisfacere, nec alterius generis creaturam 
deceret ad hoc assumi, oportuit ut persona 
satisfacientis esset Deus et homo. 12 
 
This situation of aligning with Anselm alters markedly in the sixth 
question of that twentieth distinction: ‘Whether God would have been able to 
save the human race by some other means’.13 In it, Bonaventure boldly 
becomes the first Franciscan writing on soteriology openly to disagree with 
Anselm, listing him among the authorities opposed to his own position.  
Contra: 1. Super illud ad Hebraeos secundo: ‘Decebat 
auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummari’; 
Glossa ‘Nisi [sic.] Christus moreretur, homo non 
redimeretur, et non redemptus periret, et frustra essent 
omnia facta’: si ergo hoc est impossibile, restat, quod 
primum est impossibile, scilicet Christum non mori pro 
                                                   
12 ‘...[I]t is clear that it is impossible that some wholly created being could satisfy God on 
behalf of the human race for so serious was the injustice done to God, due to God’s most 
excellent dignity, that no wholly created being is able to make a recompense in any way 
commensurate to it... And thus, since neither a wholly created being is able to make 
satisfaction for the whole human race nor would it be appropriate that another type of 
creature take on that role, it was proper that the person making the satisfaction be God and 
man.’ Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3. 
13 ‘Utrum alio modo potuerit Deus genus humanum salvare.’ Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 
1, q. 6. 
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salute generis humani. Et si hoc, impossibile fuit, alio 
modo genus humanum liberari quam per mortem 
Christi. 
2. Item, Anselmus in libro Cur Deus Homo: ‘Non potuit 
transire calicem, nisi haberet, non quia non posset 
vitare mortem, si vellet, sed, sicut dictum est, 
impossibile fuit aliter salvare mundum’: redit ergo idem 
quod prius.14 
 
Despite Anselm and the Gloss, Bonaventure concludes that humanity could 
have been restored by some way other than Christ’s death, if God had so 
chosen.15 He directly responded to the former argument:  
Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de Glossa et 
de Anselmo, dicendum, quod auctoritates illae 
intelliguntur, quantum ex parte nostra, praesupposita 
dispositione divina, qua nos sic, et non alio modo, 
liberare decrevit. Per hunc etiam modum intelligenda 
est auctoritas Ambrosii, quae posita fuit supra 
distinctione decima octava, capitulo ultimo. ‘Tantum, 
inquit, fuit peccatum nostrum, ut salvari non possemus, 
nisi unigenitus Dei Filius moreretur pro nobis 
debitoribus mortis’; hoc, inquam, intelligendum est, 
quia Deus nos aliter non decrevit salvare. Per hunc 
etiam modum intelligendae sunt auctoritates similes.16 
                                                   
14 ‘Contra: 1.The Gloss on this text: “For it became him to perfect the author of their salvation 
by his passion” from the second chapter of Hebrews has “Unless Christ had died, humanity 
would not have been redeemed, and, if unredeemed, it would have perished and all things 
done in vain”: if therefore this is impossible, it remains that it was impossible from the first, 
that is to say, Christ was not to die for the salvation of the human race. And, if so, it was 
impossible for the human race to be freed by another means than through the death of 
Christ.  
2. Again, Anselm in the book Cur Deus Homo had said, “It was not possible to take the cup 
from him, unless he drank, not since he was unable to evade death if he so chose, but, as it is 
written, it was impossible to save the world otherwise”: thus it is the same as that before.’ 
Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6. 
15 ‘Genus humanum ex parte Dei reparantis et liberantis potuit alia via quam per mortem 
Christi reparari; licet ex parte generis humani reparati non potuit salvari nisi hac via a Deo 
determinata.’ Bonaventure, III Sent, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6: ‘The human race could be restored and 
set free on the part of God by some means other than restoration through the death of 
Christ; although the human race could be neither restored or saved unless this was a means 
set forth by God’. 
16 ‘But to this it is objected that it is contrary to the Gloss and to Anselm, saying that those 
authorities are understood, as far as it pertains to us, that it was decreed to free us by 
reordering of the divine plan and by no other means. Yet the authority of Ambrose, which 
had been argued above in distinction eighteen in the last chapter, should be understood in 
this way, “Our sin was such that we could not be saved unless the only begotten Son of God 
died for us under the debt of death”; this, I say, is to be understood that God did not decree 
to save us otherwise. Yet through this means the authorities are understood to be alike.’ 
Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6. Bonaventure’s quotation is of Ambrosiaster and not 
Ambrose. Ambrosiaster, Commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanos, ed. by Academia 
112 
 
Bonaventure is arguing, in essence, that humanity was to be saved 
through whatever means God decreed and that it just so happened that the 
means that the Divine Will chose was through the death of Christ. It was 
open to God to have chosen some other means, in which instance that would 
have been sufficient to save humanity. Humanity was saved in the manner in 
which it was simply because God did not choose some alternative. Whereas 
Anselm argued that it was intrinsic to the nature of the God-Man and his 
sacrifice that made it capable of attaining salvation for humanity, 
Bonaventure does not accept this, saying that this sacrifice was efficacious 
because God had willed that it be so. The crux lay for Bonaventure not in the 
nature of the God-Man but rather in the will of God. 
Bonaventure does not expressly declare Anselm to have erred but 
distinguished his argument saying rather that Anselm was misconstrued due 
to a failure to have been interpreted with due reference to Ambrosiaster’s 
writings.17 Of course, the goal of a sentence commentary was not to pick and 
choose the ‘correct’ authorities among the available sources in order to justify 
a particular idea but rather to demonstrate a mastery of all those sources by 
bringing into concord even those that appear seemingly opposed, and this 
Bonaventure did, albeit with some textual legerdemain involving 
Ambrosiaster’s text. While not completely abandoning the fundamental 
structure of the Anselmian explanation for human salvation, Bonaventure 
supplanted the union of natures in the God-Man as the sine qua non of 
redemption, arguing instead for the choices of the Divine Will.  
                                                                                                                                                
Scientiarum Austriaca, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 81, Commentarius 
Epistulas Paulinas, 1-4 (Vienna: Hoelder, Pichler & Tempsky, 1966), 1, V. 14. 
17 Bonaventure’s reference to Ambrosiaster is from his Commentarius in Epistolam ad 
Romanos, I, IX. 15. 
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4.1.1  The Absolute Freedom of God in Salvation 
This twentieth distinction shows a quite fundamental difference between 
Anselm and Bonaventure. Although Anselm had intended the Cur Deus 
Homo to be in the nature of an apologia for the incarnation:  
‘[M]onstratur […] naturam humanam ad hoc institutam 
esse, ut aliquando immortalitate beata totus homo, id 
est in corpore et anima, frueretur, ac necesse esse ut 
hoc fiat de homine propter quod factus est, sed non nisi 
per Hominem-Deum, atque ex necessitate omnia quae 
de Christo credimus fieri oportere’.18  
 
Anselm wished to show how humanity had to be fulfilled and so had to be 
redeemed and therefore, in Anselm’s reasoning, it had to be a God-Man who 
achieved this. 
This is not the case with Bonaventure for whom there was no necessity 
upon God. For Bonaventure, that redemption occurs only because God wills 
that a certain price of satisfaction be acceptable. God could have willed that a 
person, or angel or non-incarnate person of the Trinity render satisfaction 
and that would have been sufficient. To this end, Bonaventure introduces a 
whole new question into his commentary to address this: ‘Utrum aliqua 
creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano’.19 He concludes 
that it was fitting for the God-Man to be the agent of redemption, but that it 
not essential: ‘Oportuit ut persona satisfacientis esset Deus et homo’.20 The 
shift was that Bonaventure no longer held that the incarnation of Jesus 
Christ was intrinsic to salvation, but rather whatever price God may have 
                                                   
18 ‘It is shown that human nature was established so that the whole human nature, that is in 
both body and soul, might enjoy blessed immortality and, since humanity was made for this, 
that it was necessary that this should happen but only through the Man-God and that 
everything which we believe about Christ should come to pass out of necessity’. Anselm, Cur 
Deus Homo, Preface (pp. 42-43). 
19 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3, ‘Whether some other wholly created being would 
have been able to make satisfaction for the whole human race’. 
20 ‘It was appropriate that the person making satisfaction be both God and man.’ 
114 
 
chosen. The consequence of this was that the two doctrines of incarnation 
and salvation become uncoupled from each other. No longer was the 
incarnation, of its essence, required to ensure that salvation occurred nor was 
redemption necessarily the principal reason for the incarnation. For 
Bonaventure, those doctrines were now free to be considered independently. 
Bonaventure differed further with Anselm. He argued that divine 
justice did not necessitate satisfaction by the God-Man either: 
Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod Deus non potest 
facere contra suam iustitiam, et iustitiam non potest 
praeter satisfactionem culpam dimittere, responderi 
potest per interemptionem duarum propositionum 
quas proponit, quarum prima est haec, quod non potuit 
liberari genus humanum nisi per viam iustitiae: potuit 
enim liberare per viam misericordiae; nec in hoc fuisset 
factum praeiudicium iustitiae, si hoc facere voluisset. 
Potuisset enim omnia demerit delere et hominem in 
priori statu constituere, nec remansisset aliquid 
inordinatum in universum nec etiam impunitum. 
Peccatum enim fert secum poenam, per quam 
ordinatur; et ita si sine satisfactione genus humanum 
liberasset, non propter hoc contra iustitiam fecisset. 
Potest etiam responderi per interemptionem illius quod 
nullo alio modo potuit satisfacere nisi per mortem. 
Quamvis hoc esset magis congruum, fortassis modicum 
supplicium in tam nobili persona suffecisset ad humani 
generis reparationem; sed Dominus in liberando 
supererogavit, propter quod dicitur: ‘Copiosa apud eum 
redemptio’.21 
 
                                                   
21 ‘To this it is lastly objected that God is not able to act contrary to God’s justice and that this 
justice cannot forgive wrong beyond the satisfaction made. It can be responded that in this 
regard there are two propositions put forward of which the first is this: that God could not 
free the human race unless by way of justice; yet God could set it free by way of mercy – and 
this would not be an act prejudicial to justice if God had wished to do this. For God was able 
to remove all faults and to restore humanity to its original state and this would retain neither 
some disorder nor unpunished fault within the universe. For sin carries its own punishment 
with itself and it was ordained thus, and if the human race were set free without satisfaction, 
not for this reason would it be done contrary to justice.  
To the objection that by no other means could satisfaction have been made save through 
death, it can be responded: however fitting this might have been, perhaps moderate suffering 
for such a noble person would suffice as reparation for the human race. But God did more 
than was demanded in freeing us, for thus it is said: “With him there is plentiful 
redemption”’, Bonaventure, Sent III d. 20, a. 1, q. 6. The quote is Psalms 129: 4. 
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Bonaventure maintains that it was entirely possible for God to have proposed 
an alternate path for human redemption and that, had God so chosen, it 
would have been no offence against divine justice. Contrary to Anselm, 
Bonaventure argues that the justness of God did not fully delimit God’s 
manner of interacting with humanity.  
 
4.1.2  From Necessity to Fittingness 
Nonetheless, salvation through Christ’s sacrifice was not some mere act of 
divine caprice for Bonaventure; there are good reasons for God to have 
chosen this means. In the above passage and in numerous other answers in 
the commentary, Bonaventure points out that it was ‘congruus’ or 
‘conveniens’ for God so to have acted: ‘Genus humanum reparari, congruum 
et decens est tum ex parte Dei, tum ex parte hominis’, ‘Magis fuit congruum 
et ex parte Dei et ex parte nostra, genus humanum reparari per 
satisfactionem’, ‘Modus nostrae satisfactionis, factae per Christum, fuit 
congruentissimus et maxime a Deo acceptandus’.22 In fact, he entitled the 
whole twentieth distinction, ‘De Christi Passionis Congruentia’. Consistently 
and studiously, Bonaventure avoids using any terms of obligation, opting 
rather for what was ‘seemly’, ‘apt’ or ‘fitting’. For Bonaventure, alternative 
means of salvation are possible and he refrains from predicating any 
                                                   
22 Respectively, ‘It was fitting and seemly that the human race be restored both on the part of 
God and on the part of humanity’, Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 1, ‘On the part of God 
and of us, it was more fitting that the human race be restored through satisfaction’, d. 20, a. 
1, q. 2, ‘The means of our satisfaction done through Christ was the most fitting and greatly 
accepted by God’, d. 20, a. 1, q. 5. See further Zachary Hayes, ‘The Meaning of 




necessity of God, even in the context of salvation.23 All divine action stems 
from God’s good pleasure and will.  
In the first article of this twentieth distinction, Bonaventure sets out 
why he believes that this arrangement, while not necessary, at least was 
fitting. 
Homo peccaverat per superbam et gulam et 
inobedientiam, sicut dicit Gregorius et in secundo libro 
fuit ostensum; voluit enim assimilari Deo per scientiae 
sublimitatem, gustare ligni suavitatem et transgredi 
praecepti divini limitem. Et quoniam curatio habet fieri 
per contrarium, ideo modus satisfaciendi 
congruentissimus fuit per abiectionem, humiliationem 
et divinae voluntatis impletionem.24 
 
As Bonaventure sets forth matters, he accepted that humankind bore already 
the image and likeness of the Son, yet it hungered for more and a closer 
union with God. It was dissatisfied and sought to liken itself to God by means 
of its own, employing ‘pride and greed and disobedience’, the self-same 
things that were to keep it from God.25 As Bonaventure noted above, sin 
carries its own punishment within itself and thus humanity fell by act of its 
own and not of God; no greater punishment could there be for a being 
destined to enjoy the image and likeness of God and longing to enjoy union 
with God, than to have that image and likeness disfigured and to be thwarted 
                                                   
23 ‘Utrum alio modo potuerit Deus genus humanusm salvare’. Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6 – 
‘Whether God could have saved the human race by some other means’. Bonaventure 
concludes that God was not obligd to but one means of salvation. 
24 ‘Humanity sinned through pride and greed and disobedience, as Gregory said and was 
shown in the second book. For it wished to become like God through sublime knowledge, to 
taste the sweetness of the tree and transgress the limit of the divine precepts. And because 
the treatment must be opposite to the cause, for that reason the most appropriate means for 
making our satisfaction was through meekness, humility and the fulfilment of the divine 
will’. Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 5. The reference is to Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, ed. by 
Marcus Andriaen, Corpus Christianorum – Series Latina, 143 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), 5. 
v. 31.  
25 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 5. 
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in its desire for union.26 ‘Si consideremus hominis lapsum, videbimus quod 
lapsus fuit appetendo falsam Dei similitudinem et aequalitatem’.27  
 
4.1.3  Pseudo-Dionysius and Hierarchies 
This sin carries within itself consequences not only for humanity. 
Bonaventure was deeply influenced in his theology by Pseudo-Dionysius the 
Areopagite and borrowed much from him, including the idea of cosmic 
hierarchies.28 For Pseudo-Dionysius, God had established a perfect order 
with each creation in its perfect place, arrayed in hierarchy according to its 
ability to know and love God. When humanity reached beyond itself and 
sought to know God in a way improper to its nature, it disordered not only 
itself but also the established hierarchy, introducing discord all around itself 
and marring the perfection established and arrayed by God. 
Si autem aliquis salvationem laudet et sicut ex 
peioribus tota salvatorie abripientem omnino alicubi et 
hunc nos laudatorem largissimae recipiemus 
salvationis. 
Et hanc primam salvationem totorum rogabimus ipsum 
diffinire, qui omnia in seipsis intransmutabilia et non 
pugnantia et fortia contra peiora salvat; et omnia 
custodit non pugnantia et non bellantia, singularis sui 
ipsorum rationibus ordinate; et omnem inaequalitatem 
et alienam operationem ex totis exterminate et 
proportiones uniuscuiusque constituit, non volentes 
cadere ad contraria nec transire. 
Quoniam et ita salvationem aliquis laudabit non longe 
ab intentione sanctae Theologiae, sicut omnia existentia 
salvatoria omnium bonitate, a casu propriorum 
bonorum liberantem, secundum quod uniuscuiusque 
eorum quae salvantur suscipit natura. 
                                                   
26 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6. See page 114 above. 
27 ‘If we consider the fall of humanity, we shall see that the fall took place by desiring a false 
likeness and equality to God’. Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 1, a. 2, q. 3. 
28 See, for example, Zachary Hayes, The Hidden Center: Spirituality and Speculative 
Christology in Saint Bonaventure (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 
2000), pp. 15, 42, 112 or Bonaventure, Writings on the Spiritual Life, ed. by Edward 
Coughlin, trans. by Robert J. Karris (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 
2006), pp. 43, 75. 
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Propter quod et liberationem ipsam nominant theologi, 
inquantum non sinit vere existentia ad nihil esse cadere 
et inquantum, et si aliquid ad peccatum et inordinatum 
fallatur et minorationem quamdam patiatur 
perfectionis propriorum bonorum, et haec a passione et 
infirmitate et privatione liberat, implens minus habens 
et paterne infirmitatem supportans et suscitans a malo; 
magis autem, statuens in bono et percussum bonum 
adimplens et ordinans et statuens et ornans inordinate 
ipsius et inornatum et integrum perficiens et ab 
omnibus maculatis solvens.29 
 
Bonaventure described a humanity bearing the image and likeness of 
the Son and so destined to enjoy something of the relationship shared 
between the Father and the Son. Yet it hungered for more and covetously 
strove to elevate itself in the hierarchy and so fell. Bonaventure finds it 
‘congruentissimus’ that the Son, who truly does enjoy that relationship, 
surrendered it to take upon himself the form of those wrongly claiming it, 
and redeemed those who elevated themselves by abasing himself and so was 
exalted.30  
As Bonaventure conceived of the fall, then, this ‘wish to become like 
God’, is almost a usurpation of the hierarchic place of Christ. Humanity 
                                                   
29 ‘And if any one praises salvation as the saving power which rescues all things from the 
influence of evil, we would accept him as one who praises the greatest part of salvation. 
But we shall ask him to define this first salvation of all things as that which preserves all 
things in themselves without change or conflict and strong against wicked things and keeps 
them without strife or struggle, each ordered in their own rules, and banishes all inequality 
and foreign interference from everything, and establishes the proportions of each so that 
they are not able to fall or pass over into their opposites.  
For anyone who will praise salvation thus is not far from the intention of sacred theology, 
just as all saving existence is by the goodness of all things, due to the redemption of their 
own good virtues according to which each of them which are saved and take up their nature. 
On account of which, theologians call it “redemption” inasmuch as it does not permit things 
truly existing to fall into nothingness and also because, if anything stumble into sin or 
disorder and suffer some lessening of the perfection of its proper virtues, it also redeems 
from the suffering, weakness and loss, filling up what is lacking and paternally supporting 
weakness and rousing from evil; yet more, establishing it in goodness and fulfilling stricken 
virtue, and ordering, establishing and furnishing its disorder, wholly perfecting its disarray 
and freeing it from all faults.’ Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,  - De 
Divinis Nominibus, ed. and trans. by Beate Regina Suchla, Corpus Dionysiacum, 1, 
Patristische Texte und Studien, 33 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), VIII. 9. 
30 Cf. Philippians 2: 6-9; Hayes, The Hidden Center, p. 171. 
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wished to know and experience God in a way that is proper only to the Son.31 
It blighted the Divine order by reaching beyond its proper place in the cosmic 
hierarchy, seeking to intrude even into the communion of the Trinity, ‘to be 
like God’ in the language of Genesis 3: 5. Disfigured through sin, humanity 
becomes other than itself and can no longer love and experience God as fully 
as it was created to do.  
[Mens humana] concupiscentiis illecta, ad se ipsam 
nequaquam revertitur per desiderium suavitatis 
internae et laetitiae spiritualis. Ideo totaliter in his 
sensibilibus iacens, non potest ad se tanquam ad Dei 
imaginem reintrare. Et quoniam, ubi quis cederet, 
necesse habet ibidem recumbere, nisi apponat quis et 
adjiciat, ut resurgat; non potuit anima nostra perfecte 
ab his sensibilibus relevari ad contuitum sui et aeternae 
Veritas in se ipsa, nisi Veritas, assumpta forma humana 
in Christo, fieret sibi scala reparans priorem scalam, 
quae fracta fuerat in Adam.32 
 
As Bonaventure portrayed matters, humanity had longed to ‘be like 
God’ and reached beyond itself in ‘pride and greed and disobedience’ and 
sinned, disordering creation and disfiguring itself in the process, such that it 
could no longer even enjoy the communion with God that was proper to it. 
The most apt way to restore creation was by its opposite. Rather than 
humanity attempting to become like God, God would truly become human. 
In lieu of humanity’s ‘pride and greed and disobedience’ despoiling its 
relationship with God, Christ’s humility, poverty and obedience would heal 
humanity and restores it to its proper relationship with God. In other words, 
                                                   
31 Hayes, The Hidden Center, p. 171. 
32 ‘[The human mind] is seduced by disordered desires and therefore it does not in any way 
return to itself through a desire for inner sweetness and spiritual joy. Thus totally immersed 
in matters of the senses, it is unable to reoccupy itself as the image of God. Just as when a 
person falls, the person must lie there until someone approaches and reaches out and to 
raise up the fallen one, so our soul cannot perfectly be lifted up again from things of the 
senses to consider itself and the eternal Truth within itself unless the Truth, assuming a 
human form in Christ, should become a ladder for it, repairing the first ladder that had been 
broken in Adam’. Bonaventure, Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, 4: 1-2. 
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while for Anselm and even for Alexander of Hales, salvation had been about 
rendering adequate satisfaction to undo the offence that humanity did to 
God, for Bonaventure it was much more about undoing what the nature of 
sin had done to humanity.  
 
4.1.4  Locus of Suffering  
Appendix 1 also reveals that Bonaventure shares with Alexander a desire to 
investigate much more closely the nature and locus of Christ’s suffering in 
the passion. Bonaventure broadly follows Alexander’s argument with respect 
to the place of human suffering in salvation but in doing so he never 
expressly quotes Alexander. This is not startling; a sentence commentary was 
to harmonise authorities and Alexander had been dead less than a decade 
when Bonaventure was writing his own commentary. Alexander was a 
learned and revered scholar to be sure but did not enjoy the same 
authoritative status as St Augustine, St Gregory or even the Glossa 
Ordinaria. It would have been presumptuous for Bonaventure to have 
quoted his former teacher and used him as an authority on a par with the 
patristic sources. 
Nonetheless, Bonaventure, without expressly referring to Alexander, 
does use his former teacher’s ideas in yet another open departure from 
Anselm. In dealing with the question of whether Christ took upon himself the 
obligation to suffer, Bonaventure lists Anselm among those with whom he 
disagrees.33 
                                                   
33 ‘Utrum Christus assumserit necessitatem patiendi.’ Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 1, q. 3. 
It will be recalled that Anselm had believed that the human body assumed by the Word was a 
perfect one as enjoyed by humanity prior to the fall. Alexander had believed that it was a 
human body of the time of the incarnation and so marred by the sufferings consequent to the 
fall. See pages 70-71 above. 
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Contra: 3. Item, Anselmus in libro Cur Deus Homo: 
‘Quoniam voluntas Dei nulla necessitate facit aliquid, 
sed sola potestate; et voluntas Christi fuit voluntas Dei: 
nulla igitur necessitate mortuus est, sed sola 
potestate.’34 
 
To this Bonaventure responded: 
Ad illud Anselmi de voluntate Christi iam patet 
responsio; non enim excludit necessitatem simpliciter, 
sed necessitatem respectu voluntatis divinae. – Et per 
hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur, quod 
omnis necessitas aut est prohibitionis, aut coactionis; 
dicendum enim, quod hoc intelligitur de necessitate, 
quae repugnant voluntati, sicut dicit idem Anselmus; de 
ea autem necessitate, quae voluntati subest, non habet 
veritatem. Ideo ratio illa non probat, quod nulla fuit in 
Christo necessitas patiendi, sed quia non fuit aliqua 
eius voluntati contraria.35 
 
In other words, Bonaventure, in an effort to harmonise the objection of 
Anselm, accepts that it is not possible to posit an obligation of God, yet points 
out that it is possible for God, in God’s utter freedom of action, voluntarily to 
assume an obligation and that this is what occurred in the incarnation of the 
Word. On the basis of this, Bonaventure ultimately concludes in this question 
that there is an obligation upon Christ to suffer but that this obligation was 
assumed in freedom and not contracted of necessity, just as Alexander had 
reasoned previously.36  
                                                   
34 ‘Opposed: 3. Anselm in the book Cur Deus Homo: “Since the will of God does nothing 
from any need but only from power, and the will of Christ was the will of God: therefore he 
died not from need but only from power.”’ Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 1, q. 3. 
35 ‘To that of Anselm concerning the will of Christ, the response is now obvious: for it does 
not simply exclude obligation but obligation in respect of the Divine Will. And, through that, 
the response to the following is obvious: to which it is objected that all obligation is either a 
prohibition or a limitation; for it must be said that that which is understood about obligation 
is repugnant to free will, just as the same Anselm said concerning that obligation which is 
subject to free will, does not have truth. For the same reason it does not prove that there was 
no obligation in Christ for him to suffer but that there was nothing contrary to his will.’ 
Bonaventure’s reference to Anselm’s text is drawn from Cur Deus Homo II. 17: ‘Et si vis 
omnium quae fecit et quae passus est veram scire necessitatem, scito omnia ex necessitate 
fuisse, quia ipse voluit. Voluntatem vero eius nulla praecessit necessitas.’ 
36 ‘In Christo fuit necessitas patiendi, sed assumta, non contracta.’ Sent III, d. 16, a. 1, q. 3. 
See pages80-81 above. 
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Artfully, Bonaventure not only brings Anselm’s idea into concord with 
his own but again preserved God’s freedom in respect of human salvation. 
Neither the act of rendering satisfaction nor the means by which it occurs are 
necessarily so, other than by a free election of God’s will. 
Again, like Alexander of Hales, he establishes the reality of the 
suffering in Christ in the passion, thus he can argue that there was true 
suffering of Christ’s sorrow and that this sorrow was the bitterest and 
sharpest of all sorrows.37 However, he does not connect this as forcefully as 
Alexander had done with his idea of full human engagement in the work of 
salvation. Rather, in Bonaventure’s reasoning, the authenticity of Christ’s 
sorrow was simply a matter of established dogma: ‘Dicendum, quod absque 
dubio, sicut Evangelium dicit, et fides catholica sensit, vera doloris passio fuit 
in Christo. In ipso enim fuit caro passibilis et perforabilis, fuit etiam virtus 
sentiendi, secundum quam anima compatitur corpori laeso’.38 However, 
when it came to a consideration of the precise locus of that suffering and 
sorrow, Bonaventure elected to adhere to what Alexander had established. 
Like his teacher, he drew a distinction between the ‘ratio ut ratio’ and the 
‘ratio ut natura’ and locates different experiences of the passion in each.39 In 
addressing whether Christ suffered according to his reason or his senses, 
Bonaventure gives a very Alexandrine response albeit, once again, without 
expressly naming him. He notes that the soul can suffer in and of itself and it 
can also sorrow as a result of what occurs to the body to which it is 
                                                   
37 ‘Vera doloris passio fuit in Christo’, Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, ‘Dolor passionis 
Christi inter ceteros Dolores fuit acerbissimus et acutissimus’, Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 
1, q. 2. 
38 ‘It must be said that, without doubt, just as the Gospel states and the catholic faith senses, 
there was a genuine experience of sorrow in Christ. For, in him was a passible and vulnerable 
flesh, strength that could yet experience things and in accordance with all this, a soul that 
suffered with the wounded body’. Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 15, a. 1, q. 1. 
39 See pages 73-76 and following above. 
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conjoined.40 As to the former, he said that in Christ, his soul genuinely 
sorrowed and suffered for human sins and this feeling proceeded from the 
rational mind. He then turns to the suffering of the natural mind: 
De alio autem dolore, qui inest animae ex carne, non est 
usquequaque evidens. Distinguunt tamen magistri 
nostri communiter, quod ratio dupliciter habet 
considerari, videlicet ut ratio et ut natura. Si 
consideretur ut ratio, sic passionis, quae ei 
attribuuntur, sunt consequentes ipsam deliberationem; 
et hoc modo anima Christi corpori patienti non 
compatiebatur, immo multum gaudebat et 
gratulabatur; vehementer enim placebat ei pati pro 
salute generis humani. Si autem consideretur ratio ut 
natura; sic, cum habeat naturalem appetitum et 
inclinationem ad corpus, ut pote perfectio ad 
perfectabile, patiebatur, corpore patiente.41 
 
Bonaventure has adopted Alexander’s position and paraphrased it for 
his response. Nevertheless, the passage shows a less than wholehearted 
commitment to those ideas on the part of Bonaventure. He did not choose to 
present it as his own position but merely as what ‘nostri magistri 
communiter’ had taught previously. Moreover, again unlike Alexander, 
Bonaventure refrains from positing any necessity of God, nor any need that 
Christ should suffer, in either his human or divine nature.  
Nevertheless, Bonaventure persisted with this distinction of the 
rational and natural reason. In the very next question, Bonaventure 
considers whether Christ’s soul suffered according to the higher part of its 
                                                   
40 This was a distinction well established in the patristic sources. As his authority for the 
proposition, Bonaventure gives Augustine, De Civitates Dei, ed. by Bernhard Dombart, 
Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana - Scriptores Graeci, 1 
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1928), XIV. 15.  
41 ‘Yet concerning the other sorrow, which is in the soul by virtue of the flesh, that is not 
entirely clear. Our teachers commonly make the distinction that the reason is to be 
considered in two ways, namely “as reason” and “as nature”. If it is considered “as reason”, 
then the sufferings attributed to it are those that follow from a choice; and by this means 
Christ’s soul did not suffer with the body as it suffered but rather it rejoiced greatly and gave 
thanks; for it was exceedingly pleased to suffer this for the salvation of the human race. If, 
however, reason “as nature” be considered; then since it has the natural appetites and 
tendencies of the body, and inasmuch as what is perfect can be made perfect, it suffered as 
the body suffered.’ Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 1.  
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reason, the ‘ratio ut natura’, and again he repeats the ideas of another author, 
rather than advancing arguments of his own.42 
Dicendum, quod secundum communen sententiam 
magistrorum passio Christi non solum stetit in 
sensualitate nec tantum pervenit ad rationem 
inferiorem, sed extendit se usque ad superiorem 
portionem. Sicut enim anima nostra ex coniunctione 
sui ad corpus infectum tota corrumpitur et tota inficitur 
secundum omnem partem, scilicet tam superiorem 
quam inferiorem; sic anima Christi ex coniunctione sui 
ad corpus patiens et afflictum tota patiebatur et 
affligebatur, ut per illam passionem et dolorem illum 
tota peccatrix anima curaretur. Et sic dolor fuit et 
passio in Christo secundum supremam rationis partem, 
quamvis in ea fuerit gaudium fruitionis. Licet autem 
hoc teneatur tanquam verum, difficile tamen est ad 
intelligendum, qualiter in anima Christi secundum 
eandem potentiam et secundem eundem statum 
potentiae fuerit dolor et gaudium, nec dolor 
superveniens discontinuaverit gaudium, immo fuerunt 
simul, nec iterum, quod maius est, dolor intensus valde 
fecerat, gaudium esse minus perfectum.43 
 
Bonaventure is clear that he is content to follow the line established by 
Alexander. It is also clear that Bonaventure harbours some reservations 
concerning it and does not quite understand how joy and sorrow can 
simultaneous be in Christ’s soul. Although Alexander laid emphasis on the 
human engagement with the experience of the passion so that the whole of 
the God-Man might participate in the experience, Bonaventure adopts a 
                                                   
42 ‘Utrum anima Christi passa fuerit secundum superiorem portionem rationis’. 
Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 2 – ‘Whether Christ’s soul had suffered according to the 
higher part of reason’. 
43 ‘It must be said that according to the common opinion of the masters, the suffering of 
Christ happened not only in the senses nor did it settle just in the lower reason, but it 
stretched itself into the higher part. For just as our soul from its union to the tainted body 
was wholly being corrupted and infected according to each part, that is to say the higher as 
much as the lower; thus Christ’s soul, from its union to a suffering and afflicted body, 
suffered and was afflicted wholly so that through that suffering and that sorrow, the whole 
sinful soul might be cured. And thus sorrow and suffering were in Christ according to the 
upper part as much as there was pleasure from enjoyment. Although this is held to be true, 
yet it is difficult to understand how in Christ’s soul, according to the same potential and 
according to the same state of potential, there was both sorrow and joy and not an 
overpowering sorrow separating off joy, or rather, they were together not in sequence so 
which is greater, a sorrow made very intense or a joy made less perfect.’ Bonaventure, Sent 
III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 2. 
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differing stance. He prefers to stress the importance of all that was tainted 
and afflicted by the fall to be in full union with Jesus Christ in order that he 
might heal it.44 Alexander, adhering to Anselm’s model of penal-substitution, 
was at pains to ensure that all the God-Man might truly render satisfaction, 
but Bonaventure wishes all the experience of humanity to be embraced by 
Christ so it might participate in his redemption. The distinction is that 
Bonaventure writes of salvation as an act of healing humanity marred by the 
circumstances of the fall, in contrast to Anselm and Alexander who depict 
salvation as furnishing adequate satisfaction to God. 
 
4.1.5  Passion and Compassion  
It is in this sense, Bonaventure’s preference for healing over satisfaction, that 
perhaps the final question of article two is best understood. Bonaventure asks 
whether the sorrow was more intense in the rational part of Christ’s soul or 
in the sensual part.45 In answering, Bonaventure draws a distinction between 
the suffering (passio) that is experienced in the sensual part and the 
‘suffering with’ (compassio) that is experienced in the rational part. Since the 
former is sourced in Christ’s own experience but the latter derived from a 
loving solidarity with the whole human race, Bonaventure concludes that the 
compassio in the rational part of his soul was the more intense sorrow.  
Quamvis magna causa esset dolendi in sensualitate 
propter separationem ipsius a carne, magna etiam esset 
dispositio ad dolendum propter optimam 
complexionem; in dolore tamen compassionis amplior 
erat ratio dolendi propter inhonorationem Dei et 
separationem nostram a Deo, maior etiam erat 
                                                   
44 This notion, ‘recapitulation’ or ‘anacephaleosis’, had a pedigree stretching back to Irenaeus 
of Lyons. See, e.g., Irenaeus of Lyon, Adversus Haereses, III. 18. vii. See Sheets, The 
Theology of the Atonement, p. 12. 
45 ‘Utrum dolor fuerit intensior in parte rationali animae Christi, an in parte sensuali’. 
Bonaventure, Sent IIeusI, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3. 
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dispositio ad dolendum propter dilectionis 
nimietatem.46  
 
Again, Bonaventure and Alexander arrive at similar conclusions but by quite 
different paths. For Alexander, the suffering in the rational part of the soul 
was essential both in order to apply the suffering to the satisfaction of the 
price for redemption and to ensure full engagement by the humanity of 
Christ.47 In the case of Bonaventure, declining to predicate any necessity of 
God, he holds that the Son freely chose in love to reach out to the human race 
in which he had freely chosen to become incarnate and ‘suffer with’ it in love, 
and the Father freely chose to accept this compassio as the adequate price of 
human redemption.  
Incorporating these ideas from Alexander was not completely 
successful and the reasoning seems somewhat strained; the reason for the 
incarnation appears as both an expression of divine love and a precondition 
to human redemption.48 This blending of reasons can be ascribed to the 
scholastic nature of sentence commentaries. 
A young scholar’s commentary on the Book of Sentences was 
ordinarily his first major composition and was written at the start of his 
academic career. Its purpose was to demonstrate sufficient command of 
authorities, to expound on their concord and to manifest proficiency across 
the breadth of the discipline of theology. More fundamentally, its purpose 
                                                   
46 ‘However great was the cause of sorrow in the sensual part on account of its separation 
from the flesh, yet greater still was the disposition to sorrowing on account of excellent 
communion; in the grief of such compassion was a great reason for sorrowing due to the 
dishonour to God and our separation from God, yet greater still was the disposition to 
sorrowing on account of the abundance of love’. Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3. 
47 See, for example, Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’ q. 
16, d. 4, m. 5, and page 72 above. 
48 See, for example, Hayes, The Hidden Center, pp. 152-53 or Romano Guardini, Die Lehre 
des Heil. Bonaventura von der Erlösung: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zum System der 
Erlösungslehre (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1921), pp. 19-21. 
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was also to demonstrate to the faculty of theology sufficient ability on the 
part of the author to be admitted to his degree.49 As was seen in the case of 
Eudes Rigaud, keenness of mind and sharpness of intellect were admired 
skills but there was a risk in straying too far from the established paths of 
scholarship and orthodoxy.50 Something of this prudence can be seen in 
Bonaventure’s treatment of the thought of Alexander of Hales. Bonaventure 
duly noted that the division of the upper will was something that his teachers 
had taught and which Bonaventure accepted but he admitted that he did not 
understand how it could be so!51 Wrestling within him is, internally, a desire 
to express his own opinion and, externally, the pressure from observing the 
form of a sentence commentary along with the suspicious oversight of the 
secular masters of the faculty, during a rekindled secular-mendicant 
controversy, the circumstances around which are considered in the following 
chapter.52 
 
4.1.6  The Secular-Mendicant Controversy and Bonaventure 
The constraints of the secular-mendicant controversy upon the Franciscans 
manifested themselves upon Bonaventure in two significant fashions. Due to 
the masters’ ban on degrees for mendicants, Bonaventure was unable to 
teach other than as a formed bachelor.53 This afforded him time to compose a 
large number of theological works. All of his Quaestiones Disputatae, the 
Breviloquium, De Reductione, De Triplici Via and a number of others were 
                                                   
49 See pages 21-22 above. 
50 See pages 91-92 above. 
51 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 2. 
52 As to the renewed hostilities in the controversy, see pages 161-65 below. 
53 Roest, History of Franciscan Education, p. 54. 
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composed in the 1250s.54 His election as Minister General in 1257 ended his 
time as an academic and, but for the dispute, Bonaventure would have lacked 
the liberty to compose many of these works. They would never have come 
into being. 
The second of these constraints, also arising from the secular-
mendicant controversy, was that against excessive novelty. Bonaventure was 
composing during a rather contentious phase of the controversy in which 
secular masters, keen to undermine the influence of the mendicants with the 
papacy, scrutinised attentively mendicant works for signs of errors, especially 
Joachism.55 They had successfully ousted from the university the friar Gerard 
of Borgo San Donnino on such grounds and were seeking others, placing the 
mendicants under considerable suspicion.56 Synthesis was, as for all in the 
scholastic era, the prudent goal of a sensible student, not novelty. Even so, 
the Franciscans may at this time have felt a greater sensitivity to such 
scrutiny. 
Bonaventure left evidence of this pressure. Some manuscript 
traditions of Bonaventure’s commentary included an initial prologue to Book 
Two in which Bonaventure refers to comments that other scholars had made 
                                                   
54 Bonaventure, ‘Quaestiones Disputatae de Scientia Christi’ in Opera Omnia, ed. by 
Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-
1907), 5 (1891), pp. 3-43; ‘Quaestiones Disputatae de Mysterio Sacrosanctis Trinitatis’ in 
Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. 
Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), V (1891), pp. 45-115; ‘Quaestiones Disputatae de Perfectione 
Evangelica’ Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia 
Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), V (1891), pp. 117-98; ‘De Reductione Artium ad 
Theologiam’, in Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: 
Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), 5 (1891), pp. 317-25; ; ‘De Triplici Via’, in 
Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. 
Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), VIII (1898), pp. 3-27. See too Sanctus Bonaventura 1274-1974, 
ed. by Collegio S. Bonaventura, 7 vols (Grottaferrata: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 
1974), II: De Vita, Mente, Fontibus et Operibus, pp. 15-16. 
55 As to Joachism, see page 162 below. 
56 Gerard of Borgo San Donnino, Introductorium in Evangelium Aeternum, ed. by J. G. V. 
Engelhardt (Erlangen: Kunstmann, 1828). See also Marjorie Reeves, The Influence of 
Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages: A Study in Joachimism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), pp. 60-70. 
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on his first book. These masters had apparently indeed scrutinised 
Bonaventure’s work upbraided him for his creativity. He complains that he 
was accused of travelling much further in his thought that Peter Lombard 
had established and of departing from his instruction. As a result of this 
criticism, Bonaventure bemoaned that he was obliged to revise what he had 
said previously, in some cases needing to edit his position while, in others, 
having to change his whole arguments. 
At quemadmodum in primo libro sententiis adhaesi et 
communibus opinionibus magistrorum, et potissime 
magistri et patris nostri bonae memoriae fratris 
Alexandri, sic in consequentibus libris ab eorum 
vestigiis non recedam. Non enim intendo novas 
opiniones adversare, sed communes et approbatas 
retexere. Nec quisquam aestimet, quod novi scripti 
velim esse fabricator; hoc enim sentio et fateor, quod 
sum pauper et tenuis compilator.57  
 
It would seem clear that Bonaventure was being accused of innovation and 
was attempting to defend himself by proclaiming his adherence to Peter 
Lombard and to the other masters including Alexander of Hales. As he puts 
it, ‘In hoc igitur Magistro non contradixi, sed potius verbum eius iuxta 
veritatis regulam, ut aestimo, explicavi’.58 
The precise nature of this so-called Praelocutio is unclear. Some have 
opined that it is a Principium of Bonaventure’s; the formal lecture given at 
the start of term to open new topics in the Sentences for consideration.59 It 
seems too retrospective for that and is more a ‘foreword’ in which 
                                                   
57 ‘And just as in the first Book of the Sentences, I clung to the general opinions of teachers 
and especially of the Master [Peter Lombard] and to our good father of happy memory, 
Brother Alexander [of Hales], so in the following books, I shall not draw back from their 
paths. For I do not strive to invent new opinions but retrace what are commonly held and 
endorsed. Nor let anyone consider that I want to be the maker of new writings; for I realise 
and admit that I am a poor and weak copyist’. Bonaventure, Praelocutio, Sent. II.  
58 ‘In this, therefore, I did not contradict the Master [Peter Lombard], but rather I 
expounded his words truthfully, as I reckon it.’ Bonaventure, Praelocutio to the 
Commentary of the Book of Sentences. 
59 This, for example, is the opinion of Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, p. 72.  
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Bonaventure first resolves some outstanding issues that had circulated about 
his treatment of Book I before moving to his second book.   
For all his eloquence, it should not be forgotten that Bonaventure was 
scarcely in his thirties when he was composing his commentary. Unlike many 
of his later works, composed for the order, this had been prepared for an 
academic audience, some of whose members had been quite vociferous in 
their hostility to the mendicants. The readership and acceptance of this 
commentary were quite different to that which read the later Breviloquium 
and Collationes in Hexaëmeron. His answers in Sent III, d. 16, a. 2, as one set 
of examples, reveal a writer who clearly possesses reservations about the 
answer he is proposing but who has elected to adhere publicly to the way of 
greater prudence and uses positions adopted by his masters.60 Even so, 
Bonaventure seems dissatisfied with his response and returns to it in later 
works.61 Similarly, although Bonaventure argues against a divine obligation 
upon Christ to suffer and die, he fails to provide a satisfactory alternative to 
penal substitution. Yet further, if human salvation was not the principal 
purpose of the incarnation, the commentary is unclear about the alternate 
reason for it. 
 
                                                   
60 ‘Et sic dolor fuit et passio in Christo secundum supremam rationis partem, quamvis in ea 
fuerit gaudium fruitionis. Licet autem hoc teneatur tanquam verum, difficile tamen est ad 
intelligendum, qualiter in anima Christi secundum eandem potentiam et secundem eundem 
statum potentiae fuerit dolor et gaudium, nec dolor superveniens discontinuaverit gaudium’. 
Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 2, ‘And thus sorrow and suffering were in Christ 
according to the upper part as much as there was pleasure from enjoyment. Although this is 
held to be true, yet it is difficult to understand how in Christ’s soul, according to the same 
potential and according to the same state of potential, there was both sorrow and joy and not 
an overpowering sorrow separating off joy’. See pages 124-25 above. 
61 See page 141 below. 
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4.2  BREVILOQUIUM 
The response to these issues is found in Bonaventure’s later works. The 
Breviloquium is one of the works that Bonaventure completed in about 1257 
as he departed Paris to begin his term as Minister General, putting it roughly 
seven to ten years after the sentence commentary. It was written in lieu of a 
Summa. Rather than a typically systematic and comprehensive theological 
treatment within some structure of the author’s choice, Bonaventure opted 
for a systematic but briefer and far more concise text suited to the needs of 
itinerant friars, especially popular preachers, wanting something more in the 
nature of a short summary or enchiridion of theology.62 Part IV of the work, 
entitled De Incarnatione Verbi, deals with Christ’s life and work, including 
the work of redemption. 
That part opens directly with a restatement of the soteriological 
position that was seen in the commentary on the sentences:  
Restat nunc aliqua breviter dicere de incarnatione 
Verbi, per quod quidem Verbum incarnatum facta est 
salus et reparatio generis humani, non quia aliter Deus 
non potuerit humanum genus salvare vel liberare, sed 
quia nullus alius modus erat ita congruus et conveniens 
ipse repartori et reparabili et reparationi.63  
 
Although less than a decade older than his sentence commentary, this 
work has a greater directness and self-assurance with which the older and 
more experienced Bonaventure now expresses himself. No longer the 
deferential young scholar of the sentence commentary writing, in a sense, for 
his first public audience, Bonaventure is now quite comfortable in openly and 
                                                   
62 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, Prologus, 6. The Breviloquium survives in 251 manuscripts, 
attesting to its popularity in use. 
63 Breviloquium, IV. 1: ‘It remains now to say something briefly about the incarnation of the 
Word, through which Incarnate Word the salvation and restoration of the human race 
occurred, not because God could not save or set free the human race by some other means, 
but because no other means would have been as apt or suitable for repairing, restoring or 
renewing it.’ Cf. Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1. 
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unapologetically writing for his own community. With the change in locus 
and genre comes a change in Bonaventure’s theological output. For example, 
he now plainly contradicts Anselm, who had held that there was no other way 
in which humanity could have been saved than Christ.64 
In Book IV Bonaventure addresses how it was that human salvation 
was wrought. He identifies the consequences of the fall and notes that 
humanity was corrupted in its fleshly, animal and sensual natures, and thus 
it was beset with weakness, ignorance and malice, respectively, and so no 
longer, by itself, able to imitate virtue, to know the light or to love goodness. 
It follows that the best remedy for the consequence of sin is therefore that 
which is perfectly imitable, knowable and lovable. For Bonaventure, that role 
was best performed by the incarnate Word. 
Homo, cadens in culpam, averterat se et recesserat a 
principio potentissimo, sapientissimo et 
benevolentissimo; ideo corruerat et in infirmitatem, 
ignorantiam et malignitatem, ac per hoc de spirituali 
effectus est carnalis, animalis et sensualis; et ideo 
ineptus erat ad divinam virtutem imitandam, ad lucem 
cognoscendam, ad bonitatem diligendam. Ad hoc igitur, 
quod homo ab isto statu repararetur congruentissimum 
fuit, ut ei condescenderet primum principium, 
reddendo se illi noscibile, amabile et imitabile. Et quia 
homo carnalis, animalis et sensualis non noverat nec 
amabat nec sequebatur nisi sibi proportionalia et 
consimilia; ideo ad eripiendum hominem de hoc statu 
Verbum caro factum est, ut ab homine, qui caro erat, et 
cognosci posset et amari et imitari ac per hoc et homo 
Deum cognoscens et amans et imitans remediaretur a 
morbo peccati.65 
                                                   
64 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I. 25. ‘Quod ex necessitate per Christum salvetur homo’. 
65 ‘Humanity, falling into sin, turned itself away and fell back from its most powerful, wise 
and benevolent cause. Thereby it stumbled into weakness, ignorance and malice and through 
this there was a carnal, animal and sensual effect on the spirit. It was unsuited for imitating 
divine virtue, knowing the light or loving goodness. It was most fitting that humanity be 
restored from that status and so the First Cause came down to humanity, making itself 
knowable, lovable and imitable for humanity. And since humanity is carnal, animal and 
sensual, it does not know nor love nor follow anything unless it be like and similar to itself, 
therefore, to snatch humanity from this condition, the Word became flesh so that it might be 
known and loved and imitated by humanity which is flesh too. Thus humanity, knowing and 
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In this healing of humanity from the consequence of the fall, the central 
function of salvation, it is noteworthy that Bonaventure makes no mention of 
Christ’s passion, crucifixion or resurrection. Likewise, he makes no provision 
at all for the rendering of some satisfaction to God. Instead, for Bonaventure, 
the human encounter with the divine self-utterance in the incarnate Word is 
in itself salvific. It is in that encounter that humanity learns to know God, 
love goodness and imitate virtue. Put in other words, for Bonaventure, the 
incarnation does not occur in order that Christ might go on to redeem 
humankind, the incarnation is itself redemptive for humankind. 
 
4.2.1  A New Role for Satisfaction 
The making of satisfaction, which had been, in penal-substitution, the pivotal 
element in human salvation, is not utterly abandoned by Bonaventure. It is 
instead relegated to a lesser role. Bonaventure was notoriously fond of 
Trinitarian triads: God is ‘knowable, lovable and imitable’, humanity is 
‘restored, repaired and renewed’ and so on. Each of these latter three cures 
has, in turn, three aspects. Humanity is restored through its return to 
excellence, relationships and innocence. Of these, innocence is restored by 
erasing human guilt, done by making satisfaction.  
Innocentiam vero mentis recuperare non poterat, nisi 
dimissa culpa; quam dimittere non decebat divinam 
iustitiam nisi per satisfactionem condignam; et quia 
satisfacere non poterat nisi Deus pro toto humano 
genere, nec debebat nisi homo, qui peccaverat: ideo 
congruentissimum fuit humanum genus reparari per 
Deum-hominem natum de genere Adae.66 
                                                                                                                                               
loving and imitating God, might be healed from the sickness of sin.’ Bonaventure, 
Breviloquium, IV. 1. 
66 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 1: ‘Yet [humanity] cannot recover innocence of soul 
unless set free from guilt; which it was not proper for divine justice to discharge unless 
through fitting satisfaction. Because none could make satisfaction for the whole human race 
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The argument is clearly that of Anselm and the reasoning also. Nevertheless, 
for Bonaventure, its significance is no longer as a recompense to God for 
some offence done against God’s dignity. Rather, it is something done for the 
benefit of humanity, that it might be freed from its own guilt and thereby be 
‘restored’ to its lost innocence. They differ in that, for Bonaventure, salvation 
is not about ‘placating’ God so God might lift God’s punishment from 
humanity, for Bonaventure maintains that God did not mar humanity nor 
disfigure any creation in spite.67 Bonaventure writes rather of ‘repairing, 
restoring, renewing’ humanity so it might fulfil its place in the Divine plan, 
believing that once the harmful consequences of human sin are stripped 
away from humankind, it would recapture the perfection in which God had 
created it. 
It was the harmful effect of sin to cause humanity to fall into 
weakness, ignorance and malice. Loving, knowing, and imitating Christ is the 
ideal counter to these. This is done through the action of the Word who is the 
most excellent man (Christ the man), God’s love made flesh (Christ as God 
incarnate) and the satisfaction that erases human guilt (Christ as God-
man).68 In Bonaventure’s depiction, Christ saves not because he suffers and 
dies but because he is ‘noscibile, amabile et imitabile’, he is the medium, 
mediation and mediator in, of and for creation and he is, in Bonaventure’s 
terms, the uncreated, incarnate and inspiring Word.69 
Renewing, repairing and restoring humanity each had three steps and 
each hinges on the person of Christ. Unlike his predecessors who looked to 
                                                                                                                                                
save God, nor ought any make it save humanity who had sinned, thus it was most fitting that 
the human race be restored through a God-man born of the race of Adam.’  
67 Cf. Genesis 1: 31. 
68 Bonaventure, Breviloquium IV. 1. 
69 Bonaventure, Breviloquium IV. 1; cf. Sent I, d. 27, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1. 
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the shortcomings of humanity needing to be saved, or to the penalties 
inflicted by the Father aggrieved by human sin, Bonaventure focussed upon 
Christ. It was Christ’s nature that he should be both salvific and redemptive 
and the very act of Christ’s incarnate entering into the world brought about 
salvation, as he made clear in the conclusion to this chapter: 
‘Congruentissima fuit nostrae reparationi incarnatio Verbi, ut, sicut genus 
humanum in esse exierat per Verbum increatum et in culpam ceciderat 
deserendo Verbum inspiratum; sic a culpa resurgeret per Verbum 
incarnatum’.70 
Bonaventure’s handling of Anselm’s legacy is artful. On the one hand, 
he did not brusquely dismiss Anselm’s ideas which were by then well 
established in the teaching of the universities. On the other, Bonaventure saw 
a greater soteriological role for the incarnation that Anselm’s model did not 
accommodate. Bonaventure’s solution was not openly to disagree with 
Anselm’s reasoning but to reduce the importance and significance of 
satisfaction and take from it its former centrality in the workings of salvation. 
This is a centrality that it will never again reacquire among Franciscans for 
whom salvation will ever after be about more than satisfaction. 
In some respects, Bonaventure clarified and restored Anselm’s 
argument to its proper place. As noted earlier, Anselm had written the Cur 
Deus Homo not as a soteriological text but rather one that attempted to 
explain the reasons for the incarnation, namely to prevent frustration of the 
divine plan for humanity. As Anselm famously declared, ‘He was born that he 
                                                   
70 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 1: ‘The incarnation of the Word was the most fitting for 
our restoration so that, just as the human race had emerged into being through the 
uncreated Word and fell into sin by abandoning the inspiring Word, so it rose again from sin 
through the incarnate Word.’ 
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might die’.71 Later authors, including Alexander of Hales, had taken his 
reasoning and applied it in soteriological contexts not intended by Anselm, to 
explain how salvation occurred.72 By reducing the significance to salvation of 
Anselmian satisfaction, Bonaventure could be said to have allowed Anselm’s 
theory to operate more closely to the manner in which the latter originally 
had intended, to explain why the incarnation occurred. 
 
4.2.2  Christ as Middle, Medium and Mediator  
Such a move also left Bonaventure free to develop the place of Christ in his 
approach. For him, Christ is the centre, of whose engagement with humanity 
the pivot is the incarnation. In the threefold nature of the uncreated, 
incarnate and inspiring Word, Bonaventure beheld the perfect medium.73 
The Word is the middle person of the Trinity and, through its union with 
humanity, it is the centre of creation, being the medium between creator and 
created.74 The central act of this central figure is the incarnation, in which the 
first of creation is joined to the last, and creation itself culminates; as 
Bonaventure put it in the Itinerarium: 
Respice ad propitiatorium et mirare, quod in ipso 
principium primum iunctum est cum postremo, Deus 
cum homine sexto die formato, aeternum iunctum est 
                                                   
71 See page 81 above. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, II. 16. 
72 John McIntyre, Saint Anselm and His Critics, pp. 62, 77. 
73 John 1: 2. This idea recurs in Bonaventure’s writings. See, for example, Bonaventure, Sent 
I, d. 27, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1; Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, I. 5 and IX. 1-4; 
Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, IV. 3; Breviloquium V. 6. For a more detailed consideration of 
this see Hayes, The Hidden Center, pp. 87–90; Alexander Gerken, Theologie des Wortes. 
Das Verhältnis von Schöpfung und Inkarnation bei Bonaventura (Düsseldorf: Patmos-
Verlag, 1963), pp. 238–56 or Wayne Hellmann and Jay Hammond, Divine and Created 
Order in Bonaventure’s Theology, Theology Series, 15 (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan 
Institute Publications, 2001), pp. 121-28. 
74 See, for example, Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 19, a. 2, q. 1-2; Breviloquium I. 6 and IV. 4; 
Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, II. 7; De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam 23; Collationes in 
Hexaëmeron I. 1. For a more detailed consideration of this see Ewert Cousins, Bonaventure 
and the Coincidence of Opposites (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978), pp. 131-60; 
Cullen, Bonaventure, pp. 128–33, and Hayes, The Hidden Center, pp. 192–214. 
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cum homine temporali, in plenitudine temporum de 
Virgine nato, simplicissimum cum summe composito, 
actualissimum cum summe passo et mortuo, 
perfectissimum et immensum cum modico, summe 
unum et omnimodum cum individuo composito et a 
ceteris distincto, homine scilicet Jesu Christo.75 
 
Naming the incarnation as the centrepiece of the universe was 
metaphysical and not metaphorical for Bonaventure.76 It was the medial act 
of him who is both medium and mediator that brought creation to 
fulfilment.77 
To return to the question posed earlier concerning the purpose of the 
incarnation, Bonaventure does not accept that it was simply to enable Christ 
to come into the world so that he might make the satisfaction by which 
humanity is saved and set free.78 Rather, the incarnation was salvific in itself, 
for it was to be what Bonaventure called ‘the sublime remedy’.79 He affirms 
just this in chapter III of this part:  
Quoniam ergo incarnatio est a primo principio 
reparante modo congruentissimo; et congruus modus 
est, quod medicina ex opposito respondeat morbo, et 
reparatio lapsui, et remedium nocumento; cum genus 
humanum lapsum fuerit per diabolicam suggestionem 
et per consensum mulieris deceptae et per 
generationem concupiscentialem, transfundentem 
originale in prolem: oportuit quod e contrario his esset 
Angelus bonus suadens bonum, et virgo credens et 
consentiens in bonum suasum, et caritas Spiritus sancti 
sanctificans et fecundans ad conceptum immaculatum; 
ut sic ‘contraria contrariis curarentur’.80 
                                                   
75 ‘Look upon the Mercy Seat and marvel, that in him the first principle is united with the 
last, God with man formed on the sixth day, eternity is united with a man in time born in the 
fullness of time from a Virgin, the simplest being with the most compound, the most actual 
with one who suffered greatly and died, the most perfect and immeasurable with the 
insignificant, the highest and all-encompassing unity with a compound individual distinct 
from all others, in a man, namely, Jesus Christ.’ Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, VI. 5. Cf. 
Breviloquium, IV. 1. 
76 Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, I. 17. 
77 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, II. 12. 
78 See page 133 above. 
79 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 4. 
80 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 3: ‘Thus it follows that the incarnation is the most fitting 




The incarnation is not a means to an end but, for Bonaventure, an 
end in itself but this then leaves unclear the role of Christ’s 
passion. 
 
4.2.3  Remedy by Opposites 
Chapters 8-10 of Part IV of the Breviloquium consider the role of the passion. 
Bonaventure established that God is just, blessed, impassible and immortal, 
in contrast to fallen human nature as sinful, wretched, passible and mortal.81 
Jesus Christ, the perfect mediator, shares elements of each, and is just and 
blessed but also passible and mortal. Thus, for Bonaventure, it was possible 
for Christ in his passion to pray to the Father that the cup of suffering might 
be taken from him.82 This was an act not of fear nor unwillingness to suffer 
but because it might offend justice that an innocent carry the penalty of 
another’s fault.83 Having established Christ’s ability to suffer, he explores 
what place the events of Calvary played in salvation and again, it is about 
remediation through opposites. 
Ideo per remedium convenientissimum reparavit. 
Convenientissimum autem est, ut contraria contrariis 
curentur. Quia ergo homo, volens esse sapiens ut Deus, 
peccavit, in ligno vetito volens delectari, ita quod 
inclinatus est ad libidinem, erectus in praesumtionem; 
ac per hoc totum genus humanum infectum est et 
perdidit immortalitatem et incurrit debitam mortem: 
hinc est quod ad hoc, quod homo reparetur convenienti 
remedio, Deus factus homo voluit humiliari et in ligno 
                                                                                                                                                
illness, this fitting means is restoration for the fall and a remedy for affliction. When the 
human race had fallen through satanic suggestion, the consent of a deceived woman and 
lustful procreation, passing on the original fault to offspring; it was appropriate that from 
the opposite there be a good angel counselling goodness, a virgin believing and consenting in 
good counsel and the Holy Spirit’s love sanctifying and making fruitful for an immaculate 
conception – all so that “things might be healed by their opposites”’. 
81 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 8. 
82 Mark 14:36, Matthew 26:39, Luke 22:42. 
83 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 8. 
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pati; et contra universalem infectionem pati passione 
generalissima, contra libidinem passione acerbissimo, 
contra praesumtionem passione ignominiosissima, 
contra mortem debita et invitam pati voluit mortem 
non meritam sed voluntariam.84 
 
In this account, nothing in Christ’s passion and death was intrinsically 
necessary for human salvation. It is salvific not because of the great price 
rendered by the passion of the God-man, as Anselm and even Alexander of 
Hales maintained, but simply because it was the opposite to what humanity 
had done in the fall and so the most fitting remediation. If an arrogant 
humanity succumbed to the lure of a tree in order to be as gods and thereby 
was involuntarily subjected to suffering and death, then the apt response was 
a humble God becoming human and freely embracing a tree in a voluntary 
subjection to suffering and death. The events of Calvary had a place but not a 
necessary one; being opposite to the fall, they were only the best suited to 
being its remedy.  
Bonaventure is setting out an alternative to the Anselmian depiction of 
the role of Christ’s passion. It has already been noted that Bonaventure does 
not portray the events of Calvary as a satisfaction made to God but an action 
restorative of humanity.85 He now adds that those acts were apt, but not 
essential, even for that restorative purpose. In Bonaventure’s depiction, the 
focus is neither upon God nor upon appeasing divine justice. The need is 
humanity’s, and satisfaction serves simply to free humanity from its own 
                                                   
84 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 9: ‘Therefore he restored it through the most fitting 
remedy. The most fitting is that opposites be healed by opposites. So therefore humanity, 
desiring to be as knowing as God, sinned by wanting to taste the forbidden tree, became 
misshapen in its desires but forthright in its presumption. Through this the whole human 
race was infected and forfeited immortality and incurred the debt of death. Because 
humanity should be restored by a fitting remedy, this is that for which God wished to be 
humbled and become man and suffer upon a tree. Against the infection of the whole world, 
he wished to suffer the most general passion, against lustfulness, to suffer the most bitter 
passion, against presumption, to suffer the most ignominious passion, against the unwanted 
obligation of death he wished a willing but undeserved death’.  
85 See page 137 above. 
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sense of guilt. Bonaventure omits a sense of wronged divine justice insisting 
on recompense so that humanity might be redeemed. 
The development of Bonaventure’s thought and reasoning from the 
commentary on the Book of Sentences to the Breviloquium can therefore be 
described as more a change in degree than a change in substance. All of the 
notions in soteriology that have been discussed in the Breviloquium are to be 
found at some stage of development in his earlier work, such as reluctance to 
predicate necessity of God, salvation through restoration of humanity rather 
than satisfaction to God and the salvific nature of the incarnation. What 
differs is that the older and more confident Bonaventure of the Breviloquium 
is much more explicit in expressing these opinions and demonstrates less 
willingness to defer to the thought of his former teachers and elders. He is 
now bolder and of greater conviction in his ideas and with less that he had to 
prove to the secular masters of the university. Composing the work out of the 
context of the faculty of theology and the events of the secular-mendicant 
controversy, Bonaventure reveals a less reserved approach to his 
soteriological work. 
The Breviloquium had been written when Bonaventure was about 
thirty-seven years of age and had already become a master himself and 
Minister General of the order. Such positions gave him greater intellectual 
freedom and independence certainly. Bonaventure’s lesser circumspection 
and caution is clear throughout the text. Moreover, the text was written for 
an internal audience of the order and not for public consumption by fellow 
academics. 
Yet Bonaventure knew too that in writing a text as this, its ideas would 
come to the attention of university authorities and risk provoking problems 
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for the friars there. This would then become very much a problem for the 
Minister General. To some degree the different genre of the Breviloquium 
addressed this problem. It was comprehensive enough to still contain the 
broad framework of Bonaventure’s ideas but sufficiently brief and accessible 
to the average friar to omit details that could be used to further rancour with 
the Franciscans. This change of setting for Bonaventure brought about a 
change in pressures upon him and so a different sort of theological 
expression and this was very apparent in his final major work touching 
soteriological. 
 
4.3  COLLATIONES IN HEXAËMERON 
The Collationes in Hexaëmeron show a new dimensions to Bonaventure’s 
soteriology. It was Bonaventure’s final work, composed in the year of his 
death in 1274. He had been created a cardinal the preceding June and 
subsequently appointed to a preparatory commission for the Ecumenical 
Council of Lyons that was to open that summer. Since the commission was to 
be based in Paris, Bonaventure lodged with the friars there at the Grand 
Couvent and, during his stay, was invited by the friars to give a series of 
collations to the community.86 Bonaventure accepted and took as his theme 
the six days of creation but did not conclude the series before leaving for 
Lyons. It was there that Bonaventure died, never to return to Paris to 
                                                   
86 A collation was, strictly speaking, the light evening meal served to monks. In time, it 




complete the collations, which end abruptly with a partial consideration of 
the fourth day.87 
The Collationes in Hexaëmeron exist only in two reportationes but 
the substantially longer of which is so detailed and so replete with 
Bonaventure’s characteristic cursus and style that it is difficult to conclude 
that it is not a reportatio examinata.88 The Hexaëmeron had a small 
circulation and only ten manuscripts survive of which, surprisingly, none are 
in France. It was not well known until first published in 1891.89 
The text is not one specifically on the topic of soteriology and, 
moreover, the passages which were most likely to be relevant to a 
consideration of salvation, those concerning humanity, were never 
composed. It is a text that is not readily described or compartmentalised 
within a single genre. It is certainly a far less methodical and systematic work 
than his sentence commentary or Breviloquium. There are parts of it that are 
an exhortation to young friars, parts an exposition of scripture, parts a 
treatise on epistemology and yet other parts a polemic against the use of 
pagan authors in the university.90 It is clear when reading the work that, as 
Bonaventure moved from collation to collation, he altered his themes. 
Nevertheless, in the whole work, Bonaventure artfully presented a particular 
view of the cosmos and God’s engagement with it that shows integrity and 
consistency. From that, as well as Bonaventure’s distinctive numerological 
structuring, it is possible to extrapolate with some confidence certain 
                                                   
87 Chronica XXIV Generalium Ordinis Minorum, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, Analecta 
Franciscana, 3 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1887), p. 100. 
Bonaventure, Opera Omnia, Vol. IX, Prolegomena xxxvii. 
88 Bonaventure, Opera Omnia, V, xxxvi–xl. 
89 Bonaventure, Opera Omnia, V, xxxix. 
90 Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, II. 3, XIII. 8-9, XII. 1-3 and VII. 1, respectively, 
are examples of these. See the comments on the general nature of the text in Roest, 
Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission, pp. 76-77. 
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approaches to salvation by the mature Bonaventure in the fullness of his 
days. 
An initial observation is that the Bonaventure writing here is a 
different man to the author of commentary on the sentences and the 
Breviloquium twenty years earlier. In this work Bonaventure presents as 
older, more experienced and now lacking a strictly academic audience to 
address. Accordingly, Bonaventure approaches his topic in different way in 
this instance. 
From outset it is clear that the notion of hierarchy is deeply ingrained 
within the Hexaëmeron. Bonaventure wrote of hierarchy thus: ‘Est autem 
hierarchia ordo divinus, scientia et actio ad deiforme, quantum possibile est, 
assimilata, et ad inditas ei divinitus illuminationes proportionaliter in Dei 
similitudinem ascendens’.91 He goes on to explain that God is, in a sense, 
hierarchic inasmuch as God is ordered in a way proper to each divine Person, 
with order corresponding to the Father, knowledge to the Son and action to 
the Spirit, although no person was subordinate to another. The universe, too, 
is ordered into a hierarchy because it is created of the self-effusive fecundity 
of God and reflects God, from whom it came and with whom it is imprinted. 
In the Hexaëmeron, ‘hierarchy’ is more than a mere static occupation of 
one’s place in the divinely instituted order; there is a dynamism in 
Bonaventure’s depiction of hierarchy and it included a concept of ascending 
to a greater likeness to God proper to each being, as in the quote above. 
                                                   
91 ‘Yet the divine order, knowledge and action is a hierarchy of similarity, as much as 
possible, to deiformity and divinely taking on enlightenment, proportionally to its rising in 
likeness to God.’ Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, XXI. 17. 
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There is a hierarchic nature that was given to creatures by the mere 
fact of their creation from the Father, but also a richer form flowing from 
‘ascending to the likeness of God’ under the influence of grace.  
‘Haec autem influentia non est simpliciter quid 
increatum; nec ex hoc sequitur, quod influentiae sit 
influentia, quia haec influentia reducit in Deum; dicit 
enim continuationem cum primo principio et 
reductionem in ipsum; non sicut res distans. Unde vera 
est influentia, quae egreditur et regreditur, ut Filius 
exivi a Patre et revertitur in ipsum’.92 
 
Hierarchy, as Bonaventure is using the term, encompasses a being striving 
for a deiformity proper to the degree to which it shares likeness and image 
with God. God’s own quasi-hierarchic nature is displayed in God’s order, 
knowledge and action, and these were most potently manifested in creation 
itself, the physical emanation of divine fecundity, in which God’s all-knowing 
wisdom, the Word, acted to bring forth the cosmos, rendering order from 
chaos. Since the Word returns to the Father, so too do the beings imprinted 
with the Word’s likeness, striving for deiformity. This notion of egressio and 
regressio is encountered throughout the collations for, in Bonaventure’s 
thought, the act of the creation of the cosmos was not completed in the six 
days, for that was but a part of the egressio; the fulfilment of creation is yet to 
occur and awaits the full regressio to the Father of all that was made.93 Thus, 
for example, in describing the twelve fruits of the study of scripture, 
Bonaventure says, ‘Imaginor illas duodecim illustrationes primas sive 
                                                   
92 ‘This influence is not simply what is uncreated, nor does it follow from this that what is of 
influence is this influence, since this influence leads back to God. Rather, it declares a 
continuation with the first principle and a return to it, not just something standing apart. 
Thus this is the true influence, which goes out and returns back, just as the Son goes forth 
from the Father and returns to him’. Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, XXI. 18. 
93 Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, II. 33 and III. 31-32. See also Benedict XVI 
(Joseph Ratzinger), The Theology of History in St Bonaventure, trans. by Zachary Hayes 
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971), p. 110 and Ctirad Václav Pospísĭl, ‘L’Architettura 
della soteriologia Bonaventuriana’, Antonianum, 73 (1998), 695-712, pp. 698, 701. 
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ascendentes, quae fluunt a Deo ad Deum terminantur et currunt per totam 
Scripturam’.94 Again, in Hexaëmeron XX. 22, Bonaventure likens the souls of 
the humanae hierarchizatae to the stars which follow their orbits across the 
heavens, always to return in proper course to their origin. Similarly, as 
Bonaventure pondered each day of creation across the collations, he wrote of 
the rays of light emanating from the Father of Lights, shining down upon the 
creation of that day and then reflecting it back in regressio so that God might 
say that God ‘saw that it was good’.95  
Relating this, then, to what has already been observed concerning the 
incarnation, it is apparent that Christ’s coming into creation was not solely 
some remedial act but, for Bonaventure and many later Franciscans too, the 
culmination of creation’s egressio and the climax of God’s self-giving in 
creation, the giving of God’s own self as part of that creation. Creation, more 
than simply made by God through the Word, was ennobled and 
consummated by the entry of the Word into it and conjunction to it, as both 
the perfection and perfecter of that creation. 
Just as Christ is the middle Person of the Trinity, so he is the perfect 
medium and mediator.96 More than the climax to the egressio, he is at the 
same time also the beginning of the regressio, first to return to the Father; 
the pivot of the act of creation.97 A marred and disfigured humanity sees in 
Christ both its source and its destiny, the true nature of which it is the image 
                                                   
94 ‘I visualise those first twelve lights as if rising up, those which flow from God and end in 
God and run through the whole of Scripture’. Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, 
XVIII. 32. 
95 Genesis 1: 31. Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, IV. 1-2; XI. 1; XVIII. 1-2; XXI. 1-3. 
The ‘Father of Lights’ is a title for God much favoured by Bonaventure and drawn from 
James 1: 17, ‘Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the 
Father of lights, with whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration.’ 
96 See, for example, Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, III. 
97 Cf. Colossians 1: 12-23 which speaks of Christ as ‘the firstborn of all creation’, in and 
through whom all things had been made and are now remade free of sin and able to enter the 
presence of the Father. Pospísĭl, ‘L’Architettura della soteriologia Bonaventuriana’, p. 702. 
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and likeness. It beholds that, in Bonaventure’s terms, which is knowable, 
lovable and imitable. It finds in Christ its restoration and the means too to 
attain its proper hierarchic place in a return to the Father. 
 
4.3.1  ‘Moral-Legal’ or ‘Physical-Mystical’ Soteriology 
While this depiction builds upon ideas of Bonaventure present in his earlier 
works, it is intellectually a considerable distance from the presentation in the 
sentence commentary. Once again, a shift in context in which Bonaventure 
was writing has meant a shift in theology. Romano Guardini, in Die Lehre 
des hl. Bonaventura von der Erlösung in 1921, noted two differing 
approaches to soteriology in the more mature Bonaventure and dubbed them 
the ‘moral-legal’ and the ‘physical-mystical’.98 The former was more heavily 
influenced by Anselmian notions and the legalistic concepts of reparation 
and satisfaction for wrongs done and were more common in the sentence 
commentary. The latter model owed more to Greek thought, especially the 
ideas of Pseudo-Dionysius and recapitulation from Irenaeus of Lyons, and 
contended that just as each person shares in the mystical body of Christ, 
when that was renewed and fulfilled through Christ’s death and resurrection, 
so too was each of its members.99 Christ’s saving work restored the cosmic 
hierarchy and humanity, no longer disfigured by sin, is restored to its original 
state of grace.100 This happens both inwardly and, by virtue of humanity’s 
participation in the mystical body of Christ, outwardly, by reoccupying its 
proper place in the cosmic hierarchy.101 
                                                   
98 Guardini, Erlösungslehre, pp. 72, 119. 
99 Jacques-Guy Bougerol, ‘Saint Bonaventure et Saint Anselme’, Antonianum, 47 (1972), 
333-61, p. 359. See page 125 above. 
100 Pospísĭl, ‘L’Architettura della soteriologia Bonaventuriana’, p. 700. 
101 Guardini, Erlösungslehre, pp. 136-147. 
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In 1938, Rufinus Šilić considered the relationship of those two 
approaches and proposed that Bonaventure shifted to the physical-mystical 
approach later in life, as it was much more pronounced in the 
Hexaëmeron.102 Certainly, there Bonaventure discussed human salvation in 
cosmological terms, but this is to be anticipated in a work so imbued with 
mystical theology. Scholastic courses of theology at universities, in contrast, 
were much more exercises in systematic theology. Writing in his later years, 
after a long break from academia, to young minds well sated with scholastic 
texts of systematic theology, Bonaventure offered an alternate way to 
consider Christian salvation from the perspective of mystical theology or, in 
Guardini’s language a ‘physical-mystical’ perspective. That did not 
necessarily mean that this displaced Bonaventure’s earlier soteriological 
ideas, just that he expressed them in a different theological context. A 
different audience, place and genre demanded a different theological 
expression. 
A consideration of Bonaventure’s ‘sermons’ may be useful guide to 
disclose any shift in approach, if they show Bonaventure speaking of 
salvation in ‘physical-mystical’ terms. A certain prudence is to be observed in 
what has been gathered by the Quaracchi editors as Bonaventure’s sermons 
in Volume 9 of his Opera Omnia.103 Firstly, they are not true sermons in the 
sense of a text preached by Bonaventure but rather they are exempla, taken 
down by a third party and circulated for the use of others to develop their 
own sermons and skills in preaching. At best, a few may have been revised by 
                                                   
102 Rufinus Šilić, Christus und die Kirche: Ihr Verhältnis nach der Lehre des heiligen 
Bonaventura (Breslau: Müller und Seiffert, 1938), p. 34. See also Gerken, Theologie des 
Wortes. 
103 Bonaventure, Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura (Quaracchi: Collegio S. 
Bonaventura, 1884-1907), IX (1907). 
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Bonaventure but many never received even this level of attention. Further, 
these are not fully developed theological expositions. They were designed for 
a very specific purpose with a particular audience in mind. These are much 
more in the nature of moral exhortations and simple catechesis than detailed 
theological treatise. 
Mindful of those limitations, there are eight surviving sermons of 
Bonaventure that deal with soteriological matters: the twentieth sermon for 
the first Sunday of Advent, the first sermon for Good Friday, the second 
sermon for Easter Sunday, the second and fifth sermons for the second 
Sunday of Easter, the third and fourth sermons for the feast of St Francis, 
and a sermon of an unnamed occasion simply entitled De Nostra 
Redemptione.104 While we have the liturgical occasion for nearly all, we lack 
details of the date on which each was composed save for the first and last 
which are recorded as having been given in Naples and Munich respectively, 
places Bonaventure visited only as Minister General and so must be dated 
after 1257. 
The content of all these sermons broadly fits within Guardini’s 
moral-legal model of salvation. Moreover, there does not appear to be any 
marked movement in soteriological expression from the evidence of these 
texts beyond what had been said in the Breviloquium. Broadly speaking, 
their content is in accord with the general presentation within that text. They 
offer no firm evidence that would support an assertion that that Bonaventure 
                                                   
104 Respectively, Bonaventure, Opera Omnia, IX, ‘Nunc propior est nostra salus quam cum 
credidimus’ pp. 42-49, ‘De mysterio redemptionis nostrae’ pp. 259-62, ‘Si consurrexistis cum 
Christo’ pp.275-76, ‘Christus passus est pro nobis’ pp. 296-300, ‘Tradebat iudicanti se iniuste 
qui peccata nostra ipse pertulit in corpore suo super lignum, ut peccatis mortuis iustitiae’ pp. 
303-05, ‘Creavit Deus homines ad imaginem et similitudinem suam’ pp. 582-85, ‘Tunc 
apparebit signum Filii hominis in caelo’ pp. 585-90, ‘Lavit nos a peccata nostris in sanguine 
suo’ pp. 725-29. 
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changed his mind and shifted to a physical-mystical approach to soteriology 
later in life. As far as they go, these sermons show a persistent employment of 
a moral-legal approach to soteriology used by Bonaventure. 
The better characterisation is that Bonaventure’s soteriological 
approach remained generally constant while he changes his expression of it 
to suit the place and occasion of his argument. There is no serious suggestion 
that when Bonaventure in the Hexaëmeron spoke of the Trinity’s divine 
activity in terms of order, knowledge and action, that he thereby necessarily 
rejected older formulations of the Trinity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit that 
had come from more traditional theological expressions and his own 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Mysterio Sanctissimae Trinitatis.105 Rather, it is 
understood that for him this is merely another, but equally valid, way of 
speaking of the mystery of the Trinity and likewise in his conception of 
salvation. The change probably lay rather in the place and genre in which 
that theology is being expressed. 
 
4.3.2  Non-Christian Authors in Theology 
One change that Bonaventure did not wish to embrace was that in theological 
method being encountered in the universities. In contrast with his earlier 
pains not to provoke the university masters in Paris, Cardinal Bonaventure 
now quite explicitly wants to spark a disagreement with them.106 The 
Hexaëmeron is strewn with criticisms on the use in the universities of pagan 
authors, amongst whom he includes both Greek philosophers, such as 
Aristotle, and the Islamic commentators upon Greek works, the most 
                                                   
105 Bonaventure, ‘Quaestiones Disputatae de Mysterio Sacrosancti Trinitiatis’, qq. 3 and 5. 
106 See pages 126-30 above. 
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significant of whom were Averroës and Avicenna.107 Bonaventure’s opinions 
on these are clear from their titles: ‘Errores philosophorum circa Deum’, 
‘Errores Aristotelis et excusatio eius’, ‘Triplex defectus in virtutibus 
philosophorum fide carentium’ and ‘Sola fides divisit lucem et tenebras’.108 
While Thomas Aquinas eagerly integrated Aristotelian philosophy into 
Christian thought, Bonaventure strove to keep pagan writers out of Christian 
philosophy: ‘Descendere autem ad philosophiam est maximum periculum.’109 
It was not for him a matter of simple religious bigotry. Bonaventure 
doubted that the theological opinions of those who had not been enlightened 
by the Christian faith could ever be superior to those of scholars who had 
been so illumined. Those who did not know God were unable, in 
Bonaventure’s mind, to speak authoritatively of God. N0netheless, the tide 
was against Bonaventure in this, as there was great enthusiasm for the 
writings and Aristotle, while Bonaventure would be among the last great 
exponents of Christian Neoplatonism in the universities.  
However unsuccessful he was in the university generally in this 
endeavour, he had greater success among Franciscans. A combination of 
factors worked to ensure a long influence for Bonaventure among them. A 
man of great academic abilities and intellect, he was, quite simply, the most 
gifted theologian yet to join the order. To this was coupled considerable 
                                                   
107 See, for example, Averroës (Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad bin Aḥmad bin Muhammad bin 
Rušd), Cordubensis Commentarium Medium and Epitome in Aristotelis ‘De Generatione et 
Corruptione’ Libros, ed. by Samel Kurland, Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in 
Aristotelem, 4 (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1958) and Avicenna (Abū 
ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sīnā), Metaphysica (Louvain: Bibliothèque S. J., 1964). 
108 ‘The philosophers’ errors concerning God’, ‘Aristotle’s errors and his excuse’, ‘The 
threefold failing in the virtues of philosophers lacking the faith’ and ‘Only faith separates 
light from darkness’. Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, VI. 1, VII. I, VII. 3-4 and VII. 
12 respectively. 
109 ‘Yet to descend to philosophy is the greatest peril of all.’ Bonaventure, Collationes in 
Hexaëmeron, XIX. 12. 
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personal sanctity; when nominating Bonaventure as his successor, the 
Minister General, John of Parma, reportedly said that, ‘it is as if in him Adam 
had not fallen’.110 Also, Bonaventure was a man of considerable status; 
although a bishop and cardinal only briefly, he had been an active and 
energetic Minister General for an extremely long period and had stamped 
himself upon the order. He had led the order and shaped it longer even than 
St Francis and it is not until the fifteenth century that a Minister General had 
a longer term in office.111 During that lengthy term, the influence of 
Bonaventure touched and shaped the entire order; Bonaventure established a 
sole and authoritative version of the life of Francis (his own Legenda Maior), 
in the constitutions of Narbonne he established his own juridical structuring 
of the order and in his control of admissions to the order and the erection of 
new houses, he controlled the type of friar for the future and where and how 
they would work.112 There is much solid foundation to calling him the second 
founder of the order. The confluence of all these factors produced a 
reluctance by contemporary friars to depart from a Bonaventurian style of 
theology and many would persist with a Neoplatonic approach into the later 
fourteenth century, well after it had fallen from intellectual favour in the 
universities and elsewhere.113 The General Chapter of Narbonne, held in 1260 
under Bonaventure’s presidency, expressed mistrust at too frequent a use of 
                                                   
110 Salimbene de Adam, The Chronicle of Salimbene de Adam, ed. and trans. by Joseph L. 
Baird, Giuseppe Baglivi and John Robert Kane, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and 
Studies, 40 (Binghamton, NY: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1986), pp. 
309-10. 
111 Enrico Alfieri was Minister General from 1387 to 1405 but his term was during the turmoil 
of the Great Schism and he led only the friars of the Roman obedience. 
112 Bonaventure, ‘Legenda Major’, in Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, ed. and trans. by 
Regis J. Armstrong, J. A. Wayne Hellman and William J. Short, 3 vols (New York: New City 
Press, 1999), II: The Founder, pp. 525-683. For a consideration of Bonaventure’s extensive 
standardisation of the order and his sweeping reforms, see Moorman, A History of the 
Franciscan Order, pp. 145-54. 
113 Roland Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 Mars 1277, 
Philosophes Médiévaux, 22 (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1977), pp. 8-11. 
152 
 
Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica in the order’s studia because of its 
heavy reliance on non-Christian philosophers. The Chapter insisted that 
henceforward the Summa was always to be read in conjunction with the 
Franciscan William de la Mare’s Correctorium Fratris Thomae.114 Moreover, 
even as late as 1331, the General Chapter of Perpignan was warning students 
and teachers not to dabble in this new philosophical speculation in theology 
when it was at the expense of preparing friars for their practical ministerial 
needs.115 By the latter half of the thirteenth century, the standard syllabus of 
philosophical texts was fairly settled in the University of Paris and was 
dominated by works of, or attributed to, Aristotle along with commentaries 
upon them, both Christian and pagan.116 In contrast, these were largely 
shunned at the Franciscan studium in Paris, favouring instead compendia of 
earlier Christian works that had been prepared by Franciscans such as the 
Sapientiale of Thomas of York.117  
                                                   
114 William went on to be Franciscan regent master in Paris in 1273. His Correctorium is 
known today through the four Dominican responses to it: Palémon Glorieux, ed., Les 
Premières polémiques thomistes I: Le Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Quare’ (Le Sauchoir: Kain, 
1927); Palémon Glorieux, ed., Les Premières polémiques thomistes II: Le Correctorium 
Corruptorii ‘Sciendum’ (Paris: Vrin, 1956); John of Paris, Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Circa’, 
ed. by Jean Pierre Müller, Studia Anselmiana Philosophica Theologica, 12-13 (Rome: Herder, 
1941); Müller, Jean Pierre, ed., Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Quaestione’, Studia Anselmiana 
Philosophica Theologica, 35 (Rome: Herder, 1954). Geroldus Fusseneger (ed.), ‘Diffinitiones 
Argentinae’, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 26 (1933), 127-40 (p. 139). 
115 ‘Constitutiones Perpinianenses, 1331’, in Cesare Cenci and Romain Georges Mailleux, eds., 
Constitutiones Generales Ordinis Fratrum Minorum, 2 vols (Grottaferrata: Frati Editori di 
Quaracchi, 2007-2010), II (2010), Art IX.11.ii.  
116 The use of the following Aristotelian or Pseudo-Aristotelian works is recorded: De Anima, 
Parva Naturalia, De Generatione et Corruptione, De Caelo et Mundo, De Meteoris and De 
Causis. The only other philosophical texts were De Plantis (by Nicolaus of Damascus, a 
Greek pagan), De Differentia Spiritus et Animae and De Consolatione (by the Christians 
Constabulus and Boethius). Alfonso Maierù, University Training in Medieval Europe, ed. 
and trans. by D. N. Pryds, Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 3 
(Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 12. 
117 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 141. Thomas of York, Commentaria in 
Libros Viginti Quattuor Philosophorum, hoc est Sapientiale (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010). This 
had once been erroneously ascribed to Robert Grosseteste. Ludwig Baur, ed., Die 
philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, Beiträge zur 




This caution did not mean that Bonaventure faded in time into 
intellectual irrelevance. While he did not favour the use of Aristotle or the 
new philosophy, he certainly knew them and was well skilled in employing 
them in what he considered to be their proper place, a place which did not 
include theology already illuminated by divine self-revelation.118 Even if his 
methods fell from favour, he gave expression to concepts of enduring 
significance in Franciscan theology.  
 
Bonaventure advocated that the fall was not a punitive work of God but a 
self-distorting act that humanity inflicts upon itself which God, in love, freely 
elected to restore and redeem. Bonaventure characterised Christ as lovingly 
choosing to heal humanity in the most effective means, that which was 
opposite to the harmful choices that humanity had made, unlike Anselm who 
portrayed Christ as born that he might die, as fated by his conjoined natures. 
Bonaventure maintained the unfettered sovereignty of God, insisting rather 
that all was done solely by free choice of the divine will. The Cur Deus Homo 
was taught in a way that argued that the act of human sin dictated the 
necessity of the incarnation and obliged the Father to hand the Son over to 
suffering and a shameful death. Bonaventure displaced sin as the centre 
point of divine engagement with humanity, placing in lieu God’s choice in 
love to become incarnate and to employ human restoration as the most 
effective means to counter the fall. These ideas persisted in Franciscan 
                                                   
118 The fourth of Bonaventure’s Collationes in Hexaëmeron not only sets out his objections to 
the new approaches to philosophy and theology but also skilfully turns those same 
techniques on themselves to argue his position. 
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theology long after Bonaventure’s objections to the new philosophy were 
deemed obsolete.119 
Such methodological conservatism could and did cause other similar 
authors of that era to fade into irrelevance and for many secular masters of 
this time scarcely a trace is left of their work. To some degree, Bonaventure 
escaped from such theological obscurity through the operation of the 
Franciscan education system. His ideas were recorded and preserved in 
written and highly systematic forms of scholastic texts. These were 
encountered by students coming from across the order to study in Paris and 
then diffused by them on their return back into the order’s network of studia. 
The structure of the Parisian Grand Couvent provided a place and a written 
form for Bonaventure’s ideas to retain a currency after the Neoplatonism 
foundations on which they rested slipped away. Bonaventure’s opinions 
endured and were studied by generations on Franciscan students, even when 
many texts of St Francis were unknown to them. Their theological formation 
was shaped by ideas of Bonaventure but not solely because of the scholarship 
or appeal of those ideas. It was at least as much due to the physical setting in 
the Grand Couvent and to the scholastic forms in which those ideas were 
couched.  
This process is apparent in the case of Richard Rufus of Cornwall, a 
scholar who came from Oxford to Paris, composing only a single work there. 
Rather than create new texts that added his own ideas to the Franciscan 
school in Paris, he gathered Bonaventure’s ideas to take back to England. The 
Franciscan theology done in England would thereafter be shaped by Parisian 
ideas of Bonaventure, because of the operation of Franciscan educational 
                                                   
119 Bianchi, ‘Aristotle Among Thirteenth-Century Franciscans’, p. 239. 
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5  Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Revival 
of the Secular-Mendicant Controversy 
 
Richard Rufus of Cornwall is in some respects an anomalous candidate for 
consideration in this study. He is markedly less well known than 
Bonaventure or even Eudes Rigaud and such renown that he does possess 
has been due more largely to his philosophical than his theological work.1 
Unlike so many other friars in this study, we do possess a number of 
historical details concerning him but making some sense of these details is 
not without complexity.  
Richard is first encountered in Thomas of Eccleston’s chronicle, which 
recounts that he was a secular master of arts in the University of Paris. 
Thomas says that he then chose to enter the Franciscans and joined the 
English province, returning from Paris to do so. According to Thomas, this 
occurred just a few days before Abbot John of Reading left the Benedictines 
also to join the friars, a date known to be September 1235.2 This would mean 
that Richard was born some time about the year 1200. Nothing more is heard 
of him until Adam Marsh, a Franciscan scholar at Oxford, records that in 
1248, when Richard was ‘reading the sentences’, the Minister General, John 
of Parma, conducted a visitation of the English province and that, in the 
course of that, gave Richard written permission to ‘continue his studies’ in 
                                                   
1 While a number of Richard’s philosophical works are still studied, none of his theological 
works have yet received a modern publication. A complete set of his works is in preparation 
at Stanford University. See Rega Wood, ‘The Works of Richard Rufus of Cornwall: The Status 
of the Question in 2009’, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiéval, 76 (2009), 1-73. 
Peter Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford Theology (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 254-57. 
2 Thomas of Eccleston, De Adventu Fratrum Minorum, III, p. 18. 
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Paris.3 For reasons of his delicate health, Richard elected to remain in 
England. It is known that he wrote a sentence commentary during his time at 
Oxford and thus no later than 1253 when he departed for Paris.4 
A subsequent but undated letter from Adam Marsh to Robert 
Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, discloses that Richard later changed his mind 
and chose to go to France, availing himself of his minister’s permission.5 
While in Paris, he is again described as ‘reading the sentences’. It was in 
doing so that he caused Roger Bacon to form a rather low opinion of him. 
Et optime noui pessimum et stultissimum istorum 
errorum autorem, qui vocatus est Ricardus 
Cornubiensis, famosissimus apud stultam 
multitudinem; set apud sapientem fuit insanus et 
reprobatur quando solempniter legebat sentencias 
ibidem postquam legerat sententias Oxonie ab anno 
Domini 1250.6 
 
During his time in Paris, he composed a further work that bears the 
title of sentence commentary but has for most of its existence been known as 
the Abbreviatio Bonaventurae. It has never been published and the 
soteriological sections of this work are transcribed as Appendix 3 below.7 
They are drawn from the only surviving complete copy of the text and the 
sole manuscript containing his material on Book III of the sentences, now 
                                                   
3 Adam Marsh, The Letters of Adam Marsh, ed. by C. H. Lawrence, 2 vols, Oxford Medieval 
Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006-10), II (2010), clxxxii, pp. 438-9.  
4 Oxford, Balliol College Library, MS 62. See also Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, pp. 20-
30. 
5 Adam Marsh, Letters, cciii, pp. 494-97. 
6 ‘I best know the author of the worst and most stupid of these errors, who was called 
Richard of Cornwall, most renowned among the stupid throng; but among the wise he was 
absurd and written off when he was solemnly reading the sentences, after he had read the 
sentences in Oxford from the year of the Lord 1250’. Roger Bacon, Compendium Studii 
Theologie, ed. by H. Rashdall (London: British Society for Franciscan Studies, 1911), pp. 52-
53. 
7 See pages 397-428 below. 
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held in Assisi at the Biblioteca Sacro Convento, Fondo Antico Communale, as 
MS 176.8 
In 1256, he returned to England to take up the post of Franciscan 
master in Oxford and he then fades back into obscurity, dying somewhere 
around 1260. He left behind him a series of important philosophical works 
that include the oldest existing commentaries in Latin on Aristotle’s Physica, 
Metaphysica, De Generatione et Corruptione and De Anima. Of his 
theological writings, it is unclear during which of his periods at Oxford they 
were composed and, further, whether they can all be reliably attributed to 
him.9 His Parisian output is clearer and it can be said with confidence that 
his sole Parisian theological work was the Abbreviatio.10 
 
5.1  THE WORKS OF RICHARD RUFUS 
On the strength of a fragmentary colophon, ‘Introitus in libros sententiarum 
secundum fratrem R ... rdum ...nubiensem’, the Abbreviatio has formally 
been known as his ‘Sententia Parisiensis’ but that perhaps does not 
accurately indicate the content of the work for it is not a true sentence 
commentary.11 Had Richard already composed a sentence commentary in 
Oxford, and this is expected as it was Oxonian practice for theology students 
to commence with study of the sentences before proceeding to Biblical 
                                                   
8 Incomplete copies are held in the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, MS Theologie Q. 48 (markedly 
edited at some later date), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Borghese 362 and Biblioteca 
Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vaticanus Latinus 12993. 
9 See the review of these dubious works in Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, pp. 64-114 
and Wood, ‘The Works of Richard Rufus of Cornwall’. 
10 Rega Wood, ‘Richard Rufus of Cornwall’, in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle 
Ages, ed. by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, 
24 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 579-87 (p. 579); Rega Wood, ‘The Earliest Known 
Surviving Western Medieval “Metaphysics” Commentary’, Medieval Philosophy and 
Theology, 7 (1998), 39-49 and Wood, ‘The Works of Richard Rufus of Cornwall’, pp. 2-8. 
11 Colophon on Vat. lat. 12993, fol.2.r.A. 
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studies, then there was no need for Richard to compose a second version.12 
Equally, nor was there a need to write a text based on Bonaventure’s work, a 
man who, even when Richard returned from England in 1256, was not yet a 
master nor had he ever held any office in the order. It is true that the 
Abbreviatio is very like a sentence commentary; it covers the whole field of 
theology, it follows the structure and sequence of arguments from the Book 
of Sentences and argues in the familiar scholastic fashion. It differs from 
other commentaries in that it frequently fails to develop those arguments 
fully, ending abruptly with the note ergo et cetera and advancing to the next 
point. It reads more as notes for personal reference or teaching than as a text 
to be read or presented in satisfaction of requirements for a degree. This 
would explain the work’s very small circulation with only one complete text 
and three smaller fragments extant.13 The soteriological material quoted in 
Appendix 3 below is overwhelmingly, but not exclusively, from Bonaventure.  
Despite possessing a commentary of his own in which Richard had 
developed his positions on each question, in the Abbreviatio he has 
developed little new material and even his ‘conclusions’ are taken from 
elsewhere. It is neither a true sentence commentary nor a ‘revised edition’ of 
Richard’s Oxford commentary. This is rather a select précis of Bonaventure’s 
commentary, prepared for reference and teaching purposes. 
Richard’s own status is also less than completely clear. We are certain 
that Richard, on his return in 1256, took up the Franciscan chair at Oxford 
and so by then must have held the rank of master. Despite being described as 
‘reading the sentences’ on his arrival in Paris in 1253, Richard does not 
                                                   
12 Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, pp. 33-34. 
13 Wood, ‘The Works of Richard Rufus of Cornwall’, pp. 67-8.  
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necessarily have to have been a bachelor then, for masters could and did 
regularly read scripture and the sentences to their students, especially 
sections of particular interest to them.14 Moreover, it would seem improbable 
that Richard would change university halfway through a theological course. 
Such a transfer was not impossible but rare, as the course structures in Paris 
and Oxford were quite different.15 Additionally, 1253 was at the height of the 
secular-mendicant controversy in Paris and, as a punitive measure, the 
secular masters had refused to recommend any mendicants for degrees.16 It 
seems implausible that Richard would abandon a half completed course of 
study in Oxford to transfer to Paris where there was no certain prospect of 
ever securing that degree. 
 
5.2  THE SECULAR-MENDICANT CONTROVERSY REVIVES 
The conflict in the university re-ignited in 1253 when, once again, it 
embarked upon a strike to protest the death of students while in the custody 
of the Parisian civil authorities. Again, the mendicant schools, both Preachers 
and Minors, defied the suspension, infuriating many among the secular 
masters. They retaliated with the promulgation of a new enactment requiring 
all masters to swear an oath of obedience to the statutes of the university as a 
way to be able to compel the mendicants to observe the strike. Any master 
who failed to swear within fifteen days, i.e. by 17 April 1253, would be 
expelled from the university and forfeit his license to teach.17 The mendicants 
                                                   
14 Courtenay, ‘Institutionalization of Theology’, pp. 248-9, 253. 
15 At Oxford, candidates commencedwith the sentences before proceeding to study scripture. 
A. G. Little, ‘The Franciscan School at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century’, Archivum 
Franciscanum Historicum, 29 (1926), 803-74. 
16 It was this same ban that delayed both Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas from obtaining 
their degrees for a number of years. See pages 107-08 above. 
17 Chartularium, n. 219, pp. 242-44. 
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declined, objecting that, by virtue of their profession of religious vows, their 
wills were no longer their own and that to swear an oath such as was being 
demanded would be inconsistent with the evangelical counsels which they 
had assumed. They declined the oath and were duly cast out of the 
university.18 
The dispute widened when the aggrieved friars appealed to Innocent 
IV since the papacy had juridically established both the university and the 
mendicant orders. Innocent ordered the immediate reinstatement of the 
friars and their schools. The university responded that it would do so as soon 
as the friars swore obedience to its statutes. Until then, mendicant inceptions 
would be blocked and no degrees would be recommended for their 
students.19  
The dispute continued with many of the secular masters attacking the 
very right of the orders to exist, publishing tracts that questioned the merits 
of evangelical poverty, the notion of mendicancy itself, the absolute poverty 
of Christ and the incursion of mendicants into the divinely established roles 
of the secular clergy.20 They accused the mendicant orders generally of 
holding the heretical beliefs of Joachism and desiring the overthrow of the 
Church.21 Disobedience was a further charge levelled at the mendicants; since 
                                                   
18 Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’, p. 13. 
19 Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’, pp. 13-14. 
20 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 56. This re-ignition of the secular-mendicant 
controversy has not wanted for more detailed considerations of its events and motivations. 
See especially Michel-Marie Dufeil, Guillaume de Saint-Amour et la polémique universitaire 
parisienne 1250-1259 (Paris: Picard, 1972) and Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’. 
21 Joachim, Abbot of Fiore (c. 1135 – 1202), had published apocalyptic works of scriptural 
exegesis. Among his many teachings was a coming third age, the ‘Age of the Holy Spirit’ in 
which the Church and Gospel would be supplanted by newer more spiritual versions. The 
harbingers of this new age would be ‘two poor men’ living and preaching in simplicity, 
figures by many readily identified with Francis and Dominic. Much has been written on 
Joachism, see especially Bernard McGinn, The Calabrian Abbot: Joachim of Fiore in the 
History of Western Thought (New York: Macmillan, 1985). As to Joachim’s works, the most 
pertinent to this consideration is Joachim of Fiore, Enchiridion Super Apocalypsim, ed. by 
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the university’s power to legislate and to suspend classes both derived from 
papal authority expressed in the bull Parens Scientarum of Gregory IX in 
1231, the mendicants were reproached for defying the papal authority.22 
The friars felt the tide move dramatically against them when, in 1254, 
Innocent IV issued the bull Etsi Animarum, substantially curbing the 
privileges of the mendicant orders and obliging them to subscribe to the 
university oath.23 They averted the consequences of that through what was 
for them the convenient death of Innocent and his succession by Alexander 
IV, a pontiff strongly supportive of the mendicant orders. To the friars’ relief, 
he reinstated their privileges and exemptions and, shortly after, they were 
reinstated in the university without condition by Alexander’s decree Quasi 
Lignum Vitae.24 
                                                                                                                                               
Edward Killian Burger, Studies and Texts, 78 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1986). The most notorious enthusiast for Joachism was the Franciscan Gerard of 
Borgo San Donnino, Introductorium in Evangelium Aeternum, ed. by J. G. V. Engelhardt 
(Erlangen: Kunstmann, 1828). It was these accusations of Joachism that forced the 
resignation of John of Parma as Franciscan Minister General and the subsequent election of 
Bonaventure. 
22 Gregory IX (Ugolino di Conti di Segni), Parens Scientarum, Papal Bull of 13 April 1231, 
reproduced in Heinrich Denifle and Émile Chatelain, eds, Chartularium Universitatis 
Parisiensis, 4 vols (Paris: Delalain, 1889-97), I (1889), No. 79, pp. 136-39. One of the leaders 
of the secular masters, William of St Amour, produced many of the polemical texts of the 
seculars at this time, especially William of Saint Amour, De Periculis Novissimorum 
Temporum, ed. by Guy Geltner, Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations, 8 (Louvain: 
Peeters, 2007). It was in this context that the mendicant champions composed similarly 
polemical replies: Thomas Aquinas, Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem, ed. by 
John Proctor and Mark Johnson (Leesberg, VA: Alethes Press, 2007); Bonaventure, 
‘Quaestiones Disputatae de Perfectione Evangelica’, in Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. 
Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), VI 
(1891), pp. 117-98; Thomas of York, Commentaria in Libros Viginti Quattuor 
Philosophorum, hoc est Sapientiale (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010). Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’, 
pp. 9-45. 
23 Innocent IV (Sinibaldo Fieschi), Etsi Animarum, Papal Bull of 10 May, 1254, reproduced 
in Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium, I, No. 236, pp. 263-64. 
24 Their privileges were restored in Alexander IV (Rinaldo di Jenne), Nec Insolitum, Papal 
Bull of 22 December, 1254, reproduced in Denifle and Chatelaine, Chartularium, I, No. 244, 
pp, 276-77. Quasi Lignum Vitae, Papal Bull of 12 April 1255, reproduced in Denifle and 
Chatelain, Chartularium, I, No. 247, p. 279-85. It may be significant that Alexander was a 
nephew of Gregory IX who had canonised Francis and Dominic. Gregory, as Cardinal 
Ugolino di Segni, had been the first Cardinal Protector of the Franciscans and had a hand in 
the writing of their rule. He was, in turn, the great nephew of Innocent III who had granted 
approval to both mendicant orders. Alexander, like Gregory IX, had served as Cardinal 
Protector of the Franciscans. 
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The mendicants found that the combination of this papal support 
along with that of Louis IX, a devoted benefactor of both orders, was more 
than their opponents in the university were able to withstand. In 1256 the 
resolve of those opponents weakened and they begrudgingly accepted the 
presence of the friars in the university. 
The period of that ban, 1253 to 1256, were the very years in which 
Richard was in Paris. It is Peter Raedts’ contention that in 1253 Richard had 
fallen out with Thomas of York when the latter was appointed as Franciscan 
regent master of theology at Oxford in preference to Richard. Richard in 
resentment invoked the permission that the Minister General had given him 
to go to Paris and wiped his hands of the English friars.25  
Certainly Adam Marsh records in a letter to his Minister Provincial, 
William of Nottingham, that Richard’s change of mind in favour of Paris was 
decisive and sudden:  
Proinde, cum ante dies aliquot ob vehementiores 
perturbationum occasiones dictus Frater Richardus 
inexorabile concepit propositum transferendi se, 
secundum concessionem ministri generalis olim 
indultam, in provinciam Francie.26 
 
Raedts posits that when Thomas of York was moved to Cambridge in 
1256, Richard was at last offered the post of regent master in Oxford and he 
hastily returned to take it up his long coveted post. This account does fit the 
known events, but for a lack of any evidence of some acrimony between 
Richard and Thomas of York.27 This feud is only speculation and, moreover, a 
                                                   
25 Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, pp. 5-9. 
26 ‘Likewise, several days ago, due to instances of quite vehement agitation, the said Brother 
Richard reached a firm decision to transfer himself to the French province, in accord with 
the permission that the Minister General previously gave him’. Adam Marsh, Letters, cciii, p. 
496. 
27 Raedts himself concedes the dispute with Thomas of York is but a ‘hypothesis’: Raedts, 
Richard Rufus of Cornwall, p. 8. 
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simple dislike of Thomas of York and wounded pride seem insufficient 
reasons to drive one into exile and embark on the composition of the 
Abbreviatio. 
A simpler explanation can be found in the events of a reopening of 
hostilities in the secular-mendicant controversy. Unable to produce its own 
lectors and masters, the Franciscan school in Paris temporarily needed to 
import teachers from elsewhere. Richard, a former master of arts in Paris, 
was a logical choice for such a role. Such an account would also explain why 
Richard is described as ‘reading the sentences’ in Paris as masters were 
pressed into service for teaching when no more bachelors could be obtained. 
In 1256 the Franciscans were again able to fill teaching posts that had 
been blocked since the early 1250s. Rather than seeing Richard Rufus’ return 
to England as a cooling of temper in a hypothetical quarrel with Thomas of 
York, when in 1256 French masters like Bonaventure, Eudes of Rosny and 
Gilbert of Tournai were all able to assume teaching posts in the Grand 
Couvent, they freed the ‘borrowed’ personnel in Paris for posts in England 
and elsewhere. Thus Bertrand of Bayonne was released to go to Rome and 
Richard Rufus for Oxford.28 
When Richard returned to England, he brought back with him the 
latest ideas and developments from Parisian theology to use in his new 
Oxford post. He drew these from the writing of the new shining light of the 
Parisian school, Bonaventure, who in that November would be elected 
Minister General of the order.  
 
                                                   
28 Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle, II, p. 52. 
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5.3  FRANCISCAN SCHOOLS OF OXFORD AND PARIS 
Richard’s use of this material is significant because among the Franciscans, 
differing methodological approaches to theological teaching had emerged in 
those two biggest schools of the order, Paris and Oxford. This was largely due 
to the influence of their initial teachers, Alexander of Hales in Paris and 
Robert Grosseteste in Oxford. Speaking broadly, the school in Paris placed a 
greater emphasis upon speculative theology and was inclined to make a 
greater use of such philosophical tools as logic and dialectics. In contrast, 
theologians at Oxford were marked by a tendency to engage more with 
natural philosophy and the observance of the world about them, abstracting 
their theology from those sources.29 This latter approach would quite 
naturally appeal to Franciscans of an Aristotelian bent but this theological 
method traces back to their English secular master and teacher, Robert 
Grosseteste.30 
The origins of the Franciscan school in Oxford parallel those of Paris. 
The friars came to Oxford in 1224 or 1225, even before London, originally as 
a base for their preaching ministry but soon became involved in the work of 
the university, receiving undergraduates as vocations to the order and 
                                                   
29 Gordon Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: 
An Institutional and Intellectual History, New Dimensions in History: Essays in 
Comparative History (New York: Wiley, 1968), Little, ‘The Franciscan School at Oxford in 
the Thirteenth Century’, pp. 803-74 and Séamus Mulholland, ‘The Shaping of a Mind: The 
Thirteenth-Century Franciscan Oxfordian Intellectual Inheritance of Duns Scotus’, in John 
Duns Scotus, Philosopher: Proceedings of the ‘Quadruple Congress’ on John Duns Scotus, 
Part 1, ed. by Mary Beth Ingham and Oleg Bychkov, Archa Verbi Subsidia, 3 (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 2010), pp. 119-27. 
30 As to the influence of Grosseteste in education, and theology in particular, see James 
McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); James 
McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, Great Medieval Thinkers, 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000) and Richard Southern, Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in 
Medieval Europe, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Grosseteste had his own 
influential ideas on soteriology that deserve far more study than they have received to date: 
Robert Grosseteste, De Cessatione Legalium, ed. and trans. by Richard C. Dales and Edward 
B. King, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, 7 (London: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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making use of the university for the theological education of Franciscan 
students, in time opening a studium in the city.31 As in Paris, at the 
establishment of the school the friars yet lacked a teaching master and so a 
secular master, Grosseteste, was engaged for that purpose. Like Alexander of 
Hales, Grosseteste grew extremely attached to the friars and deeply admired 
their spirituality. He surrendered all but one of his benefices and embraced a 
life of great simplicity.32 It was widely anticipated that Robert too would join 
the order but in 1235 he was appointed Bishop of Lincoln.33 Nevertheless he 
retained, even as bishop, a very close connection to the friars and especially 
to his protégé, Adam Marsh, to whom he passed his chair on his appointment 
to Lincoln.34 As in Paris, the Franciscans would thereafter control that chair 
and Grosseteste had effectively created a Franciscan school in Oxford. 
Grosseteste maintained a lifelong correspondence with the Franciscans and, 
at his death, bequeathed his books to the Franciscans as the foundation of 
their Oxford library.35  
Like Alexander of Hales, Grosseteste’s theological approach had an 
enduring influence upon his Franciscan school. Theologically, Grosseteste 
was rather conservative and, like the Parisian Franciscans, had deep 
misgivings about the growing popularity of the use of Aristotle, Averroës and 
other non-Christian writers in theology. This was not because they were 
pagan; for Robert the source, soul and summit of theology was the study of 
the Bible. He believed that all theology was to be found in its pages and for 
                                                   
31 Eccleston, De Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam, II (p. 9) and XI (p. 64). 
32 Peter Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford Theology, p. 118 
and L. Boyle, ‘Robert Grosseteste and the Pastoral Care’, Journal of Mediaeval and 
Renaissance Studies, 8 (1979), 3-51, (pp. 4-7). 
33 McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, p. 52. 
34 Little, ‘The Franciscan School at Oxford’, p. 836. 
35 Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, p. 118; Thomas of Eccleston, De Adventu Fratrum 
Minorum in Angliam, XI (pp. 48-49). 
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that reason, he was opposed to the excessive intrusion of philosophy into 
theology and disapproved of the use of Peter Lombard and Peter Comestor in 
theology as much as Aristotle and Averroës. In his view, using the Book of 
Sentences was a helpful enough exercise but it could divert a student away 
from the true work of theology, the analysis and exposition of Sacred 
Scripture.36 
Even so, Grosseteste knew the works of both of Peter Lombard and 
Aristotle well and could use their methods when the need arose. He made 
substantial contributions to the development of dialectics, writing one of the 
first commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.37 For him, that need 
lay principally in the better comprehension of the Biblical texts. Scripture, of 
necessity, can speak of God only through analogy and so variously likens God 
to familiar analogies like a hen, a shepherd, the sun and a lamb amongst 
many other objects.38 Grosseteste considered that the better that one 
understood the nature of such objects, that is to say ‘the divine law’, the 
better would be understood the analogy and hence the truth that is being 
communicated.39 In this lay Robert’s enthusiasm for the understanding and 
use of natural philosophy in theology and, to the degree that Aristotle or any 
other writer was able to assist in that task, Grosseteste was not slow to 
employ such authors. Hence, he composed treatises on light, mathematics, 
tides, rainbows, geometry and astronomy among others. Similarly, in 
Grosseteste’s own Hexaëmeron, he has a standard literal, anagogical and 
                                                   
36 McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, p.57, James McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, 
p. 26, Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, pp. 123-7. 
37 Robert Grosseteste, Commentarus in Posteriorum Analyticorum, ed. by Pietro Rossi, 
Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Testi e Studi, 2 (Florence: Olstechki, 1981). 
38 Respectively Matthew 23: 37, John 10: 11, Psalms 19:4-5 and Revelations 5: 6-14. 
39 McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, pp.17-19, 26; Raedts, Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall, p. 132. 
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allegorical exegesis of the Biblical account of each day of creation but each is 
followed by a substantial exposition on the nature of the things created on 
that day for the purpose of better understanding the theological points that 
he had made.40 
These Parisian and Oxonian approaches did not exist in conflict with 
each other and the actions of Richard Rufus in moving between both centres 
and in writing commentaries in both styles attest to this.41 Richard clearly 
was aware of the work and standing of Bonaventure, even as a formed 
bachelor and he played a role in the circulation of Bonaventure’s ideas 
through the Abbrevatio. Likewise, it should not be forgotten that Richard 
had studied and taught in Paris previously, as had a number of Oxford 
mendicants and the Franciscans demonstrated a keenness to move their best 
scholars to schools all over the order, regardless of provincial boundaries. 
Richard shows evidence of participating in a Franciscan trans-national 
network of scholarly activity, including Paris and Oxford, that was in 
operation even before the 1250s. 
 
5.4  ABBREVIATIO BONAVENTURAE 
Richard’s own academic journey commenced at Oxford for his studies and 
where he composed his own sentence commentary in that Oxonian tradition. 
In Paris, his sole composition was the Abbreviatio Bonaventurae and it is 
within this that will be found his Parisian soteriology.  
The first is that, despite the title Abbreviatio Bonaventurae, and it 
does indeed rely heavily upon Bonaventure’s writings, it does not do so 
                                                   
40 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron, ed. by Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben, Auctores 
Britannica Medii Aevi, 6 (London: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
41 Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, p. 63. 
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exclusively. Richard reproduces from Alexander of Hales the idea of a 
division in the upper part of the will that Bonaventure has eschewed and 
while the seraphic doctor did not have a lengthy discussion of the 
chirographum, Richard Rufus does, taking it from earlier sources like Eudes 
Rigaud.42 Richard seems, in composing his work, to have attempted to gather 
much to which he had not been exposed in Oxford. The work repeatedly 
leaves arguments in outline only, sufficient merely to refresh a reader’s 
memory. These two factors suggest that the Abbreviatio was written 
primarily as notes for personal reference and teaching on the sentences. 
The second observation is the significance of the very heavy reliance 
placed on the ideas of Bonaventure. The Abbreviatio must have been 
composed no later than 1256, the year in which Richard departed Paris and 
so when Bonaventure was still a bachelor. He was but a rather precocious 
student who had never held any office in the order and, since becoming a 
friar, had never left Paris. Aquinas was writing at exactly this time but 
Richard does not quote from him at all. This speaks greatly about 
Bonaventure’s reputation but also about a nascent sense of a common 
Franciscan theological outlook. 
Richard, in collecting ideas for his own teaching, draws neither from 
the latest nor most established Parisian contemporaries. He did not show 
interest in the ideas of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Eudes of 
Chateauroux and in most of the masters around Paris at the time. Rather, he 
brings together exclusively what other Franciscans are teaching in Paris, even 
if that material is astonishingly novel and from scholars with little reputation. 
                                                   
42 Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Commentaria in Sententia Parisiensis (Assisi, Biblioteca 
Sacro Convento Fondo Antico Communale, MS 176), Sent III, d. 17, a. 1 and d. 19, a. 1, q. 2. 
Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 19, a. 3, q. 1. 
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It would seem that Richard considered this most suitable and useful for his 
own teaching and for his Franciscan students. 
Richard demonstrates a consciousness that the Franciscans were, in 
some fashion, doing theology differently and reaching conclusions unlike 
those of other theologians. Richard also evinces a desire that Franciscan 
students should be taught this material. The way in which he assembles his 
soteriological material, collected from and delivered to fellow Franciscans, 
exhibits a belief that there existed a distinctly Franciscan school of theology 
in development. The creation of works like the Abbreviatio served to further 
that process. 
Because of the way in which Richard chose to compile the Abbreviatio, 
there is little that is new of his own in his argumentation and, in much of it, 
he does no more than paraphrase and abridge the material he found being 
taught at the Grand Couvent. A comparison of even the questions in the 
soteriological sections of the Abbreviatio and Bonaventure’s sentence 
commentary displays the closeness of the texts. With few exceptions, Richard 
uses the same questions as Bonaventure and in the same sequence.43 The 
content of the commentary similarly parallels Bonaventure closely in its 
arrangement.  
There are sometimes instances in which Richard supplements the 
material he reproduces from Bonaventure’s commentary but not in the 
soteriological sections.44 At best, Richard might shift emphases in 
Bonaventure’s argumentation. For example, it has been noted that 
Bonaventure incorporated ideas from Alexander of Hales on the division of 
                                                   
43 These questions can be seen in Appendix 1 below. 
44 Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, pp. 40 and 47-48. 
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the higher will but expressed reservations about the idea.45 Richard’s text has 
no such reservations and reproduces Alexander’s argument, albeit mediated 
through Bonaventure.  
Mostly, however, Richard’s prefers to confine himself to material from 
Bonaventure but freely condenses it and omits many of the latter’s passages. 
Richard tends to discard commonplace and readily accessible material but 
favours retaining new and unfamiliar ideas or authorities. For example, in 
distinction 17 in discussing the dual wills of Christ, Bonaventure adds some 
fresh arguments from the De Fide Orthodoxa of John the Damascene and 
Richard reproduces these.46 Even so, he frequently does not expound fully on 
these new arguments and leaves off with his customary ‘ergo, et cetera’. In 
just the four soteriological distinctions transcribed in Appendix 3 below, 
Richard truncates Bonaventure’s argument with this ‘ergo et cetera’ on fifty-
five occasions. In other words, the title Abbreviatio Bonaventurae is quite 
apt. 
Such an approach suggests that reaching a final conclusion to a 
question was frequently not Richard’s primary interest but rather the new 
ideas and arguments that he had located and that lead to that answer. There 
is no evidence in the text that in anything Richard changed his mind, but 
rather in reaching his unchanged conclusions he now made use of a more 
abundant array of authorities and reasons. 
 
                                                   
45 Richard Rufus, Abbreviatio Bonaventurae, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, 3. See page 127 above. 
Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 16, d. 2, m. 3; 
Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. 
46 John the Damascene, Writings, ed. by Frederic Chase, The Fathers of the Church, 37 
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1958). 
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5.5  RICHARD’S SOTERIOLOGICAL WRITING IN THE FRANCISCAN SCHOOL 
It follows that much of soteriological interest in Richard’s text has been 
discussed previously in considering Bonaventure’s works. The most 
illuminative material from Richard lies where he differs from Bonaventure 
but this happens only once in his soteriological section, in the twentieth 
distinction, dealing with the aptness of human redemption occurring through 
Christ’s passion.47 
Richard, after having faithfully reproduced the structure of 
Bonaventure’s commentary and even, unconventionally, his very questions, 
in the twentieth distinction alters that pattern. In this distinction he deletes 
all but the first two questions.48 The eliminated questions had asked whether 
some other true creature could have made satisfaction, whether that creature 
could have done so with the aid of grace, whether God ought to have accepted 
Christ’s passion as the sufficient satisfaction and whether God could have 
accepted some alternative. 
A possible explanation for this omission is that all of these questions 
deal with hypothetical situations that may possibly have afforded salvation to 
humanity. Like Eudes Rigaud before him, Richard was possibly little 
interested in speculative postulations. Equally, it may have been the case that 
Richard, with his strongly Oxonian background, was simply disinclined to 
engage in conjecture of this sort when humanity had already been saved in a 
particular fashion. 
After the Abbreviatio Richard wrote very little further in soteriology. 
When he returned to England and took up his chair at Oxford, he wrote no 
                                                   
47 ‘De Christi Passionis Congruentia’. See pages 424-45 in Appendix 3 below. 
48 A scribal error will not account for this. The entire rest of the folio is left blank before 
starting a fresh skin with distinction 21. 
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works on soteriology. He continued to demonstrate interest in Bonaventure’s 
work and incorporated reasoning of his in some of his own disputed 
questions but these texts reflected Richard’s philosophical interests and were 
largely limited to considerations of material in Book 1 of the sentences.49 In 
terms of developing further soteriological ideas of the Franciscans and 
building upon the work of the friars who had preceded him, Richard had 
little to say other than simply to repeat in part what others had said before 
him. It would, however, be wrong to dismiss Richard as simply a copyist with 
nothing of his own worthy of study. 
Rather, Richard’s production of the Abbreviatio shows some level of 
interest among English Franciscans in the directions being followed in Paris. 
It shows that, even while still a bachelor, the eminence of Bonaventure was 
apparent to many, an eminence that would propel him to the leadership of 
the order, despite his youth and even his absence from the General Chapter 
that elected him. Richard shows an interest in Bonaventure’s ideas that he 
displays in none of the other celebrated contemporary Parisian figures of the 
time. He thus attests to a growing consciousness of a distinctive Franciscan 
approach that he wishes to nurture and cultivate among his students in both 
France and England. Richard may not add to Bonaventure’s contributions 
but nor does Richard reject his newer ideas in soteriology such as seeing 
salvation as bringing creation to culmination rather than solely undoing 
some human distortion of a divine plan. That idea may have been quite novel 
and even contradict Anselm’s teachings, but Richard liked it, copied it and 
circulated it, both reproducing Bonaventure’s conclusions and rewriting 
                                                   
49 Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, pp. 57-60. 
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them in his own style.50 These notions did not remain exclusive to 
Bonaventure and would appear in the works of Franciscan authors to 
follow.51 
Richard also attests to more than these ideas themselves but to the 
manner in which they arose and spread. He shows Franciscans participating 
in more than just the academic networks within the University of Paris. They 
engaged in networks stretching between their various schools, be they other 
universities or studia. Such connections were furthered as the friars acquired 
other institutionalised foundations for their teaching, such as the schools in 
Cambridge, Cologne, Bologna and others, but also as the order acquired a 
larger number of friars with the degree of master that could be and were 
transferred among these schools. They diffused ideas among universities and 
also built up a sense among themselves of belonging to a body of scholars 
wider than just their own university, that of Franciscan scholars. They were 
writing ideas and reaching conclusions that set them apart and they were 
teaching these to other Franciscans. Richard Rufus of Cornwall is a witness 
to what might be considered as the embryonic appearance of a distinctly 
Franciscan school of theology. 
 
  
                                                   
50 For example, Richard Rufus, Abbreviatio Bonaventurae, d. 18, a. 1, q. 1 is an abridgement 
of Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 1 but Richard in the next question composes his own 
paraphrase to the answer. He agrees with Bonaventure’s answer and the reasons for it but 
expresses his answer quite differently. See pages 406-08 below. 








6  Matthew of Aquasparta and the Reworking 
of Anselm 
 
Matthew of Aquasparta had a career parallel in some ways to that of 
Bonaventure. He too was a scholar in Paris, from about 1266 onwards, later 
to be regent master of the Franciscan school there from 1279.1 He too needed 
to leave that role when he became Minister General of the order in 1287. 
Again, like Bonaventure, he left that office in 1289 on becoming a cardinal. 
Matthew of Aquasparta came from the old Roman spa town of 
Aquasparta, around fifty kilometres from both Bagnoreggio and Assisi.2 His 
family, the Bentivenghi, were of the lesser nobility and prominent in local 
ecclesiastical affairs. His uncle Peter was the local bishop, and another 
kinsman, Bentivenga, also a friar, was a cardinal who succeeded Bonaventure 
as bishop of Albano, rising to become dean of the College of Cardinals from 
1279.3 In such an area and with such a family, his entry in 1260 into the 
Assisi province of the Franciscans is not surprising.4 He was selected in 1263 
for study in Paris and was taught there by such figures as John Pecham and 
                                                   
1 There is an extant Franciscan soteriological text from Paris that precedes Matthew, the 
sentence commentary of John Pecham who was regent master in Paris 1269-1272 and who 
taught Matthew. He went on to be regent master at Oxford also and later Master of the 
Sacred Palace in Rome. His sentence commentary has never been published and survives in 
a sole manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS Latin 16407. The poor and 
deteriorated quality of its skins, the unclear scribal hand, John’s personal symbol codes and 
copious abbreviation all combine to render the text nearly impenetrable.  
2 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia, ed. by Victorinus Doucet, 
Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 11 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. 
Bonaventurae, 1935), p. xiii. 
3 Johann Auer, Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik mit besonderer 
Berücksichtigung des Kardinals Matteo d’Acquasparta, Freiburger Theologische Studien, 
62 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1942), p. 4. 
4 Chronica XXIV Generalium Ordinis Minorum, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, Analecta 
Franciscana, 3 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1887), p. 406. 
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William de la Mare.5 He completed his sentence commentary and studies in 
1273 and was then sent to Bologna to teach theology in the Franciscan 
studium there.6 This was an important post; while it did not have the prestige 
in theology that Paris enjoyed, the University of Bologna was Europe’s 
foremost school of law and the Franciscan studium there attracted students 
from beyond the Romagna and Veneto as well as the order’s most promising 
canonists. These friars required instruction in theology as well as law and 
Matthew’s role was to provide this. 
 
6.1  THE WORKS OF MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA 
In 1276, Matthew was sent back to teach theology in Paris and in 1279, he 
succeeded to the Franciscan chair in the university and also to John 
Pecham’s role as lector sacri palatii.7 It was during this period that Matthew 
produced a number of sets of Quaestiones Disputatae but in 1287 he was 
forced to abandon teaching. The Franciscan Minister General, Jerome of 
Ascoli, had been appointed a cardinal and was obliged to resign the 
leadership of the order. At the ensuing General Chapter of Montpellier, 
Matthew was elected as Minister General. As he had been in his theology, 
Matthew proved a conciliatory Minister General and lifted the censures that 
had fallen upon his predecessor John of Parma and also John of Peter Olivi.8 
He held office for barely two years, for in 1288 Cardinal Jerome of Ascoli was 
                                                   
5 Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie, I, p. 102. 
6 Auer, Matteo d’Acquasparta, p. 6. 
7 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia, p. xv. The master of the sacred 
palace was the theologian to the papal court.  
8 R. E. Houser, ‘Matthew of Aquasparta’, in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 
ed. by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, 24 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 423-31 (p. 427). Moorman, A History of the Franciscan 
Order, pp. 189-91. John of Parma had been accused of Joachism while Olivi had writings 
suspected of heterodoxy. 
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elected as Pope Nicholas IV and in 1289 appointed Matthew to fill the 
vacancy in the College of Cardinals that Jerome’s election had created. 
Matthew was, at the same time, also appointed Bishop of Porto and created 
the Major Penitentiary.9 With such duties, he undertook no further concerted 
academic work up to his death in Rome in 1302.10 
Inherited from Bonaventure, Pecham and de la Mare, Matthew held a 
lingering Franciscan misgiving about the use of non-Christian authors in 
theology.11 Much of what survives of Matthew’s scholarly output centres on 
disputes with those in favour of Aristotelian methods in metaphysics and 
tracts on cognition and epistemology; none of which topics relate closely to 
soteriology. While parts of his sentence commentary survive, all of the third 
book, which treats of soteriology, has been lost.12 In contrast, twenty-one sets 
of Quaestiones Disputatae have survived to today. 
Three of these, De Incarnatione, De Christo and De Gratia, contain 
soteriological material and give some guidance to Matthew’s thoughts about 
salvation.13 The dating of these disputed questions has been the subject of 
scholarly discussion but of all his disputed questions, the only ones that can 
be firmly dated are his Quaestiones Disputatae de Cognitione.14 These quote 
from a 1277 decree of Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris and so must be after 
                                                   
9 His kinsman, the assonant Cardinal Bentivenga de Bentivenghi, had once held the same 
post of Major Penitentiary, the papal office in charge of absolutions and forgiveness.  
10 Auer, Matteod’Acquasparta, pp. 7-9. 
11 William de la Mare was the author of the Correctorium Fratris Thomae, a supplement to 
Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica removing its dependence on pagan writers like 
Aristotle. See pages 149-53 above. 
12 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia, p. ci. 
13 The Questiones de Incarnatione and de Christo were published as Matthew of Aquasparta, 
Quaestiones Disputata Selecta, Bibliotecha Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 2 
(Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1914), pp. 1-176 and 176-223 respectively. The 
publication details of the Quaestiones Disputata de Gratia are given in fn. 1 above.  
14 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputata de Fide et de Cognitione, Bibliotecha 
Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 1 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonventurae, 1903). Doucet 
gives an extensive discussion on the chronology of Matthew’s works, and the arguments 
around it, in Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia, pp. cxi-clv. 
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that date.15 Victorinus Doucet, in his study, concludes that the likely sequence 
of composition were the questions De Christo, then De Cognitione (not 
earlier than 1277) followed by De Incarnatione and finally De Gratia.16 
 
6.2  QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE CHRISTO 
The earliest, then, of the questions to be considered here were what was 
published as Quaestiones Octo de Christo. Preceding the 1277 condemnation, 
it would thus seem likely that they come from Matthew’s time in Bologna. 
While they are predominantly concerned with the nature of Christ’s body in 
the sacrament of the Eucharist and in the tomb, the initial question does 
have a soteriological relevance: ‘Utrum Filius Dei fuisset incarnatus, si homo 
non fuisset lapsus’.17  
In a surprisingly brief and cursory overview of the authorities for and 
against that proposition, handled in just ten lines, Matthew cites a sole 
authority in favour of it, Augustine, and only one in opposition, the 
anonymous De Spiritu et Anima.18 In his response to them, even though 
Matthew could be said to have straddled the fence, his answer does display a 
certain audacity: 
                                                   
15 Matthew quotes from Article 8 of the decree, Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles 
condamnés à Paris le 7 Mars 1277, pp. 27-29 : Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones 
Disputatae de Gratia, p. CXVI.  
16 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia, pp. cxxiii-cxxxiv. 
17 ‘Whether the Son of God would have been made incarnate if humanity had not fallen’. 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Christo I, p. 177. 
18 The Augustine reference is to his Sermon 174, De Verbis Apostoli which Matthew 
misquotes saying, ‘Si homo non pecasset, Filius Dei non venisset’, when Augustine had 
written ‘Si homo non perisset Filius hominis non venisset.’ Augustine of Hippo, Sermons, ed. 
by Michele Pelligrino and John E. Rotelle, trans. by Edmund Hill, 11 (Brooklyn, N.Y.: New 
City Press, 1990-97), V (1994), Sermo CLXXIV. 7. The other reference is to De Spiritu et 
Anima, 6, a twelfth-century compilation of numerous texts. It had initially been attributed to 
Augustine but the error of this was realised by the mid-thirteenth century and certainly 
Matthew refers only to its ‘auctor’, giving no name. See Leo Norpoth, Der pseudo-




Omissis opinionibus, dico sine praeiudicio, quod de 
incarnatione Filii Dei, sive carnis assumptione, 
possumus loqui duobus modis: uno modo de 
assumptione carnis impassibilis et immortalis, vel de 
assumptione carnis passibilis et mortalis. Si de 
assumptione carnis passibilis et mortalis loquamur, 
utique verum est quod, si homo non pecasset, Filius Dei 
carnem non assumpsisset; ideo enim carnem 
passibilem et mortalem assumpsit, ut, in carne 
assumpta moriens, a peccato hominem liberaret. Si 
vero de assumptione carnis impassibilis et immortalis 
loquamur, sic pie credo et huic opinioni magis assentio, 
quod si homo non fuisset lapsus, Filius Dei nihilominus 
fuisset incarnatus.19 
 
In other words, incarnation was always to take place. The occurrence of the 
fall only changed the nature of the flesh to be assumed but some form of 
incarnation was certain, whether humanity fell or not. Nevertheless, Matthew 
notes, like Eudes Rigaud, that this is a speculative question and so does not 
require a definitive answer. His reasoning is that the incarnation is so that 
Christ might attain a threefold perfection of nature, grace and glory.20 
Human nature, he ventures, has within it the capacity for growth and greater 
perfection. That nature is best fulfilled and perfected when it is united to a 
Divine Person in the incarnation. Matthew then borrows a Bonaventurian 
notion of regressio and adds that if all creation ‘est a Deo et est ad Deum’, 
then it is perfected in that which brings it most fully back to God. The best 
                                                   
19 ‘In the absence of other opinions, I say without prejudice that we can speak in two ways 
about the incarnation of the Son of God or about his assumption of flesh. One way is to speak 
about the assumption of an impassible and immortal flesh, the other is of the assumption of 
a passible and mortal flesh. If we speak about the assumption of a passible and mortal flesh, 
then it is true that, if humanity had not sinned, the Son of God would not have assumed 
flesh; for he assumed passible and mortal flesh so that, dying in assumed flesh, he might free 
humanity from sin. Yet if we speak of the assumption of impassible and immortal flesh, then 
I conscientiously believe and strongly concur in this opinion, that if humanity had not fallen, 
the Son of God would nonetheless have taken flesh’. Quaestiones de Christo I, p. 178. 
20 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Christo I, p. 178. 
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achievement of this is actual physical union with Godhead and therefore 
incarnation leads humanity to its true nature.21  
Matthew declares that there was also the attainment of the perfection 
of grace. Such merit as Christ earned, Matthew says, cannot have been for 
himself as he stood in no need of anything. Rather, he merited for the benefit 
of humanity, and applied his merit freely to it. Quoting St Paul, Matthew 
identifies Christ as the head of the church and humanity as members, not 
just of the church but of the mystical body of Christ participating in the 
abundant grace flowing from Christ, the perfect mediator between God and 
humanity.22 Through Christ’s taking flesh and being united to human nature, 
humanity had access to his grace: ‘of his fullness we all have received; grace 
for grace’.23 The incarnation made such perfection of grace possible.24 
Matthew proposes that the incarnation attains the perfection of glory 
since humanity, gifted with both an intellective and a sensitive nature, can 
behold in Jesus Christ the union of God and humanity. The greatest, most 
satisfying and most glorious possible object of both the intellect and the 
senses is therefore the beatific vision. In Christ’s fullness this is manifest, 
uniting divinity to humanity. In Matthew’s words, ‘Quis enim possit capere, 
quantum sit vel erit gaudium beatorum contemplari naturam suam, naturam 
creaturam unitam naturae divinae in persona Filii Dei, in persona Verbi 
aeterni?’25 
                                                   
21 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Christo, I, p. 179. Zachary Hayes, ‘The Death of 
Christ in the Theology of Matthew of Aquasparta’, Franciscan Studies, 56 (1998), 189-201. 
22 Ephesians 4: 22. 
23 John 1: 16. 
24 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Christo, I, p. 180. 
25 ‘For who could grasp how great is, or will be, the joy of the blessed to contemplate their 
own nature, a created nature, united to the divine nature in the person of the Son of God, in 
the person of the eternal Word?’ Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Christ, I, p. 180. 
183 
 
There are two important soteriological observations to be drawn from 
the material of this text. The first is that this attainment of perfection of 
nature, grace and glory is in Matthew’s explication derived solely from Christ 
having become incarnate; neither sacrifice nor offering of satisfaction is even 
mentioned in Matthew’s argument. Ideas of penal substitution derived from 
Anselm do not appear in his reasoning. In a quite Bonaventurian fashion, 
Matthew posits that the benefit of salvation, the full attainment of humanity, 
flows from the incarnation of Christ without any further act on his part, 
neither passion nor resurrection. The work of creation is brought to its 
consummation and fulfilment through the entry into it of divinity, the 
juncture of created and creator. In that act, humanity is more fully realised 
by that union with divinity and this would be so, and is so, quite 
independently of whether humanity had sinned and fallen or not. It is, from 
this, a small but obvious step in the argument to then say that a perfect God 
does not leave creation imperfectly created and thus had always intended the 
perfection of creation and, so, had always intended the incarnation. 
Nonetheless, tellingly, Matthew does not go so far as to take that step in the 
text and halts himself before reaching that point.  
Matthew notes in conclusion that all the earlier authorities have 
considered this question with the presupposition that the fall had occurred. 
They did not speculate on this theoretical question of what would have 
happened in the absence of the fall. Matthew declares that he, too, declines to 
consider a hypothetical situation, such as a world in which humanity had not 
sinned, despite all the speculation he had done to this point.26 It is to be 
remembered that he was composing a set of questions looking at the nature 
                                                   
26 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Christo I, p. 181. 
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of the body of Christ, so speculation on hypothetical worlds without human 
sin are some distance from his principal goal but Matthew has, obiter dicta, 
laid all the groundwork for such a consideration. He provides reasoning that 
establishes Christ would have become incarnate without the fall, explains 
how Christ could have come without the fall and what would have occurred if 
Christ had come without the fall but he declines actually to say that Christ 
would have come without the fall. There are bounds to how far Matthew was 
willing to go. 
The second important observation is that, given that the fall did occur, 
these perfections of nature, grace and glory are inadequate in themselves for 
the salvation of humanity; ‘[…] ideo enim carnem passibilem et mortalem 
assumpsit, ut, in carne assumpta moriens, a peccato hominem liberaret’.27 
There is still for Matthew a place for Christ’s passion and death in human 
redemption. Matthew does not develop here whether that is done through 
the making of satisfaction or through some other means but he does 
maintain that it should occur as an integral part of human redemption.28 
Thus Matthew has a two-fold element to soteriology: a perfection of 
humanity wrought by the incarnation and a restoration and redemption 
brought about by Christ’s passion, death and resurrection. 
 
6.3  CHRIST’S OBLIGATION TO DIE 
Some clearer sense of this latter element can be observed in the seventh of 
this set of question: ‘Utrum Christus alias fuisset necessario mortuus, si non 
                                                   
27 ‘[…] for he assumed passible and mortal flesh so that, dying in assumed flesh, he might 
free humanity from sin’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Christo, I, p. 178. 
28 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Christo I, pp. 178-81. 
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fuisset occisus?’29 Matthew proposes that it was essential that Christ die for 
three reasons, all derived from the incarnation: because of the divine person 
who assumed humanity, because of the nature that was assumed and because 
of the reason for that assumption. The nature of Christ was to love humanity 
and since he had the ‘power to lay down his life and to take it up again’, his 
loving nature disposed him to embrace mortality so as to share humanity’s 
state.30 Matthew argues further for Christ’s death because the nature that 
Christ assumed was mortal, passible and human, it followed that, like any 
human, he must die, even if not slain.  
In terms of why the assumption of human nature meant that Christ 
had to die, Matthew gives a twofold response: 
Supposito enim lapsu humani generis, ideo assumpsit 
naturam humanam, ut per mortem indebitam a morte 
debita liberaret, et per mortem destrueret eum, qui 
habebat mortis imperium, scilicet diabolum, ut ostendit 
Augustinus, IV et XIII De Trinitate, in multis locis. 
Propterea dicit Gregorius, quod ‘nihil nobis nasci 
profuit, nisi redimi profuisset’. Ulterius ideo naturam 
humanam assumpsit, ut esset mediator Dei et 
hominum, homo Christus Iesus: ideo debuit habere 
similitudinem carnis peccati quantum ad mortalitatem 
ut ‘factus particeps mortalitatis nostrae, faceret nos 
participes Divinitatis suae’, ut dicit Augustinus, IV De 
Trinitate, cap. 2; non ergo esset verus mediator, nisi 
esset in eo similitudo carnis peccati. Si autem naturam 
non haberet mortalem, nec caro peccati esset in eo, nec 
similitudo carnis peccati.31 
                                                   
29 ‘Whether it was necessary that Christ die by some other means, if he had not been slain?’ 
Quaestiones de Christ, VII, p. 198. 
30 John 5: 18. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Christ, VII, p. 204. 
31 ‘Presupposing the fall of the human race, therefore he assumed human nature so that, 
through his unowed death, he might free it from the debt of death, and through his death he 
might destroy him who had the command of death, namely the devil, as Augustine 
demonstrates in parts IV and XIII of De Trinitate in many places. Because of this, Gregory 
says that “being born profits us nothing, unless it profits us to be redeemed”. Finally, 
therefore he assumed human nature so that he might be the mediator of God and humanity, 
the man Jesus Christ. Thus he ought to have sufficient likeness to sinful flesh for mortality so 
that, “made a participant in our mortality, he might make us participants in his Divinity” as 
Augustine says in IV De Trinitate, chap. 2; therefore he is not a true mediator unless there is 




The first reason is that Christ’s death facilitates the destruction of the 
dominance of death and its master, the Devil. Matthew gives no details about 
how this is accomplished but presumably he draws upon that 
understanding’s lengthy Neoplatonic tradition, going all the way back 
through Augustine to St Paul, in which the humanity in which Christ 
participated, shared in Christ’s overcoming of death.32 Matthew’s invocation 
of this reasoning of how the incarnation meant that Christ had to die was 
orthodox and well established scripturally in tradition. 
In contrast, what is novel is that while Matthew argues that Christ 
must die, that is not, as Anselm for example had argued, for the purpose of 
undoing the fall or rendering satisfaction. Rather, Matthew is explicit that 
Christ’s death is to overcome human death. As Matthew sets out his 
argument, the death of Christ deals with a consequence of the fall but not 
with the fall itself. 
Thus secondly, Matthew proposes an aspect of Christ’s mission that is 
concerned with undoing the consequences of the fall. It frees passible and 
mortal human flesh from the burden of death and its subjugation to the devil. 
There is also another aspect that involves the perfection and fulfilment of 
humanity through uniting it to Divinity. It has already been noted in the first 
of these questions that Matthew was of the opinion that some form of 
incarnation was always to occur.33 This could not have been for the former 
                                                                                                                                                
in him nor a likeness of sinful flesh’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Christo VII, p. 
205. 
32 For example, Romans 5: 12, 6: 4, I Corinthians 15: 21, II Corinthians 4: 10. For further on 
this Neoplatonic tradition in redemption, see Mertens, Not the Cross but the Crucified, pp. 
68-70 and Rivière, Le Dogme de la rédemption, pp. 152 and 321. This notion is the 
foundation of the predominant soteriology of the Eastern Church, recapitulation or 
anacephaleosis. Cf. pages 125 and 146 above.
33 See page 181 above. 
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purpose of redressing the fall, since such a fall would be contingent upon 
human sin. It must therefore have been for the latter purpose of perfecting 
humanity in Christ, which Matthew thought always was to come to pass. In 
Matthew’s understanding, as for the later Bonaventure, the coming of Christ 
was for the purpose of the culmination of humanity, achieved through the 
union of divine and human natures in Christ. However, in addition to that 
and independent of any design of God, humanity had chosen to sin and had 
been marred by that sin, so that the perfective work of Christ also undid the 
consequences of that sin, but this redemptive activity of the incarnation was 
an ancillary and contingent consequence. 
 
6.4  QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE INCARNATIONE 
This manner of conceiving of salvation continued when Matthew returned to 
Paris in 1277. There he composed a set of nine disputed questions on the 
incarnation in which he advanced and developed this approach.34 He 
commences by establishing that humanity could be disfigured by its own sin 
and that this disfigurement would pass from the first parents to their 
posterity. He also establishes that this disfigurement was, in God’s 
omnipotence, reparable.35 Matthew then asked a question common in 
sentence commentaries: ‘Supposito quod natura humana sit lapsa 
reparabiliter quaeritur, utrum potuerit reparari per puram creaturam.’36 He 
gives what had become, by now, a fairly standard Franciscan response: God’s 
                                                   
34 Matthew of Aquasparta, ‘Quaestiones Novem de Incarnatione’, in Quaestiones Disputatae 
Selectae, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 2 
(Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1914), pp. 1-176. 
35 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Incarnatione, I-IV, pp. 1-80. 
36 ‘Assuming that human nature could be restored from the fall, it is asked whether it could 
be restored through a wholly created being’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de 
Incarnatione VI, p. 100. The question frequently appeared in d. 20, a. 1 of sentence 
commentaries. See page 324 below. 
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omnipotence is such that any means and any agent would have been 
sufficient for the restoration of humanity, including the use of a being that 
was wholly created, had God so chosen.  
Ad intelligentiam istius quaestionis et aliarum 
materiam possent quaeri et quaerentur inferius suo 
loco, praenotandum est, quod omnino alius modus fuit 
Deo possibilis liberationis et reparationis generis 
humani et hoc ostendit ‘divinae potentiae immensitas, 
quam non aequat opus, et divinae sapientiae 
incomprehensibilitas, quam non aequat sensus et 
divinae bonitatis immensitas, quam non aequat 
virtus’.37 
 
The use of Christ as that agent of redemption was the most fitting way 
to effect that restoration and so it was the means chosen. The innovation in 
Matthew’s answer is to claim Anselm as an authority for that proposition. 
That is a striking move, as Anselm was generally considered to be an 
authority for the very opposite position. The passage from which Matthew 
cites, Cur Deus Homo I. 5, says expressly, ‘Quod redemptio hominis non 
potuit fieri per aliam quam per Dei personam’.38 Matthew reasons that, while 
it is true that God’s omnipotence means that the restoration of humanity 
could have been effected by any means, none would have been as fitting or 
efficacious as Jesus Christ. He cites Hugh of St Victor in acknowledging that 
it was open to God to choose any means of redemption but that the use of the 
God-man ‘iste infirmitate nostrae convenientior fuit’.39 From here, Matthew 
                                                   
37 ‘To the proper understanding of this and other questions that can be asked and are asked 
below, it must be noted that any other means was open to God for the liberation and 
restoration of the human race and this showed “the immensity of divine power that toil could 
not match, the incomprehensibility of divine wisdom that sense does not match and the 
greatness of divine goodness that virtue does not match”. Matthew of Aquasparta, 
Quaestiones de Incarnatione VI, p. 105. The quotation is drawn from Hugh of St Victor, De 
Sacramentis, ed. by Roy J, Deferrari, Mediaeval Academy of America, 58 (Cambridge, MA: 
Mediaeval Academy of America, 1951), I. ii. 22. 
38 ‘That humanity’s redemption could not have occurred through any other than a Divine 
person’. 
39 ‘Was more suited for our weakness’, Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Incarnatione 
VI, p. 106, quoting Hugh of St Victor, De Sacramentis, I. ii. 22. 
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takes up Anselm. It would be contrary to God’s nature, Matthew argued, for 
God to fail to choose the means best suited to the goal of human restoration. 
He notes that ‘Anselmus multum eleganter deducit I libro Cur Deus Homo 
impossibile est, genus humanum reparari per aliquam puram ceaturam’.40 It 
follows for Matthew that God would choose Christ to effect human 
restoration, just as Anselm had said, and for the reasons that Anselm had 
given.41 Matthew then proceeds to subsume Anselm’s arguments into his 
own, using him to establish why a wholly created being would not be chosen 
rather than prove that God was bound not to choose a wholly created being, 
the original argument of the Cur Deus Homo.  
Manifestly, Matthew displays much less reticence about positing 
necessity of God than his earlier confreres had shown, since his arguments 
appear to suggest that God was bound to act in a certain fashion. 
Nevertheless, by constructing the argument in this manner, this reasoning 
permits him to reject Anselm’s conclusions while still adopting, as his own, 
Anselm’s argument for a special role for the God-Man. Matthew laboured to 
reduce the distance between the Franciscan position and Anselm as the 
established authority in the consideration of the sentences in soteriology. 
After a period of considerable creativity and soteriological innovation, even if 
coyly expressed at times by figures such as Alexander of Hales and 
Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta labours to reintegrate these novelties 
into the more standard and received theological tradition, especially that of 
Anselm. He chooses not to create a new path for the Franciscans, as 
                                                   
40 ‘Anselm very correctly deduces in the Book 1 of Cur Deus Homo that it is impossible that 
the human race be restored by some wholly created being’. Matthew of Aquasparta, 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Incarnatione VI, 106. 
41 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Incarnatione VI, p. 106-10. 
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Bonaventure could be said to have done, but to weave such new Franciscan 
developments into the mainstream. Among a faculty of scholars and teaching 
from such established authorities, Matthew does not keep the recent 
Franciscan insights separate from them but labours to fit those two 
approaches together. 
As authentic scholasticism sought to show the unity and harmony of 
all positions, each of them displaying a facet of the truth, Matthew makes an 
admirable effort in bringing together the Anselmian and Franciscan 
traditions. Matthew presents himself as so properly aligned with the 
theological mainstream that he follows even Anselm, whom in fact he 
employs to argue the reverse of Anselm’s own stated position, and he 
manages to preserve the novel and particular understandings that the 
Franciscans had brought to the development of soteriology. Matthew 
advances the great scholastic goal of bringing different ideas and reasons into 
concord.  
 
6.5  THE BENEFITS OF SALVATION THROUGH THE INCARNATE 
This same tendency to make Franciscan theology broader and more 
comprehensive by reaching concord between the Franciscan soteriological 
position as it had evolved and the theological mainstream is apparent in his 
answer to the next question of this set: ‘Quaeritur, dato quod genus 
humanum per puram creaturam non potuerit reparari, utrum oportuit 
reparari per hominem-Deum’.42 Matthew provides a very detailed and 
sevenfold answer to this question that affirms it was apt for this to be done by 
                                                   
42 ‘Given that the human race would not be restored by a wholly created being, it is asked 
whether it was apt that it be restored through the man-God.’ Matthew of Aquasparta, 
Quaestiones de Incarnatione VII, p. 117. 
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the man-God. His reasoning discloses insights into what Matthew 
understood to be entailed in salvation. He begins by claiming that there can 
be no perfect restoration in the absence of ‘satisfactio sive solutio debiti’.43 
Where Bonaventure had reduced the significance of satisfaction to a mere 
element in overcoming the human sense of guilt, Matthew restores the 
significance of satisfaction that it had enjoyed in the writings of Alexander of 
Hales and Anselm, whom Matthew explicitly cites in his answer and whose 
reasoning he adopts.44  
Second, Matthew says that there must be a ‘curatio morbi’, a healing of 
the corruption flowing from the fall. Matthew makes clear that, 
notwithstanding the first part of his answer, he is not rejecting Bonaventure’s 
approach to salvation as a healing and restoration of humanity. Rather, 
Matthew co-opts Bonaventure’s reasoning and argues that the best medicine 
is that opposite to the illness it cures.45 Thus, while Matthew insists that a 
satisfaction must be made and a debt paid for wrongs done, he does not agree 
with Anselm in holding that this is the totality of what constitutes salvation. 
There must also be a healing and a restoration of humanity, curing the ill that 
derived from the fall. Both elements are integral to salvation. Matthew seeks 
to hold together both the older Anselmian tradition and the newer insights 
produced among the Franciscans and Bonaventure especially. 
In the third reason, Matthew claims that perfect restoration also 
requires ‘liberatio potestate et servitute diaboli’.46 Matthew this time draws 
upon rather older theological theories that spoke of the sacrifice of Christ as a 
                                                   
43 ‘Satisfaction or recompense for debt’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de 
Incarnatione VII, p. 123. 
44 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I. 6. See page 136 above. 
45 See pages 119, 138-41 above. 
46 ‘Freedom from the power and enslavement of the devil’. Matthew of Aquasparta, 
Quaestiones de Incarnatione VII, p. 125. 
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ransom paid to the devil to buy humanity’s freedom from the power of Satan. 
These ideas can be found in writers as far back as Origen and Athanasius.47 
Matthew broadens further his depiction of salvation as not just a satisfaction 
made to God nor just a healing of humanity but also a liberation from the 
dominion which the devil had exercised over humanity since the fall. 
Matthew does not reason that a ransom (Christ’s blood) must be made to free 
humanity but simply that there is a rupture in diabolical control over 
humanity. Such a sanguinary payment, Matthew believes, would be 
ineffective. ‘Liberari autem non poteramus nisi diabolo superato, diabolus 
autem non potentia aut violentia superandus fuit, sed iustitia, quia diabolus 
diligit potentiam et exosam habet iustitiam’.48 Matthew, it is fair to say, gives 
more clarity about what is not to occur in this liberation from the devil than 
about how the devil is overcome.49 
Fourth, Matthew seeks a ‘relevatio lapsi’ and again in this he is 
assimilating prior reasoning. This time it is the conception of the celestial 
hierarchies drawn from Bonaventure and Pseudo-Dionysius.50 Human 
restoration, reasons Matthew, cannot happen if the saviour abandons his 
place in the hierarchy rather than merely bending to raise up the fallen. ‘Qui 
autem vult relevare iacentem, necesse habet se inclinare, sed non prostrare 
sive deiicere cum illo, sed manere in sua rectitudine, alias iacentem relevare 
                                                   
47 Matthew 16: 8. Origen, Commentaire sur l’Évangile selon Matthieu, ed. and trans. by 
Robert Girod, Sources chrétinnes, 162 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1970) and Athanasius of 
Alexandria, De Incarnatione, ed. by Archibald Robertson (London: David Nutt, 1893), IV-
VI. See further McIntyre, The Shape of Soteriology, p. 29; Sheets, The Theology of the 
Atonement, pp. 14-18 and Rivière, Le Dogme de la rédemption au début du moyen âge, p. 
302. 
48 ‘But we were not able to be freed unless the devil be overcome, but not by power or 
violence was he to be overcome but by justice, since the devil loves power and has a hatred 
for justice’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Incarnatione VII, p. 125. 
49 This depiction of overcoming Satan is what Gustav Aulén called the ‘Christus Victor’ 
theory and these first three reasons given by Matthew are what he refers to as the three main 
ideas of atonement. Aulén, Christus Victor. 
50 See pages 117-20 above. 
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non posset’.51 Having raised the fallen, they are restored to their proper 
hierarchic place and the cosmos is once again ordered as the divine will had 
intended. Humanity, occupying its proper place, is no longer misshapen but 
again stands erect. 
Matthew continues with a ‘reconciliatio aversi’ and this demands a 
perfect mediator who can interpose himself between the sinner and the 
sinned against, between humanity and divinity. To this no one is better 
suited than the God-man, Jesus Christ. This could not be called a specifically 
Franciscan idea and Matthew is not co-opting some earlier Franciscan’s 
thought here; the discussion of Christ as the perfect mediator effecting 
reconciliation and salvation long pre-dated the friars and was well 
established in the Book of Sentences and was regularly considered in 
sentence commentaries.52  
In his sixth reason, Matthew again looks further afield beyond both 
the Franciscans and the Book of Sentences. He argues that full human 
restoration requires ‘reductio seu directio devii’. 
Reductio autem et directio devii est per informationem 
et imitationem exemplorum; nescit enim, quo vadat in 
via, quam ignorat, nisi sequatur eum, qui viam novit. 
Nullus autem potest sequi eum, quem non videt; nec 
aliquis praebet perfecte exemplum ad se imitandum, 
nisi qui nullum alium sequitur, alias posset deviare. Si 
igitur homo devius reduci debebat, et directione et 
informatione indigebat; nullus autem erat, quem 
sequeretur, qui nullum alium imitaretur, nisi Deus; 
Deum autem sentire et videre non poterat; ergo 
oportuit, quod Deus visibilis et sensibilis fieret, quem 
sequi posset et quem sequi deberet.53 
                                                   
51 ‘Yet he who wants to lift the fallen up again must bend himself but not lie down or fall 
down with the fallen, but remain in his upright position, otherwise he cannot lift the fallen 
up again’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Incarnatione VII, p. 127. 
52 For example, Bonaventure III Sent., d. 19, a. 2. 
53 ‘Leading back and directing the wayward is through instruction and the imitation of 
examples; for he who has fallen from the way and is ignorant, knows nothing unless he 
follows him who knows the way. But no one can follow him whom he does not see; nor can 
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Matthew here assimilates what is known as exemplary salvation; that 
ignorant humanity can be freed from the ills and injury that flow from sin by 
imitating the example of Christ. The great medieval champion of this 
approach had been Peter Abelard.54 He, too, had not favoured Anselm’s idea 
of penal substitution, arguing that a greater evil cannot remedy a lesser one 
for if the Father claims such satisfaction for the commission of the lesser sin 
of consuming the forbidden fruit of Eden, what price might be sought for the 
murder of the Son?55 This approach considers that human salvation lies 
chiefly in the change and conversion within the human will which, under the 
influence of the teachings and example of Christ, is moved to abandon its 
former sinful ways.56 Because sin is always an act of the will, it is here where 
repentance must occur and, it is reasoned, some external act of a third party 
will not by itself bring about true redemption.  
This approach had never truly enjoyed great popularity among 
medieval theologians and had not fared well at the Council of Sens when it 
was denounced along with a number of other ideas of Abelard. In the pursuit 
of integration and, no doubt, comprehensiveness Matthew nevertheless 
included a modified instance of exemplary salvation here.57 The usual 
medieval criticism of this approach was that, contrary to the Biblical texts, it 
                                                                                                                                                
someone perfectly provide an example for his imitating, unless he follows no other, lest he 
stray. Thus if a wayward man ought to be led back and was needing direction and 
instruction, there is none unless he whom he followed was God, nor another to be imitated. 
But he was unable to sense and see God, therefore it was fitting that God be made visible and 
sensible so he might and ought to follow God.’ Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de 
Incarnatione VII, p. 128. 
54 See, for example, Peter Abelard, Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos, III. 26. 
ccxlii. For exemplary salvation generally, see Rivière, Le dogme de la rédemption au début 
du Moyen-âge, pp. 355-58. 
55 Mertens, Not the Cross but the Crucified, p. 75. 
56 Aulén, Christus Victor, p. 112. 
57 Mertens, Not the Cross but the Crucified, p. 77. See also Thomas Williams, ‘Sin, Grace and 
Redemption’, in Cambridge Companion to Abelard, ed. by Jeffrey E. Brower and Kevin 
Gulfoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 258-78. 
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afforded no salvific role to Christ’s death and resurrection, for it claimed all 
must happen in the human will. For Matthew, this does not arise as a 
problem as he discards the exclusivity argument of Abelard; it is but one of 
Matthew’s seven facets to occur in salvation.  
The final factor Matthew gives for perfect restoration is ‘erectio spei et 
inflammatio amoris et desiderii’.58 It is difficult to see from the text how 
these fit into Matthew’s conception of salvation. In his exposition, Matthew 
has very little to say on this point and instead he quotes heavily from 
Augustine’s De Trinitate, repeating about two pages from Book XIII on the 
capacity of Christ to rouse hope, love and desire.59 Presumably, if Christ had 
given satisfaction for the debt of humanity, released it from its corruption 
and performed all the other preceding six tasks that Matthew has set forth, 
they would in themselves have kindled hope, love and desire without the 
need for further action on Christ’s part. Yet again, while Matthew does briefly 
set out what hope, love and desire are, and how Christ incites these, he fails 
to show how they are salvific. They surely make humanity yearn for salvation 
more passionately and predispose humanity to be open to the gift of salvation 
but Matthew does not set out how, in themselves, they bring about human 
restoration.  
Matthew himself appears to think little of this argument. Having set 
out all these reasons, Matthew proceeds in standard scholastic fashion to 
address each authority previously raised as contra to his own position to 
reconcile it with his response. There are nineteen such opposed authorities to 
                                                   
58 ‘The arousal of hope and kindling of love and desire’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestione 
de Incarnatione VII, p. 129. 
59 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Incarnationed VII, pp. 130-1 quoting Augustine, 
De Trinitate, XIII. 
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which Matthew responds and he makes use of all his reasoning to do so 
except this seventh and final argument, which he never employs. Its presence 
may well be due more to numerological or rhetorical reasons than theological 
ones, as seven was well established as the number of perfection and 
completeness.60 
 
6.6  MATTHEW THE SCHOLASTIC 
Considering his response to this question as a whole, a reader could be 
forgiven for looking upon Matthew as something of a soteriological magpie, 
gathering together the ideas of many others who preceded him and arraying 
them as his own. A careful reading discloses that this may not be true. 
Matthew deserves greater praise as a skilful master of the scholastic practice 
of bringing knowledge into concord. Unlike many of his predecessors, 
including even Bonaventure, Matthew drew upon a much broader field of 
soteriological notions, of which he discards none but instead artfully 
assembled them to bolster his arguments in favour of restoration by the God-
man.  
It is to be remembered that all this reasoning is within the context of a 
disputed question asking whether it was fitting for humanity to be restored 
through the God-Man. Clearly and from the very outset, Matthew establishes 
that he conceives of salvation as not some atonement or recompense 
rendered to God but as centred upon humanity and the return of it to some 
prior condition from which it had fallen. 
                                                   
60 Roger E. Reynolds, ‘“At Sixes and Sevens” and Eights and Nines: The Sacred Mathematics 
of Sacred Order in the Early Middle Ages’, Speculum, 54 (1979), 669-84, (p. 671). 
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Nor is Matthew as accepting of the earlier theologians as he may 
appear. He cites Anselm and speaks of ‘satisfactio debiti’ but he introduces 
into Anselm’s thought the more tempered idea of ‘solutio debiti’, an 
expression never used by Anselm. Like Origen, he speaks of freeing humanity 
from servitude to the Devil but in Matthew’s treatment this is not through 
some blood price given at Christ’s death but by acts of justice, an idea that 
Origen had never propounded. Similarly, while he does use Pseudo-
Dionysius’ concept of humanity creating discord through its usurpation of a 
place not its own in the hierarchy of the cosmos, nowhere in Pseudo-
Dionysius’ writings is Matthew’s idea of Christ keeping his own place while 
‘bending down’ to another to reach humanity and restore it to its place. In 
only one instance does Matthew make use, without emendation, of an earlier 
idea: that of Bonaventure and the ‘curatio morbi’. Matthew may well, in this, 
disclose his own Franciscan leanings. 
Matthew portrayed himself as being thoroughly in keeping with the 
accepted theological mainstream while at the same time making novel 
adaptations of his own to that received tradition. After the theological 
creativity of Bonaventure, Matthew declines to be quite as overtly at the 
forefront of such innovation. The scholastic setting in which Matthew was 
working inclined him to conduct and fashion his theology in a scholastic 
manner, striving to unite and bring together all reasoning, especially the 
burgeoning body of Franciscan material. While Matthew may have all the 
requisite reasoning established to claim that the incarnation would have 
occurred in the absence of the fall, he declines to make that claim. Although 
he has in place sufficient reasons to postulate a claim that the primary 
purpose of Christ’s coming was the fulfilment of humanity, he declines to go 
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so far as to state that explicitly. He patently believes that Anselm used the 
right ideas to reach the wrong conclusion but Matthew does not openly make 
that claim. He is a theologian who in his work is willing time and again to go 
very close to the edge but never further. He falls afoul neither of the Church 
nor of the secular masters as his theological style is to integrate widely 
around him. He is a model of what scholasticism seeks to achieve. 
This makes Matthew a great integrator of past theological idea. While 
he does amend the ideas and expressions of his Franciscan predecessors, he 
does not reject what had preceded him in the development of soteriology 
among them. He did not create new ideas and approaches to soteriology but 
his achievement was in championing the process of integrating those 
Franciscan developments with the accepted positions of Anselm and other 
prevailing theological notions of the day. His accomplishment was in 
managing to hold them all together without contradiction.  
 
6.7  QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE GRATIA 
This fervour for integration is evident in the final set of disputed questions 
touching on salvation, his Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia. In the second 
of those questions, ‘Quaeritur utrum a defectu culpae possibile sit quemquam 
resurgere ad statum iustitiae sine auxilio gratiae’, Matthew again gives an 
extended and lengthy array of reasons in his response.61 The accepted answer 
to this question was very well established: Grace was necessary and to hold 
                                                   
61 ‘It is asked whether it is possible for someone to rise again from the defect of guilt to the 
state of justice without the aid of grace’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de 
Gratia II. 32. 
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that people could restore themselves through their own efforts without the 
aid of grace was the ancient and anathematised position of Pelagianism.62 
In the course of his answer to the question, Matthew explores what is 
meant by ‘restoring someone to a state of justice’ and again gives many 
explanations as he sets out why grace is needed for humanity:  
Ergo versa vice iustificatio sive ad iustitiam reditio, 
resurrectio a culpa, necessario ista sex claudit, scilicet 
peccati detestationem et iustitiae desiderium vel 
dilectionem, spiritualem vivificationem, naturae 
reformationem vel reordinationem, virtutem 
generationem, conversionem ad Deum et peccati sive 
culpae remissionem.63  
 
As Matthew explores each of these elements in turn, he again draws on many 
sources. There are to be heard echoes of Anselm in the remission of sins, of 
Bonaventure in the reordering of human nature, of Abelard in the generation 
of virtue, of Origen in the detestation of sin and so forth. Matthew expounds 
on each of these elements in his answer and certainly maintains each with 
vigour.  
This trend to synthesise endured throughout Matthew’s academic 
career. According to Doucet, the Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia were 
written about 1285.64 It would be followed by only two other works, yet even 
at this point in his life, Matthew continues to favour a very broad and 
comprehensive approach to soteriology. He discounts little of what preceded 
and was reluctant to opt for one conception over another but preferring to 
                                                   
62 That matter had been settled at the Councils of Diospolis (418) and Ephesus (431). See 
generally Rebecca Weaver, Divine Grace and Human Agency: A Study of the Semi-Pelagian 
Controversy, Patristic Monograph Series, 15 (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1996). 
63 ‘Therefore justification or the return to justice, the rising again from guilt, must in turn 
encompass six things, namely a hatred for sin and a desire or love for justice, a life-giving 
spirit, a reforming and reordering of nature, a generation of virtue, a conversion to God and 
a remission of sin and guilt’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia II, 
p. 44. 
64 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia, pp. cxxxiv–cxxxv. 
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bring those ideas into harmony in a more comprehensive coverage of what 
salvation signifies. As well as can be judged from Matthew’s extant works, 
this had been his approach throughout his academic career. 
 
It is not unjust to make the observation that there were parts of theology that 
clearly attracted Matthew far more than soteriology. He produced twenty-one 
sets of disputed questions on a wide array of theological topics of interest to 
him but none of them deals specifically with salvation.65 On the basis of the 
topics of his other works, the evidence is that Matthew’s interests lay 
elsewhere and he only treated of soteriology when it strayed into some other 
topic of interest to him. When he does speak of soteriology, Matthew can 
frequently appear the very opposite of originality in that he seems merely to 
amass together all the theories of which he is familiar. However, inasmuch as 
he succeeds in holding them together as one non-contradictory whole, in a 
way in which none of his confreres had thus far managed, he makes his own 
contribution of Franciscan soteriology and serves as an exemplary scholastic. 
The consequence of Matthew’s actions is that the Franciscan 
innovations derived from Bonaventure were not lost to soteriology generally. 
Matthew did not force his readers and students into a choice between either 
the Anselmian or Bonaventurian traditions. The scholastic nature of the 
genre of disputed questions in which Matthew wrote nurtured and furthered 
his all-embracing approach to soteriology. His efforts to bring these two 
traditions together, meant that the insights of both would continue. By 
broadening the coverage of Bonaventure’s approach, Matthew was cementing 
a place of the new Franciscan ideas. This more inclusive Franciscan approach 
                                                   
65 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia, p. cix. 
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is picked up by later Franciscan authors whose works carry on Matthew’s 
labours in integrating Franciscan soteriology with the theological 
mainstream.66  
To conceive of Matthew as uncritically repeating past views is a poor 
characterisation, for Matthew made his own contributions. No Franciscan 
preceding him had yet established so thoroughly and well the grounding for 
an understanding of the incarnation that was not contingent on human sin. 
While a number of friars had wrestled with reconciling the ideas of Anselm 
with the developing Franciscan theories of fulfilment in Christ, only Matthew 
brought exemplary salvation into consideration also. It is true that Matthew 
assembled a very broad approach to understanding salvation but he did so 
while avoiding contradictions in that broad array of material. Impressively, 
he accomplishes all this in the context of works that were composed on topics 
other than soteriology and his discussions of the mechanics of salvation were 
at best tangential to his actual concerns in fields such as epistemology and 
cognition. Matthew’s soteriological achievement was to root the Franciscan 
innovations more firmly into the scholastic theological mainstream. 
                                                   







7  Richard of Middleton and the Episcopal 
Condemnations of the 1270s 
 
Such moves toward closer alignment of the Franciscans and the rest of the 
faculty of theology continued in the work of Richard of Middleton, an 
Englishman working in Paris between 1276 and 1287. His career thus 
overlapped with that of Matthew of Aquasparta.  
His arrival in Paris in the autumn of 1276 was only a few months 
before Stephen Tempier, the bishop of Paris, issued an extensive list of 
philosophical propositions that were no longer to be taught in the university 
and this event had repercussions for the careers of many scholars, including 
Richard. The battle between the university scholars impeded by Tempier’s 
decrees and the ecclesiastical authorities enmeshed the Franciscans in their 
conflict. At the heart of the dispute was the degree to which the philosophy of 
non-Christians could be used in theological instruction.  
 
7.1  THE TEMPIER DECREES 
For some time there had been swelling tension between the masters and the 
bishop about the influence within theology of the writings of Aristotle and the 
non-Christian commentators on those works, as well as others from beyond 
Christianity. This was not new; Bonaventure had bemoaned the same issue in 
the Hexaëmeron.1 As the full corpus of Aristotle’s works became available to 
the Latin-speaking world over the course of the thirteenth century, his texts 
and their commentaries were widely and avidly studied by scholars in the 
universities. In particular, the integration of this new philosophical material 
                                                   
1 See pages 149-53 above. 
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gave rise to an impetus within the arts faculty in Paris to pursue and to teach 
philosophy as an end in itself, as it had been in the classical era, rather than 
as a means to an end in support of the disciplines within the higher faculties 
of the university.2 At the forefront of this trend were teachers of philosophy 
from the arts faculty in Paris, figures such as Boethius of Dacia, Bernier of 
Nivelles, Gosvin of La Chapelle and, especially, Siger of Brabant. Making use 
of non-Christian philosophers and commentators, these masters began 
expounding conclusions in not just natural philosophy but also theology 
which were at variance both with accepted Christian doctrine and with the 
conclusions of the theologians.  
Among the more notorious instances of this was the question of 
individuation of the intellect. Siger of Brabant, relying heavily on the writings 
of Averroës, taught that there was but one created intellect in the cosmos, 
eternally caused by God, and that all other beings merely participated in it to 
some greater or lesser degree, according to their nature, and as an accident to 
their being.3 However, if there were but one intellect and it were but an 
accident to being, then the idea of individual souls becomes problematic and 
so too does the possibility of personal salvation or damnation.4 This put it at 
                                                   
2 John F. Wippel, ‘The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277’, in A Companion to 
Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone, Blackwell 
Companions to Philosophy, 28 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), pp. 65-73 (p. 66). 
3 Siger reiterated this proposition many times: De Aeternitate Mundi I. 38-41, De 
Necessitate I. 29-32, 48-51, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, I. 31-38, De Anima Intellectiva I. 
3-7 all of which are found in Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones de Anima, de Anima Intellectiva, 
de Aeternitate Mundi, ed. by Bernardo Bazàn, Philosophes Médiévaux du Centre de Wulf-
Mansion, 13 (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1972). His arguments are also in his 
commentary of the Liber de Causis, a work erroneously attributed to Aristotle at this time, 
Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones super Librum de Causis, ed. by Antonio Marlasca, 
Philosophes Médiévaux du Centre de Wulf-Mansion, 12 (Louvain: Publications 
Universitaires, 1972), I pp. 29-33. As to the genesis of this material in Averroës, see 
Averroës, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libros, ed. by Stuart Crawford, 
Corpus Commentariorum in Aristotelem, 6. 1, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, 59 
(Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), pp. 159-60. 
4 As to the question of individuation of the intellect, see further Roland Hissette, Enquête sur 
les 219 articles condamnés, Philosophes Médiévaux, 22 (Louvain: Publications 
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deep variance with traditional Christian belief and counter to one on the 
foundations of Christian anthropology.  
At stake in this disagreement over the use of the texts of Aristotle, 
Averroës and the others was the issue of the degree to which the reasoning of 
non-Christian writers, even ones as eminent as Aristotle, could be 
authoritatively relied upon in reaching theological conclusions. At the 
dispute’s heart was whether philosophy alone, unguided by divine self-
revelation in the scriptures or the person of Jesus Christ, could attain 
theological truth. Like Bonaventure, the bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, 
clearly thought not, and on 6 December 1270 he issued a condemnation of 
thirteen propositions held by these philosophers and forbade their being 
taught in the University of Paris, which existed under his jurisdiction.5  
The response of the masters in the Faculty of Arts was to change their 
approach in class. Rather than Aristotle’s conclusions, they came frequently 
to investigate in class his methods and techniques and those of his 
commentators as ‘instances of their reasoning’ but not, they claimed, their 
conclusions from that reasoning. The philosophers expressly claimed that 
this use of Aristotle and the others was not for the purpose of illustrating 
universal truths. ‘We seek the mind of the philosophers rather than the truth, 
                                                                                                                                               
Universitaires, 1977), pp. 78-82, and the broader discussion there on the condemnations 
issued by the bishop of Paris about using these non-Christian texts. The numbering of the 
articles of condemnation used throughout this present work will be that of Hissette and most 
modern authors and established by Mandonnet in Pierre Félix Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant 
et l’averroïsme latin au XIIIe siècle, Les Philosophes Belges, 6-7 (Louvain: Institute 
supérieur de philosophie de l’Université, 1908). For the text of the original decree, see 
Denifle and Chatelaine, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I, No. 473, pp. 543-58.  
5 Wippel, ‘The Parisian Condemnations’, p. 65. There had been an earlier general prohibition 
against all teaching from the works of Aristotle back in 1210 made by the Archdiocese of 
Sens, of which Paris was suffragan, but it had been little observed. It was fruitlessly renewed 
in 1231, Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I , pp. 78 and 138. As 
to Bonaventure, his attacks on the use of non-Christian philosophy in his Collationes in 
Hexaëmeron was produced only three years before in 1274.  
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since we are proceeding philosophically’, as Siger himself put it.6 
Nevertheless, students were now faced with what was labelled at the time as a 
‘double-truth’ of what had been reasoned by Aristotle and the pagans and 
what had been established by the Christian theologians, with the conclusions 
of each being frequently both defensibly true within their own systems and 
yet contradictory to each other.7 Scholasticism sought to show the common 
end of all learning but this double-truth was the antithesis of that ideal. 
As the philosophers in the arts faculty gained greater access to, and 
greater proficiency in, the philosophical, dialectical and logical tools of the 
classical era, they became less content to be the mere ‘handmaids of theology’ 
and sought to advance philosophy as a discipline in its own right. They 
reached conclusions of their own, even in areas that fell within the purview of 
other faculties. The difficulty lay not so much in what those conclusions were 
but in that those conclusions were all too often theological yet reached 
without the use of the authoritative sources of theology, scripture and 
tradition. Yet worse in the eyes of the theology faculty, they were reached 
without the use of theologians.8 The response of the Faculty of Arts was 
judged to be insufficient and a further round of condemnations followed in 
1277. 
                                                   
6 Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones de Anima, de Anima Intellectiva, de Aeternitate Mundi, p. 
101. See, too, Luca Bianchi, ‘Censure, liberté et progrès intellectuel à l’Université de Paris au 
XIIIe siècle’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 63 (1996), 45-93 (p. 
66). 
7 John F. Wippel, ‘The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris’, Journal of Medieval and 
Renaissance Studies, 7 (1977), 169-201, pp. 175-78. See this same article for a good overview 
of the more contentious philosophical points in which controversies arose such as 
individuation of the intellect, divine immediacy of action and divine foreknowledge of future 
contingents. 
8 Katherine Tachau, ‘In the Ambit of Another Faculty: Parisian Theologians and the 
(Meta)Physical Universe’, in Learning Institutionalized: Teaching in the Medieval 
University, ed. by John Van Engen (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2000), 
pp. 129-60 (p. 130). 
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News of the problems arising from the use of these non-Christian 
sources by the arts faculty came to the attention of Pope John XXI. He wrote 
to Tempier on 18 January 1277, seeking an investigation into what was being 
taught in the university, such as this problem of so-called ‘double-truth’.9 
Stephen acted swiftly and assembled a commission of sixteen theologians to 
examine the works and teaching of the Faculty of Arts at the university.10 
They worked quickly and on 7 March 1277, the bishop issued a further and 
greatly expanded condemnation of 219 propositions derived from Aristotle, 
Averroës, Moses Maimonides and other non-Christian commentators upon 
Aristotle, as well as some more modern but heretical works.11 As part of the 
decree, the bishop threatened the excommunication of anyone who defended 
these propositions, supported them or even listened to them unless, within 
seven days of the occurrence, the offender came forward to the bishop or the 
chancellor of the university for the imposition of a lesser sentence.12  
The official response of the Faculty of Arts was not to protest its 
orthodoxy nor to defend its use of these sources. Rather, it passed a new 
statute prohibiting its masters from teaching theological propositions.13 
Clearly, the understanding of the arts faculty concerning the condemnations 
was that they set out the bounds delimiting how far philosophy might go 
without the aid of theology before it courted error.  
                                                   
9 Wippel, ‘The Parisian Condemnations’, p. 67. 
10 Wippel, ‘The Parisian Condemnations’, pp. 67-68. The commission included the 
theological masters Henry of Ghent, Ranulph of Houblonnière and John Alleux. Hissette, 
Énquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris, pp. 7, 9-10. 
11 These included Andreas Capellanus, De Amore (Munich: Eidos Verlag, 1964) and some 
texts on geomancy. Sylvain Piron, ‘Le Plan de l'évêque: Pour une critique interne de la 
condamnation du 7 mars 1277’, Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales, 78 
(2011), 383-415 (p. 409). 
12 Hissette, Énquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris, p. 11. 
13 Wippel, ‘The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris’, p. 184. See also David Knowles, 
The Evolution of Medieval Thought (London: Longman, 1962), p. 226. 
208 
 
This response seems not to have satisfied the diocese and numerous 
investigations were conducted. Famously, even Thomas Aquinas in his great 
project to synthesise Aristotle’s philosophy with the Christian tradition ran 
afoul of the condemnations in numerous places and was subjected to 
investigation for multiple breaches of the decrees.14  
The event of the condemnations came to be seen by many as a pivotal 
point in the development of science and philosophy. Even though, strictly 
speaking, the condemnations did not extend beyond the boundaries of the 
diocese of Paris, they came to take on a life of their own far beyond those 
borders both geographically and temporally.15 Infraction of its articles was 
the formal accusation levelled against Galileo in his trial three hundred and 
fifty years later and they were invoked as late as 1705 during the investigation 
into the writings of René Descartes.16 A number of dioceses across Europe 
adopted the condemnations as their own and, significantly for the purposes 
at hand, in 1292 the General Chapter of the Franciscans bound all the friars, 
                                                   
14 J. M. M. H. Thijssen, ‘1227 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigation 
of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome’, Vivarium, 35 (1997), 72-101. Thomas’ canonisation 
in 1323 saved him from the ignominy of a posthumous censure. Wippel, ‘The Parisian 
Condemnations of 1270 and 1277’ p. 72. 
15 See, for example, John E. Murdoch, ‘1277 and Late Medieval Natural Philosophy’, in Was 
ist Philosophie in Mittelalter?/ Qu’ est-ce que la philosophie au moyen âge?/ What is 
Philosophy in the Middle Ages? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für 
Mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’ Étude de la Philosophie 
Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, ed. by Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer, 
Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 26 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), pp. 111-21 (p. 112) and 
Edward Grant, The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages. Their Religious, 
Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
Chapter V. As to the spread of the condemnation to other jurisdictions see Luca Bianchi, 
‘1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?’ in Was ist Philosophie in Mittelalter?/ Qu’ 
est-ce que la philosophie au moyen âge?/ What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages? Akten des 
X. Internationalen Kongresses für Mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale 
pour l’ Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, ed. by Jan A. 
Aertsen and Andreas Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 26 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 
pp. 90-110 (p. 94). Archbishop Robert Kilwardby OP applied them to his province of 
Canterbury, including the universities of Cambridge and Oxford, the following month. 
16 Bianchi, ‘1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?’, p. 96. 
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wherever they dwelt, to the same rulings.17 The Friars Preacher were great 
enthusiasts for Aristotelianism and had avidly embraced the possibilities 
opened by this new philosophy and the commentaries upon it but the Friars 
Minor were considerably more diffident.18 As early as the 1250s, Bonaventure 
had publicly criticised the excessive use of these authors and this wariness 
towards them continued among his successors at the Franciscan school in 
Paris.19 There was for them a basic question of methodology to surmount: 
how can one speak confidently about God if God is not the starting point of 
investigation? The same 1292 chapter that imposed the Parisian 
condemnations of 1277 on all Franciscans also decreed that the friars were 
not to make use of the writings of Thomas Aquinas, because of their heavy 
dependence on Aristotelianism, without using the Correctorium Fratris 
Thomae of the Franciscan William de la Mare to ‘purge’ those texts of 
objectionable material.20 Even more significantly, it was a public declaration 
that the Franciscans had sided with the diocese against the embrace of 
Aristotelianism. 
This is not to be construed as competitive rivalry between the two 
mendicant orders but part of differing reactions to Tempier’s decrees. Among 
the propositions condemned was that a thing’s substance and essence could 
be separated.21 Thomas Aquinas had taught that this was not the case and 
argued, for example, that for the three days in the tomb, Christ was in a sense 
                                                   
17 Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis’, p. 80. The decree was Art. 22 of the General Chapter of 
Paris in 1292. 
18 Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, p. 222. 
19 See page 150 above. 
20 William’s Correctorium is available only through the reconstruction from four responses 
from Aquinas’ Dominican defenders, texts known as the Correctoria ‘Quare’, ‘Sciendum’, 
‘Circa’ and ‘Quaestione’. 
21 ‘Quod substantiae separatae sunt sua essentia, quia in idem est quo est et quod est’. 
Hissette, Énquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris, Article 46, pp. 92-94. 
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lessened as his substance and essence separated with the division of his soul 
and body at death.22 Investigated for breach of the condemnations, Aquinas 
had to then argue that Christ was a special and unique case, due to his dual 
natures.23 In other words, Thomas was pressed to reconceive the agent of 
salvation in his soteriology. 
The Franciscans, by contrast, had been at pains since the writings of 
Alexander of Hales to strengthen and expand the role of the human nature of 
Christ in the work of salvation to balance it better with the dominant role of 
divinity that was the legacy of Anselm’s model.24 While Richard of Middleton 
was not himself accused of transgressing the condemnations, their spectre 
was part of the context in which he was creating his soteriology.  
As Bianchi has noted, the decree did more than just punish those 
teaching unorthodox positions derived from Aristotle.25 It punished those 
who attended class and unwittingly heard erroneous propositions, unless 
they came forward and reported the matter to the bishop or chancellor. In 
other words, it was designed to foster a practice of denunciation of those 
transgressing the condemnations. Bianchi identifies such denunciations as 
but one part of a subtle, but nevertheless pervasive, atmosphere in which 
academics operated in the university. As well as the denunciations, there 
operated also pre-publication censorship, requisitions of books, restrictions 
on teaching and the imposition of doctrine.26 Richard and his colleagues 
wrote, studied and taught in a climate that demonstrated considerable 
                                                   
22 For example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, III. 50. vi and III. 53. iv. Richard 
Schenk, ‘The Soteriology of Thomas Aquinas’, The Dominicans, 1999, 15-21 (p. 17). 
23 Schenk, ‘The Soteriology of Thomas Aquinas’, pp. 18-19. 
24 See page 69 above. 
25 Bianchi, ‘Censure, liberté, et progress intellectual à l’Université de Paris au XIIIe siècle’, p. 
99. 




hostility towards what might be called free-ranging philosophical and 
theological speculation. This had consequences for soteriology. 
The Franciscans did not face a simple choice to side with the bishop or 
the masters, with the hope that they had chosen the winning side. They had 
obligations of obedience to the bishop and against that must be set that they 
had to live and work in the university among its masters who were making 
their own demands of loyalty. It was well within living memory that a failure 
to take the side of the university masters and support them in their conflict 
with the provost and civil authorities of Paris had sparked the secular-
mendicant controversy that had endured for decades and whose embers were 
not yet completely extinguished.27 The Franciscans found themselves 
pressured to accommodate both religious and academic authorities in this 
matter. Beginning his studies as these condemnations were made in 1277, 
these events had a bearing upon Richard as a scholar. The task that Richard 
faced was to write of soteriology without contravening the episcopal decrees 
but yet still to engage with an audience of scholars who more and more had 
come to embrace Aristotle and the lessons of the commentaries upon his 
writings. 
 
7.2  PARIS AT THE ARRIVAL OF RICHARD OF MIDDLETON 
The years preceding Richard’s taking up the post of master in Paris had quite 
a surfeit of controversy around the Franciscans. While the worst of the 
secular-mendicant controversy in the university may have subsided, at 
Richard’s arrival in 1276 the friars had still not yielded to the secular masters 
nor sworn an oath to observe the statutes of the university; what may well be 
                                                   
27 See pages 84-85 above. 
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described as a cold war still existed between the two parties.28 The works of 
figures like Gerard of Borgo San Donnino had already attracted to 
Franciscans no dearth of questions about their orthodoxy due to their toying 
with Joachism.29 The 1270s saw also the first appearance of figures who 
would become later become significant among the Spiritual Franciscans: 
1272 saw Peter of John Olivi enter the order, 1273 Ubertino da Casale and 
1274 Angelo Clareno.30 There was a limit to how frequently the friars could 
display defiance to the various secular and religious authorities.  
Beyond political considerations, Richard’s religious motivations 
should not be discounted, since Francis of Assisi forcefully insisted on the 
obedience friars owed to the clergy.31 Richard was yet a further son of Francis 
that had to strike a balance between what he believed and the Poverello’s 
exhortation to submission to episcopal authority. The ultimate fate of the 
                                                   
28 Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, 3 vols (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1895), I, p. 378-95. See pages 161-65 above. 
29 See page 128 above. It was accusations of Joachism that led to the resignation of the 
Franciscan Minister General, John of Parma, in favour of Bonaventure. 
30 Richard served on the commission formed to investigate the writings of John Olivi. Sharp, 
Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century, p. 212 and Moorman, A History 
of the Franciscan Order, pp. 114, 188. A detailed consideration of the Spiritual movement 
among the Franciscans is beyond the scope of this project but it was a movement, flourishing 
especially in central Italy and southern France, which felt that the observance of the 
Franciscan rule had been compromised by the numerous exceptions, interpretations and 
indults given by the papacy over the years. It wished to return to the ‘spirit’ of the original 
observance and this tended to be marked by greater asceticism and a strong resistance to 
obeying the later papal interpretations of the rule. See further David Burr, The Spiritual 
Franciscans: From Protest to Persecution in the Century after Saint Francis (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), especially pp. 43-44 for the rise of the 
Spirituals in the 1270s. 
31 For example, ‘And if I possessed as much wisdom as Solomon had and I came upon pitiful 
priests of this world, I would not preach contrary to their will in the parishes in which they 
live. And I desire to fear, love, and honour them and all others as my masters. And I do not 
wish to consider sin in them because I discern the Son of God in them and they are my 
masters’, Francis of Assisi, ‘Testament’ in Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, ed. and trans. 
by Regis J. Armstrong, J. A. Wayne Hellman and William J. Short, 3 vols (New York: New 
City Press, 1999), I: The Saint, pp. 124-27 (pp. 124-25). Similarly, ‘Blessed is the servant who 
has faith in the clergy… Woe to those who look down upon them; for even though they be 
sinners, no one should judge them’, Francis of Assisi, ‘Admonitions’ in Francis of Assisi: 
Early Documents, ed. and trans. by Regis J. Armstrong, J. A. Wayne Hellman and William J. 
Short, 3 vols (New York: New City Press, 1999), I: The Saint, pp. 128-37 (p. 136). 
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Spirituals in choosing not to comply with that authority shows just how 
forceful those pressures were.32 
Richard was moved to Paris from England in 1276 amid this turmoil. 
He came probably from the village of Middleton in Northamptonshire.33 He 
joined the English province of the Franciscans at some time no later than 
1267.34 As the statutes pertaining to the theology faculty by the 1280s had 
established that one could not be admitted to the degree of master prior to 
the age of thirty-five, and as Richard was admitted to his degree in 1284, he 
could have been born no later than 1249.35 After some initial studies at the 
Franciscan school in Oxford where he was taught by figures such as William 
of Heddele, Thomas of Bungay, Robert Crouche and John Pecham, Richard 
was sent for study in Paris.36 Wadding records this to have occurred in 1278 
but, as Hocedez has shown, that date is too late for Richard to have 
completed his studies in sufficient time to have taken up a chair, as he did, at 
                                                   
32 A number of the Spirituals were handed to the Inquisition and later put to death while 
others were separated from colleagues and scattered across the provinces of the order. Burr, 
The Spiritual Franciscans, p. 218. 
33 Johannes Trithemius, De Scripturibus Ecclesiasticis (Cologne: Peter Quentel, 1546), p. 
216. Richard’s origins are confused by the existence of another English cleric named Richard 
of Middleton of this same era, who became Lord Chancellor of England under Henry III 
from 1269 to 1272. Their biographies have become muddled at times. For a discussion of the 
various sources for the origins of friar Richard of Middleton, see Hocedez, Richard de 
Middleton, pp. 63-71. 
34 Hocedez, Richard de Middleton, pp. 69-70. 
35 Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I, XX. p. 79. Hocedez, 
Richard de Middleton, p. 64. Alain Boureau, ‘Enseignement et débat dans les ordres 
mendiants du XIIIe siècle: Le Cas des Quodlibeta de Richard de Mediavilla’, in Philosophy 
and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts: Acts of 
the Fifteenth Annual Colloquium of the Société internationale pour l’étude de la philosophie 
médiévale, University of Notre Dame, 8-10 October 2008, ed. by Kent Emery, Jr, William J. 
Courtenay and Stephen M. Metzger, Société internationale pour l’ étude de la philosophie 
médiévale – Rencontres de philosophie médiévale, 15 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), pp. 261–76 
36 D. E. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century (New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1964), pp. 212-14. 
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the end of 1284.37 For this reason, Hocedez’s alternate chronology that has 
Richard travel to Paris in 1276 is to be preferred.38 
In Paris, he came under the influence of Matthew of Aquasparta and 
William de la Ware, both of whom were reading the sentences when Richard 
began his Parisian studies. He composed his own commentary on the Book of 
Sentences between about 1281 and 1283 and then succeeded to the 
Franciscan chair in theology at the University of Paris as regent master in 
1284, or possibly 1285, where he remained until 1287.39  
In keeping with the usual Franciscan custom, after that point Richard 
was reassigned to other works of the order.40 In Richard’s case, he was 
dispatched to the court of Naples to undertake the education of the sons of 
King Charles II. Following the defeat of Charles by the Aragonese in the War 
of the Sicilian Vespers, Charles was in 1288 allowed his freedom upon 
condition that his sons were kept in Aragon as hostages. They were held in 
Barcelona until 1295 and Richard elected to share with them their captivity 
and to continue their education.41 There is an argument to be made that he 
had considerable influence on the princes; the elder, Louis, renounced his 
birth right and became a Franciscan himself and later bishop of Toulouse and 
was canonised in 1317 by John XXII.42 The younger, Robert, succeeded to 
                                                   
37 Luke Wadding, Annales Minorum, ed. by Joseph Mary Fonseca, 20 vols (Quaracchi: 
Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1931-54), V (1934), p. 55. Moorman concurs: John 
Moorman, A History of the Franciscan Order from its Origins to the Year 1517 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 250. Hocedez, Richard de Middleton, p. 70. 
38 Hocedez, Richard de Middleton, pp. 72-75. 
39 There are complications in the dating of his sentence commentary. Richard, as was 
common, later revised his commentary but subsequent editors have confused the two 
versions. For an account of the disentanglement of them, see Hocedez, Richard de 
Middleton, pp. 49-55, 76. 
40 See page 25 above. 
41 Hocedez, Richard de Middleton, pp. 115-18. 
42 Wadding, Annales Minorum,VI (1935), p. 327. Sol Oriens Mundo was the Bull of 
Canonisation, issued 7 April, 1317. 
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Louis’ inheritances and acceded as King of Naples in 1309.43 Following their 
release, Richard found himself back in France where he was elected as 
minister of the Franciscan province there and, like Bonaventure in Rome 
before him, administration seemed to consume his energies thereafter, right 
up to his death on 30 March 1302 in Rheims.44 
 
7.3  THE WRITINGS OF RICHARD 
Plunged amid the tumult of the condemnations from Tempier, Richard 
decided that his stance was to be quite expressly of observing the episcopal 
decrees. Richard is an instance of a scholar explicitly citing from the 1277 
condemnations in his writings to demonstrate his compliance with them.45 
For example, Richard considers whether the universe can be physically 
moved or not by God. The philosophers, drawing on Aristotle’s natural 
philosophy, said that it cannot, as such motion would create a vacuum, while 
the traditional theological response had been that it could, since all things are 
possible to an omnipotent God. Richard answers one aspect of their 
argument thus: 
Alii dicunt quod celum movetur ab intelligentia solo 
imperio voluntatis, sed hoc est falsum. Videmus enim 
quod in motu quo anima movet corpus suum localiter 
est intellectus dirigens, et voluntas imperans et alia 
potentia a voluntate mutum exequens secundum 
imperium voluntatis prout potest. Ita ergo, et in motu 
quo angelus movet celum, non tantummodo est 
                                                   
43 Paul Jacques, ‘Saint Louis d’Anjou, franciscain et évêque de Toulouse’, in Les évêques, les 
clercs et le roi (1250-1300), ed. by M.-H. Vicaire, Cahiers de Fanjeaux, 7 (Toulouse: Privat, 
1972), pp. 59-90 (p. 69). 
44 Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century, p. 212. Richard Cross, 
‘Richard of Middleton’, in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. by Jorge J. E. 
Gracia and Timothy B. Noone, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, 24 (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2003), pp. 573-8 (p. 573). 
45 See, for example, Richard of Middleton, Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, 4 vols 
(Brescia: Vincentium Sabbium, 1591), II, d. 14, a. 1, q. 6 or d. 14, a. 2, qq. 3-4 in which he 
treats of Christ’s knowledge of individuated intellects. 
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intellectus dirigens et voluntas motum imperans, sed 
etiam alia potentia motum exequens secundum 
imperium voluntatis intelligentiae46 prout potest, unde 
hic articulus, scilicet, quod angelus sola voluntate 
movet celum a domino Stephano Episcopo Parisiensis 
et sacrae theologiae doctore excommunicatus est.47 
 
 Not content merely to observe Bishop Tempier’s decrees, Richard 
wishes to be seen as incontestably orthodox and thus he takes the step of 
unashamedly signposting that fact through explicit reference to the 
condemnations. Acts such as this attest to Richard’s strong desire, both for 
himself and his order, to be seen as orthodox and above reproach. It would, 
however, be wrong to account Richard as an unassertive thinker, reticent to 
innovate. 
He composed, aside from his sentence commentary, about eighty 
extant series of quodlibets of which most remain unpublished and, sadly, 
none treated soteriology. They reflect instead Richard’s interests in 
epistemology, cognition and the relationship between the affect and will and, 
intriguingly, his fascination with hypnosis and bioluminescence on both of 
which he appears to have been one of the world’s first specialists.48 Thus, it is 
to the sentence commentary alone that attention must be given in order to 
discover his approach to the topic of salvation. 
That sentence commentary puts forward a cluster of novel questions 
that had not been previously seen among Franciscans, dealing mainly with 
                                                   
46 Sic. Intellectivae is perhaps intended? 
47 ‘Others say that heaven is moved by the intelligence through a simple command of the will 
but this is false. For we see that the spirit which moves its body around is the directive 
intellect, and the commanding will and other powers moved by the will following along, 
according to the direction of the will as they can. Thus, the spirit by which heaven is put in 
motion is not merely the directive intellect and the will ordering motion, but the other 
moving powers as well according to the direction of the intelligent will [‘will of 
understanding’?] as it can hence that article, namely, ‘that a spirit by will alone moves 
heaven’, condemned by Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, and doctor of sacred theology.’ 
Richard of Middleton, Sent. II, d. 14, a. 1, q. 6. The transgressed article in question is 119. 
48 Hocedez, Richard de Middleton, pp. 14-27. 
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the entombed Christ. They look also at Christ’s passion and redemptive work 
and their role and interrelationship in the light of the two wills of Christ. 
Further, Richard does away with the distinctions in the human will of Christ 
introduced by Alexander of Hales and, in lieu, gives a greatly expanded role 
to what he terms Christ’s sensual appetites. 
 
7.4  THE WILLS OF CHRIST 
Richard accepts the standard understanding that there were, in one sense, 
two wills at work in Christ, namely the human and the divine. However, he 
also notes that Aristotle, in this instance arguing scientifically and not 
philosophically, would say that if one speaks of the will as a power, there are 
three: namely the divine will, the will of a rational mind and the sensual 
appetites.49 Having established this, Richard never again speaks of the ‘will of 
a rational mind’ and instead hereafter favours the term of the ‘deliberative 
will of reason’.50  
With this tripartite conception of the will, Richard discarded the 
distinctions that Alexander of Hales had introduced into the will of Christ 
and with which a number of his successors had grappled. This was the 
division of the higher part of the human will into two, the ratio ut ratio and 
the ratio ut natura.51 For Richard, the ‘deliberative will of reason’ is unified 
and, in the case of Christ, was never at variance with the divine will, 
                                                   
49 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 17, a. 1, q. 1. This notion derives from Aristotle, De 
Anima, ed. by David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), III. 2. xlii.  
50 ‘Voluntas rationis deliberativa’. 
51 As to this distinction, see pages 71-76. See also pages 120-23 above for Bonaventure’s 
tepidity towards this idea. 
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apparently always wanting whatever the divine will desired and, likewise, 
desiring these things for reasons of charity, as did the divine will.52 
Respondeo quod in Christo voluntas rationis 
deliberativa numquam in aliquo discordavit a divina 
voluntate, imo concordavit cum ea, et in volito, quia 
volebat quicquid videbat divinam voluntatem velle, et 
in forma volendi,53 quia quicquid volebat, volebat ex 
charitate et sic volebat, sicut Deus volebat eam velle.54 
  
Alexander had placed what was unique to Christ’s humanity in the 
ratio ut natura but Richard opted rather to locate it in the sensual appetites. 
The ingenuity in this, and the reason for it, is perhaps appreciated best by 
hypothetically considering the alternative of a Christ in the absence of these 
sensual appetites.  
It was accepted and received tradition that Christ was both truly God 
and truly human. He was also an individual capable of independent action. 
Since the time of Alexander of Hales, Franciscans had been at pains to ensure 
that the humanity of Christ made its own choices and contributions to the act 
of salvation rather than the ancillary role it had played in Anselm’s model. 
Had that uniquely human role been located not in the sensual appetites but 
in Christ’s human will, Richard would have had a portrayal of Christ in which 
either his wills were in perfectly balanced conflict with each other, wherein 
Christ would be rendered incapable of action as the two wills warred within 
him, or one will subordinated the other, in which case Christ would be 
possessed of only one directive will and no longer truly be both human and 
divine. Employing sensual appetites, Richard permits Christ’s two wills to be 
                                                   
52 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 17, a. 1, qq. 2-4. 
53 Sic. Presumably ‘volenti’. 
54 ‘I reply that in Christ the deliberative will of reason was never on any matter in conflict 
with the divine will, rather it was in agreement with it both in what it desired, since it wanted 
whatever the divine will wished, and in the manner of willing, since whatever it wanted, it 




in that perfect concord needed for action, preserves the authenticity of the 
two natures of Christ and yet still allows for a unique and distinct identity for 
the human Christ that is not shared with his divine nature. He also obviates 
the confusion of a division of the human will where one half was aware of the 
existence of the divine will and the other not, which had been the 
problematic solution of Alexander of Hales.55 In Richard’s abandonment of 
this somewhat artificial division, it can be argued that he improved upon 
what Alexander was attempting to do. The sensual appetites fulfil the role of 
Alexander’s ratio ut natura; a human power within Christ that was not 
shared with divinity. Moreover, being, by definition, more carnal than 
Alexander’s ratio ut natura, the sensual appetites are more suited to fulfilling 
greater engagement with what was specifically fleshly and human in Christ in 
the work of redemption. 
With this portrayal, Richard is able to resolve the long-standing issue 
of why Christ prayed.56 The conundrum had been that if Christ were 
omniscient and so knew the will of God, why then would he pray, since 
knowing the will of God and thus how God would act, he had nothing to gain 
from his prayerful petition? Yet Christ did clearly pray for himself, as in 
Matthew 26: 39, Mark 14: 36, Luke 22: 42. However, the sensual appetites do 
not share this divine knowledge and so can desire to pray. Richard points out 
                                                   
55 See pages 71-76 above. As to the struggles of later Franciscan theologians with this idea of 
Alexander’s, see pages 120-23 above. 
56 One can go back at least as far as Apollinaris of Laodicea in the fourth century for 
consideration of this point: Hélène Grelier, ‘Comment décrire l’humanité du Christe sans 
introduire une quaternité en Dieu? La controverse de Grégoire de Nysse contre Apolinaire de 
Laodicée’, in Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Treatises on Trinitarian Theology and 
Apollinarianism, ed. by Volker Henning Drecoll and Margitta Berghaus (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 




that it is a fitting and meritorious act for the body to desire to pray.57 In fact, 
the prayer from Christ’s agony in the garden Richard describes as being, in 
substance, an act of the sensual appetites and, in form, an act of his human 
will.58  
This solution also handles neatly the issue of how Christ could change 
his mind, an act hard to explain in the case of a being both perfect and 
immutable. Once again, scriptures clearly attest that Christ did so: e.g., Mark 
7: 26-29, John 2:3-7. This was a matter that had grown complicated because 
among Bishop Tempier’s condemnations in 1277 were the following: 
21. Quod a voluntate antiqua non potest novum 
procedere absque transmutatione praecedente. 
22. Quod Deus non potest esse causa novi facti, nec 
potest aliquid de novo producere.59 
 
These are, in the case of the former, a conclusion of Aristotle himself 
and, in the case of the latter, a corollary deriving from that reached by Siger 
of Brabant.60 Proposition 21 is reached by simple reason but the difficulty, 
and the objection to it, arises when this is applied to the concept of a perfect, 
and therefore immutable, God. Since this would lead to the conclusion that 
either the will of God is not omnipotent or that God is mutable, and is thus 
imperfect, Tempier condemned this notion. The latter proposition was 
objectionable on the same grounds as it follows from the former, applied in 
this instance to deeds rather than to the will.61 Had Richard clung to the 
                                                   
57 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 17, a. 2. 
58 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 17, a. 2, q. 3. 
59 ‘21. That from an ancient will a new cannot proceed without change to what went before. 
22. That God cannot be the cause of new deeds nor produce anything new.’ Hissette, Enquête 
sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris, articles 53 and 55. 
60 Aristotle, Physics, trans. by Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), I 
and Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant, p. 163. 
61 It also contradicts the established understanding of the Divine nature as being pure act, 
having no potential. For further discussion on this point, see Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 
articles condamnés à Paris, p. 55, and the other works cited there. 
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traditional sense of the two wills in Christ and wished also to argue, as he had 
done, that these never disagreed, then he would not have been capable of 
explaining how Christ could change his mind without contravening the 
condemnations of 1277, since Christ’s divine will is immutable and Richard 
claimed that his human will was in perfect accord with it.  
Richard solves his problem through use of the sensual appetites. These 
sensual appetites are clearly intrinsic to the human body and are also 
manifestly mutable in nature. Since this change is not a voluntate antiqua, in 
the language of the 1277 decree, by using these sensual appetites Richard can 
explain change in Christ and his desire to pray, can avoid contravening 
Tempier’s decrees and can explain that concord between Christ’s human and 
divine wills which permits his actions. Richard may use an approach 
different from Alexander’s but, like him, he ensures that there is an authentic 
engagement in the work of salvation by the human nature of Christ. His use 
of these sensual appetites arguably gives an even greater, or more easily 
understood, prominence to the place of Christ’s humanity. 
 
7.5  DISTINGUISHING REDEMPTION AND SALVATION 
Resolving the issue of Christ’s will, Richard proceeds in the next distinction 
of his commentary to establish Christ’s ability to earn merit and to do so from 
the time of his conception, both in his manner of life and in his enduring the 
passion.62 Interestingly, Richard introduces a new way of approaching the 
issue of merit at this point. He posits that it was not possible for any of that 
merit to be applied to the glorification of Christ’s soul since in the case of 
Christ, being God, the fullness of glory and the most intimate relationship 
                                                   
62 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 18, a. 1. 
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with God was already his.63 It was possible to apply some merit to the 
glorification of his body, as was done after his resurrection (e.g., Luke, 24: 16; 
John 20: 14; 21: 4; I Corinthians 15: 38-54) but such excess merit as Christ 
did earn was free to be applied elsewhere.64 Richard identifies that this grace 
was applied in two ways: firstly it opened the doors of paradise that had been 
held closed against humanity because of the fall and, secondly, the residue, as 
it were, was applied to humanity as ‘grace freely given’.65 In other words, in 
Richard’s conception there is both an external consequence to the fall that 
Christ’s merit redresses, namely that humanity was barred from attaining the 
reward of paradise, and an internal consequence, in that humans had access 
only to such merit as each had earned individually. Christ’s sacrifice enabled 
access to his ‘grace freely given’ irrespective of a person’s own merits, and to 
the possibility of attaining paradise. 
The importance that Richard assigns to this meriting by Christ, and 
his understanding of soteriology, is demonstrated more clearly by looking 
ahead briefly at the next distinction in the commentary, the nineteenth, 
which he labelled, ‘Hic qualiter a diabolo et a peccato nos redemit per 
mortem’.66 It is significant that, as Richard has arranged matters, he says that 
this is the distinction that sets out a consideration of ‘redemption’, not 
distinction eighteen: ‘Si Christus meruit sibi et nobis, et quid sibi et quid 
                                                   
63 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1. 
64 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 18, a. 2, q. 2. 
65 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3 -4. This ‘grace freely given’ (gratia grata 
faciens) is an ancient but infrequently used notion first championed by John Cassian. John 
Cassian, Collationes Patrum in Thebaide Aegypti Consistentum, ed. by Michael Petschenig, 
Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 13 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2004), XIII. 9 and XV. 1.  
66 ‘Here is the manner he redeemed us from the devil and sin through death’. Richard of 
Middleton, Sent. III, d. 19. 
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nobis’.67 For Richard, there is a difference to be drawn between on the one 
hand undoing the consequences, both internal and external, of the fall, which 
he treats as salvation, and on the other, the liberation from the power of evil, 
which he terms redemption. ‘Salvation’ and ‘redemption’ are not for Richard 
simply interchangeable synonyms but, rather, discrete and different topics 
and the titles he assigns to the distinctions reflect this. In Richard’s mind, 
undoing the consequences of the fall and extending grace to all humanity are 
salvific works, as distinction eighteen establishes, but not redemptive ones, 
as distinction nineteen argues. Such a division is not found in Richard’s 
Franciscan predecessors nor in Anselm.68  
For Richard, one element of Christ’s salvific work opens humanity to a 
richer and more profound experience of God. Inasmuch as Bonaventure had 
held that the incarnation brought humanity to the fullness of its proper 
position in the hierarchy and of its role in the work of creation, there are 
similarities to be found here between the two writers. Yet Richard goes 
further and, much like Matthew of Aquasparta before him, revives an 
ancient, if not Old Testament, understanding of redemption in the sense of a 
ransom for property held that had attracted scant attention from 
Bonaventure or any of the Franciscans yet considered.69 
                                                   
67 ‘If Christ merited for himself and for us, and what he merited for himself and what for us’. 
68 Compare, for example, Anselm, ‘Cur Deus Homo’, Opera Omnia, ed. by Franciscus 
Salesius Schmitt, 6 Vols (Rome: Sansaini et Soc., 1940) II, II. 19; Alexander of Hales, Summa 
Fratris Alexandri, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 3, c. 2 or m. 4, c. 1, a. 2; Eudes Rigaud, Sent. III, d. 18, a. 
3, q. 4; Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 19, a. 1 or Breviloquium IV. 1. 
69 Biblical precedents for this understanding of redemption can be found, for example, in 
Exodus 21: 30, Leviticus 25: 24-32, 48-54 or Numbers 18: 15. It should be noted that 
Bonaventure does, in fact, have one reference in which can be read such an approach to 
redemption, although this is one of the dubia on the Book of Sentences: ‘Ideo Christus, in 
offerendo sanguinem suum Deo, redemit nos a servitute diaboli, peccati et supplicii’. III 
Sent., d. 19, Dubium iv. (‘Thus Christ, in offering his blood to God, redeemed us from 
servitude to the devil, sin and punishment’.) For further on this, see, for example, Rivière, Le 
Dogme de la rédemption au début du moyen âge, p. 302. Also compare the similar 
development by Matthew of Aquasparta in the preceding chapter, on pages 190-91 above. 
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7.6  DIABOLIC POWER 
The manner in which Richard speaks of redemption, even in the light of the 
nineteenth distinction’s title, suggests that Richard is drawing upon a much 
older tradition, predating even Anselm, in which the understanding was that, 
like goods redeemed back from bailment, humanity had to be redeemed from 
a third party through a payment made, namely the death of Christ.70 
Classically, that redemptive payment had often been understood to be owed 
to the devil and certainly Richard seems to hold this, at least in part, although 
he also maintains that this payment serves ‘to free humanity from sin’. 
Confirmation that this is how Richard approaches the question of 
redemption is found in the actual text of this distinction, where he considers 
whether or not humanity had been freed from the power of the devil. 
Respondeo, quod per passionem Christi sumus a 
potestate diabolica liberati. Unde Augustinus IV De 
Trinitate 13: Christus occisus innocens, diabolum iure 
aequissimo superavit, nosque liberavit captivitate facta 
propter peccatum, suo iusto sanguine effuso iniuste, 
quod non est sic intelligendum, quod per passionem 
Christi sit a diabolo ablata totaliter potestas nocendi, et 
tentandi, sed quod per eam potestas detinendi animas 
iustorum nihil habentes purgabile totaliter ab eo est 
ablata et potestas nocendi, et tentandi sibi est restricta 
quod signatum est Apoc. 20 per ligationem diaboli, 
secundum quod patet per glossam ibidem. Per 
passionem etiam Christi virtus nostra multipliciter est 
adiuta, quia per eam gratiae adiutorium nobis 
abundantius infunditur et veritas patet manifestius, et 
angeli nos custodiunt diligentius. Et ideo diabolus non 
ita potest humana corpora violentare, sicut ante. Nec ita 
vehementer potest nos per suas tentationes, ad 
                                                   
70 While such a position can readily be seen in the Pauline epistles (e.g., II Corinthians 4: 4, 
Galatians 4: 9, etc.), the first great expositor of this idea is generally held to be Origen in the 
third century in Origen, De Principiis, ed. by Henri Crouzel, 5 vols, Sources chrétiennes, 252-
53, 268-69, 312 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1978-84), III (1984), III. 2. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, 
The Catechetical Oration of Gregory of Nyssa, ed. by James Srawley, Cambridge Patristic 
Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. 48. For further on this, see John R. 
Sheets, The Theology of the Atonement: Readings in Soteriology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall, 1967), pp. 12-18 and Aulén, Christus Victor, p. 48. 
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peccatum inclinare, nec ita faciliter decipere hominum 
intellectus.71 
 
Richard here shows that he is not in full concord with Bonaventure on 
the working of salvation. Both agree that Christ’s incarnation has salvific 
consequences. Bonaventure accepted that Christ performed further salvific 
acts but argued that these were done not for the sake of satisfying God but for 
the benefit of humanity, to ‘repair, restore and renew’ it. Richard takes a 
different path: he claims that these further acts of Christ beyond the 
incarnation were not directed towards God or humanity but instead toward 
Satan, to free humanity from diabolical power and to restrict the devil’s 
activities and influence in the future. While Bonaventure seeks, through 
Christ’s self-sacrifice, to undo the consequences of sin, Richard gives greater 
attention to the effect of that self-sacrifice on what he sees as the origin of 
that sin, the devil.  
Bonaventure had written of sin as that which disfigures humanity, 
distorting it from how it had been created by God and causing it to occupy a 
place that was not its own in the hierarchy of creation.72 This disfigurement 
                                                   
71 ‘I reply that through Christ’s passion we are freed from devilish power. Hence Augustine 
says in Book IV of De Trinitate 13: “Christ the innocent victim overcame the devil through 
the fairest law, and freed us from the captivity that came about on account of sin, by his just 
blood flowing out for the unjust” but this is not to be understood that, through Christ’s 
passion, the power to harm and to tempt was completely taken away from the devil. But 
through the passion, the power to imprison the souls of the just who have nothing from 
which to be purged, is taken away completely from him and his power to harm and to tempt 
is curtailed, as is indicated through “the bond of the devil” in Apocalypse 20, as is clear in the 
Glossa on the same place. Moreover, through Christ’s passion, our virtue is aided in 
manifold ways since through it the aid of grace is infused in us more abundantly, the truth is 
apparent more clearly and the angels care for us more diligently. And thus the devil cannot 
harm human flesh as previously nor, through his temptations, can he so vehemently bend us 
to sin nor so easily deceive the understanding of humanity’. Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, 
d. 19, a. 1, q. 2. The reference to the gloss is: ‘Sciendum quod similiter in Abraham et aliis 
fidelibus diabolus fuit ligatus in istis praesentibus sed in illis ligavit spes futuri Christi, in 
istis ipse Christus adveniens ligavit’. ‘It should be noted that, likewise, in case of Abraham 
and others of the faithful, the devil was bound in keeping with those matters, but he bound 
in them the hope of Christ yet to be, the coming Christ bound it in his very self’ – Glossa, 
Revelations 20: 2.  
72 See page 114 above. 
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was such that not only did it mar humanity but it prevented humanity from 
enjoying that relationship with God that was proper to it. Impeded in that 
divine relationship, it could not attain without aid the grace necessary for its 
own restoration.73 That aid came from Jesus Christ to ‘repair, restore and 
renew’ humanity. The harm from sin flows from its own nature not some 
external punishment. The figure of the devil scarcely appears in Bonaventure 
and certainly not as a propagator of evil. 
In contrast, for Richard the harm of sin and its sway over humankind 
is much more closely identified with the figure of the devil. Prior to the 
coming of Christ, Richard holds that humanity was subjected to diabolical 
power which extended to holding back even the innocent from the 
attainment of paradise.74 With the shedding of Christ’s blood in the passion, 
this situation changed; the devil’s power abated and his future influence was 
fettered. Although Richard does link this to the pouring out of Christ’s blood, 
nowhere does he expressly state that it is paid to the devil as the price of 
human redemption.75 Richard clarifies his understanding of ‘redeeming’ 
thus: 
Propter peccata nostra iuste permittebant Deus nos 
esse in diaboli servitute; per peccatum etiam eramus 
obligati poenae aeternae et alienati, non a Dei potestate 
cui cuncta subjecta sunt, sed a clara Dei visione ad 
quam familiares admittuntur. Dico quod Christus in 
hoc, quod moriendo vicit diabolum, redemit nos ab eius 
servitute, sicut aliquis sacrifaciens iudici pro culpa 
                                                   
73 See, for example, Bonaventure Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6 or Breviloquium III. 5. 
74 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3. 
75 Earlier authors had argued that due to human sin, humanity had been ‘handed over’ to the 
devil to enjoy as he wished until the coming of Christ, then humanity would be liberated. 
This is not Richard’s notion. John McIntyre, Studies in the Doctrine of the Death of Christ 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1992), pp. 29-32 or Sheets, The Theology of the Atonement, pp. 
14-15. Anselm had not accepted this either and it would seem to have been to disprove this 
notion was part of Anselm’s motivation to compose the Cur Deus Homo. Anselm, Cur Deus 
Homo, Praefatio. See further Richard Southern, Saint Anselm and his Biographer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 94-96. 
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homicidae, redemit illum homicidam a morte. In hoc 
etiam quod summo Patri seipsum moriendo pro nobis 
obtulit sacrificium, quo nos reconciliavit et ianuam ad 
vivendum Deum nobis aperuit, vere dicitur nos 
redemisse quia redimere est illud, quod suum erat vel 
esse debebat, sibi restituere, maxime pretio 
interveniente.76 
 
Note that in this conception of redemption, the sacrifice of Christ is 
not completely efficacious; the devil’s power is merely diminished by the 
shedding of Christ’s blood but not extinguished. This permits Richard to 
explain conveniently the enduring presence of sin and misery in the world 
notwithstanding the redemption by Christ but, frustratingly, he does not 
make entirely clear how or why this power of Satan endures, albeit in a 
weakened form. This contrasts with the answers that he gives to the other 
questions within this article of the commentary. In a truly thorough example 
of the dialectician’s art, he explains how Christ’s passion freed humanity 
from its guilt by considering the effect of it on the formal, efficient, 
dispositive, instrumental and sufficient causes of human guilt.77 Similarly, he 
gives a detailed threefold explanation of how it is that humanity is freed from 
both temporal and eternal punishment for its faults.78  
Despite the lack of explanation for only a partial inhibition of satanic 
power, it is clear that Richard clung tenaciously to the Anselmian idea that a 
sacrifice to the Father on the part of Christ was an essential element in the 
                                                   
76 ‘On account of our sins, God justly permitted us to be in servitude to the devil; and further, 
due to sin, we were bound to eternal punishment and estranged, not from the power of God 
to which all things are subject, but from the bright vision of God to which the beloved are 
admitted. I say that, in dying, he overcame the devil and Christ in this redeemed us from his 
servitude, just as someone making an offering to a judge for the guilt of a murderer redeems 
that murderer from death. In this case, he offered his very self to the Father Most High, by 
which we were reconciled and the door to the living God was opened for us - truly it is said 
that we are redeemed, since this is to redeem: to restore to him that which what was his, or 
ought to be, through a substantial payment as bailment’. Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 
19, a. 2, q. 1.  
77 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1.  
78 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 3-4. 
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attainment of human salvation. This was not so for all his Franciscan 
predecessors. At the forefront of those stands Bonaventure who located the 
key salvific event in the incarnation of Christ, not in Christ’s passion and 
death.79 For Richard, a sacrifice by Christ to make satisfaction to God in 
order to attain human liberty remained an important element in soteriology. 
This does not signify that Richard saw no salvific role for the 
incarnation. Not in the soteriology section of his sentence commentary but in 
earlier distinctions dealing with the incarnation, Richard walks in the 
footsteps of Eudes Rigaud and also considers, ‘Utrum congruum fuisset Dei 
filium incarnari si natura humana permansisset in statu innocentiae’.80 
Richard shows himself to be yet another Franciscan willing to entertain the 
possibility of the incarnation even in the absence of human sin and to find 
some other reason for it. ‘Sine praeiudicio concedi potest, etiam si natura 
humana permansisset in statu innocentia adhuc congruum fuisset Dei filium 
incarnari’.81 As Bonaventure had done in the Hexaëmeron, Richard’s 
reasoning is derived from a reading of I Corinthians 12 in which Paul speaks 
of humanity as members of the mystical body of Christ, with Jesus as its 
head.82 Richard asserts that it would be absurd for God to have created 
humanity as God had done, and yet not provide it with its head unless 
humanity might sin. It would be nonsensical to gift humanity with union to 
the divine only if it did wrong, rewarding humanity with nothing lest it sin. 
                                                   
79 See pages 132-33 above. 
80 ‘Whether it was fitting that the Son of God become incarnate if human nature had 
remained in a state of innocence.’ Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 1, a. 2, q. 4. 
81 ‘Without prejudice, it can be conceded that even if human nature had remained in a state 
of innocence, even so it was fitting that the Son of God become incarnate’. Richard of 
Middleton, Sent. III, d. 1, a. 2, q. 4. 
82 See page 146 above. 
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Richard reasons that thus God must have intended the incarnation from the 
beginning of creation and for reasons independent of the human fall.83 
 
7.7  THE CONGRUITY OF SALVATION FOR GOD 
This does not signify that Richard abandoned Bonaventurian notions of 
salvation entirely. Richard not only accepts this but makes his own addition 
to this approach. 
Congruum fuit naturam humanam reparari et ex parte 
Dei et ex parte hominis. Ex parte Dei, quia in 
reparatione humanae naturae manifestata est Dei 
potentia, quia per hoc patet ipsum omnem defectum 
nostrum per suam potentiam vicisse. Manifestata est 
etiam Dei sapientia, quia per hoc claruit ipsum nullam 
creaturam frustra fecisse. Manifestata est etiam eius 
misericordia, quia per hoc patet ipsum proprii 
plasmatis infirmitatem non despexisse.84 
 
Like Bonaventure, he acknowledges that it was ‘fitting’ that humanity be 
restored but whereas Bonaventure wrote exclusively on how this was 
‘congruus’ for humanity, Richard goes further and points out that it was 
fitting also for God that God do such a thing, in that it enabled the 
manifestation of God’s power, wisdom and mercy. 
In making that claim, Richard is not just adding to what Bonaventure 
had said but, philosophically, straying into areas that Bonaventure had 
studiously shunned. If it is accepted that God is a perfect being and one 
argues that a certain course of action is more fitting to God than some other, 
then it can be said with confidence that God, the perfect being, is bound to 
                                                   
83 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 1, a. 2, q. 4. 
84 ‘It was fitting that human nature be restored both on the part of God and on the part of 
humanity. On the part of God, since in the restoration of human nature the power of God 
was made visible, and because by this it is clear that our every fault has been overcome by his 
power. Also, God’s wisdom was displayed, since through this it made clear that no creature 
was made in vain. Yet further, it showed forth God’s mercy, since through this it is clear that 




choose the more apt course of action and bound to act in a certain way. In 
other words, Richard had arguably posited necessity upon God. Richard, 
conscious of this, creates a new question in his sentence commentary 
specifically to address this: ‘Utrum necessarium fuerit naturam humanam 
reparari’.  
Respondeo quantum ad praesens sufficit, potest 
distingui duplex necessitas, scilicet absoluta et 
conditionata. 
Primo modo non fuit necessarium naturam humanam 
reparari, nec ex parte Dei, nec ex parte humanae 
naturae, quia Deus nihil producit extra se tali 
necessitate, nec reparatio tali necessitate humanae 
debebatur naturae. 
Secundo modo loquendo de necessitate necessarium 
fuit naturam humanam reparari et ex parte Dei et ex 
parte naturae humanae, quia ex praesuppositione 
divinae ordinationis qua Deus ordinaverat naturam 
humanam reparare, necessarium fuit non necessitate 
coactionis, sed immutabilitas, quod eam repararet. Si 
etiam natura humana perventura erat ad suum finem, 
scilicet ad claram Dei visionem, necessarium fuit causa 
reparari, quia aliter ad illam visionem pertingere 
nullatenus potuisset.85 
 
Richard is attempting to assign predictable behaviour to God without 
actually predicating necessity of God. In essence, he argues that if in God’s 
wisdom, God has already ordained a particular end for humanity, then God’s 
unchanging perfection means that God will continue to ordain such an end 
for humanity. Put otherwise, God predictably restores humanity not from 
                                                   
85 ‘Whether there was a necessity that human nature be restored’. ‘I reply that it is enough 
for present purposes, that there can be distinguished a twofold necessity, namely an absolute 
and a conditional. 
In the former, it was not necessary that human nature be restored, neither on the part of God 
nor on the part of human nature, since God for God’s self produces nothing beyond what is 
necessary, and the restoration of human nature ought not to have been so necessary. 
In the latter manner of speaking of necessity, it was necessary that human nature be restored 
both on the part of God and on the part of human nature since it flows from presupposition 
of the divine ordering that God had ordained that human nature be restored. It was 
necessary, not by constraint of necessity but of immutability, that it was restored. For if 
human nature was going to reach its end, namely the brilliant vision of God, for this reason it 
was necessary that it be restored, since otherwise it would not by any means at all have been 
able to reach that vision’. Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 2. 
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strict necessity or obligation but rather as part of the process of carrying out 
what God had already decided to do.86  
It is not an entirely satisfying solution and it is ill-equipped to deal 
with, for example, human free will and Richard is unwilling to go further. He 
concurs with Bonaventure that human nature was to be restored and that 
this was not through Christ’s passion because of some necessity. Any other 
means could have been chosen by God and have been sufficient.87 However, 
Richard distinguishes himself from Bonaventure in the remaining question 
in the soteriological section of his commentary. 
 
7.8  SATISFACTION 
The third question of the twentieth distinction had normally been one that 
examined whether it was Christ who had to make satisfaction for humanity.88 
Richard uniquely alters that question and asks instead, ‘Utrum per 
satisfactionem conveniens fuit naturam humanam reparari’.89 For him the 
focus of the question is not if the restoration should be done through Christ 
but whether satisfaction is the way in which such restoration ought to have 
been brought about.  
Given his line of argument to this point, expecting a substantial 
reliance upon Anselm and an emphasis on the place of satisfaction in 
                                                   
86 Further, God as an atemporal being possessed no potential and is pure act; the result of a 
decision by God to act in a certain way, such as save humanity, is instantaneous. This is so 
even if human beings, as temporal beings, experience that decision as sequential in time. 
Thus for God there is no sequence of events to which God is obliged. This argument is 
developed further in the context of human salvation most famously in John Duns Scotus, 
Opera Omnia, ed. by Commissio Scotistica, 12 Vols (Vatican City: Typis Vaticanis, 2004), X, 
‘Reportatio Parisiensa III, d. 7, q. 4. 
87 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 4. Cf pages 112 ff. above. 
88 For example, ‘Utrum aliquid creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano’, 
‘Whether some other wholly created being was able to make satisfaction for the entire 
human race’, Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3. See page 324 below. 
89 ‘Whether it was fitting that human nature was restored through satisfaction’. Richard of 
Middleton, Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3. 
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salvation is justifiable. Richard makes no less than five references to the Cur 
Deus Homo in the course of his answer. However, the answer that Richard 
gives is much closer to Bonaventure than Anselm and he expressly argues 
against the latter. Richard begins by accepting that human restoration could 
have been achieved by any means of God’s choosing and did not, from 
necessity, have to be through some satisfactory act. Like Bonaventure, he 
believes satisfaction by Christ was merely the most fitting way in which it 
could be done but, unlike Bonaventure, it was not because it was opposite to 
what had occurred in the fall and therefore the best remedy for it.90 Richard 
gives his attention again to the degree to which it was fitting for God so to 
have acted and he holds that satisfaction was the most fitting because it was 
the best manner for God to show forth God’s mercy and justice. Richard 
argues that if ‘all the ways of the Lord are mercy and justice’ then the manner 
which shows these forth best is the most fitting.91 Had God merely restored 
human nature, Richard argues that this would have been merciful but 
without satisfaction it would not have shown justice, since the wrong of the 
fall would have been unexpurgated. Likewise, if only satisfaction had been 
rendered, this would have demonstrated justice but not mercy without 
restoration. The most fitting response is thus restoration attained through 
satisfaction.92 Equally, for humanity, it was the most fitting act for, if it were 
to make satisfaction, nothing could be greater than the offering of that 
perfect man and highpoint of creation, the instance of humanity to whom 
was joined divinity.93 Richard’s genius is to utilise the solution of Anselm, 
                                                   
90 See pages 138-41 above. 
91 Richard alludes to a number of Psalms in which that expression or close cognate appears: 
Psalms 24:5, 84:11, 88:11 and 102:13. 
92 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3. 
93 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3. 
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that humanity ought to make satisfaction but only God can make satisfaction 
and so a God-man is needed, but to clothe it in a distinctly Franciscan 
approach to the issue. Anselm is driven to his answer because of the 
shortcomings of human nature but Richard attains his through a more fitting 
and perfect expression of the divine nature. 
 
Considering Satan in soteriological discussions and revisiting the topic of 
satisfaction can cause Richard to be read as somewhat conservative. 
However, the episcopal decrees of the 1270s, the continuing aftermath of the 
secular-mendicant controversy, the errors of the Joachites and the swelling 
discord around the Spirituals all inclined Richard to give refinement to the 
ideas in his theology that had already passed to him in his training at the 
Grand Couvent. He adds the idea of divine congruity to Bonaventure’s 
notions of how apt salvation is to humanity. Origen’s statement on payment 
to Satan for human liberty is recast as overcoming diabolic power. Alexander 
of Hales championed a role for Christ’s humanity in salvation but it was 
Richard who devised a better explanation of how this occurred. He artfully 
did this while still portraying himself as meticulous in his observance of 
Bishop Tempier’s decrees, thoroughly orthodox and very much the upholder 
of the tradition which he had received. He may appear conservative in his 
thinking but the comprehensive nature of the genre of a sentence 
commentary and the theological continuity that the Franciscan education 
system in Paris fostered all inclined Richard to produce his theology in the 
manner in which he did. 
With all these approaches and traditions, Richard synthesised the new 
soteriological material coming from the Franciscans. Both he and Matthew of 
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Aquasparta wrote during the transition from the Neoplatonism favoured by 
Bonaventure but waning from fashion in the university to the newer interest 
in Aristotelianism. Both authors evidence a desire to hold on to the earlier 
Franciscan insights and, in good scholastic fashion, to blend them with what 
is being acquired through the new Aristotelian approach. Richard’s particular 
gift was to clarify the content of both traditions by distinguishing the ideas of 
redemption and salvation. That simple step achieved two things. Firstly, it 
aligned the Franciscan approach to salvation more closely with the New 
Testament conviction on the place of Christ’s passion in human redemption, 
doing so in a way that Bonaventure with his marginalisation of satisfaction 
had not, and preserved a soteriological role for satisfaction.94 It also kept 
Franciscan teaching in step with the Anselmian tradition being taught 
elsewhere and that still prevailed within the university approach to 
soteriology. Arguably, without the corrective moderation that Richard 
brought, the Bonaventurian impetus on Franciscan teaching would have 
caused it to travel ever further from the mainstream of teaching in the 
university whose theology adhered to Anselm’s theories. Such a state of 
affairs would only have increased suspicion of the friars’ orthodoxy and led in 
time to further storms. Sensitive to this, Richard produced theological texts 
that were capable of being ‘all things to all people’ and satisfy Franciscan 
innovators, vigilant episcopal agents and colleagues in the faculty of 
theology.95 Richard’s teaching anchored the Franciscan tradition, and the 
Franciscan school in Paris, amid the theologically orthodox. The content of 
                                                   
94 For example, Romans 6:4 or 8:2, Philippians 2:30, Hebrews 2:9. For Bonaventure and the 
passion, see p. 133 above. 
95 1 Corinthians 9: 22. 
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Richard’s output in soteriology arose from the Parisian setting and genre of 









8  Roger Marston, Peter Falco and the 
Physical Consequences of the Fall 
 
Roger Marston and Peter Falco, authors of the decade that followed Richard 
of Middleton, continued the process of bridging the Franciscan insights to 
the older tradition they had received. In the case of Roger and Peter, 
however, the older tradition that they received was of the Franciscan 
approach to theology favoured in Oxford, a legacy of Robert Grosseteste. The 
meeting of the Franciscan traditions with this Oxonian influence showed 
itself in their interest in how one might understand the physical effects of the 
fall and the consequences of that for soteriology. Sadly, from neither does a 
sentence commentary survive but their thought is accessible through 
disputed questions and quodlibets.  
These two friars shared obscure origins. Peter’s work has frequently 
been confused with that of other authors and even today there is some doubt 
that he ever existed or, if he did, that he was a Franciscan.1 In the case of 
Roger Marston, we can at least be confident in his existence and in his status 
as an Englishman of the English Franciscan province but further details are 
harder to establish.2  
Tradition has placed Roger’s birthplace in Marston, Oxfordshire.3 
Because of the university statutes governing the minimum age for masters, 
                                                   
1 Alban Heysse, ‘Fr. Pierre de Falco ne peut être identifié avec Guillaume de Falegar, 
OFM', Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 33 (1940), 241-67. 
2 Thomas of Eccleston, De Adventu Fratrum Minorum, ed. by Andrew G. Little, p. 147. 
3 England in the thirteenth century had thirty-two locations called ‘Marston’: Roger Marston, 
Quodlibeta Quatuor, ed. by Gerard F. Etzkorn and Ignatius C. Brady, Bibliotheca 
Franciscana Medii Aevi, 26 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1968), p. 8*. 
Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventurae, Bibliotheca 
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Roger can have been born no later than 1239 but an earlier birth is more 
likely.4 Roger went initially to the provincial studium in Oxford, and was then 
sent on to Paris for further study.5 Uncharacteristically for theologians of this 
era, he provided historians with some personal comments about his time 
there. He notes that he was personally present at a famed disputation in Paris 
involving such prominent figures as Gerard of Abbeville, John Pecham, 
Thomas Aquinas and some two dozen other masters of the university.6 As 
John Pecham became regent master in Paris in October of 1269 and Gerard 
of Abbeville left office in the middle of 1271, Roger must have been present in 
Paris between those dates.7 That dating would mean that he was probably a 
student of Pecham and a fellow pupil with Matthew of Aquasparta. It is 
known that Roger successfully concluded his studies in Paris by 1276, for in 
that year Roger is recorded as being back in Oxford teaching there.8 In 1285 
he took up a post at Cambridge where he stayed until his election as Minister 
Provincial of England in 1292.9 He died in 1303 in Norwich, where his tomb 
survives.  
Three Quaestiones Disputatae have survived, namely Quaestiones De 
Emanatione Aeterna, De Statu Naturae Lapsae and De Anima, as well as 
                                                                                                                                                
Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 7 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 
1932), p. xii. 
4 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, p. 8*. 
5 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae, p. xvi. 
6 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputate de Emanatione Aeterna, p. 116. 
7 Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie, I, p. 329 and P. Grand, ‘Le Quodlibet XIV de 
Gérard d’Abbeville: La Vie de Gérard d’Abbeville’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire 
du moyen âge, 31 (1964), 207-69 (p. 218). 
8 Thomas of Eccleston, De Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam, p. 53. See also Roger 
Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, p. 11*. 
9 François-Marie Henquinet, ‘Descriptio codicis 158 Assisii in Bibliotheca Communali’, 
Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 24 (1931), 91-108 and 215-54 (pp. 229-30). Cf. 
Moorman, A History of the Franciscan Order, p. 251, who says that Roger went first to 
Cambridge and then Oxford. He presumably is relying upon early reasoning of Little, but see 
the latter’s retraction in Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, pp. 93-95. 
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four sets of quodlibetal questions.10 There are three extant manuscripts of the 
De Statu Naturae Lapsae and two of these are accompanied by John 
Pecham’s Quaestiones Disputatae de Peccato Originali, which suggests that 
they had a common origin, most likely Paris where Pecham was then 
master.11 Etzkorn and Brady have noted that the questions De Anima seem to 
have provoked a response from Adam of Lincoln, a Franciscan friar of 
Oxford, who published his own opinion on very similar questions. This has 
prompted them to place those questions from Roger’s time at Oxford.12 In the 
case of De Emanatione Aeterna, the text makes reference to the other two 
sets of disputed questions which would mean that these were the earliest 
composed.13 Thus the sequence of the questions upon which Etzkorn and 
Brady settled was De Statu Naturae Lapsae first, prior to 1276, and probably 
originating in Paris, then De Anima coming later and probably from Oxford 
and finally De Emanatione Aeterna from Roger’s time at either Oxford or 
Cambridge.14  
Of the quodlibets, the earlier two sets survive in two manuscripts both 
including the disputed questions from Roger’s time in England so it would 
seem that the quodlibets are also from his time in England.15 The third and 
fourth set of quodlibets are more confidently identified as having originated 
in Oxford, as all manuscripts of them are included in codices containing 
works of Oxford scholars such as Thomas Sutton and Richard Clive.16 Thus 
Quodlibets I-IV are probably in chronological order and all derive from 
                                                   
10 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae, pp. xxxv-xlii. 
11 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, p. 39* and Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae, 
pp. xxxv-li. 
12 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, p. 39*. 
13 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, pp. 36*-37*. 
14 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, p. 40*. 
15 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, pp. 44*, 69*. 
16 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, p. 45*. 
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Roger’s time teaching in England, and quite probably from his period at 
Oxford.17 
 
8.1  QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE STATU NATURAE LAPSAE 
Thus, Roger’s oldest work to be encountered that pertains to soteriology is 
his Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae, a work of just two 
questions but both relevant to this discussion. He sets out the first question 
thus: 
Postquam quaesitum est de rebus divinis, 
prosequendum est de humanis; et quia totius religionis 
christianae praecipuum fundamentum est lapsus 
humani generis, quia ex eo ponitur Incarnationis 
necessitas, quaesitum fuit utrum sit in nobis aliquis 
defectus veniens per originem. Et haec quaestio duos 
habet articulos. Nam primo probatum fuit quod isti 
defectus, qui sunt in nobis, ut ignorantia et difficultas, 
mortalitas et concupiscentia, non insint nobis ab 
origine vitiosa, sed a creatione. Secundo, dato quod 
tales defectus sint in nobis ab origine, quod non 
habeant rationem culpae.18  
 
Roger’s answer adheres to the now established Franciscan position: there 
was no intrinsic defect in humanity needing the incarnation for its 
‘correction’. Roger does, however, show ingenuity in his new reasoning 
behind these conclusions. 
As well as demonstrating a typically Oxford preference for the use of 
natural philosophy in engaging in theology,19 Roger also discloses a quite 
                                                   
17 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, pp. 45*-6*. 
18 ‘After inquiring of divine matters, it must follow to ask of human matters; and since the 
fall of the human race is the foundation of all religion and especially the Christian religion, 
since the need for the incarnation is posited from this, it had been asked whether there be in 
us some defect coming through our origin. And this question has two articles. Firstly, it is 
discussed whether these defects which are in us as ignorance and hardship, mortality and 
concupiscence, were not ours from the source of wrong-doing but from creation. Secondly, 
given that such defects were in us from our origin, that they are not the reason for our guilt’. 
Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae I, p. 149. 
19 See pages 166-69 above. 
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sophisticated classical education in his answer, employing Plato, Homer and 
even Pythagoras in the course of his reasoning.20 He considers in turn each of 
those four identified ills from the fall. In the case of mortality, Roger notes 
that Providence has endowed all beings with the ability to overcome the 
afflictions of the world: wounds will heal, fevers will break and bones will 
knit, since this is the way of nature. Roger observes that this is not so with 
death and against it there is no protection. This, Roger proposes, is evidence 
that it was not part of nature from its beginning but rather was introduced 
later.21 In the case of concupiscence, Roger again turns to nature and 
observes that our very bodies react to disordered desires. Not only do 
humans feel the displeasure of an offended conscience but the flesh itself 
changes colour, going red with shame, a response it never makes when doing 
good in accordance with divine law and the regular workings of nature. From 
this, Roger again reasons that concupiscence must be foreign to authentic 
human nature.22 
Again, nature is the source for his argument that ignorance too is not 
native to humanity. ‘A parte vero cognitivae sensibilis hoc idem patet, quia 
homo, cum sit dignissima creaturarum, est ceteris animantibus magis hebes 
in sensibus’.23 Roger notes the excellence of the human mind and intellect 
that far exceeds all other beings and yet wonders how it is that humans 
cannot see, hear or smell as much of the world around it as other creatures 
can. This appears to Roger as a disordering of nature and a sign that 
humanity was placed into ignorance after the perfect creation of the world. 
                                                   
20 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae I, p. 155. 
21 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae I, p. 156. 
22 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae I, p. 157. 
23 Roger Marston, ‘On the part of the cognitive senses, this matter is clear, that humanity, 
even though the worthiest of creatures, is duller than other creatures in the senses’. 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae I, p, 159. 
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Finally he considers the matter of hardship. For Roger, there is a clear 
scriptural establishment in Genesis 3: 17-19 of hardship as a later infliction 
upon humanity and not its own from creation.24 He also draws once more 
upon natural philosophy in establishing this, for he observes that animals 
have no trouble in knowing what is necessary for their own well-being but 
that the human mind is frequently ignorant of what is needed and so brings 
hardship upon itself.25 Against the pattern seen elsewhere in nature, 
humanity is observed often to make decisions that are harmful to itself. 
Displaying once again his classical education, Roger notes that even though 
both Plato and Aristotle, and numerous of their disciples, wrote about and 
argued for the existence of but one God, they continued to offer sacrifices to 
the various and multitudinous deities of the Greek pantheon. He even quotes 
Cicero’s observation that ‘[homo] non ut a matre, sed ut a noverca natura 
editum in vitam corpore nudo, fragili et infirmo, animo autem anxio ad 
molestias, humili ad timores, molli ad labores, prono ad libidines in quo 
tamen inesset tamquam obrutus quidam divinus ignis ingenii’.26 Roger 
concludes that this is evidence that hardship is not humanity’s natural state 
and was a later imposed. 
The second half of Roger’s initial question inquires as to the cause of 
culpability in the generations after Adam. Roger concedes that this is a 
                                                   
24 ‘And to Adam he said: Because you have hearkened to the voice of your wife, and have 
eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded you, that you should not eat, cursed is the earth in 
your work: with labour and toil will you eat thereof all the days of your life. Thorns and 
thistles shall it bring forth to you, and you shall eat the herbs of the earth. In the sweat of 
your face shall you eat bread till you return to the earth out of which you were taken: for dust 
you are, and into dust you shall return.’ Genesis 3: 17-19. 
25 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae I, p. 159. 
26 ‘A man is not brought forth into this life by his mother but by nature, his stepmother, in a 
naked, frail and weak body and with a spirit as much subject to anxiety with worries, 
abasement with fears, weakness from labours, susceptibility to lusts as the divine spark of 
genius is overwhelmed’. Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae I, 
160. The quotation is drawn from Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Re Publica, ed. by J. G. F. 
Powell, Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), III. 1. 
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difficult matter and notes that even Augustine struggled to resolve this 
perplexity: if these ills of hardship, ignorance, mortality and concupiscence 
were introduced as a result of the fall, how can it be that later generations 
were visited with the punishment of the fault of some other person from 
centuries earlier? There is much to say of Roger’s approach to original sin but 
for the purposes of understanding his soteriology, it is enough to make the 
following observations. Roger is adamant that guilt lies upon the soul but 
also that each soul is created afresh by God and uniquely infused into each 
new person. To argue that the guilt was transmitted to each new person is to 
claim that God creates imperfect and tainted souls and Roger rejects this. 
Roger also resists a view of the punishment for the fall as some sort of 
congenital defect passed through birth from Adam to his posterity.27 Rather, 
he argues that as a result of the sin of Adam, that first sin subjected the body 
to those ills of ignorance, hardship, concupiscence and mortality. As a result, 
the confounded body makes poor and harmful choices, affecting others in 
turn, inducing them also to sin, just as happened between Eve and Adam. 
Having sinned, these others were then also beset with the four flaws that 
Roger had identified. He maintains that the soul began as perfect but it, too, 
became misshapen and disordered by the effect of those four ills of the body 
in which it is embodied. Misinformed by its deficient senses, befuddled in its 
ignorance and so on under the influence of these ills, the human will was 
obstructed in its desire to do right. The bewildered soul thereby falls into sin 
and offends against what Roger terms the ‘original justice’ of God.28 The soul 
                                                   
27 See, for example, Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae I, p. 
162. 
28 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae I, p. 162-66. It takes 
little extrapolation to see readily how such reasoning could provide fertile soil for Scotus’ 
ideas on both liberation from sin and thus immaculate conception. 
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and its powers begin as perfect but become deceived, confounded and so then 
become misled. 
Roger’s novelty is that he says that sin neither harms nor perverts the 
soul directly. Rather, sin introduces disorder and weakness into the body and 
the body misdirects the soul, making the soul prone to sin. Both for the 
individual concerned and those nearby, there is a cascading chain of 
consequence from that first sin. 
The significance to soteriology in what Roger has expressed here is in 
his conviction that the ongoing ill of the fall flows not from some direct 
punishment from God but from the fourfold elements to marred human 
nature. Any salvation of humanity must, therefore for Roger, redress these 
defects. It is from these that humanity must be rescued and liberated if it is to 
be saved from the effects of the fall. 
 
8.2  PETER FALCO AND THE SOURCE OF HUMAN SUFFERING 
Roger was not alone in pondering the origin of human suffering derived from 
the fall. Peter Falco considered this also during his time in Paris, probably in 
the late 1280s.29 Peter, now generally considered to have been a friar of the 
province of Aquitaine, left only a solitary set of disputed questions and one 
set of quodlibetal questions.30 
Of these, just one question is pertinent to this study: ‘Utrum peccatum 
originale sit in essentia animae vel in potentia ut in subjecto primo?’31 Like 
                                                   
29 William J. Courtenay, ‘A New Witness to a Disputed Question of Petrus de Falco, OMin.: 
Harvard Ms. Lat. 265’, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 103 (2010), 493-96 (p. 493). 
30 Heysse, ‘Fr. Pierre de Falco’, pp. 241-67. His commentary has only fragments copied into 
the commentary of Peter Reginaldetus, a Franciscan theologian of the fifteenth century, 
Stegmüller, Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, I, p. 332. 
31 ‘Whether original sin be in the essence or the potential of the soul in the first subject’. 
Alexandre-Jean Gondras, ‘Pierre de Falco: Quaestiones Disputatae de Quolibet’, Archives 
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Roger, he turned his mind to the issue of the origin of sin so as to understand 
how humanity might be set free from it. Roger held that the punishment of 
sin directly affected only the mind and body but not the soul. The harm to the 
soul was indirect and had to be inflicted individually to each soul as they all 
began in perfection. Peter Falco explored whether the influence of that sin 
was of the essence of the soul, from its very origin, or did the soul possess 
only the possibility of sin, which may or may not arise later? If the former, 
then any salvation must involve a remaking of the soul in some fashion, but if 
the latter, then what is required soteriologically is only a restoration of the 
physical body to its original state. 
As a quodlibet, the list of authorities in Peter’s answer is typically 
brief. Peter gives no authority, arguing that the origin of sin does lie in the 
soul’s essence other than common observation and against the proposition 
he cites only the Retractationes of Augustine.32 His own response, though, is 
very much of the mould of Roger Marston.  
Peter makes use of the philosophical distinction between an event 
having active and proximate causes. Just as the sun is the active source of 
heat but we are actually warmed by the air around us, the proximate cause, 
that has been warmed in turn by the sun. Likewise, he argues, original sin 
was the active cause of the soul’s suffering but what Peter terms the ‘infected 
body’ was the proximate cause of that suffering; sin affected the body which 
                                                                                                                                               
d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 33 (1966), 105-236 (p. 163). This is Part IV, 
Question 1 of the quodlibet.  
32 ‘Peccatum autem quod nusquam est nisi in voluntate, illud praecipue intelligendum est, 
quod justa damnatio consecuta est’. ‘But because sin be nowhere save in the will, it is chiefly 
to be understood that damnation is a just consequence’. Augustine of Hippo, Retractationes, 
ed. by Almut Mutzenbecher, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 57 (Turnhout: Brepols, 
1984), XV. 2. 
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in turn affected the soul.33 This is an argument very close to that of Roger 
Marston. Peter’s addition to what Roger had established is to look closer at 
what was the nature of the change wrought upon the soul through its 
infusion within an ‘infected body’.  
Peter proposes that original sin is the actual cause of a deprivation of 
justice while the proximate cause was concupiscence in the will, the ‘tinder of 
sin’.34 In other words, the fall wrought in humanity a loss of the sense of 
original justice, the right and proper ordering of the cosmos, and this loss 
found expression in humanity’s disordered desires and impaired ability to 
reason and make moral choices. Hence, Peter argues, there is not an array of 
different sins but just one: the human desire for that which is harmful to 
itself.35  
Nec tamen sunt multa peccata, sed unum. Sicut enim in 
pluribus actibus virium inferiorum est unum peccatum 
actuale, quando una numero est inordinatio vel aversio 
in voluntate, ut patet in homicidio vel adulterio, ad 
quae concurrunt actus multarum potentiarum, tamen 
unum peccatum faciunt, quia imperantur ab una 
voluntate, ita in peccato orginali est multiplex 
inordinatio potentiarum inferiorum, tamen unum 
peccatum originale constituunt, in quantum 
conjunguntur uni aversioni habituali voluntatis, scilicet 
carentiae justitiae orginalis.36 
 
From a soteriological perspective, Peter concurs with Roger: human 
salvation requires the healing of the ills of the body so that a soul might be 
                                                   
33 Gondras, ‘Pierre de Falco’, p. 164, being Question IV. 1 of Falco’s quodlibet.  
34 In medieval moral theology, ‘concupiscence’ was understood in the broader sense of 
‘disordered desire’. See, for example, Bonaventure, Breviloquium, III. 5. 
35 Peter Falco, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, IV. 1; Gondras, ‘Pierre de Falco’, pp. 165-66. 
36 ‘For there are not many sins, but one. For just as in the many deeds of lesser people is 
actually one sin, so disorder or distortion in the will is to be reckoned as one in number, as is 
clear in murder or adultery, in which acts many possibilities run together yet make one sin 
since they are ordered by the one will. So in that the original sin is a disordered composite of 
lesser possibilities but making up one original sin, inasmuch as they are joined into one 
habitual disorder of the will, namely the want of original justice’, Peter Falco, Quaestiones 
Quodlibetales, IV. 1; Gondras, ‘Pierre de Falco’, p. 166. 
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freed from the influence of the flawed body and thereby become 
unencumbered and ordered once again to original justice. 
This is not a completely new idea of Peter or Roger and this approach 
to sin had been used by others before them. For example, this same idea had 
been present in the writings of Bonaventure: 
Mirum autem videtur, cum ostensum sit, quod Deus sit 
ita propinquus mentibus nostris, quod tam paucorum 
est in se ipsis primum principium speculari. Sed ratio 
est in promptu, quia mens humana, sollicitudinibus 
distracta, non intrat ad se per memoriam; 
phantasmatibus obnubilata, non redit as se per 
intelligentiam; concupiscentiis illecta, ad se ipsam 
nequaquam revertitur per desiderium suavitatis 
internae et laetitiae spiritualis. Ideo totaliter in his 
sensibilibus iacens, non potest ad se tanquam ad Dei 
imaginem reintrare.37 
 
For Bonaventure, as much as for Peter and Roger, the soul remains the image 
of God and a thing of intrinsic goodness, but it is united to a body corrupted, 
distorted and enfeebled by the effect of sin, and so becomes deceived and 
bewildered. What Peter and Roger do that is new is take this idea and 
integrate it into their soteriology. For them, were these physical ills to be 
lifted, these ‘matters of the senses’ as Bonaventure termed them, then the 
soul could be reset aright and salvifically. 
 
8.3  HUMAN RESTORATION 
Roger goes further once he has identified these ills of the fall. He turns to the 
second and final disputed question in his set to consider human capacity to 
                                                   
37 ‘It seems amazing, when it has been shown that God is so close to our souls, that so few 
should be aware of the First Principle within themselves. But the reason is at hand: because 
the human soul, distracted with worries, does not enter into itself through 
memory; befuddled with phantasms, it does not return back to itself through understanding; 
enticed with wayward desires, it in no way returns to itself through a desire for inner 
sweetness or spiritual joy. Thus, lying completely amongst matters of the senses, it cannot 




be freed from that ill: ‘Supposito lapsu humani generis, quaeritur utrum 
homo possit ex puris naturalibus acquirere rectitudinem voluntatis. Et 
probatum fuit primo quod sic, primo per auctoritatem, secundo per 
rationem’.38 To suggest, as this question does, that humanity was capable of 
re-attaining uprightness of will from its own resources, is at first glance, a 
rather unexpected position. He appears to be very close to the heresy of 
Pelagianism, the belief that people could attain their own salvation without 
divine assistance, a position ultimately condemned at the Council of Ephesus 
in 431.39 
Roger is quite cognisant of the possibility of accusations of 
Pelagianism, for he opens his response to the question thus: 
Circa istam quaestionem aliter delirat haeretica 
pravitas, aliter somniat philosophica vanitas, aliter 
determinat catholica veritas. Nam haeretici Pelagiani, 
Dei gratiam impugnantes, dixerunt quod homo ex puris 
naturalibus potest sibi acquirere perfectam iustitiam et 
mereri Dei gratiam ad facilius implenda praecepta Dei, 
quae potest homo ex naturalibus tantum perfecte 
implere, quamvis difficilius quam opitulante gratia.40 
 
Roger goes on to endorse emphatically the condemnations of Pelagianism by 
Augustine, leaving himself in the curious position that he denies Pelagianism 
yet asserts that humanity can attain rectitudo voluntatis by itself. 
                                                   
38 ‘Given the fall of the human race, it is asked whether humanity could, from its own nature, 
acquire uprightness of will. And it is proven that this is so, firstly by authority and secondly 
by reason’. Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae II, p. 174. 
39 Gerard Bonner, ‘Augustine and Pelagianism’, in Doctrinal Diversity: Varieties of Early 
Christianity, ed. by Everett Ferguson (New York, NY: Garland, 1999), pp. 211-31. Cf pages 
198-99 above. 
40 ‘Heretical perverseness babbles about this question one way and philosophical vanity 
fantasises about it in another and catholic truth determines in yet another way. For the 
Pelagian heretics, assailing God’s grace, say that humanity from its own nature can gain for 
itself perfect justice and merit God’s grace and quite readily fulfil God’s precepts, which 
humanity, by its own nature, can fulfil perfectly however much more difficult it may be than 




Roger takes as his starting point Ecclesiastes 7: 30: ‘Deus condidit 
hominem rectum et ipse se infinitis miscuit quaestionibus’.41 Roger says that 
there was a threefold rectitude originally in humanity: one directed to itself 
that opposed all obliquity, one directed to those beings lesser than itself to 
order them for their better life, and one directed to God that God might be 
loved perfectly. These he identifies, respectively, as the rectitudes of the 
rational soul, of original justice and of grace.42 Roger then proceeds to 
consider the consequence of the fall: 
Igitur homo lapsus in peccatum, quod est carentia 
debitae justitiae, iure aequissimo spoliatus est gratia, 
qua fuit acceptus et proficere potuit, et incurrit Dei 
offensam ut nihil operari posset Deo gratum aut quod 
sibi prodesset ad meritum, nisi prius sanaretur per 
gratiam liberum arbitrium, et sic esset Deo 
reconciliatus homo qui sponte se subdidit miserae 
servituti.43 
 
By this reasoning, Roger argues that the fall impeded the flow of grace, 
which he had already established as being necessary for humanity to enter 
into perfect love of God. Without that grace, and hence the ability to love as it 
should, humanity was unable to enter into its proper relationship with God. 
This argument disposes of Pelagainism but it has other consequences. This 
deficiency in the rectitude of grace affects only humanity’s relationship with 
God, but says nothing of the other two rectitudes. The rectitude of a rational 
soul, which avoids obliquity, flows from human nature but is not dependent 
                                                   
41 ‘God made man right, and he has entangled himself with an infinity of questions.’ The 
Vulgate text actually reads ‘Fecerit Deus hominem rectum et ipse se infinitis miscuerit 
quaestionibus’. 
42 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae II, p. 183. 
43 ‘Thus humanity fallen in sin, which is a lack of that owed to justice, was deprived by a most 
just law of grace, which humanity had received and by which it was able to advance. 
Humanity caused offence to God so that nothing might be done pleasing to God or advance 
itself in merit, unless first it be healed through the grace of free will and so humanity, which 
willingly subjected itself to the misery of servitude, was reconciled to God’. Roger Marston, 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae II, p. 184. 
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upon grace since it derives from the manner in which human beings and 
their souls were created. Likewise it also follows that it is possible for a 
rational human soul to deal justly with fellow human beings and so attain 
‘rectitudo voluntatis’ by itself.44 
The soteriological consequence of Roger’s reasoning is therefore that 
divine intervention is not needed for humanity to avoid obliquity, for that it 
can achieve for itself. Likewise, the rectitude that is directed to lower beings, 
being grounded in original justice, is unaffected by the fall and needs no 
remedy. That which must be restored to humanity is solely that rectitude 
directed towards God ‘secundum perfectissimam caritatem’.45 Grace is 
needed if humanity is to be able to redress its impaired relationship with 
God. 
Considering both parts of this disputed question as a whole, Roger is 
significant for addressing two aspects of fallen humanity, the physical and 
the spiritual. The former, in particular, is an aspect that had been much 
neglected by the Franciscan writers to this point. While Bonaventure had 
indeed written of humanity being ‘repaired, restored and renewed’, it is 
Roger Marston who sets out what it would entail, in a physical sense, to place 
humanity back into the state that it had occupied prior to the fall: a liberation 
from hardship, mortality, ignorance and concupiscence. He brings also a 
specificity to the human nature that is spiritually required in order to be 
‘saved’. Roger acknowledges that there is a great deal that is beneficial for 
humanity that can be done but notes that much of this does not strictly 
require the intervention of the divine. Divine engagement is, however, 
                                                   
44 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae II, pp. 184-6. 
45 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae II, p. 183. 
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essential in the restoration of human rectitude toward God and in the 
reinstatement of the ability, proper to human nature, to love God. 
 
8.4  INCARNATION IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FALL 
These ideas return in Roger’s arguments in his later series of quodlibets. 
These quodlibets were composed in Oxford and, as shall be seen, show 
arguments accommodating an English audience but they also demonstrate 
the influence of the Parisian approach which Roger carried back with him to 
England. Three of these questions pertain to soteriology: 
Quodlibet II, Question 5: Utrum Filius Dei incarnatus 
fuisset, si homo non pecasset? 
Quodlibet II, Question 13: Utrum si Adam restitisset 
primae tentationi, statim fuisset in gratia confirmatus? 
Quodlibet IV, Question 13: Utrum [Christus] nobis 
meruerit vitam in morte vel post?46 
 
Roger’s answer to the first of these questions appears to reflect a 
recurring Franciscan interest in the relationship between the incarnation and 
the after-effects of the human fall, exploring whether the latter brought about 
the former. Despite Roger’s very Anselmian stance to this point, he concludes 
that the incarnation was not contingent of the fall. In doing so, he 
acknowledges that this is contrary to many early patristic authorities:  
‘Sacri doctores antiqui studiose in hanc quaestionem 
laborantes, persuasiones pulchras et plurimas 
adduxerunt quibus conati sunt ostendere Dei Filium 
incarnandum fuisse, lapsu hominis circumscripto’.47  
 
                                                   
46 ‘Whether the Son of God would have become incarnate if humanity had not sinned?’, 
‘Whether, if Adam resisted the first temptation, he would have been confirmed at once in 
grace?’ and ‘Whether [Christ] merited life for us in his death or after?’ Roger Marston, 
Quodlibeta Quatuor, pp. 153, 190 and 392 respectively. 
47 ‘The holy teachers of old, studiously labouring at this question, proposed numerous 
beautiful arguments which attempted to show that the Son of God would have needed to 
become incarnate, simply put, on account of the fall of humanity’. Roger Marston, 
Quodlibeta Quatuor, II. v, p. 154. 
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This does not daunt Roger and he adduces three arguments as to why 
he believes that the incarnation was to happen independently of the fall. The 
first argues from the nature of God: God is the highest good and no greater 
good than God can be imagined and so it follows that, in the act of creating 
the universe, God would create all things as well as God was able and nothing 
would be deprived of some greater good that, according to its nature, it was 
capable of enjoying.48 Yet the highest good of which the universe was capable 
was to enjoy union with its creator and perfection itself, through having the 
Son as part of it in the experience of the God-man. If this be the highest good 
of which the universe is capable, Roger argues that it is irrational for the 
entry of this greater good into the cosmos to be both conditional and to be 
brought about by a deed, the fall, that actually lessens the universe’s 
goodness. Rather, Roger claims, the incarnation must have been intended in 
the very creation of the universe, without reference to any possible fall of 
humanity.49 
His second argument proceeds thus: 
Secundo declaratur idem ex parte perfectionis universi 
et connexionis. Qualiter enim, ne desit pulchritudo 
universi et ne universitas sit imperfecta et minus 
decora, non omittit Deus naturam vermiculi et 
omitteret Christum, universitatis decus maximum? 
Licet enim Christi persona semper fuerit, non tamen 
semper Iesus Christus nominatur, scilicet ante ‘Verbum 
caro factum est’.50  
                                                   
48 Defining God as that greater than which cannot be imagined is some rhetorical adroitness 
on the part of Roger. This is part of Anselm’s own definition of God from his Proslogion 3. 
49 This argument is not Roger’s own and in the course of it he draws quite liberally on the 
work of Grosseteste, De Cessatione Legalium. On the influence of Grosseteste in such topics 
and especially on the Franciscans of England, see Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall and 
the Oxford Tradition of Theology; Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians and 
Michael Robson, ‘Robert Grosseteste, His Memory Among the Greyfriars, his Cult in Lincoln 
Cathedral and the Petition for his Canonisation’, Miscellanea Francescana, 104 (2004), 306-
23. See also pages 166-69 above. 
50 ‘Secondly, it is also proven on the basis of the perfection and wholeness of the universe. 
For how, lest he be missing from the beauty of the universe and the universe be unfinished 




As an argument, this proposition that it would be absurd for a perfect God to 
have made the universe to be imperfect and incomplete is defensible enough. 
However, in the hands of Roger, it is but one premise in a more sophisticated 
philosophical argument he develops. Roger argues that inasmuch as God can 
be said to be the cause of all things, there is a way in which one can speak of 
God as having a role within the universe, but since God’s nature shares 
nothing with the created nature of the cosmos in genus or in species, it 
cannot be said that the universe participates in any unity according to genus. 
Since it lacks that factor of commonality, the universe is deprived, says 
Roger, of a wholeness and unity. If the universe is to possess these, it must do 
so through some means other than unity according to genus. ‘Non est enim 
rationi consonum quod universum, cum sit pulcherrimum et perfectissimum, 
participet unitatem debilissimam, cum perfectio et pulchritudo universi in 
unitate consistat, et maior pulchritudo in maiori unitate’.51 This unity is 
achieved in Christ, whom Roger calls the ‘genus generalissimum’, for 
according to John 1: 3, ‘All things were made by him and without him was 
made nothing that was made’.52 In Christ’s union of natures, there is 
achieved a preservation of God’s role as ‘principium omnium’ but there is 
achieved also a unity with, in and through creation, by means of Christ’s 
participation in that creation. That participation allows the attainment of 
unity and perfection by the cosmos. 
                                                                                                                                               
greatest splendour? For although the person of Christ always was, not so is he always named 
Jesus Christ, that is before “The Word became flesh”.’ Roger, Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, 
II. v, p. 155. 
51 ‘For it is not harmonious with reason that the universe, when it is most beautiful and 
utterly perfect, enjoy a most fragile unity, when the perfection and beauty of the universe 
consist in greater beauty and unity’. Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, II. v, p. 155. 
52 Cf. the Nicene Creed which speaks Christ as him ‘through whom all things were made’. 
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The third argument that Roger presents is based on the nature of the 
adoption of humanity through the Incarnate Word and draws on St Paul’s 
depiction of redeemed humanity as the adoptive children of God.53 In 
arraying the authorities, Roger cites the usual counter-argument that 
humanity’s capacity to be the adoptive children of God must be more than a 
simple matter of conformity of will with Christ but needs something more 
physical also, an actual sharing of something of Christ’s natures. In this way, 
humanity might be freed from death, share in Christ’s divinity and be 
ennobled. If this were to occur, there then would logically need to be the 
human fall to bring about this ‘filiation’ by Christ. Roger response is Oxonian 
in method but unexpected in rejecting such an answer: 
Nam valde videtur magnum inconveniens ut summum 
quod habemus per gratiam, videlicet quod ‘filii Dei 
nominemur et simus’,54 et creatura excellentissima, 
videlicet anima Christi, occasionata sit tantummodo per 
peccatum. Sacramentum etiam matrimonii fuit signum 
coniunctionis Christi et ecclesiae, iuxta illud Apostoli 
Eph. 5: 32; loquens de matrimonio primorum 
parentum, dicit: ‘Sacramentum autem hoc magnum est, 
dico autem quod in Christo et Ecclesia’. Ergo cum hoc 
sacramentum fuerit ante lapsum, aut fuit falsum 
signum, aut necesse fuit Christum incarnari, licet homo 
non peccasset.55 
 
Since marriage was understood as a sign of Christ’s union to his Church, in 
essence Roger is arguing that it must always have intended that Christ come 
in flesh and wed his Church, since otherwise there was no way for Adam and 
                                                   
53 See, for example, Romans 8 and Galatians 4. 
54 1 John 3: 1. 
55 ‘Now this seems greatly inappropriate, that the greatest thing which we can have through 
grace, namely that we “be called and be the sons of God”, and that the most excellent 
creation, namely Christ’s soul, be brought about only through sin. Now the sacrament of 
matrimony was a sign of the union of Christ and the church, just as the Apostle says in 
Ephesians 5: 32. Speaking of the marriage of the first parents he says, “This is a great 
sacrament, and I refer to Christ and the Church”. Therefore, when this sacrament existed 
before the fall, either it was a false sign, or there was a need for Christ to be incarnated, 
although humanity had not yet sinned’. Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, II. v, p. 157. He 
has borrowed this use of marriage from Robert Grosseteste, De Cessatione Legalium, c. 3. 
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Eve to have wed before the fall. Roger concludes that this is evidence that 
Christ’s coming was not contingent upon the fall. Roger does not stop there 
and proceeds then to adduce reasons why the incarnation occurred 
independently of that fall. 
Firstly, Roger points out that although many ancient authorities, 
whom he terms ‘sacri doctores antiqui’, quite rightly had shown that the 
coming of Christ enabled the restoration of the human race, it does not follow 
that this was for them the reason for the incarnation, just a result of it.56 He 
repeats an argument of Matthew of Aquasparta that the fall was not without 
consequence for the incarnation for it affected the nature of the flesh that was 
taken in the incarnation, its passibility or otherwise, but it did not effect the 
certainty of its occurrence.57 
Finally, Roger sets against his ‘sacri doctores antiqui’ a set of newer 
ideas being held more commonly among ‘moderni doctores’: that Christ 
freely assumed flesh so that corrupted humanity might be restored, which 
would suggest that Roger is reckoning the Franciscan authors in soteriology 
among these ‘modern teachers’. Roger enthusiastically sides with them and 
embraces this idea of theirs: 
Et opinionem hanc aestimo magis piam. Plus enim 
movere debet homines miseros ad Deum diligendum 
quod propter ipsos reparandos carnem assumere voluit, 
quam propter aliam quamcumque quid poterit conicere 
rationem. Licet enim Christi incarnationem comitata 
fuerit universi completio, et gradus naturae sublimatio, 
et per gratiam adoptio, non tamen sequitur quod istae 
fuerint incarnationis rationes praecipuae.58 
                                                   
56 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, II. v, p. 158. 
57 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, II. v, p. 158. See pages 181-82 above. 
58 ‘And I consider this opinion much better. For God ought to move wretched humans to the 
love of God more because God chose to take flesh for their restoration, than for some other 
reason or another that God could put together. For although the fulfilment of the universe 
was accompanied by the incarnation of Christ, and sublimation of the order of nature, and 
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It can be seen that Roger sees a number of salvific benefits that flow from the 
coming of Christ: restoration of humanity and a consequent greater love for 
God on humanity’s part, reordering of nature and a fulfilment of the 
universe. These notions had been amassing a considerable Franciscan 
heritage to them by this point, stretching back to Bonaventure. Notably, 
Roger makes all of this attainable in the absence of any sacrifice of Christ or 
the rendering of any satisfaction; as Roger treats the matter, these benefits 
are all attained by the incarnation alone and need, for example, no sacrifice 
upon the cross. This is not because Roger rejected that concept but because 
his argument was largely determined by the genre in which he was writing. 
The question which Roger was answering was concerned with whether the 
incarnation was contingent on human sin and Roger confined himself to this 
topic. Nevertheless, this answer shows that whatever good may have flown 
from the satisfactory acts by Christ at Calvary, Roger believes that the spring 
for soteriological consequences derived from the incarnation alone. 
Roger’s answer here makes clear that he agrees with Matthew of 
Aquasparta: the incarnation of Christ had salvific consequences for humanity 
and that these would have occurred regardless of any triggering sinful act on 
the part of humanity. Roger expressly states that the incarnation was not 
contingent upon those sinful acts. From this, it also follows that the act of 
humanity coming into being was not, for Roger, the completion of the act of 
humanity’s creation. That act was but part of a process that would reach its 
culmination in the union of human nature with divinity in the Incarnate 
                                                                                                                                                
adoption through grace, it does not thus follow that these were the principal causes of the 
incarnation’. Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, II. v, p. 158. 
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Word.59 Roger concurred with a number of the more recent Franciscan 
masters from Paris that to speak of human salvation is to speak of two 
functions: one aspect that brings human creation to its fulfilment and 
completion, an act always pre-ordained, and a second aspect that undoes the 
disfigurement that humanity has wreaked upon itself through sin, an 
intervention elicited by sin and the fall of humanity.60 
 
8.5  IF ADAM HAD RESISTED TEMPTATION 
The next of Roger’s quodlibetal questions with soteriological relevance asks 
whether, if Adam had resisted that first temptation, he would instantly have 
been strengthened in grace.61 The question asks whether the fall and the 
passage of punishment to Adam’s descendants could only have happened at 
that first temptation or whether the fall could have occurred at any point. If 
Adam had been strengthened in grace at that moment, the reasoning ran that 
he could not thereafter have sinned and no fall would have ever occurred; 
Eve and Adam had only to resist that initial temptation in the garden. This 
was the position adopted by Anselm and others such as Hugh of St Victor.62 
If Adam were not strengthened then, it was open to him to sin at the next 
temptation and the fall could have occurred then or at any subsequent point. 
Roger takes a position leaning more to the latter but with reservations. Roger 
is critical, as he had been in the Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae 
Lapsae, of viewing the taint of sin and its consequences as a sort of 
hereditary imperfection passed congenitally to the offspring of Adam. All that 
                                                   
59 Cf Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, XXI. 18 and see page 143 above. 
60 See pages 222-23 above. 
61 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, II. xiii, p. 190. 
62 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I. 19. Hugh of St Victor, De Sacramentis, I. vi. 10. 
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Adam can pass to his descendants, argues Roger, are physical properties, for 
the body engenders the body. As seen above, Roger had previously 
established in De Statu Naturae Lapsae that the physical ills of ignorance, 
mortality, hardship and concupiscence were what passed from Adam to 
subsequent generations. But spiritual matters, grace and strength of soul, are 
all a free matter for God who infuses a soul into flesh that is engendered by 
humanity. Each soul is created afresh and perfect by God, although it may 
later change under the influence of the human experience of sin. Even if, 
Roger reasons, Adam had been strengthened in grace if he had resisted that 
first temptation, it would have made no difference to the descendants of 
Adam who could not, thereby, share in that confirmation of grace.63  
Even though Roger is dealing with a hypothetical situation, since 
Adam did not resist that first temptation, once more he demonstrates that 
there is for Christ an ongoing salvific role in perfecting creation. This was so 
even if Adam had not sinned or if he had received some special grace through 
electing not to sin. Whatever may have happened to Adam’s legacy, that 
legacy would not benefit from Adam’s choice and would remain in need of 
divine aid. Moreover, Roger argues that this need for divine aid would exist 
independently of any further harm that may or may not be done to humanity 
in the fall, as a consequence of Adam’s failure to resist that temptation.64 
 
8.6  THE SALVIFIC ROLE OF CHRIST’S DEATH 
In the final relevant quodlibet, Roger turns to the other end of the life of 
Jesus Christ and considers whether Christ merited life for humanity in his 
                                                   
63 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, II. xiii, p. 192. 
64 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, II. xiii, p. 192. 
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death or afterwards.65 It is a very brief discussion and he deals with it all in 
less than twenty lines, noting that on the one hand, Christ’s death itself was 
seen to be the price to be paid for human salvation but also noting that after 
the death of Jesus, blood and water flowed from his side and that this too had 
been said to be for the benefit of humanity.66 Roger’s answer is sufficiently 
succinct to set forth in full: 
Quamvis minima iniuria illata personae Christi, eo 
quod fuit infinita, suffecisset ad redemptionem generis 
humani, sicut probat Anselmus, Cur Deus Homo, 
solutio tamen pretii facta est in morte Christi, 
secundum quod competebat nostrae infirmitati. Unde 
vere in morte facta est nostra redemptio, a qua morte 
omnia sacramenta designantia efficaciam habuerint. Et 
patet utcumque ad utraque argumenta: nam sanguis ille 
qui fluxit de latere Christi, non praestitit virtutem 
sacramentis, nisi quatenus innitebantur morti sacrae 
Filii Dei, qua sumus perfecte redempti.67 
 
Roger’s reply makes it clear that for him, too, the incarnation is not the sum 
total of the redemptive work of Christ. He firmly states here that it is only 
through Christ’s death that humanity is fully redeemed. He artfully makes 
use of Anselm’s reasoning so that, just as the initial offence against God 
rendered infinite dishonour, so the suffering in Christ’s passion rendered 
infinite satisfaction. Following Matthew of Aquasparta, Roger holds that 
there is still a role for Anselmian notions about salvation but, again following 
him, he believes that these ideas only partially explain salvation.68 For Roger, 
                                                   
65 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, IV. xiii, p. 392. 
66 John 19: 34. 
67 ‘However slight the wound inflicted on Christ’s person, since for him it was infinite, it was 
sufficient for the redemption of the human race just as Anselm proves in Cur Deus Homo, 
and so the payment of the price was made in Christ’s death, by means of which he made up 
for our weakness. Thus truly our redemption was made in his death, from which death every 
sacrament has its designated efficacy. And this is clear for both arguments: for that blood 
which flowed from the side of Christ, is no greater than the virtue of the sacraments, save 
inasmuch as they were supported by the death of the holy Son of God, by whom we were fully 
redeemed’. Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, IV. xiii, p. 392. The reference to Anselm is 
Cur Deus Homo, II. 20. 
68 See pages 186-87 above. 
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the death of Christ serves to pay the price of redemption, to undo human 
weaknesses and to become the source of sacramental power yet, as discussed 
above, there are also the perfective aspects for human salvation, which sees 
humanity brought to its completion and fulfilment, and this derives from the 
incarnation alone.69 
 
It is possible to observe two significant trends in the soteriological work of 
Roger and both are of a unifying nature shaped by the places in which Roger 
was working. The first is that he, rather like Richard Rufus before him, was a 
graduate of Paris and trained in the studium there but his English, and more 
precisely his Oxonian, training also found expression in his writings and he 
manages to bring his learning from both places together. Much of his 
approach to theology had been shaped by his masters in England such as 
John Pecham and Robert Grosseteste. This manifested itself in such interests 
as a consideration of the physical nature and consequence of sin and the fall 
and in his approach these questions with a greater emphasis upon natural 
philosophy than speculative theology. 
The second unifying trend apparent in both Roger and Peter is that 
they further trends that had been apparent in Richard of Middleton and even 
Matthew of Aquasparta. Bonaventure had been a considerable innovator and 
had greatly advanced Franciscan soteriology, and its theology generally, in 
quite novel and fresh directions. Even if he were right in doing so, the 
                                                   
69 The idea of the blood shed by Christ as the wellspring of sacramental power has a long 
tradition behind it. See, for example, Clement of Alexandria, Pedagogus, ed. by Miroslav 
Marcovich and J. C. M. van Windel, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 61 (Leiden: Brill, 
2002), II. 2. xix. 4 or Cyril of Alexandria, De Adoratione et Cultu in Spiritu et Veritate, ed. 
by Jacques Paul Migne, Patrologia Graeca, 68 (Paris: Petit-Montrouge, 1857-1904), III. 101-
3. See also Tom Ravetz, ‘Patristic Theology of the Efficacy of the Eucharist’, Journal for the 




developments in these directions were ones being made by the Franciscans 
alone and they had not truly been embraced by either the wider church or 
even leading theologians in Paris. Propelled by Bonaventure, the Franciscans 
were at risk of going off along unfrequented paths of their own. 
The Franciscans that followed, while at no time repudiating the new 
ideas of Bonaventure, certainly more closely and more explicitly integrated 
into his thought the more established soteriological understanding of other 
authorities. Bonaventure may indeed have woven a new and shiny theological 
cloth but it was friars such as Matthew of Aquasparta, Richard of Middleton 
and now Roger Marston and Peter Falco who took up the task of securely 
sewing that new cloth to that which was already established and had 
preceded it. Franciscan ideas, such as salvation through the completion of 
creation and a non-contingency incarnation, were now joined to a 
reimagined role for satisfaction. This unifying work certainly served to 
temper a surfeit of Franciscan novelty but it also enriched soteriology of the 
thirteenth century generally by more firmly integrating these newer 
Franciscan insights into the tradition. 
Following the Averroïst condemnations of the 1270s, Roger and Peter 
were not willing to set the satisfaction ideas from the soteriology of Anselm 
and the restorative ideas from the soteriology of Bonaventure into opposition 
against each other. Like their post-Bonaventurian confreres, they wished to 
maintain both traditions. For them, Anselm’s idea of the infinite price of 
Christ’s self-offering in his passion and death making satisfaction for the 
offence against divine justice at the fall remains a valid and useful description 
of one aspect of soteriology. Perhaps because of their interest in detailing 
what might be called the psychology of fallen human nature, they articulate 
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more clearly than many of other Franciscans that this work of Christ only 
heals humanity from the weaknesses introduced into human nature by its 
fall: ignorance, hardship, mortality and concupiscence. In other words, the 
passion and death of Christ reverses what had happened to humanity from 
its own actions and not those of God and, secondarily, they provide the 
source of the sacraments to sustain that healed humanity. 
Yet they also adhere to a more Bonaventurian notion that this does not 
exhaust the entire scope of the salvific work of God. Even in the absence of 
the fall, humanity would still have to be renewed, perfected and fulfilled, as 
would all creation, through the union of creator and creatures within the 
bounds of creation when the Word took flesh. They continue this decidedly 
Franciscan approach to soteriology by allocating a salvifically critical role to 
the incarnation that benefits humanity, whether that humanity fell into sin or 
not.  
The stance that they adopted, then, furthers the effort to use the more 
recent innovations of Franciscan soteriology to enhance and expand the 
Anselmian approach to salvation, rather than to supplant it. It can be viewed 
as a harmonisation of the two and enriches each with the advantages of the 
other, the scholastic ideal. Roger and Peter were not the first to have done so 
but they do express a shift in the understanding of what it is to be saved. 
Richard of Middleton and even Matthew of Aquasparta to a degree had 
drawn a distinction in their writings between salvation, the perfection of 
flawed fallen humanity, and redemption, payment of the debt of sin incurred 
at the fall.70 In the case of Roger Marston, there are again two aspects to the 
perfecting of humanity. He, too, reserves use of the term ‘redemption’ to 
                                                   
70 See pages 222-23 above. 
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discussions of Christ’s sacrifice at Calvary as recompense for the offence 
rendered at the fall. Where Roger takes a new position is in the role of the 
incarnation. In Roger’s conception, the incarnation is depicted as always 
going to occur so that the work of creation might be brought to its completion 
and humanity be fulfilled and perfected. If that is so, then it would seem that 
the only ‘salvation’ of humanity is to be from its own incipient creation, an 
occurrence yet to reach its culmination. It is the reasoning of Roger that this 
final stage of the process was already in train when humanity appeared. 
Creation was making its way to its consummation with the entry into it of the 
Creator. For Roger, it follows that there is nothing to be undone nor from 
which humanity must be ‘saved’ but its own inchoate state.  
In that conclusion of Roger’s can be detected the amount of movement 
of not just Franciscan soteriology but also its conviction about human nature. 
In its initial steps with Alexander of Hales, Franciscan soteriology had 
wrestled with how to make adequate recompense to God for the sin of the 
fall, so that humanity might be ‘repaired’ and ‘restored’ to a pre-lapsarian 
state. By the time that Roger Marston and Peter Falco were writing, such 
works of rectification had come to be considered in Franciscan soteriology as 
a coincidental by-product of the true work of salvation. Humanity was 
fundamentally and intrinsically good and unafflicted by a God who 
demanded satisfaction to undo the fall. Salvation was rather to culminate the 
divine work of creation that had but only commenced. Begun in Christ, it 
would move forward to reach completion in Christ. Roger Marston and Peter 
Falco give expression to the belief to which many Franciscans were coming: 
the study of the divine salvation of humanity revealed that humanity was 






9  Conclusion 
 
At the close of the thirteenth century, the Franciscan had managed to create 
for themselves quite a vibrant centre for theological activity in Paris. This 
activity operated in a purpose-built structure, housed one the chairs of the 
faculty of theology, conducted two parallel programmes of instruction to 
meet the needs of the order for both competent lectors in the provinces and 
scholars for the whole order, and it was producing a steady stream of trained 
friars drawn from the best students of the order. They were versed in and by 
the scholastic methods of the day and, on their departure from Paris, these 
friars carried with them back to order’s various provinces what in time 
became a common theological patrimony of ideas, methods and approaches 
of the order.  
The development of this academic activity would have been hard to foresee at 
the order’s origins. In 1223, the Rule of Francis warned the friars against the 
perils of learning and instructed the friars who were unable to read to take no 
care to learn to do so.1 Just seventy years later, the General Constitutions of 
the order prepared at the General Chapter of Paris in 1292 felt obliged to 
place limits on the number and qualifications of friars wishing to take up 
degree courses, in an effort to curb the rush into the universities.2 It was a 
swift and dramatic change for those who in so many other areas were 
punctilious in their observance of their Rule. This was no subtle or half-
hearted change either, for in that seventy years, the Franciscans went from 
                                                   
1 ‘Moneo vero et exhortor in Domino Jesu Christo, ut… non curent nescientes litteras litteras 
discere’. ‘Indeed I warn and exhort in the Lord Jesus Christ that those not knowing letters 
not bother to learn to read’. Regula Bullata, X. 
2 Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis’, Paris 1292, Arts. XI.11 and XX (pp. 77 and 79). 
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the demolition of libraries to the building and filling of them.3 As had 
happened in the case of the Dominicans friars, Franciscan history became 
entwined with that of the rise of universities. In hand with this change in 
attitude to study among the friars there was a corresponding change in how 
they engaged in theology, and the content of their soteriology is a prism 
through which to observe this development. 
To consider adequately that Franciscan theological content, one must 
consider the specific time and setting of their theological activity. More than 
being, in part, created by that specific time and setting, those Franciscan 
conclusions are improperly understood in the absence of a concomitant 
understanding of the historical circumstances from which they sprang and 
which, in turn, they fashioned. For example, Franciscan thinkers worked in a 
university exploiting the learning of Aristotle, while being juridically bound 
by prohibitions of their bishop not to teach many of Aristotle’s conclusions. 
These prohibitions shaped the way in which they did theology, but equally it 
was their own theology that had contributed to this polarisation of attitudes 
to Aristotelianism. Likewise, in the first half of the thirteenth century, the 
Franciscan confronted overt hostility from secular masters to their work in 
the university and this prompted a certain circumspection in Franciscan 
theology for a time but, conversely, the friars also contributed to and shaped 
the work of the university, providing some of its most influential and eminent 
figures.  
                                                   
3 On returning from the Holy Land, St Francis was dismayed to find the brothers in Bologna 
possessing buildings, including a library, and personally tore down the offending structures. 
Thomas of Celano, ‘Desiderio Animae’, Ch XXVIII and XXIX, p. 286. Cf. Bonaventure, 
Legenda Maior, VII. 2. 
267 
 
This process is seen well in Franciscan soteriology, which had 
reached by the close of the thirteenth century a conception of salvation as not 
a rectification but as a culmination of humanity. This understanding had 
been in evolution among them throughout that century and each of the 
authors that has been considered in this present study furthered that process. 
The highpoint and a turning point of that process can be seen in the 
work of Bonaventure. More clearly and explicitly than any Franciscan scholar 
before him, Bonaventure expressed the Franciscan dissatisfaction with the 
Anselmian tradition that had passed to scholars through its incorporation 
into and canonisation within Peter the Lombard’s Book of Sentences. 
Bonaventure argued against satisfaction for the fall as a cause for either the 
incarnation or salvation. Directly counter to Anselm, Bonaventure argued 
that neither penal substitution nor satisfaction had a soteriological 
pertinence to God at all. Rather, satisfaction served only the minor role of 
easing the human sense of guilt for the fall.  
Bonaventure instead argued forcefully that the fall had not resulted 
in some divinely imposed penalty upon a disobedient humanity. Convinced 
of a loving God unwilling to afflict or encumber humanity, Bonaventure 
insisted that the harm of the fall arose from the nature of sin itself and the 
sundering it wrought between God and humanity. Any adverse consequence 
of the fall was one of human making and, for Bonaventure, soteriology was a 
study of how God reaches beyond that breach between God and humanity 
brought about by the fall so as to undo its consequences. Bonaventure came 
to see salvation not as a deed to correct a broken humanity but rather as the 
completion of the act of creating humanity, a work still in progress. It 
enabled humanity to occupy its proper place in the cosmos and to enjoy the 
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relationship with God that was proper to itself. That proper role was to be 
that with which divinity united itself. Hence, for Bonaventure, the great 
salvific act was not Christ’s passion and death upon Calvary, but rather his 
incarnate union with human kind at Bethlehem. 
These were not positions at which Bonaventure arrived 
independently. Alexander of Hales, the first regent master among the 
Franciscans, had his own difficulties with the understanding of salvation that 
was a legacy of Anselm. In particular, Alexander resisted a depiction of 
salvation in which so much, both the penalty of the fall and the release from 
it, was due to the action of divinity. Alexander argued for a distinctly human 
role in soteriology, maintaining that the divine nature by itself was incapable 
of saving humanity. 
Likewise, Eudes Rigaud was dissatisfied with the Anselmian legacy, 
struggling to reconcile it with the biblical tradition. He broadened it to 
explain the erasure of the chirographum, the opening of the doors of paradise 
and the place and role of Christ’s resurrection in human salvation. It is Eudes 
who first among the Franciscans pondered whether the fall was essential to 
bring about the incarnation or whether these two events were independent of 
each other.  
For each of them, Alexander, Eudes and Bonaventure, as well as their 
contemporary, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, the way in which university and 
Franciscan education were operating played a role in shaping their 
theological conclusions. Alexander was not only the founder of an 
institutionalised Franciscan school de facto within the University of Paris but 
also primarily responsible for bringing increased standardisation to 
theological education across the universities of Europe, especially the use of 
269 
 
sentence commentaries. Use of the Book of Sentences gave students training 
in dialectic and scholastic method and a common course of progress through 
systematic theology. It served as a principal means of evaluating a student’s 
fitness to be advanced to the rank of master.  
In the Grand Couvent des Cordeliers, as students considered similar 
questions and material, they naturally exchanged resources and approaches, 
and drew upon the models and solutions of friars who had preceded them, 
including their masters. These scholars lived together, studied together, were 
assigned the same books and heard the same lessons. Obliged to consider 
near identical questions, drawing upon a like array of authorities and reading 
similar conclusions, they tended to produce considerable commonality in 
their writings. They travelled theologically in a similar direction, producing 
works that showed this shared origin. 
In the 1250s, when the first wave of Franciscan sentence 
commentaries were appearing, the Franciscans found themselves embroiled 
in a further eruption of the secular-mendicant controversy. Many secular 
masters objected to what they perceived to be the mendicants making use of 
all the benefits and privileges of the university without submitting to its 
obligations and discipline. Both the Franciscan and Dominican friars found 
themselves labelled as disloyal and lacking concern for the university’s best 
interests. Wishing to deprive the mendicants of their papal exemptions and 
to subject them to university discipline, many secular masters accused them 
of questionable orthodoxy and inadequate training. The mendicants found 
themselves often portrayed as seed beds of error whose curbing would be to 
the benefit of the university and the Church generally. 
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The events of the controversy had consequences for both the friars 
and for their theological activity. Facing such accusations, these first 
generations of Franciscan scholars retreated to defensible terrain. They 
vigorously asserted their conformity to the teachings of Alexander of Hales, 
himself a former secular master and so less readily impeached by his former 
peers. Eudes and Bonaventure make a great show of adhering to his 
instruction and the posthumous composition of the Summa Fratris 
Alexandri can be understood as just such a defensive act by the Franciscans.4 
Likewise, their soteriology stayed within common bounds and this can be 
seen very clearly in the case of Richard Rufus who produced no material of 
his own in Paris but abridged the arguments of Bonaventure. Brought to 
Paris by the events of the secular-mendicant controversy, Richard produced 
there his Abbreviatio Bonaventurae, a work which displays the presence of a 
trend to harmonise thinking among Franciscan educational institutions. The 
controversy caused Richard to be sent to Paris, exposed him to the Parisian 
approach to soteriology and facilitated his diffusion of those ideas among 
other Franciscan schools in England upon his return there. How and where 
he was working shaped what Richard was teaching.  
Richard was not the only author of works spreading this new 
material and even today there remain forty-six extant copies of 
Bonaventure’s sentence commentary dating from the thirteenth century.5 In 
contrast, only a single sentence commentary from the thirteenth century 
                                                   
4 See pages 64-66 above. 
5 Stegmüller, Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, I, pp. 56-67. 
The places to which Bonaventure’s works circulated were as diverse as Alençon, Amiens, 
Angers, Assisi, Auxerre, Barcelona, Bologne, Bruges, Cambridge, Colmar, Cologne, Erfurt, 
Florence, Lincoln, Milan, Modena, Naples, Oxford, Padua, Paris, Rheims, Rome, Todi, 




survives from a Parisian secular master.6 The Franciscans were spreading 
their own commentaries around Europe and the locations of extant 
Franciscan sentence commentaries reproduced in that century are shown in 
Map 1 below, giving some indication of the degree of dissemination of these 
texts.  
By the end of 1257, some level of peace had been achieved in the 
secular-mendicant controversy and the climate had improved between the 
two sides. The main protagonists had left Paris, the papacy had shown itself 
                                                   
6 Chris Schabel, ‘Reshaping the Genre: Literary Trends in Philosophical Theology in the 
Fourteenth Century’, in Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities, ed. by Spencer E. 
Young, Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 36 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 
pp. 51-84 (p. 74). 
Map 1: Destination of complete extant thirteenth century Franciscan sentence commentaries. 
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as a firm protector of the mendicants and there was an end to punitive 
measures in the conflict. That is not to say that the experience was without 
consequence and among them was that the Franciscans showed markedly 
less theological creativity and novelty thereafter. Bonaventure had marked 
the zenith of that early stage of Franciscan theology in the thirteenth century 
and the phase that followed would be marked by a shift to the coadunation of 
that legacy with the more established theological heritage. 
A further reason marking Bonaventure as a turning point in this 
development in Franciscan soteriology is that at the time of his departure 
from Paris in 1257, Aristotelian approaches assumed ever greater importance 
in theology, even among the Franciscans. Throughout the century to that 
point, the long dominance of Neoplatonism in theology and philosophy had 
been yielding to the ideas of Aristotle and the classical, Islamic and Jewish 
interpreters upon his works, such as Averroës and Moses Maimonides. This 
shift was more than a matter of a whole new philosophical system, 
substantial as that change was. The move to Aristotelianism altered the 
relationship between philosophy and theology and demanded of the latter a 
re-expression in new terms of much of what it contained. Theological 
reasoning had thereafter to happen in new ways. The rise of Aristotelianism 
posed the question of the degree to which one could rely in theological 
matters upon the thought and reason of thinkers who had not been guided 
by, in Christian terms, the light of divine truth expressed in the word of 
scripture and Jesus Christ. It was an issue to which Bonaventure turned on 
numerous occasions and wrestling with this issue and its consequences 
became significant for the scholars that followed him. As Aristotelianism 
came to be embraced more widely and approvingly by theologians of the 
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faculty, friars after Bonaventure came to adapt to the new approach. They 
showed greater confidence in the new approach and no Franciscan scholar 
would ever again be so staunch a Neoplatonist as Bonaventure had been. 
More than a philosophical choice, this was also a political matter. 
The bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, had issued in the 1270s a substantial 
array of Aristotelian contentions which he forbade to be taught in the 
university. This set him and many of the Faculty of Arts into conflict and the 
Franciscans found themselves caught up in the clash. The scholars of the 
Grand Couvent could see, notwithstanding the opinion of many friars of 
Bonaventure’s generation and of Bishop Tempier, that this new fashion for 
Aristotelian reasoning was the way of the future. It was popular among 
students, it was where innovation and development in both philosophy and 
theology was occurring and, like many scholars, newer Franciscans students 
could see that they ran the risk of being left behind in irrelevance and 
disconnected from contemporary scholarship if they did not find a way to 
engage with the new theological trends. Tempier’s decrees obliged the 
Franciscans once again to have to make a choice to follow the masters of the 
university or to side with their opponent. The events of the secular-
mendicant controversy seemed about to repeat. 
The Franciscan solution was to present themselves as loyal and 
dutiful adherents to the decrees of Stephen Tempier, while proceeding to 
keep up in fact with the most recent developments in philosophy and 
theology. They explicitly gave effect to the decrees and enacted them but also 
quietly and, with little ruction, they laid aside much of the Neoplatonism so 
favoured by earlier friars. Significantly, figures such as Matthew of 
Aquasparta, Richard of Middleton, Roger Marston and Peter Falco did not 
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abandon the conclusions of Bonaventure, just his method and reasoning for 
reaching them. With those conclusions they favoured the blending of 
established and more mainstream approaches to theology. The result was a 
more comprehensive soteriology that was sufficiently orthodox to satisfy the 
Tempier decrees, to serve the university and to be adequate new and creative 
material to build upon the more recent Franciscan insights.  
Thus Matthew of Aquasparta wrote in his soteriology of a broad array 
of ways in which humanity can be saved. He included in this list a number of 
ideas distinctly Franciscan, such as salvation as the furthering of creation, 
but also more established theological notions. He showed his work to be a 
blend 0f newer ideas with older and trusted traditions. In particular, he 
portrayed the received ideas of Anselm as arguing in favour of the Franciscan 
new directions and reincorporated an Anselmian dimension into Franciscan 
soteriology.  
In like fashion, Richard of Middleton also worked to bring together 
the more recent Franciscan ideas with older traditions. Richard revived 
attention to a soteriological role for Christ’s passion, death and resurrection 
and, refining the ideas of Alexander of Hales, he displaced the latter’s 
division of the upper part of the will with a role for human, sensual appetites. 
Moves such as these served to remove much of the distance between the two 
traditions. Richard drew a far clearer distinction than his Franciscan 
predecessors between the two parts to soteriology: redemption, the 
retrospective element which redressed the consequences of the fall, however 
conceived, and salvation, the prospective element which looked to the 
fulfilment of humanity. Like Matthew of Aquasparta, he faithfully observed 
Tempier’s decrees yet still explored new theological possibilities, including 
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those that sprang from this closer marrying of Franciscan innovation with 
the established theological tradition. 
Roger Marston and Peter Falco engaged in similar unifying work, 
melding the Oxonian interest in natural philosophy and its impact on 
Franciscan theology with the more speculative Parisian approach. The result 
was a broad purview given to Franciscan soteriology that, by the end of the 
thirteenth century, avowed that there was in soteriology both a consequence 
to the fall to be undone and humanity’s nature to be fully realised. 
Such a policy of adhering to the Tempier decrees while still 
advancing Franciscan innovation had its successes. While the Franciscans, in 
soteriology at least, were free to pioneer, write and discuss their new 
approaches, the Dominicans, quite public and explicit enthusiasts for the new 
Aristotelian method, found themselves the subject of numerous 
investigations and censures at the hand of episcopal authorities, hampering 
their work in the universities.7 
Beyond evading censure, this approach also served to bring a greater 
comprehensiveness to Franciscan soteriology and a greater precision about 
the role of the incarnation in the economy of salvation. The Franciscan 
theologians of Paris had been refining that position across the course of the 
thirteenth century. Eudes Rigaud had asked whether the fall of humanity was 
necessary for the incarnation to occur. Bonaventure and Richard Rufus saw a 
distinct salvific role for the incarnation itself, independent of any act that the 
incarnate Son might perform. Matthew of Aquasparta reasoned that 
                                                   
7 Dominicans like Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Lessines were among a number investigated. 
Sara Uckelman, ‘Logic and the Condemnations of 1277’, Journal of Philosophy, 39 (2010), 
201-27 (p. 213). While the Franciscans enjoined the 1277 Tempier decrees upon all members 
of the order, the Dominicans instead took punitive steps against Edward Kilwardy OP, for 




humanity could be and was perfected by the incarnation alone and Richard of 
Middleton concluded that the divine plan for the incarnation of the Word was 
in place before, and independent of, the fall. In like fashion, Roger Marston 
stated expressly that Christ would have become incarnate even without the 
fall. All of them accepted that it was the nature of Christ, the ‘first born of all 
creation’, to have a role to play in bringing humanity to its culmination.8 That 
role would be carried out whether humanity fell or not. Undoing the fall came 
to be seen as a fruit of the incarnation, but not its cause. 
This distinctly Franciscan position was reached in a location, the 
Grand Couvent des Cordeliers in Paris, in which the Franciscans’ best 
scholars came to study and through which the order maintained a steady 
stream of its foremost lectors and teachers to train those scholars. Many of 
these teachers had, in their turn, been students there and so the place also 
possessed a certain continuity of instruction across generations, as students 
were trained and moved on to teaching posts. A number of these would then 
return to teach in Paris, reinforcing this intellectual tradition. 
This place and the content of Franciscan theology played upon each 
other. Because the Franciscans retained the control of their teaching chair in 
a way that was not possible for secular masters, it gave a certain corporate 
institutionalisation to Franciscan theological education in Paris, imparting to 
it a stability of structure and content in its training notwithstanding the 
brevity of term of its regent masters. This caused certain approaches to 
theology to manifest themselves in the way in which Franciscans undertook 
the discipline. Each of the writers that has been considered here showed 
himself reticent to fetter divine sovereignty, consistently avoiding any 
                                                   
8 Colossians 1: 15. 
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predication of necessity upon God. More than a simple agent for human 
salvation, they each concurred in portraying Christ as the medium and 
mediator of that salvation. Each expressed in his own way discontent with 
the received understanding of satisfaction from Anselm and sought a better 
depiction of the working of redemption, especially one that gave a greater 
place to the workings of the human nature of Christ. They each maintained 
the fundamental goodness of humanity and disputed a human nature that 
had been marred and misshapen by God. These were positions to which they 
clung even in the face of pressure from the secular masters and episcopal 
prescriptions, finding a variety of ways to maintain their positions. 
In converse, this theological activity shaped the Franciscan presence in 
Paris. More than just a studium of the order, it was its foremost studium 
generale and it came to be granted privileges beyond all the other houses of 
study, according subsidised tuition for the best of the order’s students, those 
who would be the order’s lectors in the future. The academic theological work 
of the order had its heart not in Assisi nor Rome but in Paris. Those who 
aspired to such theological work congregated in this one friary in Paris and 
there moulded and were moulded by the Franciscan theological activity in 
the Grand Couvent. More than that, in an order constituted so that its 
members did not normally leave their provinces nor meet brothers from 
other provinces, this academic elite in assembled in Paris was a conspicuous 
exception. These were a pool of friars who became known to each other 
despite provincial borders and who also shared experiences and a common 
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formation. It is no marvel that in short order that the Franciscan scholars of 
Paris took control of the order and held it for three centuries.9  
The Franciscans therefore enjoyed a stable location, an institutional 
continuity and permanence, a growth in thought across successive 
generations that built upon the work of earlier friars within the Parisian 
school, a similarity of approach to certain theological issues and produced a 
series of theological conclusions that was identifiably common to them all. 
Put otherwise, they showed all that one would expect of a theological school 
of thought, and were doing so at least by the time of Roger Marston in 1276. 
These features of the Franciscan school and the soteriological 
conclusions that they enabled were in place well before the ‘classical’ 
formulation concerning Christ and salvation made by John Duns Scotus in 
1302, to whom the credit for their creation has long but erroneously been 
attributed. These ideas had been refined a generation earlier among the 
Franciscans of Paris. The existence of a Franciscan school has long been 
presumed, or merged with a Scotist school, but the characteristics of such a 
school have been expressed in only nebulous terms with little rigorous 
examination.10 This present review shows that there was a Franciscan school 
in operation in the thirteenth century and identifies the elements of that 
school evident in Franciscan soteriology.  
By the next century, many of these elements and beliefs became 
commonplace within the order and distinctive features of Franciscan 
theology. These ideas such as the absolute primacy of Christ and the non-
                                                   
9 On the Parisian led overthrow of Elias of Cortona as Minister General, see Şenocak, The 
Poor and the Perfect, pp. 25-75; Brooke, Early Franciscan Government, pp. 137-67. 
10 Leone Veuthey, Scuola francescana: Filosophia, teologia, spiritualità, I Maestri 
francescani, 7 (Rome: Miscellanea francescana, 1996). See especially its introduction by 
Lorenzo de Fonzo, pp. xxxiv-xxxviii. 
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contingent nature of the incarnation were to be points of enduring 
contention and argument between the Franciscans and the secular masters 
and even the Dominicans in the century to follow. The Parisian Franciscans 
of the 1200s set forth the issues for the coming arguments but their fraternal 
heirs were to be the ones to argue and defend them. 
Within the living memory of St Francis, the Friars Minor had grown 
from indigent begging preachers to masters of expansive university schools, 
exceeding those of any secular master. Once preaching simply, in the words 
of the Rule, of ‘vice and virtue, punishment and glory’11, the Franciscans now 
possessed learned masters of philosophy, dialectics, rhetoric and theology 
who were engaged in producing scholarly tracts. This transformation can be 
witnessed in the evolution of their soteriology, which proclaimed a human 
creation that was still being wrought by the creative work of Christ and which 
they integrated with an older tradition of remedying the ills from the fall. All 
this they understood and affirmed as part of creation’s perfecting.  
Est etiam in hoc verbo [caro facto refectio] perfectio 
magnificentiae consummantis et complentis omnia; 
quia figura sphaerica attestur perfectionem in 
corporibus maioris mundi et minoris... Ista figura non 
est in universo completa. Ut autem perfectissima esset 
figura, universitatis linea curvata est in circulum; 
primum enim simpliciter Deus, ultimus in operibus 
mundi homo. Cum ergo Deus factus est homo, Dei 
perfecta sunt opera. Ideo ipse Christus, Deus-homo 
vocatur alpha et omega, id est principium et finis, et 
ideo, quia audistis, quod finis omnium, homo, dicitur 
etiam primus et novissimus… Ut nobilissima omnium 
potentiarum receptivarum, quae erat in humana natura 
plantata, scilicet unibilitas cum divina in unitate 
personae, non esset otiosa, est in actum reductia; per 
hoc autem, dum in actum reducitur, omnis creaturae 
                                                   
11 ‘…vitia et virtutes, poenam et gloriam…’. Regula Bullata, Ch. IX. 
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perfectio ultimatur, et in illo uno tota unitas 
consummatur.12 
                                                   
12 ‘Yet the perfection of splendour in the consummation and fulfilment of all things is in this 
word [made restorative flesh]; for a spherical shape is evidenced by the perfection among the 
greater and lesser bodies of the cosmos... This shapes is not complete within the universe but 
if the shape be utterly perfect, the line of the universe is curved around in a circle; for God is 
simply the first, and humanity is the last among the works of the world. When therefore God 
became human, God’s work was made perfect. Thus, Christ himself, the God-man, is called 
‘alpha and omega’, that is, the beginning and the end, and hence, as you have heard, the end 
of all things, humanity, is thus called the first and last. The noblest of all the recovered 
powers which was given to human nature, namely the ability to be joined in unity with a 
divine person, was not idle but is lead back in that act. By this, as it is lead back in this act, 
the perfection of every creature is realised, and in that single person all unity is brought to 
perfection.’ Bonaventure, ‘In Nativitate Domini, Sermo II’ in Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium 
S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), IX 
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Appendix 1  Comparative Table of Soteriological Discussions in Sentence 
Commentaries 
 




Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall2 
Richard of Middleton 
Cap 
50 
Did Christ merit 
anything for 
himself and for us 
- and what was it 























What did Christ 










merited from the 





From what time 






merited from the 






merited from the 
moment of his 
conception. 





could not be 


















merited in his way 
of life. 




How did Christ 





could merit in love. 
    
                                                   
1 In the case of Alexander of Hales the comparison is with the Summa Fratris Alexandri. 
2 The questions posed and their sequence in the commentary of Richard Rufus of Cornwall are identical to those of Bonaventure save the last four questions in 




Peter the Lombard Alexander of Hales Eudes Rigaud Bonaventure and 
Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 
Richard of Middleton 




How did Christ 
merit through 
action? 
      




How did Christ 
merit through what 





could merit in the 
passion. 




merited in his 
passion. 




merited in his 
impassibility. 
    





Did Christ merit to 
be exalted 
according to his 







    

























merited a glorified 
body. 




merited for himself 








Peter the Lombard Alexander of Hales Eudes Rigaud Bonaventure and 
Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 




was written of 
him: He gave him 
the name that is 







To what degree did 
Christ merit for 
himself the name 






merited the most 
illustrious name. 
    
Cap 
53 
If Christ was 
without any 










suffering was the 
greatest. 
      






sufficient to make 
satisfaction. 
      




merited for himself 
the enjoyment of 






reason for the 
passion and death 
of Christ. 
        
Cap 
55 
How did Christ 
through his death 
redeem us from 























Peter the Lombard Alexander of Hales Eudes Rigaud Bonaventure and 
Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 
Richard of Middleton 
Cap 
56 
Why did God 
become man and 
die? 
        
Cap 
57 
In what way did 







To what degree did 
Christ merit the 
removal of guilt 
universally? 










Whether we were 
freed from all guilt 
through Christ's 
passion. 





To what degree did 










the passion we 
were freed from the 





deletion of the 






Whether we were 




      d19, 
a1, 
q4 
Whether we were 
absolved from the 








merited anything in 
his passion. 
  













the passion we 
were freed from 
punishment. 
  d19, 
a1, 
q4 














Peter the Lombard Alexander of Hales Eudes Rigaud Bonaventure and 
Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 
Richard of Middleton 




the passion we 
were free from 
temptation. 
    
Cap 
58 









passion in Christ 
was according to 
the senses. 
  d16, 
a2, 
q1 
Whether Christ had 
suffered according to 






prayer in the 
passion came from 
his sensual 
appetite. 






passion in Christ 
was according to 
his higher or lower 
reason. 





according to the 







rational will in 
Christ was at 
variance with his 
divine will. 




natural will in 
Christ was at 
variance with his 
deliberative will. 






passion in Christ 
was according to 





wished only to save 






Whether the sorrow 
was more intense in 
the rational or 






sensible appetite in 
Christ was at 






Peter the Lombard Alexander of Hales Eudes Rigaud Bonaventure and 
Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 
Richard of Middleton 
      d17, 
a2, 
q3 
Whether the prayer, 
which Christ prayed 
in his passion, that 
the cup be taken 
away, was from his 





prayed for himself. 
        d17, 
a2, 
q1 
Whether it was 
fitting for Christ to 
pray. 
        d17, 
a2, 
q4 
Whether the prayer 













Whether there were 






were multiple wills 
in Christ. 














will for all sinners 
was fulfilled. 
    







according to what 
is soul and what is 
spirit. 








Peter the Lombard Alexander of Hales Eudes Rigaud Bonaventure and 
Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 
Richard of Middleton 






had all forms of 
bodily suffering. 
      
Cap 
59 
Should it be said 









Whether Christ is 
the mediator in the 
reconciliation to 
God. 
  d19, 
a2, 
q1 
Whether only the 
Son is redeemer or 
Father and Holy 



























According to what 
is Christ said to be 
mediator? 
  d19, 
a2, 
q2 
According to which 







according to his 
human nature. 






How is Christ 
mediator? 




Peter the Lombard Alexander of Hales Eudes Rigaud Bonaventure and 
Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 





By what other 
means was it 
possible to set us 
free? 




nature could or 
should have been 






Whether God could 
have saved the 
human race by some 
other means.* 
  









Whether some other 
true creature was 
able to make 
satisfaction for the 
human race.* 
  
    d20, 
a2, 
q1 








with the aid of grace, 







could have restored 
himself. 











Whether God ought 
to have accepted this 






Whether it was 
fitting that human 





Why was this 
means better? 
  d20, 
a3, 
q1 
Whether it was 







Whether it was more 
fitting that the 
human race be 
restored through 
satisfaction than 





nature could have 
been restored by 
some means other 
than Christ's death. 
  
                                                   
3 Richard Rufus omits this question. 







Peter the Lombard Alexander of Hales Eudes Rigaud Bonaventure and 
Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 
Richard of Middleton 




would have become 
incarnate if 
humanity had not 
sinned. 
    
Cap 
64 
By what right 








effect of the 
removal of the 
Devil's power. 
  d19, 
a1, 
q3 
Whether we were 







Whether we were 
















effect of opening 






opening of the 







merited the opening 






opening of the 





handing over of 
Christ done by 
Judas, God and 
the Jews. 




passion of Christ 
is a work of God 





truth of Christ's 
passion. 
    d20, 
a1, 
q6 
Whether the Father 
gave the Son over 





Was the Word 
separated from 
the soul of the 
flesh in the dead 
Christ? 
    d21, 
a1, 
q1 
Whether the soul of 
Christ was separated 






was separated from 





Peter the Lombard Alexander of Hales Eudes Rigaud Bonaventure and 
Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 
Richard of Middleton 




separated from the 





Whether the Christ's 
divinity was 
separated from the 





was separated from 
the flesh in Christ's 
death. 




soul was rendered 




      d21, 
a2, 
q2 
Whether after that 
separation from 
Christ's flesh he had 
died or after it had 
life. 
  
      d21, 
a2, 
q3 
Whether death is to 
be attributed to the 
Person of the Word 
on account of the 
death of the flesh. 
  
      d22, 
a1, 
q1 
Whether Christ in 






was man in the 
three days of death. 
Cap 
69 
What reason is 
given for Christ's 
death or 
suffering? 








Peter the Lombard Alexander of Hales Eudes Rigaud Bonaventure and 
Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 
Richard of Middleton 
    d20, 
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q4 
Whether it was 







Whether it was 
fitting that human 





Whether it was 
fitting for human 
nature to be 
restored. 




order and union 





Whether the Word 
was united to the 






was united to the 
soul and flesh in a 
twofold union. 




Whether there be 
merit of his own in 
Christ. 
      




How much of the 
necessity of 
Christ’s passion 
was due to a lower 
material or formal 
cause? 
      




How much of the 
necessity of 
Christ’s passion 
was due to a lower 
final cause? 
      




How much of the 
necessity of 
Christ’s passion 
was due to a higher 
efficient cause? 




Peter the Lombard Alexander of Hales Eudes Rigaud Bonaventure and 
Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 
Richard of Middleton 






passion was in 
accord with divine 
justice. 
      






passion was in 
accord with divine 
mercy. 
      
        d20, 
a1, 
q2 
Whether it was 
necessary that the 





Appendix 2  Excerpt from the Commentary of 
Eudes Rigaud on the Book of 
Sentences 
 
There is as yet no published edition of the commentary on the Book of 
Sentences by Eudes Rigaud. The following is provided merely as an aid to 
accessing his text and to complement the material written above. It by no 
means purports to be a critical edition of the text and covers only the 
soteriologically relevant portions of his commentary on Book III of the 
sentences, distinctions 17-20.  
It is based principally upon MS 824 of the Médiathèque de 
l’Agglomération Troyenne, selected for its accessibility, completeness and 
relative legibility. The pagination given below is of that manuscript. In 
cases of doubt, MSS 825 and 1862 of the same collection and MS 208 of the 
Bruges Municipal Library have also been consulted. All of these were 
originally housed in the library of the Abbey of Clairvaux. 
The original spelling has been preserved throughout although the 
substantial abbreviation of the text has been expanded for ease of reading. 
Paragraph breaks as marked in the manuscript have been observed and the 
original paucity of punctuation retained.  
In the transcription that follows, [?] indicates that a word is of 
dubious accuracy and [_] an indecipherable word.  




Distinctio 17: Post praedicta considerari opportet et cetera. 
Articulus 1: Utrum voluntates contrarias fuerunt in Christo? 
Articulus 2: Utrum omnis petitionis eius et voluntas fuerit impleta? 
Articulus 3: Utrum haec petitio transeat et cetera et fuerit voluntatis vel 
rationis? 
Distinctio 18: De merito autem Christi et cetera. 
Articulus 1: Utrum Christus meruit aliquid sibi? 
Articulus 2: Ex quo tempore cepit mereri? 
Articulus 3: Per quid meruit? 
Quaestio 1: Utrum habuit potentiam libero arbitrio ad merendo? 
Quaestio 2: Utrum meruerit in caritate? 
Quaestio 3: Utrum meruerit passione? 
Articulus 4: Quid meruit? 
Quaestio 1: Cuius sit illa exaltationem quem meruit? 
Quaestio 2: De morte quam meruit. 
Quaestio 3: De merito impassibilitatis. 
Quaestio 4: De clarificatione nominis. 
Quaestio 5: Utrum meruit meritum substantiale scilicet gloriam? 
Articulus 5: Utrum illa quod meruit habere sine merito? 
Distinctio 19: Ad quid pati voluit et cetera 
Articulus 1: De aperitione ianuae factam per Christum 
Quaestio 1: Utrum sit facta per passionis meritum? 
Quaestio 2: De verbo Ambrosiano quod addunt Magister baetus 
probationem. 
Quaestio 3: De conclusione quem concludit. 
Articulus 2: De effecto quem est justifcationis. 
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Quaestio 1: Utrum sit efficiens passionis? 
Quaestio 2: Utrum sit efficiens rationis? 
Quaestio 3: Cuius magne proprie? 
Articulus 3: De liberatio potestate diabolica qui est talis efficiens 
Quaestio 1: De liberatione a potestate puniendi. 
Quaestio 2: De liberatione a potestate temptandi. 
Articulus 4: De effectu qui est liberatione a poena. 
Distinctio 20: Si vero quaeritur et cetera 
Articulus 1: Utrum natura humana potuerit vel debuerit aliter liberari 
quam per satisfactionem? 
Articulus 2: De satisfacientem. 
Quaestio 1: Utrum homo posset per se satisfacere quantum ad actuale? 
Quaestio 2: Utrum quantum ad originale? 
Quaestio 3: Utrum angelis potuerit satisfacere? 
Quaestio 4: Utrum decuerit quod Deus purus vel incarnatus 
satisfaceret? 
Articulus 3: De modo satisfaciendi 
Quaestio 1: Utrum congrue per passionem redemerit? 
Quaestio 2: Utrum Deus fuisset incarnatus si homo non fuisset lapsus? 
Quaestio 3: De carnis passionis quas tangit Magister 
 
[fol.213 v. A] Distinctio 17, Articulus 1, Quaestio Unica: Post praedicta 
considerari oportet et cetera. Ad intelligendam huius partis quaeritur utrum 
in Christo fuerint contrarie voluntates. Secundo, utrum omnis petitionem 
eius sine voluntas rationis fuerit exaudita ut impleta. Tertio, utrum huius 
petitionem transeat a me calix iste et cetera. Fuerit sensibilitas aut rationis.  
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Circa primum sit Augustinus super genere. Ad litteram dicit quod 
omnia alia fuerit parata in archa Noë id est omnes sensuales motus in Christo 
ergo in illius motus sensualitatis ibat in congruum rationem ergo non fuit in 
Christo voluntas congruetas. 
Item sensibilitas erat subjecta rationi aut rebellis si rebellis ergo in 
Christo caro concupiscebat ad usus spiritu, quod factum est fuit ergo subjecta 
ergo nichil volebat contra rationem ergo in Christo non fuit congruitas 
voluntatum. 
Contra: voluntas humana per fragilitatem carnis recusabat passionem 
sed voluntas divina parumper[?] erat perficere dispositionemm ergo videtur 
quod in ea voluntas divina congruitur humane et aequo quaeritur etiam quid 
appelletur ibi voluntas humana quare si non erat confortes divinem videtur 
fuisse inordinata. 
Item sicut dixit Augustinus de tertium voluntates, sunt congrue quae 
sunt congruarum sed voluntas rationis erat ad moriendo sensualitatis ad non 
moriendo ergo in eo erat congruitas voluntatum. 
Item sensualitas volebat unire et contra mori. 
Item ratio volebat hoc ut nostra aut ergo motus ille ordinatur autem 
inordinatus si inordinatus non ergo omnia fuerunt pacatum Christo. Si 
ordinatus ergo placebat rationi cui placet omne bonum ergo ratio 
conformatur illi sed voluntas divina volebat congruum ergo in Christo fuit 
congruitas voluntatis rationalis ad divinam. 
Respondeo dicendum quod in Christo fuerit divinas voluntates sed 
non congrue diversitas aut voluntatum consuerat quam dupliciter distingui 
primo sicut in Christo ratione nostra distingui voluntas divina et voluntas 
humana. Rursum humana distingui in voluntatem rationem parte vel capitis 
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et ratione membrorum. Rursum voluntas capitis distinguitur in voluntatem 
rationis et sensualitas rursum voluntas rationis distinguitur in voluntatem 
rationis ut rationis et ut nec contingit [_] Christum velle diversa et opposito 
sed diversas voluntates ne tamen voluntates sunt congrue per quid quare 
congruetas est igitur eiusdem. Secundo quia si congruitas est in voluntate 
tamen confortas in ratione volendi nam sensualitas in Christo nec omnino 
voluit nec quod ratio voluit eam velle.  
Ad aliud quod primo obiicitur per voluntas humana recusabat mori 
dicendum quod voluntas humana vocantur ibi voluntas sensualitas sive 
rationis ut nec quod recusabat mori nec tamen congruebatur diem quod 
divina volebat eam sic velle. 
Ad aliud quod omnia quod voluntates sunt congrue quod volita. 
Respondetur unde dupliciter, primo quod hoc intelligitur de congruitate 
volitorum in genere moris quam necesse est altum esse malum non aut de 
congruitate in genere nec qui utique pars post unum appeti hoc est 
congruitas quod genere scilicet vivere et mori quorum utique bonum ut aliter 
intelligitur hoc quod idem genus voluntatis quia sit dictum est congruetas est 
respectu eiusdem liberum arbitrium enim intingo et [_] non congruant.  
Ad illud quod obiicit tercio utrum ille motus sensualitas esset 
ordinatus dicendum quod erat ordinatus in quam erat illius vis quam non 
tenebatur conforti voluntati divino uno ratio consentiebat et volebat quod ita 
appeteret sed tam rationem appetebat illo inquisitum ratio sic enim portaret 
tam ipsa teneatur in quam unum ratio inhabens quod Deum velle conforte se 
voluntati divinae voluntas a nullis astingitur ut conformet in volito sed de 




Articulus 2, Quaestio Unica: Secundum quaeritur utrum omnis petitio 
eius sit exaudita et in quod sic Heb 5 exauditus est in omnibus per sua 
reverenitur.  
Item pars voluntate labiorum eis non fraudasti eum ergo quicquid ore 
petat exauditum est.  
Item pars impleat dominus omnis peccatores tuas. 
Item ratione sic ipse in omnibus peciat pie et inste et quod petendus 
erat ergo in omnibus fuit exauditus. 
Item ipse erat summus sacerdos sanctus innocens et in pollutus sit 
Heb 9 ergo debuit in omnibus in impetrare quoque voluit.  
Contra: Deus meus inquit clamabo per diem et non 
[fol.213.v.B]exaudies.  
Item petivit1 calicem tulire a se non tunc fuit exauditus sicut habetur 
in littera non ergo fuit exauditus in omni peccatonem2 sua.  
Item quae utrum omnis voluntas eis omnis fuerit impleta et loquor de 
voluntate rationis et utrum quod sit quia illa fuit per omnia conformis 
voluntati divinae.  
Contra Luc 19 vidit Jesum et flevit ergo si fletus non fuit falsus volebat 
illud voluntate interiori sed illa voluntas cum esset respectu fuit non potuit 
esse sensualitas fuit ergo rationis et tamen non fuit impleta ergo et cetera.  
Ad primum dicendum quod quicquid petit peccatorem rationis fuit 
exauditus sicut ostendunt rationes prime illud ergo primus mellius de 
membris tercio de calice fuit sensualitas tamen et de illa fuit exauditus quod 
forma verborum quia petit conditionaliter? 





Ad aliud dicendum quod quicquid voluit voluntate rationis utrum 
ratio est loquendo de voluntate absoluta impletum est sed voluntas quia 
compatiebatur non fuit absoluta sed conditionale sine velleitas. Hugo aut 
distingueret in Christo voluntate quadrupliciter scilicet dicatis rationis 
pietatis et sensualitas duas primas semper dicit fuisse impletas duas ultimas 
non et voluntas qua flevit fuit voluntas pietatis et hoc in idem redit. Hoc aut 
voluntas pietas rationis est quia in solis hominibus reperitur et hoc est quod 
dixit Hugo in Christo fuit voluntas dicatis voluntas rationis et voluntas 
pietatis et voluntas carnis. Voluntas dicatis per iustitiam servitiam dictabat. 
Voluntas rationis per virtutem per obedientiam [_]. Voluntas pietatis per 
compassionem in alieno malo suspirabat. Voluntas carnis per compassionem 
in malo propositio in [_]. Hoc aut voluntas pietas ut dictum est id est quod 
velleitas.  
 
Articulus 3, Quaestio Unica: Tercio quaeritur utrum illa petitionem fuit 
rationis aut sensualitatis et videtur quod rationis quia sicut dicit dictum 
oratio est alius intellegenter in Deum ergo partis intelligenter sine rationis 
est orare non ergo sensualitatis. Ergo illa oratio fuit rationis non 
sensualitatis.  
Item oratio est pius interioris affectus in Deum directus sed 
sensualitas non dirigitur in Deum ergo sensualitas non est orare sine petere 
peccato ergo illa fuit non sensualitas sed rationis.  
Item solius rationis est conferre non sensualitas sed illa peccato fuit 
cum collationem cum dixit non mea voluntas et cetera. Ergo fuit rationis et 
non sensualitatis. 
Contra magister dixit in littera quod fuit sensualitas.  
336  
 
Item nullius petit congruum est quod ultis facere si Christo quod 
rationem volebat viverem calicem ergo quod rationem non petebat calicem 
tulere. 
Respondeo quod petitio illa fuit rationis et sensualitatis sed 
sensualitatis ut monentis sive per quo rationis ut proponita tamquam 
advocati et quia advocatus format libellum quod iudicium suum ratio faciunt 
illam petitionem sub condigne debita et sic patet respondendum ad tam 
prima objecta.  
Ad illud aut quod quia quaeritur rationem petit hoc cum nominibus[?] 
hoc et sciret se non exaudiri dicendum quod petitionem illam expressit 
duplici rationes prima est ut ostendetur se timere ex parte sensualitatis ut 
martyres timentes non desperarentur secundam rationem est quam quis 
licitum fit secundam sensualitatem velle quod Deus non vult non Deus 
rationem ipsam sequi sed liberationem se voluntati divinae.  
 
Distinctio 18, Articulus 1, Quaestio Unica: De merito autem Christi et 
cetera.  
Ad intelligentiam huius partis quaeritur de merito Christi quo meruit scilicet 
hoc primo quaeritur utrum Christus meruerit aliquid. Dato quod secundo ex 
quo tempore cepit mereri utrum ab instanti conceptionis. Tertio quaeritur 
per quod meruit et quarto quid meruit. Quinto utrum illa quod meruit potuit 
habere sine merito nam hoc omnia tanguntur in littera primo igitur quaeritur 
utrum Christo meruit ad quod secundo videtur quia hoc dicit Magister in 
littera. 
Item Augustinus claritas est meritum dari humanitas est primum vult 
igitur quod meruit humiliando se pari ratione et in aliis operibus. 
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Eph 2 humiliavit et cetera. Propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum. 
Propter hoc non potest dicere merito ergo Christus meruit.  
Item in libro De Regulis Fidei mereri apud Deum quod nulla 
necessitate compassionis libentis facit Deus quod facere debet sed Christus 
obediebat per omnia libentis et hoc decebat facere inquam homo ergo 
merebatur.  
Contra: mereri est de indebito facere debitum quia sicut dicit 
Augustinus illud meretur quis quod ex debito ei redditur sicut dicit Apostolus 
2 Thes ultimo de reliquo reporta est in corona justitiae sed Christus ab 
instanti conceptionis fuit dignus omnia gratia ergo erat ei non debitum ergo 
nichil meruit.  
Item quoque meretur perficit in melius sed Christus non potuit 
perficere sicut dicit Gregorius et habetur scilicet sicut non habuit omnino quo 
potuisse ergo Christus non potuit mereri. 
Hilarius dicit et habetur ultimo dicitur praecedentis quod Christus 
non sibi oravit sed suis ergo pari ratione non meruit sibi sed suis.  
Item Christus statim ab instanti conceptionis fuit in statu 
comprehensoris sine beatudine sed illuc [fol.214.r.A] taliter meretur necesse 
est in statu merendi ergo Christus nichil meruit in quam viatorum inest in 
quam comprehensore. 
Contra caritate illud ratione cuius attenditur meritum sed caritas est 
in anima quantum ad inferiorem partem contra sit infinens ergo caritas erit 
in quam comprehensorum quod aut quod comprehensorum non merebatur 
ergo simpliciter non merebatur. 
Respondeo dicendum quod ista aperio quod dixit quod Christus 
solemniter membris et non sibi est abolita est sicut enim dicit Magister 
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tenetur quod ad sibi meruit ut mortalitatem corporis impassibilitatem in 
anima et rationis manifestationem sive exaltationem. 
 
Articulus 2, Quaestio Unica: Ad intelligiam praedictorum notandum 
quod mereri Magister primo modo in praepare sive interpretative post 
existens in mortali peccato facit bonum sed mala intentionem quare Deus 
reverbuit ei magise quem faciat et ideo mereri dicitur id est interpretatur ac 
si meruisset. 
Secondo Magister dicitur alias mereri de congrue sicut existens in 
mortali facit bonum in genere intentionem bona talis dicitur mereri gratiam 
de congruo.  
Tercio modo dicitur mereri proprie de indebito facere debitum. 
Si quod modus mereri est ex gratia existente in liberum arbitrium 
vitam aeternam sicut dixit Apostolus ad Thes 4 quis mereri ex debito facere 
magne debitum quod quem modus dicere quis mereri ex sequentibus 
operibus factis in caritate quod dixit Augustinus ad benefactum igitur merita 
Augustini ut aucta mereatur et perfici quinto modo dicitur mereri de debito 
habetur facere debitum actus sine usus hoc ultimo modo dicitur Christus 
meruisse quia ab instante conceptionis debebatur ei perhibitum plenitus 
gratiae quem habebat omne donum pressum aut temporalis excellentibus 
operibus debetur ei illud idem ex actu ut usu propter hoc patet 
respondendum ad duo prima quia ipsissima non praecedit de merito sed 
suam acceptionem secunda verba procedit de merito quod quaesitam 
acceptionem tunc etsi Christo in posset proficere in gratiam ut quantum ad 
partem superiorem tam poterat esse in meliori statu ratione carnis sicut in 
statu impassibilitatis et immortalis et quantum ad hoc exaltari et hoc meruit.  
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Ad illud quod obicitur quod non sibi oravit non est generati 
intelligenter pecat enim prope propriam claritatem sed hoc intelligenter 
quantum ad peccatum de transitu calicis de ista enim loquitur Hilarius.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod erat in statu comprehensoris dicendum 
quod sicut dicitur quod in angelis est vita contemplativa quod quam 
contemplantur Deum et hanc non meretur est unum vis [_] quod quam 
serviunt nobis et meritur aliquod praemium acceptibale sed Christus et 
animam habuerint dupliciter operam unam et quam congruebatur ad 
contemplandam deitatem et quam fovebatur et erat in statu beati alia habuit 
et quam ordinabatur ad dispensationem nostrem redemptionis et quod hanc 
erat in statu viatoris et merebatur et sic patet illud quod merebatur in quem 
viator.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod caritas erat eis in quem comprehensorum 
dicendum quod dicitur est motus caritatis scilicet in Deum et proximum 
caritas quantum ad motum in Deum respicit superiorem partem rationis et 
est ipsius in quem comprehensorum. Quantum ad motum in Christum 
respicit partem inferiorem rationis et est ipsius in quantum viatore et 
quantum ad hunc motum nichil perhibebat eum mereri.  
Secundo quaeritur utrum meruit ab instanti conceptionis et videtur 
quod sic. Jer 31 membris circumdabit virtum ergo ab instanti conceptionis 
fuit perfectus omni gratiam ergo si poenes illam attenditur meritum ab 
instanti conceptionis meruit.  
Item Gregorius dicit et habetur tertia enim non sibi plus meruit 
Christus per crucis patibulum quem a conceptione per gratiam virtutum. 
Ergo meruit ab instanti conceptionis.  
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Contra prius est esse quem operari sed mereri est operari ergo prius 
est se quam mereri ergo prius fuit quam mereretur non ergo ab instanti 
conceptionis meruit.  
Item de angelo dicitur quod non potuit esse malus in primo instanta 
conceptionis quia oporteret quod prius esset quam aduceretur ergo super est 
per conversionem oportuit ergo quod Christus prius esset quam meretur non 
ergo ab instanti conceptionis. 
Item nullis meretur nec divisus ab utero nullis enim post baptizari in 
utero materno sed aperio conceptionis non erat divisus ab utero non ergo 
meruit aperio conceptionis. 
Respondeo dicendum quod mereri dicere dicitur utrum ratione usus 
et ratione dignitatis ratione usus si alias meretur per opera ex caritate factam 
ratione dignitatis quod alias gratiam habens sine opera habeant sive non 
dicitur mereri vitam aeternam quia dignus est vita aterna sicut pervulus 
loquendo igitur de merito dignitas ab instanti conceptionis meruit quia 
similiter fuit conceptus perfectus ut vir in gratiam et dignus omni bono. Si 
non loquamur de merito usus sive operis sic distinguntur quidam quod post 
tenemur inclusive et exclusive hoc quod ab instanti si inclusive dicunt quod 
falsa est qui primo instanti si meruit si exclusive volita est et est sanctus 
Spiritus quod statim post primum instans meruit quia habuit usum liberum 
arbitrium et caritatis et per hoc solent ad obiri tunc si [fol.214.r.B] diceretur 
quod in primo instanti conceptionis sit fuit conceptio et unio et per gratiam 
visionis ficio et usus liberum arbitrium visum fuit quibusdam probabile quod 
aut dicitur quod substantia procedit operum dicunt quod usum est non 
tempore sed nata ad matrem illam substantiam quam statim omni 
completorie et dignitate fuit completa simpliciter illud mali angeli non est 
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similem quia ipse habuit motum per quod ad usus est et ideo quia pius erat 
conversus ad bonum aliquod modo non potuit hoc fieri in primo instanti 
unum non est similem patet solo ad sequens quia in ipso instanti 
conceptionis quo ad gratiam et scientiam fuit aeque perfectus sicut quem 
habuit Amos XXX. 
 
Articulus 3, Quaestio 1: Tercio quaeritur per quid meruit et cum contingat 
mereri liberum arbitrium contingat et caritate et opere elicito a caritate. 
Quaeruntur [_] hoc tamen primum utrum habuit potentiam libero arbitrio 
ad merendo. Secondo utrum meruit caritate. Tercio utrum passione meruit . 
Item primi sic solutio contingit mereri nisi potentiae rationali hoc ante 
ut dicit philosophus est ad oppositum ergo non contingit mereri per liberum 
arbitrium nec in quem est ad oppositum sed in Christo fuit confirmatum ad 
bonam caritatem ergo non habuit potentiam anime qua posset mereri. 
Item non contingit mereri nec per liberum arbitrium nec in quem 
liberum potest facere quod facit nam si necessitate faceret ad nullum esset 
meritum propter hoc cum ergo liberum arbitrium esset in Christo 
determinatum ad bonum et necessitatem esset semper ipsum per eligere 
bonum et numquam malum ergo in Christo non fuit liberum arbitrium quod 
statum merendi ergo non meruit anime potentiam quod est liberum 
arbitrium.  
Contra libertas arbitrius attestatur nobis caretur ut non possit cogi ad 
faciendo ad nolens. Sed Christus quod humanam naturam fuit nobilissima 
creaturarum omnium ergo in Christo fuit quia maxime liberum ergo maxime 
idoneum ad merendi quantum est de se. 
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Item hoc videtur de Anselmus de liberum arbitrium quod passibilitas 
nec libertas paciendi nec pars libertatis. 
Respondeo dicendum de liberum arbitrium in Christo quod fuit 
potentiam idonea ad merendi .  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod erat deteriationem ad bonum dicendum 
quod est deteriationem respectu finis et eorum quae sunt ad finens 
deteriationem respectu finis non repugnant liberum arbitrium qui liberum 
arbitrium habet in [_] respectu eorum quod finit ad finem sed attendo quod 
in habens post esset in Deum ut quantum ad oppositum in genere moris ut 
quantum ad oppositum in genere nec ut quem ad conditione opposita 
liberum arbitrium non dicitur liberum quia sit indifferens ad oppositum in 
genere moris, scilicet ad bonum et malum quia sic in Deo non esset liberum 
arbitrium sed dicitur liberum quia indifferens ad oppositum in genere et 
contradictionem ad facere quid parti caritatis et non facere et sic fuit 
indifferens in Christo et ideo fuit partis rationali quia ad oppositum liberum 
non ad omnia. 
 
Quaestio 2: Secondo quaeritur utrum meruit ad caritatis et videtur quod 
non quia illius meretur ad beatudine et ex parte beatudinis ergo caritas 
Christi esset ipsa beatitudo eius et pars beatudinis eis cum per illam frueretur 
ergo melius per illam meruit. 
Item omne meritum ordinatur ad melius quia Deus semper verberavit 
vel remunerat simpliciter condignum sed caritate Christi nobilius ut maius 
creaturam nichil est ergo caritas Christi non fuit ordinabit ad primum ergo 
per illam non merebatur. 
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Contra omni operam factam voluntarie de beati laus ut in superiorem 
laus tum recte facta vituperium indirecte. Si ergo opera Christi quae fuerunt 
neccese facta debetur eis laus ergo et praemium ergo illa opera ad merebatur 
sed constat opera quae fecit fecit ex caritate ergo caritate ad merebatur.  
Item omni operanti digne Deo debetur primum sed Christus 
operabatur digne Deo et hoc ex caritate meruit ergo aliquod primum.  
Respondeo dicendum est ex Christus meruit per opera facta ex 
caritate et caritate meruit tanquam radice.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod caritas eius erat personas beatudinis vel 
ipsa beatitudo. 
Respondendum est sicut dictum est super quod caritas quantum ad 
motum in Deum quod quem attendebatur fruitionem beatitudinis erat pars 
sed quantum ad motum in proximum erat ipsius in quem viator et hoc modo 
caritate merebatur. 
Ad illud quod obicitur quod meritum ordinatur ad nobilius dicendum 
quod meritum habet comparationem ad potentiam liberum arbitrium et ad 
gratiam per quam liberum arbitrium in fortitudine meretur quod ergo dicitur 
quod meritum ordinatur ad nobilius hoc in illi ratione liberum arbitrium non 
potentis se devare super se solutio aut hoc ratione genere in fortuus maxime 
cum gratia ista perfectam est sicut fuit in Christo in quo fuit gratiam perfecta.  
 
Quaestio 3: Tercio quaeritur utrum Christus ad meruit passione sibi et 
videtur quod ut quia congruitas meriti accenditur [fol.214.v.A] quod 
quantitatem caritatis sed in Christo fuit tanta quantitas caritas quem ad 
fervorem et quem ad intentionem ab instanta conceptionis quanta fuit in 
propria passione ergo ut meruit in passione si dicas quod meruit quem ad 
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voluntatum modus scilicet de debito habitus fecit debitum usus hoc nichil est 
quia aut passionem habuerat usum caritatis et aequalis fusioris qualis ergo 
prius meruerat si soli habitu sed usu.  
Item passio est motus Christi fuit involuntaria sed inhabens quod 
involuntaria sunt non consistit meritum ergo passione ut meruit sibi. 
Item passio solis fuit in carne et sensualitate et ratione ut natura non 
aut fuit ut ratione sed omne meritum est in ratione ut est rationem ergo 
passio Christi non fuit meritoria. 
Contra sicut dicit Augustinus et habetur in littera humanitas claritatis 
est meritum claritas humanitatis est praemium ergo passione ad sibi meruit.  
Respondeo dicendum quod per passionem ad sibi meruit sicut dicit 
Magister scilicet istaque super possumus et magister ponit in littera nec tam 
intelligendum sicut restatur magister quod meruit in passione ad quod non 
meruisset prius sed illud quod prius meruerat per caritatem et iustitiam 
perfectam meruit postea per passionem. Unum non magne meruit intensive 
sed pluribus quia sicut Magister dicit in virtute meriti per intensionem non 
poterat at perficere.  
Ad illud ergo quod obiecit primo respondeo quia non dicitur in 
passione ad meruisse sibi in debitum ut quod de debito faceret magne 
debitum sed de debito per caritatem et per passionem faceret debitum alio 
modo scilicet per passionem et ita pluribus modis non intensione.  
Ad aliud quod obiicitur de passione dicendum est quod in passione est 
considerare tamen passionis agentis est considerare passionis substantialiter 
ratione primum passio non est voluntaria in aliis a Christo sed ratione 
sciendi scilicet substantiae fuit meritoria et voluntaria in martyribus in 
Christo aut utque modo fuit voluntaria quia illi non potuissent cogere si non 
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voluisset et postea voluntarie et libenter sustinuit et ideo maxime fuit eius 
passio voluntaria.  
Ad aliud dicendum quod passio esse in aliquo dicitur vel tamquam in 
paritate sive comparitate ut per comtemplationem licet igitur passio non 
esset in rationem ut non est tanquam in patiente erat tunc per 
comtemplationem et hoc facit meritum scilicet voluntas rationis.  
 
Articulus 4, Quaestio 1: Circa quarto quaeritur principale quid meruit sibi 
et dicit Magister quod exaltationem quae consistit in immortale corporis et 
impassibilitate et nostris manifestationem primo igitur quaeritur fuit illa 
exaltationem. Secondo quaeritur de merito immortalis. Tercio de merito in 
passibilitate. Quarto de nominis clarificatione. Quinto quaeritur utrum 
meruit sibi meritum substantiale scilicet gloriam. 
De primo sic quaeritur quantum ad quantum intelligatur Christus 
exaltaritur utrum quantum ad humanam an quantum ad divinam probatur 
quod quantum ad divinam eis enim est exaltari fuit humiliari quod patet Phil 
2 ex inanivit[?] semetipsum forum sive accipiens accipere forum sive 
congruit Filio Dei ergo cum quem ad divinam naturam fuerit humiliatus 
quem ad divinam fuit exaltatus. 
Item quod non fuit exaltatus per passionem quantum ad humanam 
naturam videtur quod natura humana in caritate fuit exaltata ad unionem 
cum divina sed non poterat humana magne exaltari sicut dicitur Augustinus 
et habitum fuit sic nullum donum majus illo ergo per passionem non fuit 
exaltata humana natura ergo divina. 
Contra Augustinus dixit et habetur in littera enim in quam forma 
unitus est in ea formae exaltatus est sed hoc fuit in formae [_].  
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Item Anselmus de Incarnatione Verbi inquit in incarnationem factum 
non fuit natura divina humiliata sed solus humana exaltata ergo non divina. 
Quaestio est igitur ratione cuius dicatur natura humana exaltata. 
Respondeo dicendum quod sicut dixit Heb 2 Christus quod 
humanam naturam minoratur est Paulo minus ab angelis propter passionem 
et morte dicitur igitur fuisse exaltationem impassibilitas et immortalitatis 
quam consecuta est in ratione. 
Ad illud quod obicitur quod divinam fuit exaltata dicendum quod si 
intelligitur minorationem aliquem facta fuisse in naturam sed rem iste 
intelligitur non solum factus est sed etiam beatifico sed Deus intelligitur 
exaltato in quod ex tunc et habitum fuit quam ad reputationem in animam 
posset Dei exaltata in Christo quia potens non reputabatur esset Deus sed 
postea propter passionem cogantur est [fol.214.v.B] a nobis et laudatur et 
glorificatur.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod humana natura non potuit exaltari 
dicendus quod illa exaltationem non attenditur quantum ad pars substantiale 
ut per comparationem ad divinam naturam cui uniebatur quia per illam 
unionem erat comprehensor et beatus statim in ipsa incarnatione sed hoc 
intelligere rationem partis inferioris in quem viator et passio sicut exponitum 
est. 
 
Quaestio 2: Quaeritur de secondo scilicet de merito in mortalis et videtur 
quod illam non meruit quia meritum est per motum caritatis sed maius non 
ordinatur ad [_] cum ergo caritas sit animae et in mortalis corporis 




Item corpus Christi de sive natura non habebat debitum mortis ergo 
suum omni merito habuisse in mortalitatem ergo non est unum quod meruit 
in mortem corporalis.  
Contra nos mereri non solum doces anime sed etiam corporis ergo 
multe magis Christus. 
Respondeo dicendum quod meruit in mortalitatem.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod illud quod est anime non ordinatur ad 
illud quod est corporis respondent quidam quod immortalitas licet dicatur 
esse duos corporis tunc magne est ipsius anime quia mori est poena magis 
anime quam corporis et non ordinatur quod est anime ad illud quod est 
corporis in merito sed ad illud quod est anime sed illud non soluit quia 
caritas est maius bonum anime quam in mortalitas carnis et propter hoc 
dicendum quod ordinari ad aliud est dicitur aut tanquam ad finem ultimum 
et sit maius non ordinatur ad minus aut tunquam ad terminum et sic maius 
bonum ordinatur ad minus et meretur etiam unius unum per caritatem 
meretur quis calicem et huius et sic patet illud quod immortalitas non est 
finis ultimus caritatis immo ipsa beatitudo.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod debetur ei immortalitas via nec dicendum 
quod non est incongruens ut illud quod purus debebatur via via naturae 
postea debetur via mereri et ita pluribus modis post divina tum quod licet per 
naturam corpus illi debetur immortalitas tam per gratiam et passionis meruit 
accelerationem immortalitatis.  
 
Quaestio 3: Tercio quaeritur de impassibilitate quem collata est anime et 
videbatur primus numquam quod in mortalis carnem anima enim erat […] 
secundum unionem ergo illa duo concortantur se passibilitas anime et 
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mortalitas carnis genere et oppositum debent se confortari tunc igitur collata 
est anime impassibilitas quem corpori immortalitas sed hoc in tercia die ergo 
et cetera. 
Contra anime [_] prius dotantur in se quam in suis corporibus ergo 
cum anima Christi dignorum fuerit omni anima alia statim ut exalta est dote 
impassibilitas debuit dotari ergo in passione facta est impassibili.  
Item in statu innocentie impassibilitas anime influebat in 
mortalitatem in corpore ergo si Christus fuit vere reparator prius deberet 
anima eis fieri inpassible quam immortalis.  
Respondeo dicendum quod quia adventum partem sunt auctores 
utrum licet potest quis suffici per isto opinari sed tamen hodie tamquam 
probabilius tenetur quod in ipsam solutione anime a carne facta est anima 
impassibilis ut quid enim in ipsa ultra remaneret impassibilitas non videtur 
tamen quod per ergo obicit quod passibilitas meruit anime secundum 
mortalitatem ex parte carnis ergo etiam impassibilitas per mortalitatem 
addendus est ut quod separationem a carne mortale et ideo in ipsius 
solutionem potuit fieri impassibilitas .  
 
Quaestio 4: Quaeritur quarto de nobis manifestationem facta per 
passionem sicut Magister dicit et quaeritur de quo nomine intelligitur qua 
vocatus est Jesus vocatus est Christus vocatus est Dei filius quod non meruit 
manem alicuius haec videtur quia hoc nomen filius Dei fuit manifestum 
demonibus ante passionem unum Magister unum quid vobis est etiam filius 
Dei gloria tamen innocuit quem opportuit non sicut angelis per hoc quod est 
vita et lux sed eis [_] per quaedam virtutis est tam.  
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Item Luc iv scio quod Spiritus Sanctus Dei gloria Dominum in tria 
videntes se continuo indicandos causae credebant sed sciebant quod non 
debebant indicari nec a Deo ergo faciebant quod esset filius Dei.  
Item super illud id est corpus[?] enim si cognovissent gloria maiores 
iudei qua ad cognitationem tenebantur sciebant quod esset Christus minores 
vero et simplices nescierunt ergo demones et iudei scierunt quod vocaretur 
etiam Jesus sciebant quod esset Christus sciebant quod esset filius Dei ergo 
ante passionem omni erant [_] facta non ergo per passionem meruit 
manifestationem nominis.  
Contra super illud primo enim si cognovissent per quod de demonibus 
exponitur numquam dominum gloriae crucifixissent et crucifigi 
suggessissent per quod de iudeis numquam crucifixissent et crucifigi 
promisissent ergo neuter cognoverit quod esset filius Dei. 
Item quaeritur differentiam est horum [_] et qualiter differunt hoc 
nomen Jesus et hoc nomen Christus et utrum quoniam impositum fuit ei 
nomen Jesus quod fi Jesus dicitur salvator a salvando et hoc fecit in passione 
ergo non ad debuit vocari hoc nomine sed in passione. 
[fol.215.r.A] Contra est quod Joseph imposuit nomen illud.  
Item super illud Magister id est vocatus nomen eius Jesum gloria ab 
aeterno habuit huius nomen. 
Respondeo dicendum quod per passionem meruit nominis 
clarificationem maxime quantum ad hoc nomen filius Dei quia et si primum 
sciretur ab aliquibus per revelationem spiritualem ut ab apostolis inde post 
passionem ab apostolis praedicantibus passionem [_] est in omnis generes 
quod ipse est vere filius Dei et licet prius sciretur vocari nomine Jesus tunc 
post scitus est quod ipse vere salvator est et quod ipse vere fuit Christo.  
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Quaeritur ergo objecta quod demones scierant ipsum esse filium Dei 
dicendum quod non cognoverint sed soli dicebant ex quadam suspicionem 
videntes virtutes eis et sic intelligende sunt rationes ad utrumque partem et 
hoc est quod dicit gloria id est corporis enim si cognissent gloria quod dicunt 
demones in esse magne ex suspicione quam ex cognitione dicere adendi sunt.  
Ad illud quod quaeritur de iudeis dicendum quod ipsi nescierant quod 
esset Deus sed tunc maiores bene cognoscebant quod erat ille qui fuerat eis 
permisso in lege quia praetextum sive per litteram legis noscebant quod 
mellias corporum[?] esset dominus et quem ad hoc solvitur congruetas illa.  
Ad illud quod quaeritur de differentiam illorum nominum dicendum 
quod filius Dei nominat ipsum in divina soli substantiale aut et Christus sue 
nomina per in duabus naturis sed Jesus primam in utrumque natura magna 
tunc in comparatione ad divinam quia eius est salvare Christo aut aequo quia 
naturae humane est tingi.  
Ad illud quod quaeritur quia hoc nomen Jesus impositum fuit 
dicendum quod Jesus id est salvator salvator post dicere potentiam ad 
salvandus et sic ab aeterno fuit nomen filius Dei aut habitum et sic ipse 
incarnationis aut actum et sic per passionem sive in ipsa passione debuit Dei 
salvator.  
 
Quaestio 5: Quaeritur quinto utrum meruerit gloriam suam sive primum 
liberale et quod non utrum quia ab instanti conceptionis habuit tantam 
delectationem in fruitionem dicatis quod maiorem habere non potuit ergo 




Ad gloriam visionis in mediante et inseparabiliter et sit tempore 
sequebatur gloriam fruitionis unum cum non sit ponere ex meruerit gratiam 
visionis similiter non est ponere ipsam beatudinem sine fruitionem.  
Contra Christus meruit per caritate sicut super probatum est licet qui 
meretur ex caritate quanto maiorem habet caritatem tanto magnum meretur 
et maius cum igitur alii homines ex caritate mereantur beatudinem et nichil 
maius sit beatudine ergo Christus ex caritate summa meruit maximum 
primum sed illud primum erat summum illius quia ipsem habuit maius 
primum omnis ergo Christus sibi meruit beatudinem. 
Item in angelis similiter tempore fuit gratiam et gloriam et tum 
dicuntur meruisse gloriam ergo similiter videtur esse ex parte Christi ergo 
[_] in quam dicendum quod Christus meruit sibi gloriam. 
Respondeo dicendum quod Christus non dicitur meruisse propriam 
gloriam substantiale praemium quia ab instanti conceptionis illud habuit 
nequis dicat quod mereri contingit habitum sicut fuit quondam opinio tunc 
illud non approbatur communiter ideo dicitur quod meritum antecedit 
praemium.  
Ad illud ergo quod obicitur de caritate Christi quod mereri debuit 
maximum primum per illam dicendum quod caritate sua non meruit sibi 
primum substantiale quia iam illud habebat unum hoc non fuit propter in 
conpletionem sed propter summam perfectionem solutio aut sua caritate 
magne meruit et maius quam caritas alicuius quia meritum fuit substantiale 
et congrue et sive illo non sufficerent merita nostra ad operandum vitam 
aeternam ipsem enim meruit ianue aperationem sicut infra melius patebatur. 
Ad aliud quod obicitur de merito angelorum soluit quidam per 
interemptionem et dicunt quod angeli non solum nec sed tempore habuerit 
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prius gratiam quam gloriam cum etsi sit tempore habuissent gratiam et 
gloriam tamen non est silere quia temporis prius fuerit quam esset glorificati 
unum possibiles fuerit ad gratiam et gloriam per ordinem ut prius ad gratiam 
et per gratiam in gloriam per ordinem ne Christus aut cum fuit statim sive 
naturam humanam beatus fuit propter unionem ad Deum statum enim fuit 
beatus fuit quia non fuit ille homo nec verbo unitus et ponita unione neccesse 
fuit per partem superiorem poenere fruitionem et ita beatudinem et ideo non 
est silere. 
 
Articulus 5, Quaestio Unica: Quinto quaeritur utrum ista scilicet 
impassibilitatem et immortalitem et nominis maiorem potuit habere sive 
merito et constat sicut dicit Magister in litteram quod potuit accipere 
humanam naturam gloriosam sine merito procedente sed postquam 
assumpsit passibilitatem et mortalitatem per statum in quo fuit quaeritur 
utrum necessitatem fuit ipsum mereri et videtur quod non quia mereri est 
voluntarium omne aut voluntarium potest fieri ut non si fieri [fol.215.r.B] 
ergo Christus potuit mereri ut non mereri.  
Item per [_] baptisti consecuti sunt praemium substantiale sine 
merito operationis ergo multo forus qui habitum divinitatem habuit gratiam. 
Contra: Christus ab instanti conceptionis fuit dignus omni bono ergo 
meruit omne bonum ergo nichil potuit habere boni post qui esset ex meritis.  
Item habebat liberum arbitrium confirmatum ad bonum ergo 
necessitatem erat ipsum bonum facere ergo et mereri ergo necessarium fuit 
illum mereri illa.  
Item nobilius ex merito habetur ad quam sine meritis sed [_] 
ponendum in Christo ergo necessario ponendus est ipsum meruisse.  
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Item impossibile est gratiam in eo fuisse [_] ergo merebatur recte 
igitur accepta et sibi merebatur et aliter esse non poterat. Ergo necessarium 
fuit Christum mereri. 
Respondeo dicendum quod sicut dicit Magister per statum illum 
passibilem quem assumpsit necessitatem fuit ipsum mereri sicut ostendunt 
rationes.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod mereri est voluntarium dicendum quod 
est mereri simpliciter sine contingitur et est mereri hoc opera ut illo mereri 
simpliciter in Christo fuit necessitatem et tam necessitatem voluntarium quia 
necessitas illa est necessitas in unitis quod sicut dicit Anselmus. Non 
repugnat voluntati mereri aut hoc merito ut illo fuit quid voluntarium non 
necessitatem si enim praedicare bis vel tam vel amplius ut minus potest sine 
incongrue concedi quod utique modo poterat esse et hoc concludit ista non 
quia liberum arbitrium in Christo erat deteriatum ad bonum non tam hoc 
bonum ut ad illud.  
Ad illud quod obicitur parvuli possunt optime vitam aeternam sive 
merito dicendum quod non sive merito dignitas tunc possunt sive merito 
usus vel operationis in se tunc processit in Christo et tam huius quia non 
habent usum liberum arbitrium sed in Christo fuit liberum arbitrium et 
gratia completa et perfecta quae nullo modo poterat esse otiosa et per haec 
patent obiecitur. 
 
Distinctio 19, Articulus 1, Quaestio 1: Ad quid pati voluit et cetera.  
Ad intelligendam huius partis in quo agitur quod nobis meruit 
Christus per suam passionem intelligendam quod sicut Magister deteriat 
quadruplex consecuti sumus bonum per eius passionem. Prium est ianue 
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aperatio, secundo peccatorum abolitio, tercio est a potestate diaboli liberatio, 
quarto aut est a poena absolutio per hoc [_] quod dicta sunt incidunt 
inquirenda et prime quaeritur de ianue aperationem per passionem Christi 
facta et hic quaeruntur tamen primo utrum aperationem illa facta fuit per 
passionis meritum. Secundo de verbo Ambrosii quod adducit ut videtur ad 
probationem huius. Tercio de conclusione Magistri quam concludit.  
Circa primum sit tota videtur merendi consistit corporale[?] sed 
Christus ab instanti conceptionis fuit aequaliter caritatis et aequale ferventis 
sicut in passionem ergo in instanti conceptionis meruit nobis aperationem 
ianue. Ergo si numquam fuisse passus ianua fuisse aperta non ergo per 
passionem. 
Item Christus quolibet motu suo merebatur nobis vitam aeternam 
ergo si merebatur magne et [_] congruus maius sit bonum vita aeterna3 
quam ianue aperationem quia hoc ordinatur ad illud Christus quolibet motu 
et acceptione meruit ianue aperationem.  
Item qui meretur ad meretur illud sine quo non potest habere quod 
meretur sed aperationem ianue est annexa vitae aeternae quia sine ista 
habueri non potest vita aeterna ergo Christus quodlibet motu suo motu nobis 
aperationem ianue non ergo solum per passionem.  
Item nos modo per caritatem meretur aditum regni et iturum regni 
haereditatem sed aeque bona fuit caritas in Abraham sicut et in nobis ergo 
Abraham meruit igitur in regni caelestis ergo ianue aperationem non ergo 
passio Christi.  
                                                   
3 Sic. Presumably ‘vitae aeternae’. 
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Item Deus promissit beatitudinem aeternam ab [_] et non potest 
mentiri ergo postquam Abraham decesserat in caritate necessitate fuit ipsum 
introire in regnum ergo sive Christus pateretur sive non ianua aperiretur non 
ergo per passionem.  
Contra Ambrosius dixit et habetur in littera tantum fuit partem 
nostrum ut salvari non possemus nec unigenitus Dei filius pro nobis meretur 
debitoribus mortis similiter magister per aliam non potuit nobis aperatione 
aditus regni si igitur in passionem regni ianua est aperta cum aperta dicitur 
fuisse in baptizo et ascensione quaeritur quod differentius dixit enim Beda 
super aliud se baptisato Jesu aperti sunt caeli quod in baptiso aperta est 
ianua et nichil enim dicere ascendet eorum pandens tunc ante. 
Respondeo dicendus ad intelligendam praedictorum quod 
aperationem [_] intelligi pro intelligendo quid sit ianue clausio. Clausio ante 
ianue sicut inivit Magister in littera fuit decretum Dei quia decerent ut nullus 
intraret in regnum Dei nec factus satisfactionem [fol.215.v.A] per 
humanitatem quae omnibus perficeret sicut superbia prioribus[?] hominis 
omnibus hominibus nocuit ianue igitur aperationem est per satisfactione 
quem non naturam consistit in indice caritatis sed in humiliationem et 
poenalitate quem ad opus exterius et ideo non dicitur Christus meruisse 
nobis ianue aperationem nec per passionem quem non tam fuit meritoria sed 
etiam satisfactoria ut nulla posset esse tanta et talis satisfactionem hoc ut 
visis patet.  
Respondeo ad objecta quod enim obicitur quod meritum consistit in 
caritate dicendus quod in merito est considerare utrum meriti et effectum. 
Vis quid meriti tota consistit in caritate efficerens a non totaliter sed etiam in 
opere exteriori sicut vis convivendi in igne efficerens a non solus in igne sed 
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etiam in lignis intelligendum autem est in hoc opere per satisfactionem sine 
in merito satisfactionis in quo requiritur poenalitas tale autem fuit meritum 
aperationis ianue.  
Ad duo sequentia patet, respondeo ad aperationem ianue non tamen 
requirebatur motus caritatis sed et satisfactionem et quia satisfactionem non 
fiebat per quodque opus sive motum sed per passionem nec sicut in facta 
melius patebit ideo illud argumentum[?] nobis valet quia aperatio ianue 
addit super meritum simpliciter satisfactionem excellentissimam.  
Ad aliud dicendus quod Abraham aeque bene meruit regnum 
caelorum sua caritate sicut et nos nostram nec nos meremur ianue 
aperationem sicut nostra ipse sed quia modo est aperta ianua possimus 
statim ingredi tempore ante Abraham non erat aperta et ideo non poterat 
statim ingredi nec per mortem Christi removeretur [_].  
Ad aliud quod obicitur quod Deus promisit Abrahe dare regnum si 
persevaret in bono intelligendum est quod promisit dare sic determina cui 
ianuam aperiri per mortem filii unum promisit regnum dare et ingressum 
post mortem Jesu et sic patet quod ista permissio non tollit meritum 
passionis. 
Ad ultum dicendus quod aperationem ianue dicta est fieri in baptismo 
quantum ad figuram [_] natum est enim quod illi esset aperienda qui esset 
consepulta in morte eius per baptisma in passione quantum ad virtutem sed 
in ascensione quantum ad effectum. 
 
Quaestio 2: Secondo quaeritur de illo verbo Ambrosium tantum fuit 
peccatum nostrum ut salvari non possemus nec unigenitum moreretur per 
nobis debitoribus mortis. Quaeritur primo de qua morte intelligit esse 
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debitores aut illud temporali aut de aeterna si de aeterna hoc falsum est quia 
Abraham et alii facti non sunt debitores mortis aeterne immo sunt digni vita 
aeterna ergo sine morte unigeniti potuerit non solis liberari a morte sed 
etiam consequi gloriam si dicas quod intelligit de morte temporali hoc est 
falsum. Anselmus in litteram Cur Deus Homo si nullatenus potest se homo 
magne dare ad Dei honorem qui cum se tradit morti ad illius honorem ergo si 
[_] tanto minus grata quanto magne coacta sicut dicit Augustinus. Non 
omnis homines sunt vel fuerunt mortis debitores ergo cum debitum illud 
solutum sit per passionem Christi non ergo intelligit de morte temporali. 
Item videtur quod Christus fuerit debitor mortis et hoc probat 
Anselmus enim Cur Deus Homo duplici ratione, quia ipse debebat obedire 
patri sed pater praecipiebat Jesum mori ergo fuit debitor mortis operat.  
Item si debuit redimere quia ad hoc venerat debebat [_] meliori modo 
enim dicebat sed hoc erat per mortem ergo erat debitore mortis.  
Item quid est quod dixit quod nullo alio modo possimus salvari 
numquam intelligit dicere quia non erat alius modus possibilis quod est 
contra Augustinum.  
Respondeo dicendus quod mors dicitur magister uno modo mors est 
separato anime a corpore et sic omnis fuerit debitores mortis primum 
Christum. Secondo modo mors est separatio anime a Deo per peccatum et sic 
peccatum mors. Tercio modo mors est irrecuperabile separationem anime ab 
aeterna beatudine et hoc modo mors est damnationem aeterna. Quarto modo 
mors est separationem a Dei contemplatione sicut antiqui parens in limbo 
aut adventum Christi non ut ibi meritum essent sed usque ad liberationem 
primo igitur modo et quarto omnis fuerunt debitores mortis per peccatum 
primi parentis unde Abraham debitor erat utriusque mortis praeter Christum 
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quia nullius mortis fuit debitor quod obicitur quod Abraham erat dignans 
vita aeterna. Respondetur quod intelligitur fuit dignus vita aeterna per 
proprium meritum intervenite merito Christi. Unde merita nostra sunt 
merita cooperationis Christo enim omnibus meruit beatudinem quantum ad 
sufficentiam sed quod habuit effectum in uno non in alio hoc est inquam 
unius cooperatur alter vero non. 
Ad illud quod obicitur de morte temporali quod non omnis fuerit 
debitores respondendum quod immo omnis fuerit praeter Christum illud 
verbum Anselmus intelligit de Christo licet sit debitum cum si [fol.215.v.B] 
quis velit ex caritate pati mortem ad gloriam Christi hoc ipso quod ex caritate 
sustinet facit illam Deo gratiam sicut maxime fuit in martyribus.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod Christus fuit debitor mortis respondens 
quod est debitum bonitatis sive caritas et debitum necessitas debitum 
bonitatis sive caritas et debitum necessitas debitum bonitas hoc non est 
debitum nec absque obnoxietas sed unita liberalitas talis fuit in Christo 
debitum aut necessitas in nobis fuit in ipso non et sic intelligitur illud.  
Ad aliud dicendus quod illud verbum Ambrosii intelligendum de 
congruo quod non poteramus ita congruent salvari sicut per mortem 
unigeniti tam alio modo poteramus simpliciter verbum magnum quod non 
per aliam hostiam poterat ianua aperiti sed hoc intelligitur.  
 
Quaestio 3: Tercio quaeritur de illa congrue quam intelligit Magister 
magnus ergo in morte unigeniti perfecta sunt nobis et quaeritur utrum maius 
fuit Christum mori pro nobis quam dari vitam aeternam et aequo et quod 
maius sit dare vitam aeternam patet quia propter quod uniquisque tale et 
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illud magnum sed mortuis est ut daret vitam aeternam ergo maius fuit dare 
vitam aeternam quam mortem. 
Item minus ordinatur ad maius non aut minus sed mors Christi 
ordinatur ad vitam aeternam ergo et cetera. 
Contra: Super illud ratio uni quando non omnia nobis tradidit gloria 
minus est tradere omnia scilicet iustitiam in praesenti et in [_] vitam 
aeternam quem vitam aeternam quam unigenitum tradere morti. 
Item prius in te Domine spiritualem inclina aurem tuam super gloria 
quem maior [_] quem filium unigeniti tradere morti quidem nulla.  
Respondeo dicendus quod datum unum prius divinam maius alio 
aut in comparatione ad illud quod datur aut in comparatione ad quomodum 
illius est datur. In comparatione ad illud quod datur sic comparatur hoc duo 
vitam Christi et vitam aeternam naturam vitam Christi maius est quid 
propter unionem personalem ad deitatem quae est in Christo qualis unio non 
erit ad Deum in vita aeterna et ita maius est quid vita Christi et maius omni 
creato quod post excogitari hanc vitam nobis et pro nobis tradidit in morte et 
sic maius dedit in morte quam sit vita aeterna si autem consideremus 
utilitatem eius cui datur vita aeterna quia aufertur omnis miseria omnis 
potentia ad peccandum quod non conferebat mors Christi statim immo 
moriebatur quantum ad hoc maius donatum est nobis in vitae aeternae 
collationem et sic procedunt rationes ad partes oppositas maximum quid est 
collatum nobis in passione Christi sed parum valeret nobis nec ulterius 
daretur nobis vita aeterna exemplum si quis [_] martyrum auri parum 





Articulus 2, Quaestio 1: Nunc igitur quaeramus et cetera. Sequitur de 
iustitia effectum qui est absolutionem culpae sive iustitia et primo quaeritur 
utrum iste sit efficiens passionis iustitia utrum sit efficiens rationis. Tercio 
cuius magne proprie. 
Circa primum sic Isaiah 444: Ego sum qui deleo iniquitates tuas 
propter me ergo remittere culpam est solius Dei non ergo remittere non ergo 
creaturae non ergo peccata remissio est per passionem. 
Item dicitur quod maius est de impio facere factum pium quam 
caritate caelum et naturam sed creationem est solius Dei ergo et peccatorum 
remissio ergo et cetera. 
Item remissio peccata est solis per gratiam sed gratiam est a solo Deo 
ergo et cetera. Et bono medie Bernardus absit ut perfectionem animae 
tribuamus caritate Deo aut eius creationem cum maius sit esse perfectum 
quam factum sed anima perficitur per gratiam ergo illa a solo Deo est ergo et 
remissionum peccatorum non ergo propter passionem Deus enim gratiam 
infundit in mente. 
Item passio Christi est corporaliter sed peccata sunt in anima 
spiritualiter corporale non agit in spirituale ergo passionem Christi peccata 
non delet. 
Item passio Christi non attingit animam in qua sunt peccatum ergo 
illam non lavat a sordibus peccatorum. 
Contra Apostolus est lavit nos a peccatis unius in sanguine suo ergo 
sanguis Christi qui effusus est in passione lavit peccata ergo et cetera.  
                                                   
4 The quotation is actually Isaiah 43: 25 – ‘Ego sum ego sum ipse qui deleo iniquitates tuas 
propter me et peccatorum tuorum non recordabor’. 
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Item Heb 9 sanguis Christi qui per spiritum sanctum semetipsum 
obtulit emendavit conscientiam vitam ab operibus mortuis sed illa sunt 
peccata.  
Item ibidem sanctus sanguis effusione non est remissio peccatorum. 
Respondeo dicendum quod passio Christi potest considerari in re ut 
vel in quem est in anima si quid consideratur in re excellentia sic passio fuit 
meritoria genere omnibus hominibus cooperantibus quem ad effectum si 
enim sum per suam orationem merentur gratiam aliis multo magne passio 
Christi fuit satisfactoria poenae et in hoc dicitur portasse languores nostros 
quam potest in peccato Domino considerantur scilicet martyria quod deletur 
per gratiam et reatus poenae aequo quis absolvitur per satisfactionem 
poenale comparatur ergo passio Christi in re ad peccata ut illa delens ratione 
martyrie et reatus ut tanquam efficiens eam sed tanquam meritoria vel 
satisfactoria. 
Si a consideretur passio Christi ut est in anima quia Deus in esse per 
fidem caritatem pietatem compassionem et imitatorum duobus primis modis 
delet culpam quia sum fide impossibile est placere Deo et iustus est per fidem 
et caritas operit multitudinem peccatorum duobus [fol.216.r.A] aliis modis 
sequentibus delet ipsum reatum habens visis facile est. Respondeo ad objecta 
quod enim obicitur est enim in quod solius Dei est dare gratiam et remittere 
culpam verum est tanquam creaturae effectis et principalis passionis autem 
est mereri gratiam et tam meritoria genere potest esse creata simpliciter 
patet.  
Respondeo ad duo sequentia quia quis esset caela quia tam eius 
sustinentia per voluntatem qui est spiritualis erat tam meritoria bonum 
spiritualis et inundabis spiritualis et attingebat animam per modis merita 
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fides a passionis in anima et amor inundabat etiam efficientis quia hoc dixit 
ipsam gratiam quem inundat ipsam animam id est Deus per gratiam. 
 
Quaestio 2: Secundo quaeritur utrum resurrectio Christi necessario sit eam 
inest iustificationis sine remissionis peccatorum et videtur quod sit.  
Ratio item mortuus est propter delicta nostram resurrexionem propter 
iustificationem nostram ergo resurrectionem iustificatam.  
Contra constat quod resurrectio Christi non est tam nostram 
iustificationis efficiens per ratione spiritum superdictans de passione obicitur 
ante quod non sit tam meritoria quia Christus resurgens non erat in statu 
merendi ergo resurgendo ut nobis meruit. 
Item meritum iustificationis attenditur quantum ad gratiam in 
praesenti si ergo resurrectio ordinatur ad gloriam in futuro manifestum est 
quod non fuit tam meritoria in est iustificationis nec alio modo ut videtur 
ergo nullo modo fuit tam nostrum iustificationis. 
Respondeo dicendus quod sicut Deum est de passione sic de 
resurrectione dicendus quod potest considerari dicitur vel in re vel in anima 
considerata in rei nec est tam iustificationis praesentis per praesentem 
gratiam et tam iustificationis perfectam per praefiguratam gloriam tam in 
quam iustificationis praesentis non efficiens nec meritoria sicut objectum fuit 
sed motiva et exemplaris motiva quia sicut incarnationem scilicet unio 
dictatis ad humanitatem monebat Deum ad conferendus gratiam nec sibi 
unite et disponebat quodam modo ipsam naturam sic etiam in ratione tam 
exemplaris sicut dixit Apostolus est tam nostrem iustificationis. Rom 5 sicut 
resurrexit a mortuis per gloriam prius ita et nos in voluntate vitae [_] tam 
iustificationis quae erat perfectam gloriam in resurgentibus est exemplaris 
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quia resurrectio est exemplar nostrum resurrectionis est et efficiens quia sua 
resurrectio est tam efficiens resurrectionis aliorum tamquam cooperans vel 
ipse Christus resurgens per quod consideratur in anima sit tam iustificationis 
in quem obiecta amata et separata sic mortuo est Christus propter delicta 
resurrexit propter iustificationem. 
  
Quaestio 3: Tertio quaeritur cum illud sit iustificare et peccata remittere 
utrum ergo quod passio iustificet et quod resurrectio delent peccata quaeritur 
igitur quia sic apperat5 apostolus. 
Item quaeritur super illud mortuus est gloria utraque mors et 
resurrectio Christi delicta tollunt et utraque iustificant ut quid ergo apperat6 
sic.  
Item ratio modo iustificati per fidem in sanguine ipsius ergo videtur 
quod deberet dicere mortuus est propter iustificationem.  
Respondeo dicendus sicut dixit glossa super locum illum dictum 
mors Christi sola in totum vitae necessis figurat et in resurrectione nova vita 
figuratur quem ad significationis diversitatem verba divisit ex hac gloria 
colligitur sole quod passio potest considerari in quantum tam vel in quantum 
et signum primo modo est tam remissionis culpae et iustificationis in quem a 
signum sic est signum remissionis culpae simpliciter dicendus de 
resurrectione et ideo apperat7 in quem signum non in quantum tam et sic 
patet respondet ad objecta. 
                                                   
5 Sic. Presumably ‘apparat’. 
6 Sic. Presumably ‘apparat’. 
7 Sic. Presumably ‘apparat’. 
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Ad illud quod quaeritur quoniam differentis sit tam iustificationis 
passio et resurrectio dicendus quod iustificato potest considerari ratione 
termini initialibus et sic eius tam passio ratione termini initialis sive 
confirmationis resurrectionis.  
 
Articulus 3, Quaestio 1: Sequitur de tercio effectum quem est 
liberationem a potestate diabolica et tantum hoc merentur duo primo de 
liberatione a potestate [_] a potestate redemptandi de primo quaeritur sic 
magister dicit in litteram quod liberationem a potestate divina fuit facta per 
passionem Christi sive per sanguinem Christi quo deleta sunt chyrographa 
culparum quibus debitores a divina aut tenebam quaeritur igitur primo quid 
intelligitur nomine chirographi et utrum debitores essemus divina per illa 
chirographa et videtur quod non quia ipse nullum vis habebat in nobis ergo 
nec chirographum videtur habuisse nec potestatem. 
Item de isto verbo Augustini quod tempore suo delevit chirographa 
omnium culparum quia si parcens qui erant in limbo non habebant peccatum 
actuale nec originale ergo erat deletum chirographum non ergo passionem 
vel sanguine deletum fuit. 
Item si omnium culparum chirographa delevit ergo videtur quod 
nullius fuit dampnatur quod tamen falsum est immo multi dampnatur.  
Item dicitur Lucam 2 quod positus est in utinam multorum ergo 
videtur quod non omnium culparum chirographa delevit immo fuit multis 
occasionem peccatorum quis deleverit chirograoha non videtur quod aliquos 
eripiuntur de potestate quia illi qui erant in limbo non puniebantur nec erant 
in eius potestate illos ergo non erupit similiter nec illos qui erant in inferno 
solutio videtur ergo aliquos exprimisse de potestate divina.  
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Per Anselmum opportet ostendens quod passio Christi sufficit ad 
delenda peccatorum omnia enim Cur Deus Homo sic inquaerens putas ne 
tam bonum et tam amabile sufficere ad solvendus quod debetur [fol.216.r.B] 
per peccatis totius mundi et respondet quod immo plus in institutionem 
videtur igitur quod hoc vita […] omnia peccata si pro illis detur si ergo dare 
vitam est accipere mortem sicut dato vitae pervalet omnibus peccatis ita et 
acceptionem mortis. 
Sed contra Anselmus si tam malum est occidere Christum quam 
bonum est eius vitam servare quoniam post vitam eius superiorem et delere 
peccatorum eorum quid eum occiderunt aut si alitus peccatorum eorum delet 
quo quorum aliorum horum peccatorum delere autem quod multi ex eis 
salvati sunt et innumerabiles alii salvantur sic ergo videtur quod mors Christi 
non sufficeret ad delendum omnem culpas sive chirographa at per hoc nec ad 
liberandum omnis a potestate divina.  
Respondeo ad praedictorum intelligiam quod glossa Col 2 dicitur 
exponit illud verbum chirographum decertum[?] primo modo sic decertum 
mandatum Dei quo [_] homini ne commederet chirographum autem dicit 
memoriam esse transgressionis Adae per quam omnis postis obligabantur ad 
carentiam visionis Dei. Secundo modo sic decertum datur divinam finam 
quam Dominus dixit homini morte monerit chirographum autem est ipsum 
peccatum Adae possumus autem intelligere illud verbum Augustini deletis 
omnium culparum chirographa id est omnium culparum reatus reatus enim 
est quo quis est debitor poenae per huius aut chirographum nullum vis 
aequiter divina nec potestas in hominem. Unde diabolicus fuisse detinebat 
hominem sed tam homo per illud chirographum in sic detinebatur erat enim 
debitor poenae sive carentiam nec omnis quantum ex Adam natus est per 
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propriam sanitatem unde obligatur Deo et iuste promittebatur quo usque per 
mortem factam est satisfactionem et illius chirographum deletionem et sic 
patet respondeo ad primum.  
Ad aliud quod quaeritur quoniam delevit chirographa omnium 
culparum dicendus quod quantum sollutet[?] omnibus et quem est de se 
omnis illineret[?] tamen non omnis illinerentur sic passio Christi sufficiens 
fuit ad omnia delenda chirographa quod aut non sunt omnia deleta hoc est 
propter hoc quod aliqui disponunt se ad congruus unde illud verbum 
intelligendus quantum ad sufficientiam non quantum ad efficientiam quod 
ergo obicitur quod partes sive in limbo non habebunt aliud delendus immo 
dicendus erant debitores careri visionis quosque solutum est partum quod 
illius potuit solvere nec Christus Dei filii ad sequens patet respondeo quia 
mors illa sufficiens fuit pars eius ad delendus omnem culpam et omne 
chirographum quod positus est in iustitiam hoc dicitur per accidens quia 
multi debebantur scandalizari in Christo tamen ipse nullum scandalizavit 
immo quem in se fuit ponibus satisfecit. 
Ad hoc quod obicitur quod nullos videtur eripuisse de potestate divina 
dicendus quod illi qui in carcere limbi custodiebantur ad divina etiam licet et 
non posset eos congrue tam usurpabatur sibi potestatem detinendi eos et 
promittebatur non quia haberet iuste in eos sed illi inste detinebantur ibi. 
Ad illud Anselmus respondet ipse idem et summa responsionis sue est 
quod peccatorum illorum per ignorantiam exultatur a tanto quia si 
cognovissent numquam Deum crucifixissent et ideo non debent puniri nec 
sicut de morte unius altius hominis tamen posset dici quod illa fallit ad hunc 
quia gratiam potentiorum omni culpa quantumque fit magna et deletionem 
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peccata est per gratiam secundo passionem Christi adjuncta genere sufficiens 
erat ad satisfaciendi per quoque est quantoque peccata. 
 
Quaestio 2: Secondo, quaeritur de potestate nocendi et temptandi in hanc 
vita qua simpliciter dicimur liberari per passionem et obicitur quia in nullo 
per passionem sit potestas illa minorata quia sicut dicit Gregorius Super 
Psalmos8 non habebat potestatem auferendi unam nec promissis et 
simpliciter modo ergo videtur quod tanta habet potestatem modo quantam 
tunc. 
 Item habet vim orandi corpus humani et vexandi et necandi 
corporaliter ergo in nullo videtur diminuta potestas divina in nocendo 
hominibus.  
Item si dicas quod huius est in reprobis quia post corporaliter nocere 
non soluit quia legitur quod demones flagellabant Antonium corporaliter. 
Item quantum ad potestatem temptandi in illo videtur divinita partas 
quia librum arbiturium erat litteram ante coactione sicut et nunc ergo non 
poterat coegi a divina sicut nec nunc ergo non habuit maiorem potestatem 
temptandi quam modo. 
Contra: Apoc 20 vidi angelum descenderem de caelo qui apprehendit 
draconem et alligavit eum et constat per angelum intelligo Christum per 
draconem divinam sicut exponit a sanctis ergo divinam ligatur est a Christo 
non ergo potens ut prius innocendo.  
Item divinus aut passionem in [_] adorabatur ut Dominus modo 
autem non ergo mutata est potestas temptandi.  
                                                   
8 Some manuscripts ascribe this to Augustine’s Commentary on Job. 
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Item sive Anselmus magne veneretur naturam humanam quantum 
[fol.216.v.A] aut passionem quia prius permittebant se adorari sed potestas 
non sicut patet de Iohannem ergo diligentius modo hominem quem ante ergo 
magne arcent congruas pares non ergo tamen post divinus in homines 
quantum potestas poterat nec cooperare suggestionibus nec etiam 
corporaliter nocendo. 
Respondeo dicendus quod potestas divina quam habebat in 
temptando homines et corporaliter flagellando unitare passionis debilitata 
est tam quia ipse non permittitur temptare sicut prius permittebatur immo 
per Christum ligatus est tam etiam quia si permitteretur invenient homines 
fortiores ad resistendum propter scutum fidei quo sunt salvari sicut dicitur 
Eph ultimus in omnibus summentes[?] scutum fidei in quo possitis omnia 
tela nequissimi extinguere et etiam propter caracterem crucis quo insignati 
sunt de quo dicitur Apoc 7: nolite nocere et cetera quibus signem et illud est 
signemus et illud est signum crucis quia est [_] qua percutitur divinus et 
secondo timet agredi quod dicitur Psa 27 promovit [_] per custodem non 
modo audet ita aggredi et potest partas eius quia adorabatur in [_] totum 
mundus fide passionis ad nichil est per illam autem habebat et nocendi 
corporaliter potentiam adorantes se et temptandi spiritualiter. 
Ad illud quod obicitur quia ante incarnationem non poterat nocere nec 
promissus patet respondeo quod non tamen permittitur modo quantum 
permittebatur prius. Prius enim poterat et permittebatur nocere et vexare 
corporaliter et etiam necare et post in rebus nocumenta facere nec esset de 
aliquo per spiritualitatem gratiam sicut de Job dicitur quod Deus vallantum 
domum eius modo aut non sic unde quod objectum quod modo poterat 
negare et vexare dicendus quod vexare permissus est psalmos ab ecclesia in 
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emendationem fidei Christiane sicut dicitur de illo formatore quod Paulus 
tradidit Satane in meritum carnis 1 Cor 5 vexari permittantur a fideles sed 
hoc vel propter satisfactionem praeteriti peccata in propter maiorem est 
gloriam. Unum Dominus Jesus dixit Antonio quod aderat quem vertabantur 
et modo permittebat quia expectabat eius triumphum.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod liberum arbitrium numquam potuit cogi 
dicendus quod est coactionem sufficiendi est etiam coactionem in ducens 
non ergo potuit cogi coactionem sufficiente tamen cogi poterat quodam 
modo coactione adjacente et hoc modo cogere poterat divinus quantas non 
faceret omni modi violenter sed multo fora impellebat tamquam nunc. 
 
Articulus 4, Quaestio Unica: Sequitur quarto de quarto effectum qui est 
liberationem a poena et [_] hoc essent contenda utrum poena illa poena fuit 
sufficiens ad delendam omnem poenam et utrum [_] omni poena hoc aut 
disscussa sunt ut quaeret distinctio XV et XVI in fine utusque. 
Sed quaeritur a qua morte nos liberavit.  
Respondeo a morte aeterna liberavit qui in eum [_] omnis a quem 
ad sustinentiam spiritualiter a morte culpae quod est per peccatum et a 
morte careretur visionis Dei a morte etiam a Domino mortis divina a morte 
et temporali in mortus temporalis in morte sicut patet in sciens martyribus.  
Ultimo incidunt priore quaerenda circa humanam sed sufficiat hoc 
scilicet quia magnum sit mediator per naturam humanam quam sed divinam 
et videtur quod non per humanam quia medium dicitur aut per 
abnegationem et sic non erat mediator a non per participationem et sic 
simpliciter si erat mediator quia per naturam humanam solis participabat 
alterum extremum.  
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Item in quod humanam naturam fuit extremum et non medium. 
Respondeo dicendus quod meum post divina dupliciter aut ratione 
proprietatis aut ratione nostrarum quod ergo dicitur quod Christus per 
humanam naturam est mediator non intelligitur ratione natarum sed ratione 
peccatum quia erat iustus et mortalis iusticia communicabat cum domino 
morte cum hominibus congruo non potuit esse nec esset congruens mediator 
si intelligitur praeterea debebat enim supplicare et differre ab extremis hoc 
per humanam naturam. 
 
Distinctio 20, Articulus 1, Quaestio Unica: Si vero quaeritur et cetera.  
Ad intelligentiam huius partis supposito quod humana natura fuerit 
temporalis et reparanda ad inquirendam huius reparationis in congruitatem. 
Quaeritur utrum humana natura poterit vel debuit aliter reparari quod per 
satisfactionem. Secondo dato quod magne congrue per satisfactionem 
quaeritur de satisfactione. Tercio de modo satisfaciendi.  
Circa primum quod potuerit et decuerit humanam naturam reparari 
sive satisfactionem videtur misericordia Deum excedit naturam humanam in 
infinitum cum [fol.216.v.B] ergo misericordia humana commendetur in hoc 
quod tantum condonat multo fortius misericordia Deum est commendatus si 
totum condonet homini ergo non videtur quod augetur debuerit exigere 
satisfactionem pro culpa. 
Item Deus praecepit homini totum condonare primo si ergo nichil 
praecepit nec bonum et congruens ergo bonum et congruens est totum 
condonare sine poena aliquam sed omne bonum et decens et decens 
ponendus est in Deo ergo videtur quod sine omni satisfactionem debuit 
hominum liberare.  
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Item magne benignitas est condonare offensam et maioris magne 
condonare et maxime benignitatis totum condonare sed Deus est summae 
benignitatis ergo decuit ipsum totum condonare ergo aliter decuit liberari 
sive salvari genus humanam quam per satisfactionem. 
Item Deus nullius legi subjetus est ergo si condonaret totum nullius 
faceret iniuria ergo nulla est indecentia maxime cum omne quod vult sit 
bonum et decens. 
Contra Anselmus supposita quod peccatum ordinatur in poena arguit 
sed si peccatum damnaretur et punitum ad remaneretur in universo 
inordinaturm sed indecens est quod Deus relinquit ad inordinatur in 
universo ergo indecens est ut peccatum damnatur horum sine satisfactione 
ergo non decebat hominem [_] liberari quam per satisfactionem. 
Item si peccatum non punitur nulli legi subest ergo eadem liberior est 
malitia quam iustitia sed hoc est maxime indecens ergo non decet peccata 
divinitate sine satisfactione. 
Item si peccatum non punitur ergo est eodem modo apud Deum 
impius et peccatorum ergo non pensat merita sed hos est maxime indecens 
[_] sapiente Domino ergo non decet peccatum dimittere sine satisfactione. 
Iste sunt rationes Anselmi. 
Item super illud enim 2 Tim 2 intus se ipsum non potest negare alius 
cum sit iustus non potest negare iustitiam sed iustus est peccata puniri ergo 
non decet immo impossible est ut videtur relinqui peccatum inpunitum ergo 
nec humanum naturam reparari nec per satisfactionem. 
Respondeo dicendus quod sicut dixit Magister in littera et 
Augustinus potuit Deus liberare hominem per potentiam potuit etiam per 
iustitiam maluit tamen iustitiam quia magne congruebat per hoc intelligendo 
372  
 
quod Deus humanam naturam potuit eripere de praefata[?] divina et inferre 
in regnum aliter scilicet quam per satisfactionem sufficientem quae fuit in 
morte Christi sed non ita congruebat nostram miseriam et argumenta ergo 
Anselmi facta ad probandus quod non scilicet ita congrue intelligendus aliter 
enim non concludunt quia peccatum est quod Deus liberasse alio modo 
tamen peccatum non remaneret impunitum quia sicut dixit Augustinus. 
Peccatum secum fert poenam et non promittit Deus deletus peccatum sine 
decore iustiae propterea si deleret peccatum totum non remaneret 
inordinatum concludunt ergo rationes iste quod magne congrue facta est 
redemptio per satisfactionem et quod ita decebat. 
Ad illud quod prima obicitur in congruum quod Deus est summe 
misericors dicendus quod Deus non est tam misericors sed etiam iustus et 
non tam decet ipsum de mente[?] miseriam quia et iustius et ideo magne est 
decens est decens si auferetur et miserendo punit quam si tam puniret aut si 
tam misereretur quo ergo obiicitur de miseria humana dicendus quod non 
est silere quia homini nullo modo debetur vindictam iniuria sua per quod 
dicit dicens in vindictam Deo autem maxime convenit[?] vindicare et ideo 
quis decens sit omne miseria humanam totum condonari non propter hoc 
sequetur quod ita sit in divina et per hoc malum est respondere ad sequens 
quia Deus hoc praecepit homini decet enim hominem non sic aut decet cum 
rationem iam dictam.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod est benignus patet respondeo quia sit cum 
hoc iustus est unde benignitas tanta Deus esse ut tamen iustitiam non 
desciret et non sic remissionem debet quia puniat aliquo modo maximum aut 
Christus benignitas ostenditur in hoc quod homo peccet in eum qui est bonus 
infinitum infinita est offensa et ideo poena deberet esse infinita ipse aut 
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ponendo commutat poenam aeternam in temporalem constat quod aeternum 
excedit temporale in infinitum et in hoc infinita Dei ostenditur miseria et 
benignitas. 
Ad illud quod obicitur quod quicquid vult Deus iustum est hoc 
intelligitur de hunc quae sunt possibilia benefici quia possibile est ipsum 
velle nam ea quod per se mala sunt impossibile est ipsum velle sive qui non 
decent Deum. Et ideo cum hoc non deceat eum quin ipse aliquo modo puniat 
peccatum non est dicere quod decens esset si vellet sed quia indecens 
impossibile est ipsum velle sicut respondet Anselmus. Non tamen Dominus 
quod impossibile sit ipsum velle peccatum dimitti sine sufficienti 
satisfactione sine condigna quia possibile est quod modica sit conceptus et 
reliqua suppleat ex miseria et sic patet quod utrum potuit esse scilicet salvari 
sine satisfactionem passionis [fol.217.r.A] quia alius erat modus passibile sed 
ita magne congruebat.  
 
Articulus 2, Quaestio 1: Secondo quaeritur de satisfactionem et primo 
quaeritur utrum homo posset satisfacere per se quantum ad actuale Deum 
quem ad originale et dato quod non quaeritur utrum angelis potuit 
satisfacere et dato quod non quaeritur utrum aliquid alia creatura potuit 
satisfacere et dato quod non eum ergo ex hoc sequatur quod Deus debuit 
satisfacere quaeritur utrum purus Deus an Deus incarnatus sive humanae 
naturae unitus.  
Primo igitur quaeritur utrum homo potuit satisfacere actuali quod sic 
videtur dicit apostolus 2 Thess qui fidelis est se ipsum negare non post ergo 
cum ipse sit summe misericors non post se ipsum negare reverendi homini 
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miseretur ergo reverenti homini sed homo post per se ad Deum contingere 
ergo per se satisfacere.  
Item hoc videtur auctoritate locus simpliciter illud de filio prodigo 
nulla maior Dei iustitia quem ignoscere penitenti et ad penitentiam reverenti 
misere sine aperire ergo si non potest facere cum iustitiam suam necesse est 
quod hominem venientem recipiat ergo homo potest per peccata satisfacere. 
Item a nullo exigitur simpliciter ratio illud quod post nec per legem 
humanam nec divinam unde locus dicit quod anathema sit qui dixit Deum 
praecepisse impossibile igitur quod si facit homo quod [_] est Deus non 
exigit ab eo plus ergo videtur quod sufficientis faciat.  
Contra peccatum factum cum sit infinitum infinite est offense sed 
omnis poena hominis est finita ergo nullus homo potest satisfacere.  
Item Anselmus in littera Cur Deus Homo congruit voluntatis divinae 
factum ab aliquo nullo dampno est comparabile quia sicut ipse dicit potus 
deberet homo dare totum mundum quam facere contra divinam voluntatem 
ergo contra peccatum, faciat quis contra divinam voluntatem nulla poena 
hominis est illi comparabilis compensabit ergo nullis homo potest per se 
satisfacere.  
Item dicit Anselmus quod satisfactio non solum attenditur in ablati 
restitutionem sed etiam recompensationem iniuriae [_] ergo quod 
satisfaciens ad reddat per iniuria quod non debebat primus sed totum quod 
possumus debemus Deo omni peccato circumscripto ergo nullius potest Deo 
satisfacere.  
Item quod impossibile satisfaciendi non excuset videtur impossibile 
eum qui ex culpa sua est tam impossibilem non excusat sed talis fuit homo 
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ergo non excusatur per impossibilam quin teneatur ad condignam 
satisfactionem.  
Item per hoc divinus excusaretur et esset minus culpabatur.  
Item Beda quia homo noluit abstinere dum potuit in fluctum est ei ut 
non possit abstinere dum vult et tamen non excusatur ergo impossibilia non 
excusat ergo quis homo faciat quod in se est non tum satisfacit ergo 
impossibile est hominem satisfacere per se [_]. 
Respondeo dicendus quod si intelligatur quod homo per se id est 
non adiutus a gratiam potest satisfacere falsum est omnino quia impossibile 
est quod homo satisfaciat in peccato mortali nec prius accepta gratiam 
accepta aut gratiam dixerunt quidam quod non erat hominis satisfactionem 
sufficiens etiam per actualis nisi ad vitam a passione Christi satisfaceri 
quodam modo et influente in omnis satisfactiones vel per fidem vel per 
satisfacta et ad hoc videntur conari rationem anselmi tamen quod homo 
accepta gratiam Dei non sit potens satisfacere per actuali in tam quod non sit 
dignus poena sensuali ergo etiam quod Christus non esset incarnatus illud 
non auderem asserere tamen verbum est quod satisfactiones inest plurimum 
adiuvantur a passione Christi rationes aut ostendentes quod homo potest 
satisfacere per actuali non valent quia quantum faciat nichil meretur nec de 
congruo ante gratiam habeat gratiam potius gratiam autem acceptam habet 
potentiam satisfaciendi per actuali simpliciter illud valet de impossibilem 
quia tamen est in mortali non potest satisfacere sed quia in hanc 
impossibilam ille indiget propria culpa ideo non excusatur exemplum potest 
Anselmus de suo qui imperio Domini iturus erat ad non divinas et ex propria 
voluit se iactavit in foveam tamen cum accepit gratiam potest facere per alios 
adiutus a passione per alios ut dicunt non [_] quis ita sit. 
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Ad illa ergo quae obiciuntur incongruum patet respondeo quia homo 
dignus erat ex culpa poena aeterna sed per gratificationem absolvitur et 
gratiam ad hoc est miseria manente tamen obligationem ad poenam 
temporalem verti nec inrueret Dei miseria bona valeret illud argumentum. 
Simpliciter respondi ad sequens ad illud quod obicitur quod omne 
bonum quod quis facit Deus facere etiam si non portasset Deus id est dignum 
est quod faciat sed quod necessario teneatur ad opera poena ad quod tenetur 
si velit satisfacere hic quales intelligendi rationes sequentes sunt concedere et 
si quod impossibilia non omnino excusat sicut peccatum sicut dixit 
Anselmus.  
 
Quaestio 2: Secundo quaeritur utrum homo adiutus gratiam possit 
satisfacere per originali et videtur quod sic quia maius peccatum est actuale 
quem originale sed homo adiutus gratiam potest satisfacere per actuali ergo 
potest satisfacere per originali. 
Item facti dicunt quod approbationem est a Deo separare veniam in 
parte Deus enim tam consanat totum sanat ergo cum reunitat actuale 
simpliciter originale cum igitur contingat satisfacere per actuali ergo et per 
originali simpliciter potest homo per se satisfacere.  
Item gratiam se habet ad peccatum sicut lux ad tenebram sed lux 
coeliter adveniens in aerem [fol.217.r.B] totaliter tenebram expellit ergo 
super gratiam de anima omnem peccatum simpliciter cum actuali originale 
ergo sicut contingit satisfacere per actuali ita etiam per rationem originali. 
Item satisfactionem non est per rigorem iustiae sed secundum 
temperamentum misere sed miseria non exigit ab homine ultra quam possit 
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videtur ergo quod homo possit satisfacere per originali si habeat gratiam et 
faciat quod in se est.  
Item in Adam idem fuit per substantiam actuale et originale sed potuit 
ut prius dictum est per gratiam satisfacere per actuali ergo et per originali. 
Item per Hugonem et alios sanctos semper erit morbus cum medecina 
ergo idem faciebat destinationem et [_] quod modo facit baptismus ex 
baptizante absolvitur quis ab originali et quantum ad martyrium et quantum 
carentiae visionis ergo et prius satisfaciebat per originali ergo ante 
passionem.  
Contra non contingit satisfacere nec restituatur ablatum sed per 
originale natura humana tota corrupta est ergo nullius potest satisfacere 
quod originali nec ille cuius satisfactionem sit equivalens toti naturae sed hoc 
non potest esse aliquis homo singularis ergo nullis potuit satisfacere pro 
originale.  
Item satisfactionem est actus egrediens a liberum arbitrium gratiam 
informata sed gratiam respicit persona in singularem ergo satisfactionem per 
quod huius est persone singularis sed originale respicit ipsam naturam 
manifestam ergo manifestam quod nullis potuit satisfacere per originali nec 
etiam quales pro se. 
Item est iniustitia quam quis facit sibi et quam alius facit alii ergo pro 
iniustitia quam quis facit sibi Deus de congruo et ipse satisfacere ergo 
simpliciter per iniustitia quam facit alius alii Deus alius satisfacere sed per 
originale non potuit Adam satisfacere respectu omnem quia non satisfaciebat 
nisi per gratiam singularis persone ergo operiant quod alius satisfaceret qui 
posset influere in omnis spiritualiter talis autem non est homo purus sed 
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originale antecedit morum licet aut ergo cum satisfactionem sequatur 
morum liberum arbitrium nullis homo potest satisfacere per suo originali. 
Respondeo dicendus ad intelligendam praedictorum quod in 
originale duo considerantur scilicet culparum et reatus poenae loquendo 
igitur de originale ratione culpae bonum concedo quod gratiam aut aufert -
actuale simpliciter et aufert originale sed quia actus reatus originalis respicit 
totam naturam ex peccato enim primi parentis obligata fuit tota natura 
humana ad carentiam visionis Dei satisfactionem aut accentur[?] quantum 
ad reatum peccati nulla per singularis per gratiam singularem potuit 
satisfacere quantumque esset prius et bonus dum modo esset purus homo 
quia non poterat contra totam naturam unde et Johannes Baptista qui fuit 
satisficatus in utero descendit ad limbum et hoc est quod nec Deus expresse 
dicit Anselmus nec artamus in aliquo divinam potentiam sed potentiam 
singularis hominis humanitas ut tanta non esse ut per gratiam acceptam 
posset illud efficere. 
Ad illud quod dicitur quod actuale est maius originali dicendus quod 
magnum potest dici dicitur vel in offendo et sic actuale vel incorrumpendo et 
sit originale et quia originale totam corrumpit nam actuale tam singularem 
personam ideo et cetera. Tam praedici quod illud non valet quam alterius 
servis et alterius modi est originale quem actuale et alio modo contrahitur et 
ideo alio modo satisfacere contingit. 
Ad illa dua qui sequitur quod Deus sanat totum et simpliciter gratiam 
dicendus quod illud verum est ratione culpae unum cum aufertur originale 
simpliciter et aufertur actuale in baptizo et aequo quem aufertur actuale et 




Ad illud quod obicitur quod satisfactionem non est secundum rigorem 
iustitiae dicendus quod verbum est tam consideratur miseria et cum miseria 
consideratur iustitia et iustum erat ut per tota nec talis satisfaceret qui 
equivaleret toti nec et tum in illa satisfaciens factam est humanae naturae 
summa miseria sicut iustum melius patebit. 
Ad aliud patet respondeo quia si in Adam fuisset actuale et originale id 
tam actuale respiciebat primam originale aut respicit vel respiciebat totam 
naturam sicut deteriatum fuit in hoc.  
Ad ultum dicendus quod illa medicina erat quantum ad culpam ut non 
aeternam puniretur sed numquam ad reatum absolvens quod patet quia 
omnis descendebant ad limbum donec factam est satisfactionem per mortem 
Christi secus aut est de baptista quia habet virtutem delendi culpam se et 
absolvendi a poenam propter virtutem passionis quod fuit satisfactionem per 
peccato originali. 
 
Quaestio 3: Supposito igitur quod homo non potuit satisfacere per se sed 
alio indigeret satisfacite quaeritur utrum ille potuerit vel debuerit esse 
angelis quod sic videtur ita dicit scriptura iustum est ut quid cecidit 
[fol.217.v.A] alio inpellente alio relevante resurgat sed homo cecidit angelo 
impellente ergo angelo relevante debuit resurgere.  
Item Augustinus dicit et habetur in littera quod quia divinus nichil 
dignum morte invenit in Christo et tamen illum occidit ideo dignum fuit ut 
illos praediceret et sic fieri reparationem per angelum ergo et cetera.  
Contra reparationem per satisfactionem est opus iustitiae sed iustum 
fuit quod qui peccavit satisfaciat sed homo peccavit ergo homo debuit 
satisfacere non ergo angelus.  
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Item si congruens est reparationem [_] quod in eandem dignitatem 
homo restituatur in quem fuisset si non cecidisset sed sicut dixit 
scriptarum[?] erant angelis equivalentes nam ordines angelorum supplendi 
erant ex hominibus si aut per angelum fieret reparationem homines essent 
obnoxium angelis non ergo restituerentur in priorem dignitatem ergo non 
debuit fieri per angelum. 
Item sicut supra ostensum est per talem debuit fieri reparationem qui 
perponderaret toti naturae humanae nullis aut angelus fuit talis ergo per 
angelum non debuit et cetera. 
Respondeo dicendus quod Deus bonum potuisset hominem [_] 
angelico eripere de potestate divina sed tam loquendo de satisfactionem et 
reparatione satisfactoria angelus satisfacere non potuit sicut ostensum est 
nec quod ergo obicitur quod homo cecidit angelo suggerente ergo debuit 
resurgere angelo relevante dicendus quod non potuit angelus facere 
hominem eadem nec suggerendo malum nec relevare nec quodam 
suggerendo bonum aut sicut in [_] divinus suggestis malum et cui consensit 
sit in reparationem angelus suggessit et benedicta virgo consensit.  
Ad aliud dicendus quod illa non est tam sufficiens sed cuncta et 
quaedam adaptationem tam autem erat quia tantus et talis erat qui bonus 
toto congruum homini satisfaceret poterat.  
 
Quaestio 4: Supposito quod angelus non potuit satisfacere quaeritur utrum 
per aliam creaturam de uno factam potuit genus humanam reparari et 
videtur quod sic Augustinus dicit solutionem plus exigitur in iusta poena 
quem commistum fuit in culpa sed creatura peccavit ergo videtur poena 
creatura sufficiens poterat esse ad satisfactionem. 
381 
 
Item bonitas totius servis humani finita est ergo Deus cum possit in 
omnem finitum potuit facere creaturam equivalentem toti humano gratiam 
ergo si illa pateretur videtur quod sufficiens fieret satisfactionem aut per hoc 
congrua reparationem. 
Contra maius est de impio facere pium quam creare caelum et creatam 
sed per reparationem similius[?] iustificati ergo maius est hominem reparare 
quem caelum et terram creare sed opus creationis impossibile est fier per 
aliquam creaturam ergo nec reparationis.  
Item Gregorius nichil nasci profuit nec redimi per fuisset sic ergo 
maius benefactum est redimi quam nasci si ergo Deus nos fecisset et alia 
creatura nos redimisset magne tenemur alii creaturae quam Deo quod absit. 
Item plures testatur et sancta scriptura confirmat nos esse finem 
omnem creaturarum unde Isaiah XXX erat lux lunae gloria omnia propter 
hominem facta sunt et cetera sed si alia creatura fieret de novo ad 
redimiendum hominem illa esset homine nobiliorum ergo homo non esset 
finis omnium creaturarum non ergo restitueretur homo in personam 
dignitatem. 
Item creatura non poterat satisfacere per tota natura humana nec 
influeret in totam naturam humanam sed hoc tale quod influeret in omnis 
non potuit esse nec personam omnem hominum humanam sed hoc non est 
nec Deus vel Adam aut tam non potuit esse ergo opportuit quod esset Deus et 
nulla creatura.  
Respondeo dicendus quod non debuit alia creatura esse quem 
satisfaceret per homine per rationes iam dicans. 
Ad illud quod obicitur quod plus non exigitur in poena dicendus quod 
in peccato non solis consideratur peccans[?] sed etiam ille in quo peccatur et 
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ratione alius offensa sit infinita et ideo non sequitur quod creatura pura quae 
finita est possit satisfacere prima ille qui [_] fuit creatura et cetera hoc prium 
cuius naturae non ergo qualet creatura potest satisfacere nec talis esset 
primum quod esset prium omnem hominum in quod influeret in alios 
sanitatem sicut ille quid influxerat corrumptionem non potuit esse creatura 
de novo creatura et per hoc patet.  
Respondeo ad aliud quia [_] quod praeponderaret tum iniquitatem[?] 
creatura non est influere in totum genus humanum quia non esset primum 
solus ante Deus vel Adam fuit prium sed Adam non potuit satisfacere ex 
praedictis ergo colligitur quod solus Deus potuit satisfacere. 
 
Articulus 3, Quaestio 1: Supposito ante reparationem suis humanam per 
satisfactionem esse [fol.217.v.B] domini quaeritur utrum in divina natura 
animi humana et quod in divina videtur creavit enim Deus sine medio 
hominem ergo sine medio debuit reparare. 
Item solo verbo dicere et facta sunt ergo simpliciter videtur quod solo 
verbo debuit dicere et reparata essent.  
Item reparationem est per gratiam gratum autem a Deo immediate 
ergo Deus non assumpta natura humana creatura genus humanum debuit 
reparare. 
Item non est sapiens quem non vult vitare cum potest in decentias sed 
exitum miseriae passiones et in talia non decent divinam naturam ergo non 
debuit talia assumere sed sine habens humanam naturam reparare.  
Contra homo peccavit ergo homo debuit satisfacere qui non 
excusabatur propter ignorantiam et solus Deus potuit facere sic ergo debuit 
ille reparator esse qui deberet et posset satisfacere operant ergo quod ille 
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esset Deus et homo et maxime congruum fuit et in eadem potest ut unius et 
idem esset qui satisfaceret ex habens ergo rationibus rectis ab Anselmo in 
litteras Cur Deus Homo concedentur quod nullo alio modo congruit facere 
reparationem sicut per Deum incarnatum et hoc est quod dicit magister in 
littera quod ergo obiciit quod sine medio creavit et solo verbo dicendus quod 
non valet quia creationem fuit opus potentiae sed reparationem fuit opus 
iustitiae et ideo debuit si in illa naturam quem erat satisfacere sed hoc est 
humana et ideo reparans naturam assumpsit illam de eodem genere cum aliis 
hominibus.  
Ad aliud dicendus quod ad reparationem duo congruunt generem 
infusio ad delendo culpam et hoc est a Deo immediate et satisfactionem et 
poena et hoc est facta per passionem quem pertulit in assumpta creatura.  
Ad aliud patet respondeo quod illa non decebant divinam naturam et 
ideo non assumpsit illa in divina natura sed in humana et in humana non 
erant in deceretur sed maxime congruentia ad reparationem servis humani et 
ideo congruentissime assumpsit illa. Ex praedictis collitur quod 
congruentissime factam est reparationem generis humani per Deum 
incarnatum et quia decentissime facit omnia et licet alius modus esset ei 
possit decuit tam bonam salvare per Christum et ideo omnis qui salvati sunt 
ille auctores quae adducuntur ad ostendum quod non erat alius modus possit 
molli de fuit id est ita congruens miseriae nostrae. Consueverint autem 
adduci [_] super illud personas firmetur manus tua et cetera. Gloria tam diu 
potuit salus isti [_] donec Christus venit.  
Item super illud titulus? enim apparuit gratiam gloria non essemus 
participes dicatis eis nec esset particeps naturae mortis. 
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Item ratio vult per unius iustificationem gloria illa fides sana est qua 
credimus nullum hominem sive per minime erans sive maiori liberari a 
contagione mortis antiquam et obligationem quam congruit a prima 
nativitate maxime per unum mediatorem Deum et hominem Jesum 
Christum. 
Item super illud Hebraeis decebat eum et cetera. Gloria nec Christus 
incarnaretur homo non redimeretur et non redemptus partiret. 
Ad oppositionem fuit auctores factorum qui dicunt quod alius modus 
fuit posset quam per Deum hominem factum dicendus quod ad hoc sicut 
tactum fuit quod iste auctores intelligendum sunt hoc supposito quod Deus 
decuisset salvare genus humanum per satisfactionem et intelligitur non quod 
nullus alius esset possit sed isto debebat esse quod Deus redimeret quia hoc 
immutabiliter Deus decerneret sicut Deum fuit et quod hic modus inter alios 
omnis fuit congruentior scilicet ut per Deum hominem repararemur. 
Supposito igitur ex praedictis quod satisfactionem congruentissime 
fieret per Deum hominem quaeritur de modo satisfactionis utrum 
congruentissime satisfecerit per passionem et videtur primo quod nullo 
modo debuit Christus sic satisfacere nec Deus istum modum satisfaciendi per 
ordinare Anselmus primo Cur Deus Homo c.8 opponit sic quae iustitia est 
hominem iustissimum morti tradere per peccatorem quis homo si 
innocentem condampnaret et nocentum liberaret dampnandus non 
iudicaretur ex habens verbis concludi videtur quod non tam Deus non debuit 
hoc acceptare sed natura etiam promittere. Si respondens sicut Anselmus 
solutionem iniustum[?] eum coegit ad mortem aut occidi permisit sed ipsam 
mortem suam sponte sustinuit ut homines salvaret opponit Boso quod 
videtur eum coegisse suo praecepto et adducit auctores multas quia dicit 
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Apostolus faciens est obediens usque ad mortem et qui praeposito filio non 
propter pepercit et alias multas auctores et iterum solutionem mea sed tua 
voluntas fiat et concludit in omnibus videtur magis obedia cogente quem 
spontanea voluntate mortem subire.  
Item Deus fecit mortem nec delibaretur in nostra afflictionem ergo 
multo minus in morte filii ergo non videtur quod Deus aliquo modo debuisset 
ei praecipere morti ut illud velle.  
Item si mors satisfecit sed constat quod vita eius erat multo melior 
morte et nobilior ergo multo magno vivendo quam moriendo potuit 
satisfacere [fol.218.r.A] non ergo videtur quod modo congruo satisfecerit. 
Item ex quo per mortem debuit satisfacere cum multo melius sit 
satisfacere tali modo quod nullius laedatur quem ita quod alii produntur 
videtur quod non debuit ita ordinari ut occideretur a iudeis et gentibus in 
occidentum dampnationem aeternam.  
Ad oppositum quod iste modus decentissimus sit trahuntur rationes 
ex Cur Deus Homo c. 11 et primo sic satisfactionem est quin homo 
supererogat ei quod debebat ad honorem illius cui satisfacit Christus homo 
non erat debitor mortis cum esset iustus. Iustus enim non det mori debebat 
tamen servare iusticiam ergo quicquid faceret non poterat minus debitum et 
magnam gratiam observare Deo quam mortem ergo si illa satisfactionem fuit 
summa debuit esse per mortem et passionem.  
Item quod mortem et tali genere mortis fuit congruum satisfacere 
videtur per verba Anselmi dicentis anno decet si homo per suavitatem 
peccavit per asperitatem satisfaciat et formatur non sic decebat hominem 
satisfacere per [_] ergo per factum satisfacere per maximam [_] sed hoc est 
asperitas mortis crucis ergo et cetera. 
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Item Anselmus si tam facile est victus adeo ut Deum peccando 
congruaret ut facilius non posset nomine iustum est ut homo satisfaciens per 
peccato tanta difficultate vincat divinum ad honorem Dei ut maiori non 
possit arguitur ex hoc ulterius quod decentissimus modus satisfactionis sive 
per difficultatem sed inter omnia difficilitate fuit sustinere asperrimum 
congruus mortis quod etiam in cruce est ergo et cetera. 
Item Anselmus an non est dignum ut quia sic se abstulit Deo 
praetendo ut magne auferre non posset sic se det Deo satisfaciendo ut 
magnus dare non posset compleatur rationem sic et in morte se totum dat 
homo Deo ut magis dare non possit ergo congruentissimus modus 
satisfaciendi fuit per hoc genus mortis. 
Item Anselmus addit aliam rationem quia per illum modum non 
solum factam est satisfactionem sed exemplum datum est nobis quis inquit 
explicet quem necessarie quem sapienter factum est ut ille qui homines erat 
redempturus et de via mortis et praedictoris ad viam vitae et beatudinis 
aeternae docendo reducturus cum hominibus conversaretur et [_] 
conversationem cum eos doceret verbo qualiter unire deberent se ipsum 
exemplum probaret exemplum autem quo se ipsum daret infirmis et 
mortalibus ut propter iniurias autem contumelias aut dolores aut mortem a 
iustitia non recederent ergo mori docuit Christum et non statum mori sed 
primus conversari ad nostram instructionem. 
Respondeo dicendus quod ille modus satisfactionis inter omnis qui 
possunt esse vel ex cogitari fuit Deo acceptabilior fuit morbo sanando 
congruentorum fuit hominibus beatificandis efficaciorum et utilior Deo 
acceptorum ratione praedicta quia sicut dixit Anselmus Cur Deus Homo 2. 11 
[_] asperius nichil difficilius potest homo pati ad honorem Dei sponte et non 
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ex debito quam mortem et nullatenus se ipsum potest homo magne dare Deo 
quem cum se morti cecidit ad honorem illius in morbo sanando 
congruentiorem quia creato det fieri per congruum primus homo superbierat 
et suaviter peccaverat et se totum Deo abstulerat et [_] satisfaciens 
humiliatur vilissima morte [_] se totum Deo terruit moriendo fuit et nobis 
salvandis efficaciorum quia Christus quis pateretur per omnibus quantum ad 
sufficientiam tamquam ad efficationem solum patiens est per hunc 
sequentiam iustus sectavitur et super omnia Deum diligunt in sua passione 
pervocant nos servandam iustitiam et per illa agonizandus usque ad mortem 
per exaltavit in nobis caritas affectam ostendo nobis suam caritatem eundum 
et hoc est quod dicit Hugo De Arrha Sponse ut ostenderet tibi[?] quantum te 
diligeret non nec moriendo a morte liberare voluit ut non tamen pietatis 
impenderet benefactum verbum etiam caritas monstrans affectum.  
Ad illud ergo quod obicitur primo quod Deus videtur ei fecisse 
iniusticiam respondet de Anselmus quia Deus non coegit ad hoc illum 
hominem immo homo ille sponte se obtulit et quanto nimis debebat mori 
tanto sanorum fuit illa obligatio nec Deus debuit perhibere cum per hoc 
salvaretur gratus humanum immo esset magna debitat[?] si ille homo vellet 
et posset satisfacere et Deus nollet recipere quod ergo obicitur Boso quod 
videtur coactus diligenter soluit Anselmus ix capitulo primo libro Cur Deus 
Homo tamen ista est summa quod Deus filius in nullo fuit coactus sine homo 
et quod dicitur pater eum tradidisse hoc intelligitur quia exposuit eum morti 
et hoc voluit ut moriendo satisfaceret simpliciter quod dicit filius non mea 
voluntas sed tua fiat exponitur de voluntate sensualis aut si de voluntate 
rationis tunc intelligitur sicut illud mea doctrina non est mea quia suam 
voluntatem dixit primis quia illam dederat illi. 
388  
 
Ad illud quod obicitur quod Deus iam [fol.218.r.B] debuit velle 
mortem filii respondet Anselmus dicitur exponens primo sic intelligendo non 
quod voluit poenam illius hominis sed voluit optimam voluntatem quam 
poenam sibi iusti nec placuit sicut in nobis contra videmus aliquos per amore 
Dei poenas sustinentes vel etiam voluisse cum posset dicitur quia cum posset 
per bibere noluit perhibere et rationem iam dictam est unde voluntatem 
Christi voluit etiam liberationem naturam per illam poenam.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod si mors satisfecit multo magne vita 
respondetur quod illud non unit quia satisfactionem respicit poenam et opus 
poenale et summa satisfactionem summa poenam quia ergo illa erat in morte 
numquam ita bonum satisfecissent vivendo quam moriendo.  
Item in morte tradidit temporum quod erat vivendo nunquam tamen 
dedisset ad Dei honorem.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod Deus debuit providere modus in quo fieret 
salus sum dampnationem aliorum dicendus quod est providentia per 
acceptationem et sic providet Deus bona quia illa facit et est providentur per 
concessionem et sic providet Deus mala non quia illa faciat sed quia ex illis 
elicit bona sit etiam dicendus quod Deus naturam dedit illam voluntatem 
malam occidi Christum sed quia ipsi erant habituri illam malam voluntatem 
Deus qui non cogat liberum arbitrium hoc providit et ex hoc salutem 
naturam maximam operatus est et in hic ostenditur eius sapientia et bonitas 
quia de malo novit eicere bonum si aut quaeratur sic esto quod illi non 
occidissent quia hoc erat in libertate corporum[?] tunc ergo non esset 
reparatam genus humanum dicendus quod illa potest nulla est quia Deus 
providerat et bonum faciebat quamvis haberet liberum arbitrium ad faciendis 
hoc si faciendis quod ipsum esset occiditur quod ergo tu dicis ponatur quod 
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illi non occidissent hoc est ponere ponatur quod Deus alio modo decuisset 
salvare et dicunt tamen aliquid quod etiam hoc non fuit [_] mortuus quia sua 
modica passionem satisfecisset sed tamen quicquid fit ex praedictis 
concluditur quod modus iste satisfactionis inter omnis modos 
congruentiorum et hoc fuit et hic fuit qui in principius quaestionis propositus 
inquirendum sed posset quia hic de sufficientia satisfactionis huius de qua 
super quaesitum est quem ad culpam delendam dicit per Christum 
praecedente simpliciter quem ad poenam dicit xv sed tum in sufficientia 
dicendus dicit xv huius satisfactionis tam sunt adiutanda sicilicet ipse 
satisfaciens et hic est Deus aeternis qui omnibus praeponderat simpliciter 
consideratur pro quid est passio quia per optima naturalia et ideo poena 
acerbissima et per omni poena potest satisfacere. Tercio considerandus quod 
non habent effectum nec humanis qui habent gratiam quia sine gratia nullius 
salvantur habentes aut gratiam quicumque peccatores digni sunt vita aeterna 
et poena corporali solum et ab illa vel absolvuntur a tota per passionem ut in 
baptismo vel in parte ut in aliis sacramentis.  
 
Quaestio 2: Supposito igitur ex praedictis quod decrevit filium Dei 
incarnari ad reparandum naturam lapsam quaeritur utrum fuisset incarnatus 
si homo non fuisset lapsus. Et videtur quod sic: Bonum enim est diffusivum 
sui et maxime bonum et maxime diffusivum. Cum ergo post primum 
diffusionem quae est in generatione Filii ab aeterno maxima effusio bonitatis 
Dei sit in illam creaturam unitam Deitati in unitate personae non esset 
manifesta sua diffusio si hoc non fecisset. Decebat igitur Deum hoc facere 
esto quod homo non pecasset. 
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Item tribuit unicuique beatudinis quantum erat capax sed alia 
creatura erat Deo unibilis ergo videtur quod ab ipso sit relegata omnis invidia 
et hoc fecisset, si homo non peccasset.  
Item sicut dixit apostolus 1 Cor xi: Caput mulieris vir, caput viri 
Christus, sed constat quod homo est creatura completissima in universo, 
omnia enim ordinanda ad hominem. Sed caput hominis est Christus, ergo si 
Filius Dei non esset incarnatus, remaneret universum incompletum, sicut 
pictura sine capite. Sed hoc alius modo decebat Deum ergo si numquam 
homo pecasset Deus fuisset incarnatus.  
Item est reperire tres personas in una natura ergo igitur videtur quod 
sit reperire tres naturas in una persona. Aut hic non congruit et non est tunc 
universum esset incompletum ergo si ho non peccasset ad completionem 
universi debebat Deus incarnari. 
Item tota natura humana erat beatificabilis ergo si homo stetisset tota 
beatificaretur in visone Dei corporalis et in visione hominis hominis Christi 
ergo si homo non peccasset Deus debuit incarnari alioquin non perfectione 
beatificaretur homo quod est inconveniens. Et hoc est verbum augustinus de 
spiritum et anima factus est Deus homo ut totum hominem beatificaret. 
Item Bernardus dixit quod angelus primus vidit in verbo creaturam 
vivendam Deo et invidit. 
Ergo si illa [fol.218.v.A] quae videntur in verbo immutabiliter videntur 
esto quod angelus numquam peccasset, nihilominus creatura uniretur Deo. 
Item Apostolus dixit primo ad Romanos quod homo ille erat 
praedestinatus esse filius Dei ergo si praedestinatio est aeterna hoc fuit 
praevisum ab aeterno et immutabiliter praevisum est illud constat ergo sive 
homo peccasset sive non Filius Dei esset nihilominus incarnatus. 
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Contra: Hoc est auctoritas Bernardus qui dixit quod non esset mater 
Dei nisi peccata fuisset. Non tenemur nos peccatores tantas gratias agere Deo 
quantas tenemur si Filius et esset alias hoc facturus non principaliter propter 
nostrum peccatum sed hoc est contra fidei pietatem et ideo non solum falsum 
est sed etiam non dicendum. 
Respondeo dicendus quod nisi videam rationem vel auctoritatem 
magne expressam non credo quod filius Dei esset factus homo nisi homo 
peccasset. Et in hoc debemus ei infinitas gratiarum actiones, omne quod fecit 
pro peccatoribus quod non fecisset nec fuissemus iusti. 
Quod ergo obicitur de diffusione dicendum quod ratio diffusionis sive 
bonitatis non exigit quod faciat omnia bona quae potest sed illud solum tenet 
in diffusione aeterna de creatura nichil valet nam potuit facere meliorem 
istum hominem ut illum minus bonum et in hoc nulla est involuntaria. 
Sufficienter aut manifestatur diffussivimi boni aeternaliter in generatione 
Filii et temporaliter in creatione mundi. Potuit etiam plures mundos facere 
sed tamen non oportuit simpliciter nec in proposito. 
Ad aliud dicendus quod nullo modo intelligendum quod universum 
non fuisset completum esto etiam quod Deus non esset unitus creaturae, nec 
hoc desiderabat universum nec Deus ad hoc se abstraxerat nec etiam 
Christus dicendus est esse de universo sed supra totum universum. Unde etsi 
non esset factam illa unio non esset universum incompletum quia non est 
caput eius quem ad primam completionem ipsius universi nec illa congruitas 
quam adducit spectat ad necessitatem universi. Et ideo rationes ille non 
valent.  
Ad aliud dicendus quod tota natura humana fuisset beatificata etiam si 
non fuisset unio factum et natura corporaliter beatificaretur per influentiam 
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factam a superiori. Beatitudo enim influeret in corpus unitum et quod dixit 
Augustinus intelligendum est per quadam adaptationem, quia sine dubio 
nulla est necessitas quod visus beatificaretur eadem enim ratione posset obici 
de auditu et gustu et aliis sensibus unde non [_] quod beatificentur in 
propriis obiectis. Verum est tum quod magnum est gaudium non essentiale 
in visione praeclarissimae et formosissimae humanitatis Christi Domini 
nostri.  
Ad illud de Bernardo dicendus quod falsum ei inponitur quia 
numquam ipse voluit dicere asserendo. Praetera argumentum non valet quia 
Deus praeviderat ab aeterno se facturum hominem et illum peccatorum et 
reparatorum unde esto quod vidisset in speculato illud quod ultimo dictum 
est scilicet Deum incarnandum sive creaturae uniendum non tamen sequitur 
quod hoc fuisset si homo non peccasset.  
Simpliciter respondendum est ad sequens de praedestinatione quod 
praedestinavit quia providit casuram et si non providisset casum hominis 
non praedestinavisset.  
Illa aut qui volunt dicere quod fuisset unitus creaturae dicunt quod 
nihilominus deberemus ei gratiarum actiones quia tunc non assumpsit 
naturam passibilem et mortalem sicut fecit post peccatum et ideo 
nihilominus tenemur ad gratiarum actiones sed tamen non ad tota. Et quia 
tam hoc nobis dicere amabilius dicere et non est auctoritas expressa adducta 
in congruum melius est dicere quod ad peccatum delendum et naturam 
reparandum et non aliter fuisset Deus homo factus. 
 
Quaestio 3: Ultimo quaeritur esse hanc partem de hic quod magister tangit 
in litteram quod tam passionis fuit in scilicet Deus ipse filius Judas et etiam 
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Judei circum hoc obicitur sit congruarum creaturarum [?] congruis sunt 
efficiens sed voluntas Dei erat bona voluntas inde et Judeorum mala ergo 
non congruerunt[?] sit in unum effectum ergo passio quod sit opus Dei non 
est opus Judeorum. 
Item unius efficiens una est creatam in uno genere iste sunt talis 
passionis aut ergo per diversa genera creatarum aut per idem non ergo 
videtur possibile. 
Item de passione Christi quaeritur utrum videtur bona vel mala et 
loquendo de ipsam in se quia si loquamur per compassionem ad Deum bona 
est si autem per compassionem ad Iudeos vel Iudam constat quod vel de 
meritoria sed in se loquendo videtur quod sit indifferens dicenda quia 
passiones per quod huius sunt in voluntate et illis non laudatur homo nec 
vituperatur ergo passio Christi sic absolute loquendo non det Dei bona nec 
mala. 
Item videtur quod det divina mala simpliciter quia occidere hominem 
est malum in generatione ergo videtur simpliciter quod Christum mori vel 
occidi cum occidatur in quem homo sit malum in generatione [fol.218.v.B] 
potest effectus recipit esse et denominationem a tam per Christum sed causa 
per Christum passionis fuit actionem[?] [_] sed illa actionem [?] fuit 
simpliciter mala ergo passio simpliciter. 
Item videtur quod sit simpliciter dicenda bona quia sicut dicit [_] 
mors sanctorum est preciosa immo preciosissima in conspectu Deum ergo 
simpliciter loquendo det dici bona. 
Respondeo ad peccatorum intelligentiam est notandis quod est opus 
operans et est opus operatum loquendo igitur de opere operante qui est actus 
ipsius volutans de necessitate si necessitas bona voluntas et actus bonis et 
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aequo et unius talis operis voluntas unita est personam. Loquendo autem de 
opere operato plures voluntates possunt conterere in illud opus et unus 
meretur in illo et altus de meretur sicut patet [_] praecipit dari elementam[?] 
ex caritate servus dat eam cum [_] huius elere bona est Domino sed nulla est 
servo simpliciter in praeposita passio dicit opus operatum et ideo similiter ad 
illud efficiendum concurrunt diversa efficientia et passio quid ad diversas 
voluntates comparata recipit denominationem per illas unde meritoria est 
Christo et de meritoria Iudeis [_] autem respectu ad opera operantia sicut 
dicit magister et tradidit et Iudeis tradidit et simpliciter Iudei tradere bonum 
Dei fine quia voluntas s bona tradere autem Iudeorum malum quia voluntas 
mala quod ergo obicit quod congruarum carum congrentarum sunt efficiens 
dicendus quod illud non tenet nec in effectum [_] sua tam sed opus 
operatum non quaeritur cum sua tam supradictum est quadam est in 
proposito quia unius operati multae sunt caritatem.  
Ad illud quod obicitur quod unius [_] est tam in uno genere [_] 
dicendus quod per Christum et in medita una est sed tamen plures possunt 
esse ad adiuvantes vel cooperantes sicut iste. Iste hortatur dummodo ad 
dandam eleemosynam et Dominus praecipit maiori servo et ille minori et 
morem dat eleemosynam plures sunt hic tam in genere caritatem efficientis 
secundum alium et alium modis simpliciter Deus Pater fuit eam passionis 
inspirando illi homini voluntatem paciendi et ille homo ostendo se sicut 
Iudas fuit tam tradendo Iudei [_] milites crucifigendo et licet congruent in 
unum opus operatum non tum conformabantur in voluntatibus quia pater 
hoc volebat ex caritate simpliciter Christus Iudas ex cupiditate Iudei ex 
invidia et ideo non valet quod quia licet unius effectus esset illarum 
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voluntatum quod conformes essent conformitas enim voluntatum non tam 
accenditur in voluntate sed etiam in modo volendi. 
Ad illud quod obicitur de passione Christi absolute loquendo utrum sic 
dicenda bona vel indifferens dicendus quod si loquimur respective circum 
dicemus quod bona fuit in operatione ad sustinentionem in se autem 
loquendo dicendus quia sustinuit eam ex caritate sed malam 
incomparationem ad inferentem in se autem loquendo dicendus quod 
ponitum est indifferens hoc autem hominem occidi dicit malum in genere 
hoc autem martyrem occidi dicit bonum meritorum quia martyrem occidi 
hoc est hominem in honorem et testimonium Jesu Christi. Unde bona est 
passio martyris quia ad bonum finem ordinata est similiter de hac videndus 
est quia Christus non potest pati nisi ex bona causa et ordinata et ideo 
simpliciter loquendo contradicendus est quod passio Christi fuerit bona quod 
ergo obicit quod passionibus non laudamus nec vituperamur verum est 
inquam sunt passiones sed in quantum voluntate sunt vel non voluntate 
laudabiles sunt vituperabiles sicut enim patet velle enim pati per Domino 
bonum est et laudabile et qua passione Christi non potuit esse nec voluntaria 
simpliciter loquendo potest concedi esse bona vel fuisse. 
Ad illud quod obicitur quod efficiens recipit denominationem a causa 
proxima. Responsum quod Christus non potuit pati nec volens et ideo agens 
exterius numquam reliquisset passionem in contra nec eius volitans fuisset et 
ideo passionis Christi per Christum tam indicanda est eius voluntas quod fuit 
bona. 
Ad illud quod obicitur quod hominem occidi est malum in genere 
dicendus quod hoc est quia tamen si actus super naturam indebitam et non 
adducitur a constancia debita vel relationem ad finem debitum secus autem 
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est cum dicitur peccatum pati cum quia passio non est laudabilis nec inquam 
volutatur et non dicitur voluntaria nisi per comparationem vel ad agentem 





Appendix 3  Excerpt from Sententia 
Parisiensis of Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall 
THE ABBREVIATIO BONAVENTURAE 
 
This is a transcription from the only extant complete manuscript of the 
unpublished so-called Paris sentence commentary of Richard Rufus of 
Cornwall. It is taken from MS 176 of the Biblioteca Sacro Convento in Assisi, 
folios 42.v to 50.r and covers distinctions 17-20 of the commentary. It is 
provided not as a definitive edition of the text but is offered simply to 
facilitate access to the text of Richard Rufus and his arguments discussed in 
the main body of the thesis above. 
The original spelling has been preserved throughout although the 
substantial abbreviation of the text has been expanded for ease of reading. 
Paragraph breaks as marked in the manuscript have been observed. All 
other punctuation, however, is my own and provided purely for legibility. 
The schema of the distinctions within this excerpt is: 
 
Distinctio 17: De voluntate et oratione Christi  
Articulus 1  
Quaestio 1 Utrum in Christo fuerit voluntatum pluralitas. 
Quaestio 2 De numero et sufficientiam voluntatum dividit. 
Quaestio 3 De concordia voluntatum Christi  
Articulus 2  
Quaestio 1 Utrum decuerit Christum orare? 
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Quaestio 2 Utrum Christus in omni oratione fuit exauditus? 
Quaestio 3 Utrum oratio in quam oraverit ut calix transiret ab 
confuerit rationis ut sensualitas? 
Distinctio 18: De Merito Christi 
Articulus 1  
Quaestio 1 Utrum Christus meruerit ab instanti conceptionis.  
Quaestio 2 Utrum Christus meruerit post conceptionem? 
Quaestio 3 Utrum Christus aliquid meruerit in passione? 
Quaestio 4 Utrum Christus meruerit sibi praemium substantiale? 
Articulus 2  
Quaestio 1 Utrum Christus meruit corporis glorificationem? 
Quaestio 2 Utrum Christus meruit nobis ianuae apertum? 
Distinctio 19 De Redemptione 
Articulus 1  
Quaestio 1 Utrum per passionem Christi fiat remissio peccator? 
Quaestio 2 Utrum per passionem Christi facta fuerit 
chirographorum deletio? 
Quaestio 3 Utrum per passionem liberati simus a potestate 
diabolica? 
Quaestio 4 Utrum per passionis Christi absolvamur a poena 
peccata? 
Articulus 2  
Quaestio 1 Utrum solus Filius sit redemptor? 





Distinctio 20 De Christi Passionis Congruentia. 
Articulus Unicus  
Quaestio 1 Utrum congruum fuit humanam naturam a Deo 
reparari? 
Quaestio 2 Utrum magis congruum fuit genus humanum per 
satisfactionem reparari quem per aliam viam? 
 
[fol.42.v.A]Distinctio 17, Articulus 1, Quaestio 1: Item quaeritur utrum 
in Christo fuerit voluntatum pluralitas et videtur quod sic. Damascenum 
‘Habere enim dicimur in duabus numeratis duplicia ea quod sunt duarum 
naturam naturalia, duas voluntates naturales et divinam et humanam’ ergo et 
cetera. 
Contra. Damascenus, ‘Quorum substantia est eadem, eorum et 
voluntas eadem’, sed divina et humana natura uniuntur in Christo in 
unitatem personae, ut ypostasis quae est substantia individua, ita quod in 
Christo non fuit sic plures hypostases sed una ergo et cetera. 
Item voluntas facit volentem, ergo plures voluntates plures volentes, 
sed Christus est unicus volens, ergo et cetera. 
Respondeo dicendum est in Christo fuisse plures voluntates. 
Ergo ad primum contradicendum quod uno modo dicitur substantia 
idem quod essentia natura; alio modo idem quod suppositum. Damascenus 
ergo accipit substantiam primo modo in argumento non quod est ad 
contrarium secundo modo sumitur. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod hoc, per se loquendo intelligitur de natura, 
per consequens de persona et quoniam plures naturae possunt esse in una 
persona. Hinc est, quod ad pluralitatem voluntatum etsi sequitur pluralitas 
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[fol.42.v.B] naturarum non tamen personarum et ideo non sequitur. Plures 
voluntates ergo sic plures qui volunt sed bene sequitur, sunt plures naturae, 
secundum quas, quis insunt. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus, ‘Quia duas 
naturas Christi duas eius naturales voluntates et naturales actus aimus. 
Quoniam una duarum naturarum est hypostasis, unum aimus et volentem et 
agentem naturali secundum ambas.  
 
Quaestio 2 enim quaeritur de numero et sufficientia voluntatum dividit 
enim videtur voluntes Christi in tria membra, quorum unum sed voluntas 
divinitatis, aliud voluntas rationis, tertia verum voluntas carnis seu 
sensualitatis. Sed quod ista divisio sit superflua. Materia primo auctoritate: 
Damascenus, ‘Duas, inquit, naturas Christi, duas eius naturales voluntates et 
naturales actus aimus’, ergo si divisio Damasceni est completa, quae est per 
dua membra, patet et cetera.  
Item Philosophus dicit in terti0 ‘De Anima’ quod ‘voluntas est in sola 
rationali’ ergo nulla voluntas videtur esse sensualitatis ergo et cetera. 
Item contra quod et fuit plures quam tres videtur: Hugo tali quem 
fecit ‘De Voluntatibus Christi’ ait ‘Fuit in Christo voluntas divinitatis et 
voluntas rationis et voluntas pietatis et voluntas carnis’ ergo sunt quatuor 
differe voluntatis. 
Item sicut Christus habuit sensualitate ita habuit synderesis et sicut 
sensualitatis est appetere bonus carnis, ita synderesis appetere bonus 
honestatis. Ergo sicut ponitur aliqua voluntas in Christo secundum 
sensualitatem, ita videtur quod deberat poni secundum synderesis et ita 
quatuor erunt voluntatis differe. 
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Respondeo voluntas tripliciter consideratur, aut poenes naturam 
volentem, aut poenes potentiam per quam quis vult, aut poenes modus 
volendi. Primo [fol.43.r.A] modo dividitur voluntas divisione bimembri. 
Unum in Christo duplex est voluntas: divina, scilicet, et humana secundum 
duas naturas. Secundo materia dividitur voluntas divisione trimembri quia in 
Deo fuit potentia divina et potentia rationalis creata et potentia sensitiva et 
per quamdlibet harum exibat in actum volendi. Tertio materia dividitur 
voluntas divisione quadrimembri et ergo consideravit Hugonis voluntate 
Christi cum eam per quatuor membra divisit. Ait enim sic: ‘In Christo fuit 
voluntas divinitatis, rationis, pietatis et carnis. Voluntas divinitatis quod 
iustitiam summam dictabat. Voluntas rationalis per obediam veritatem 
approbabat. Voluntas pietatis per compassionem in malo alieno suspirabat. 
Voluntas carnis per passionem in malo proprio murmurabat. Et sic patet 
secundum per diversos modos dividendi voluntatum Christi numerus et 
sufficientia et objecta omnia evanescunt. 
 
Quaestio 3 enim quaeritur de concordia voluntatum Christi utrum scilicet 
essent in ipso conformes vel repugnantes et videtur quod repugnantes. 
Augustinus super Ps. 32 ‘Quantum distat Deus ab homine tantum distat 
voluntas Dei a voluntate hominis, unde homines gerens Christus ostendit 
privatam quandam hominis voluntatem’, ergo si privata voluntas est voluntas 
repugnans divinae voluntati patet et cetera. 
Item videtur contrariae sunt voluntates quod sunt contrariorum 
volitorum sed voluntas rationis volebam mori, voluntas sensualitatis et 
rationis erant voluntas contrariae ergo et cetera. 
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Contra voluntas humana secundum rectum ordinem debet esse 
subjecta divinae. ergo si in Christo repugnabat videtur quod in Christo pro 
esset repugnantia et culpa. 
Item, omnis motus qui adversatur voluntati divinae est motus ad 
illicitum et omnis [fol.43.r.B] talis est peccatum sed in Christo non fuit 
peccatum ergo et cetera. 
Respondeo dicendum quod conformitas voluntas1 in duobus 
consistit, scilicet in volito et in ratione volendi. Conformitatem in volito2 
dicitur quando in diversae voluntates unum et idem volunt. Conformitas in 
ratione volendi quando idem eodem modo volunt, vel altera eorum vult illud 
eo modo quo superior vult eam velle. Sic volebat etiam ratio sicut divina 
voluntas volebat eam velle. 
Ergo ad primum contra dicendum quod Augustinus intendit ibi 
ponere distantiam quantum ad diversitate voluntatum et distantiam 
volitorum non aut quantum ad subiectionis ordinem in volendo et ideo illa 
distantia non ponit contrarietem. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod illud intelligitur de contrariarite in gratie 
moris quando necessitatem est alteran esse malum non autem de 
contrarietate in genere moris quando necessitatem est alteram esse malum 
non autem de contrarietate in generis nec quia utraque post bonum appeti 
hic aut est contrarietas secundum genus humanae naturea sumere et mori. 
 
                                                   
1 Sic. ‘voluntatis’? 
2 Sic. ‘volitio’? 
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Articulus 2, Quaestio 1 enim quaeritur utrum decuerit Christum orare et 
videtur quod genus nulli magister competit orare quam ei qui est pontifex et 
sacerdos sed Christus talis fuit ergo et cetera. 
Item nullum magis decet orare quam qui est dignior exaudiri sed 
nullus est dignior exaudiri quam Christus ergo et cetera. 
Item, contra aut ‘De Correptione’ et gratia ‘Nemo quaerat ab alio 
quod per se potest sed Christus omnia poterat per se’. Ergo nichil debebat 
ipsum ab alio petere ergo nec orare. 
Item orare sed actus persone inferioris respectu eius quem orat sed 
persona Christi est aequalis Patri ergo ipsum orare non decuit. 
Respondeo dicendum [fol.43.v.A] quod Christum orare decuit.  
Ad primum contradicendum quod illud est verum secundum quod 
peccato attribuitur eidem ratione eiusdem naturae, sic autem non est in 
proposito, quia ratione alterius naturae orabat et ratione alterius naturae 
implere poterat. 
Videlicet dicendum quod illud habet unitatem quam quis orat 
propter supplendam propriam indigentiam animam eum non orat quis 
propter supplendam indigentiam alterius et maximum quem est descens3 
idoneitatis in eo per quo … Dominum potuit petere ab alio quod ipse per se 
potest. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod illud est Christum attribuendo 
inferioritatem personae ratione illius naturae secundum quem competit 
materia quamvis ergo persona Christi ratione divine naturae sic aequalis 
                                                   
3 Sic. ‘decens’? 
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Patri tamen secundum humanitatem secundum qui ei orare competit minor 
est Patre iuxta illud Joannis 244 ‘Pater maior me est’. 
 
Quaestio 2, enim quaeritur utrum Christus in omni oratione fuit exauditus 
et materia quod sic.  
Johannes 11: ‘Ego autem sciebam, quod semper me audis’ sed illud 
audire non est aliud quam exaudire’, ergo et cetera. 
Item Christus magis dignus est exaudiri quam membra in eius 
nomine petentia, sed Johannis 135 dicitur, ‘Quicumque petieritis in nomine 
dabis’ ergo multofortius, quidquid petiit ipse, obtinuit. 
Contra, in Psalmo, ‘Deus meus, clamabo per diem et non exaudies’ et 
cetera.6 
Respondeo dicendum quod quaedam oratio fuit in Christo 
procedens a voluntate rationis, quaedam a voluntate carnis prima oratio per 
omnia fuit in Christo exaudita secundum tertia non in haec ratio quia hac 
voluntate pietatis et carnis non conformabatur Deo in omni volito7 quis in 
materia volendi sicut ascensum est super [fol.43.v.B] et etiam quia illa petitio 
potius ordinabatur ad nostram instructionem quam ad divina exauditionem. 
Et ex hic patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et ad rationes ad 
utramque partem. 
Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur de auctoritate Psalmi, dicendum quod 
illud intelligitur de capite ratione membrorum, sicut Glossa ibidem exponit. 
 
                                                   
4 Sic. The reference should be to John 14: 28. 
5 Sic. The reference should be to John 14: 13. 
6 Psalms 21. 
7 Sic. ‘volitio’? 
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Quaestio 3 enim quaeritur utrum oratio in qua oraverit ut calix transiret ab 
eo fuerit rationis ut sensualitas et quod sensualitatis videtur per Magistrum 
in littera, ‘Secundum affectum sensualitatis Christus mori noluit, nec optinuit 
quod secundum istud modus petit’, ergo et cetera. 
Item nullus sapiens petit vel orat contrarium eius quod vult, sed ratio 
volebat mori. Ergo petitio de evasione mortis non erat rationis et erat rationis 
vel sensualitas, ergo et cetera. 
Contra, Damascenus: ‘Oratio est ascensus intellectus in Deum’. Sed 
sensualitatis non est ascendere in Deum. Ergo non orare. 
Item solius rationis est futura praecognoscere sed oratio illa ex 
factorum praecognitione. Ergo non erat sensualitas, sed rationis. 
Respondeo de dicta oratione est loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad 
materiam, aut quantum ad formam. Si primo modo loquamur cum materia 
omnis respiciat desiderium petentis, talis petitio fuit sensualitatis, cuius 
desiderium erat de non moriendum. Si autem secundo modo loquamur de 
ipsa cum forma petitionis respiciat discretionem petitionis. Et talis modus 
proponendi sit discretione rationis. Dicendum quod talis oratio fuit rationis. 
Non est simpliciter concedendum, quod talis oratio fuerit istius vel illius sed 
sensualitatis quantumcumque ad materiam rationis, quantum ad formam. 
Sensualitatis ut manentis, rationis ut proponentis sensualitatis ut pro quo 
rationis ut a quo et ideo consuevit [fol.44.r.A] dici, quod ratio fuit advocatus 
sensualitatis. Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et etiam 
ad rationes ad utramque partem. Sed restat quaestio; cum ratio sciret, 
sensualitatem nec exaudiendam nec dignam exaudiri, quia petebat 
contrarium voluntati divine quomodo hanc petitionem proponit. 
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Et dicendum ad hoc, quod huius ratio fuit triplex. Prima ad 
manifestationem veritatis naturae assumptae, quae naturaliter conrefutabat 
passionem. Et in hoc erudivit nostram fidem. 
Secunda ad confirmandam nostram imbecillitatem, ut non diffidam, 
si passionum pericula exhorremus. Et in hoc ex erexit nostram spem. 
Tertia, ut ostenderet, voluntates nostram voluntati divinae esse per 
omnia subiiciendam, quod ostendit in conditione apposita, ‘non sicut ego 
volo’ et cetera. Et in hoc ordinaverunt in nobis talis caritatem. 
 
Distinctio 18: De merito Christi. Supra egit de voluntate Christi. In hac vero 
parte agit de usu ipsius qui consistit in exercitio merendi. Dividitur autem 
ista pars in duas. In quarum prima agit de merito Christi in se. Secundo de 
ipso ordinato ad nostram utilitate, ibi: Ad quid ergo voluit… Prima pars 
dividitur in quatuor partes secundum quartuor quaestiones, quas 
determinat. Primi ut ostendens, quod meruit aliquid sibi in quando mereri 
incepit, ab instantia conceptionis ibi: Nec solum hoc meruit... In tertia, quid 
meruerit, ostendens quod non tantum gloriam impassibilitatis sed etiam 
nominis exaltationem, ibi: Nec tantum gloriam impassibilitatis... In quarta, 
qua necessitate meruerit, ibi: Si vero quaeritur, utrum Christus et cetera.  
Secunda pars principalis dividitur [fol.44.r.B] in duas. In quarum 
prima proponit efficaciam meriti Christi respectu nostri. In secunda vero 
multiplici auctoritate confimat, ibi: Sed quomodo per mortem nos a diabolo 
liberavit et cetera. Subdivisiones partium manifesta sunt in littera. 
 
Articulus 1, Quaestio 1 Quaeritur primo utrum Christus meruerit ab 
instanti conceptionis et videtur quod sic. Auctoritate Gregorii et Magistri in 
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littera ‘Non solum meruit Christus quando Patri obediens crucem subiit sed 
ab ipsa conceptione ex quo homo factus est’. 
Item lux propter suam nobilitatem et actualitatem in eodem instanti 
incipit esse et lucere. Ergo si anima Christi multo nobilior et potentior et 
deiformior est, videtur quod ab eodem instanti, in quo incepit esse, incepit 
habere operationem sibi debitam, sed talis est operatio merito, ergo et cetera. 
Contra, prius est esse quam agere ergo prius est esse quam mereri, 
ergo prius habuit esse completum quam meruit, ergo et cetera. 
Item meritum est a voluntate deliberativa in quantum deliberativa 
est, et ubi est, deliberatio, ibi est collatio, ubi autem haec est, ibi est temporis 
successio, ergo et cetera. 
Respondeo ad perfectionem meriti duo concurrunt, scilicet habitus 
gratuitus et eius usus. Si primo modo loquamur de merito Christi 
concedendum quod a principio suae conceptionis meruit quia omni bono et 
principio dignus propter gratiae plenitudinem. 
Si autem secundo modo loquamur sic est duplex modus dicendi 
unius quia Christus statim post principium conceptionis et ideo aut in primo 
instanti et hic ideo quare operatio debet sequi esse et ideo si alicubi dicatur a 
primordio sue conceptionis meruisse [fol.44.v.A] conceditur secundum quod 
littera a dicit ordinem ad principium sumptum non mira. 
Alius est modus dicendi quod quantum ad usum virtutis meruit in 
ipso primordio conceptionis et hoc datum est ei de plenitudine gratiae ut in 
primo instanti in quo incepit esse non tamen haberet habitum virtuti sed 
actum et uterque horum modorum probabiles est sed pervius est contrarior 
et secundum illum plana est responsio.  
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Ad objecta quia primum verbum est quantum ad habitum et hoc 
innuit verbum beati Gregorius dicit, ‘Non solus meruit,’ et cetera. 
Ad secundum responditur quod in omni creatura ita esse praecedit 
operari tam in corporali quam in spirituali, tam in actu naturae quam in actu 
gloriae. In suo preiudicio videtur secundus modus. Modus meliorum, et ad 
primum contra patet. 
Respondeo duplicitur nullus est esse prius ut natura ut tempori prius 
ergo est esse quam agere sed necessitatem est quia prius tempori. 
Ad secundum responditur quod quamvis secundum processum 
naturae deliberatio indigeat successione et tempore, tam secundum 
plenitudinem gratiae et gloriae possibile fuit animae in instantia discernere, 
quod alia anima non posset facere sine continuo et tempore. 
 
Quaestio 2 enim quaeritur utrum Christus meruerit post conceptionem et 
videtur quod sic. Philippenses: ‘Humiliavit se usque ad mortem’, et post, 
‘Propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum’.  
Et donavit quod verbum tractans Augustinus dicit, ‘Humilitas 
claritatis est meritum, claritas humilitatis est praemium.’ Si ergo humiliatio 
fuit post conceptionem patet et cetera. 
Item opera Christi [fol.44.v.B] fuerunt multo nobiliora quam sunt 
merita aliorum sanctorum. Si ergo opera aliorum sanctorum digna sunt 
retributione patet, et cetera. 
Contra mereri est facere opus causae de genere et laudabilium, sed 
potentia determinata ad unum tantum non habet laudem in suo actu, sicut 
patet in potentiis naturalibus et liberum arbitrium Christi ab instanti 
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conceptionis determinatum fuit ad bonum, ergo non potuit exire in opus de 
genere laudabilium ergo nec mereri, ergo et cetera. 
Item, quicumque meretur, proficit in bonis animae gloria, scilicet et 
gratia, sed Christus non potuit proficere supra id quod accepit a conceptione, 
gratia nec mereri gratia, et cetera. 
Respondeo tripliciter contingit mereri, scilicet merito 
multiplicativa et sic meretur qui facit bonum opus mala intentione aut tamen 
cui tamen Deus plus retribuit merito congrui. Et sic meretur qui facit opus de 
genere bonorum et bona intentione, non ex caritate talis enim de congruo se 
disponit ad gratiam. Merito condigni sicut ille qui facit bonum opus et bona 
intentione et ex caritate. Et habet post esse tripliciter. Uno modo mereri ex 
condigno, est ex indebito facere debitum, sicut meretur quis in gratiae 
infusione et motu liberi arbitrium. Alio modo ex debito facere magis 
debitum, sicut contingit de profectu in profectum [fol.45.r.A], de virtute in 
virtutem. Tertio modo debito uno modo facere debitum alio modo, ut debito 
per habitum facere debitum per usum. Meruit gratiam Christus merito 
condigni et tertio modo debito tamen quia id idem quod meruit ab instanti 
conceptionis per habitum virtutum meritum post per usum eorum. 
Ergo ad primum contra, dicendum quod determinata potentia ad 
unum potest esse dupliciter, scilicet per necessitatem naturae et per 
confirmationem gratiae. Primo modo tollit dignitatem et secundo modo non. 
Et hic secundo modo fuit liberum arbitrium in Christo determinatum ad 
unum, scilicet ad bonum. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod proficere in bono est dupliciter, scilicet 
quantum ad virtutem merendi et quantum ad numerum meritorum. Primo 




Quaestio 3 enim quaeritur utrum Christus aliquid meruerit in passione, et 
videtur quod sic. Ad Philippenses, ‘Humiliavit se ipsum usque ad mortem, 
propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum.’ Quod verbum tractans magister dicit, 
‘Aperte dicit apostolus, propterea Christum exaltatum’ per impassibilitatis 
gloriam quia humiliatus per passionis obedientiam, ergo et cetera. 
Item nihil satisfactoriun habet sicut meritorium, sed passio Christi 
fuit satisfactoria, sicut dicunt sancti. Ergo et meritoria gratia, et cetera. 
Contra sicut dicit Philosophus, passionibus nec laudamur nec 
vituperamur, sed per omne, per quod meremur, laudam gratia passionibus 
non meremur, ergo non Christus meruit. 
Item nichil est meritorium, nisi quod est secundum naturam, sed 
passio est motus [fol.45.r.B] contra naturam sicut dicit Damascenus. Ergo 
impossibile est passione fieri, ergo et cetera. 
Respondeo mereri duo contingit considerare in passione, scilicet 
passionis causam et passionis sustinentiam. Primum est a violentia agentis. 
Secundum voluntate patientis. Quantum ad primum passio non est meritoria 
nec demeritori, quia est ab extra; quantum ad secundum potest esse 
demeritoria, si quis eam perferat ex voluntate bona. Et demeritoria, si ex 
mala igitur quoniam Christus ex optima, voluntate passionem pertulit habuit 
est quod ipsam valde meritoria fuit. 
Ad primum contra dicendum quod illud est verbum secundum quod 
sunt purae passiones: prout aut est eis bona voluntas, convicta ut mala sic 
habent rationi meriti et demeriti laudis et vituperii. 
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Ad aliud dicendum quod contra naturam est dupliciter. Aut quia est 
contra rationem, aut quod est contra naturam hoc modo, est vitium nisi forte 
sit supra naturam, sicut est in assensu fidei. 
Alio modo dicitur contra naturam quia est contra naturalem 
appetitum salutis et quod est contra naturam. Habet modo potest esse 
meritorium, quamvis sit poenale, et hoc modo accipit Damascenus, cum 
dicit, quod passio est contra naturam. 
 
Quaestio 4 Enim quaeritur utrum Christus meruerit sibi praemium 
substantiale, videtur quod sic. Quia gloriosius est habere praemium per 
merita quam sine meritis. Sed Christi praemium excellit omnium sanctorum 
praemia, ergo videtur quod per meritum sicut et alii sancti illud habere 
debuerit. 
Item angeli sancti per merita habuerit praemium substantiale, 
secundum communem opinionem omnium. Sed [fol.45.v.A] angeli simul 
habuerunt gratiam et gloriam, si ergo gratia non fuit minoris efficaciae in 
Christo, patet et cetera. 
Contra, Augustinus Enchiridion dicit quod ‘nullis praecedentibus 
meritis, homo ille copulatus est Deo’, sed illa copulatio non potuit causae sine 
Dei fruitione, quod est praemium substantiale. Ergo videtur8 quod per 
aliquod meritum habuit Christus praemium substantiale. 
Item meritum naturaliter antecedit praemium, usus non ut actus 
virtutis naturaliter sequitur habitum, cum ergo habitus gratiae et gloriae 
simul fuerit in Christo. Videtur quod merita subsecuta fuit substantiale 
praemium. 
                                                   
8 Sic. ‘Non videtur’? 
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Respondeo dicendum quod anima Christi non esset necessitas ad 
unionem idonea, nisi esset beatissima et deiformissima, quod quidem fit per 
gloriae influentiam. Si ergo necesse fuit, unionem illam antecedere omnia 
merita secundum ordinem naturae, necesse etiam fuit, deiformitatem gloriae 
in Christo praecedere omnem usum gratiae, et ideo gloria in Christo 
praecessit omnia merita. 
Ergo ad primum dicendum quod illud habet veritatem solum in illis 
qui miri habent Deo solus per conformitatem affectionis. Christus assumpsit 
hunc unitus Deo etiam unione personali. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod non est simile quia in angelis infusione 
gratiae liberi arbitrium praecessit usus informatus, in quo consistit meritum, 
potuit praecedere ipsum praemium ordine, quamvis esset simul tempore. 
Christus autem enim poenis habuit deiformitatem gloriae quam usum 
[fol.45.v.B] voluntatis deliberativae. 
Aliis aliter videtur secundum Augustinus quod Deus sanctis angelis 
simul fuit naturam et gratiam. Verum in primo instanti sui esse habuerit 
gratiam et non praemium praecessit in eis usus libero arbitrio infusionem 
genere. Dicendum ergo id illud argumentum quod falsa est potest nihil 
meruerunt gloriam haec est praemium substantiale. Sed confirmationi in 
gloria per hic quid aliis cadentibus ipsi perseveraverunt. 
 
Articulus 1, Quaestio 1 Enim quaeritur utrum Christus meruerit corporis 
glorificationem et videtur quod sic. Auctoritate magistri in littera, ‘Merito 
humilitatis et anima impassibilis factam est et caro immortalis’. Ergo meruit 
immortalitatem carnis, ergo glorificationem. 
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Item efficacius meretur quis sibi quam alii et habet non hoc 
instantiam in his quae cadunt subjectum merito, sed Christus meruit aliis 
resurrectionem et glorificationem. Ergo multofortius sui, ergo et cetera. 
Contra anima Christi beatificata fuit absque meritis propter unionem 
ipsius ad deitatem. Ergo videtur quod pari ratione et corpus, ergo et cetera. 
Item in corpus nunquam qui habuit meritum mortis, ergo gloria 
videtur quod per se deberetur ipsi corpori gloria immortalis gratia. Videtur 
quod per merita eam non acquisierit. 
Respondeo dicendum quod Christus meruit sibi corporis 
glorificationem, non solus in agendo verbum et in patiendo sicut expresserat 
magister in littera. 
Ad primum contra dicendum quod non est simile, quia unio divinae 
naturae ad humanam potius patitur imperfectione carnis quod est in carentia 
minoris boni. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod ex hoc non potest [fol.46.r.A] concludi, 
quod Christus gloriam corporis non meruerit, nisi eo modo dicendi meritum, 
quo quis de indebito fiere debitum. Hoc autem modo Christus sibi non 
meruit, sed illo modo dicendi meritum quo quis de debito uno modo factum 
debitum alio modo. 
 
Quaestio 2 Enim quaeritur utrum Christus meruerit nobis ianuae 
apertionem et videntur quod sic. Auctoritate magistri super Epistolam ad 
Ephesios, ‘Per aliam hostiam non potuit nobis aperire aditus et fieri salus nisi 
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per mortem unigeniti, aut tanta fuit humilitas et patientia, ut eius merito 
pateret in eum credentibus aditus regem’, ergo et cetera.9 
Item si aliqui per Christi merita potuissemus introire in gloriam. 
Ergo sine morte Christi et passione potuissemus salvari, et si hoc, Christus 
mortuus esset gratis, ergo et cetera. 
Contra omne meritum consistit in radice caritatis. Caritas aut in 
Christo non crevit, ergo omne quod Christus meruit, ab initio meruit. Nobis 
adituum regni alio qui non opportuisset eum pati, ergo videtur quod 
numquam nobis nullum meruit. 
Item caritas meretur gloriam ex condigno sed Abraham habuit 
caritatem, sicut nos habemus, ergo aut Deus injuste cum eo egit, aut eum in 
gloriam introduxit et si hoc aditus regni ante Christo adventum patuit. 
Respondeo dicendum quod paradisus caelestis est aperta visio Dei; 
clausio autem ianuae huius fuit impossibilitas videndi Deum facie ad faciem, 
quae cosurgebat ex merito peccatam10 Adae et ex decreto divinae sententiae, 
quo decreverat neminem ad sui apertum [fol.46.r.B] admittere, nisi esset 
facta emenda et satisfactio pro illo peccato. Et quoniam emenda et 
satisfactionem facta est ei per Christum, hinc est, quod per meritum Christi 
patuit nobis aditus in caelum. 
Ergo ad primum contra dicendum quod est meritum Adae peccato 
vitae aeternae et est meritum dimissionis poenae. Primum consistit in radice 
caritatis, secundum non tamen in haec, sed etiam in acerbitate poenae. 
Apertio non ianuae principaliter consistebant quantum ad meritum 
                                                   
9 Sic. Peter Lombard was actually commenting on the Letter to the Hebrews, Sent. III, d. 18, 
a. 2, q. 3. Bonaventure had also misattributed this reference, ascribing it to Augustine. Thus 
Richard corrected the author and then erroneously altered the work upon which he was 
commenting. 
10 Sic. ‘peccati’? 
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dimissionis poenae, quod illa apertio fieri habebat per opus satisfactionis. 
Satisfactio autem fit maxime per opera poenalia. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod caritas non meretur nisi praeambulo motu 
fidei . Post lapsum hominis fides autem absoluta non sufficit, nisi sit fides 
creatoris et mediatoris, sine qua nemo potest iustificari et ideo efficacia 
omnis meriti fundata est super merita Christi. Et proprea non sequitur, quod 
caritas mereatur gloriam circumscripturis meritis Christi, vel introducat in 
ipsam, quod meritum caritatis nostrae non excludit meritus, Christi sed 
potius includit. 
 
Distinctio 19, Articulus 1, Quaestio 1 Nunc igitur quaeramus, et cetera. 
Supra egit de Christi incarnatione et de his, quod Christi incarnationem 
ordinabantur ad naturam reparationem. In hac autem parte agit de nostra 
redemptione, quae facta est per passionem. Et dividitur ista pars in duas. In 
quarum prima agit de Christi passione. In secunda de morte, Distinctione 
XXXI: Post haec considerandum est.11 Prima pars dividitur in duas. In 
quarum prima agitur [fol.46.v.A] de efficacia eius et utilitate. In secunda de 
congruentia et necessitate, Distinctio XX: ‘Vero quaeritur’, et cetera. 
Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, dividitur in 
duas. In quarum prima agitur de efficacia passionis. In secunda de persona 
redemptoris, ibi, ‘Unde ipse dicitur mundi redemptor’. Prima pars dividitur 
in quatuor. Prima ostendit passionis efficaciam in remissione peccatorum. In 
secunda in deletione chirographorum inibi, ‘Itaque in Christi sanguine.’ In 
tertia in liberatione a postestate diaboli, ibi, ‘Factus est igitur homo mortalis’. 
In quarta in absolutione peccata, ibi, ‘A qua poena? Temporali et aeterna’.  
                                                   
11 Sic. The reference is presumably to Distinctio XXI. 
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Similiter secunda pars principaliter quatuor habet partes. In quarum 
prima determinat, quare dicitur redemptor. In secunda, quaeritur mediator, 
ibi, ‘Qui solus dicitur mediator.’ In tertia, quaeritur solus Filius dicitur 
mediator, ibi, ‘Sed cum sola peccata deleat non solus Filius’. In quarta, quam 
naturam dicitur mediator, ‘Unde et mediator dicitur.’ Subdivisiones partium 
in littera satis apparent. 
Item quaeritur primo utrum per passionem Christ fiat remissio 
peccatorum et videtur quod sic. Hebraeos 9: ‘Sanguis Christi, qui per 
Spiritum Sanctus semetipsum immaculatum obtulit Deo, emundabit 
conscientias nostras ab operibus mortuis.’ Sed opera mortua propter peccata, 
ergo et cetera. 
Item, Sacramenta quod iustificant habent iustificationem a passione 
Christi, ergo multo fortius Christi passio est efficax in iustificando. 
Contra, Isaiae 43, ‘Ego sum, qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me’. 
Ergo deletio peccatorum [fol.46.v.B] nostrorum est a solo Deo. Non ergo a 
Christi passione. 
Item, iustificatio a culpa est per gratiae infusionem sed solus Deus 
potest gratiam infundere. Ergo solus Deus potest culpam delere, ergo et 
cetera. 
Respondeo dicendum quod in peccato duo sit, scilicet macula quae 
deletur per gratiam et reatus poene qui deletur per satisfactionem poenalem. 
Passio vero Christi dupliciter potest considerari, ut nec est in re exeunt, ut est 
in anima. Si primo modo consideretur, sic passio Christi fuit meritoria 
gratiae omnibus cooperatibus per quam deletur macula peccati. Fuit et 
satisfactionem poene et in hac dicitur praecare nostras languores et per hac 
absolvitur reatus peccati. Si aut consideratur secundo modo cum anima 
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debeat habere fidem et caritatem. Compassionem et mutationem quicum ad 
prima duo dicitur delere culpam, quia sine fide impossibile est placere Deo et 
caritas operit multitudinem peccatorum, quicum vero ad alia duo dicitur 
delere ipsum reatum. Convenit ergo remissio peccatorum passioni Christi. 
Sicut causae meritoriae quo ad culpam et sicut satisfactoriae qua ad reatum, 
gratia ad primum contradicendum quod illud est bonum per modus 
efficientis per hac tamen non excluditur qui alii possit convenire per modum 
merentis. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod quis gratia a solo Deo habeat infundi 
nihilominus tamen Christus per suam passionem potuit eam nobis mereri et 
sic dicimur a passione iustificari. 
 
Quaestio 2 Enim quaeritu utrum per passionem Christi facta fuerit 
chirographorum deletio, etiam videtur quod sic. Colossenses: ‘Donans nobis 
delicta [fol.47.r.A] et delens quod adversum nos erat chirographi decreti,’ et 
hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Augustini in littera. 
Item, omnia merita et demerita scribuntur a iusto iudice, iuxta illud 
quod dicitur Jeremiae 17, ‘Peccatum Judae scriptum est stylo ferreo in ungue 
adamantino,’ sed passio Christi nos liberavit ab ira ventura, ergo delevit 
culparum chirographa. 
Contra, adhuc sunt aliqua peccata, per quae diabolus detinet 
homines, et hic et in futuro ad luenda supplicia. Ergo per Christi passionem 
non omnia sunt deleta. 
Item, chirographum decreti aut est culpa, aut poena. Si culpa, ergo 
idem est delere chirographum et delere culpam, ergo male distinguit 
Apostolus, inter haec duo, ad Colossenses, dicens, ‘Donans nobis delicta et 
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delens chirographum.’ Si poena, contra chirographum obligat sed poena vero 
non. Ergo videtur non potest stare sed passio Christi non est nisi contra 
poenam vel culpam. Ergo chirographa non delevit culparum. 
Iuxta hoc, etiam quaeritur quae sit differentia inter chirographum 
decreti et chirographum culpae, cum uno nomine nominet Augustinus alio 
nominet Appstolus, et quae sit scriptura et qualiter per passionem Christi 
affixa sit cruci. 
Respondeo dicendum quod sermo iste methaforicus est, quo 
dicitur per passionem Christi deleri chirographa culparum. Secundus est 
sciendum quod chyrographum culpae dicitur esse memoriale, quo anima 
tenetur astricta et obligata alicui poene, sicut quando aliquis obligat se alteri, 
facit ei chirographum. Et hoc innuit Augustinus in littera, cum dicit, 
‘Culparum chyrographa [fol.47.r.B] deleta sunt quibus debitores ante a 
diabolo tenebantur.’ Et dicitur illud chirographum, quia talis obligatio 
consurgit ex nostra culpa tanquam ex decreto. Et sic chirographum illud 
dicitur memoria illud, quo peccatum manet quantum ad reatum, ratione 
cuius divinam iustitia habet nos punire, diabolica autem malitia potest et 
detinere et conscientia nostra potest contra remurmurare. Et illud 
chirographum adversus nos habet inscribi non solum. Pro peccato primi 
parentis et ratione huius diabolus habet in nos aliquam potestatem vel 
simpliciter, vel ad tempus.  
Quoniam aut Christus per passionem suam impetravit non solus 
remissionem culpae quantum ad maculam sed etiam quantum ad reatum. 
Hinc est, quod dicit Apostolus et Augustinus, quod Christus passionem suam 
delevit chirographa culparum sed Apostolus dicit singulariter delens 
chirographum decerti, quia loquitur de memoriale transgressionis primi 
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parentis. Augustinus vero pluraliter, quia loquitur de remissione omnium 
peccatorum quantum ad reatum, ut perfectum exprimat ipsius passionis 
effectum. 
Concedendum est igitur quod per passionem Christi delentur 
chirographa culparum. 
Et ad primum contra dicendum quod dupliciter est loqui de efficatia 
passionis Christi, aut quantum ad sufficientiam, aut quantum ad efficaciam. 
Primo modo se extendit ad omnes secundam ad eos solummodo qui 
baptizantur in eius nomine, qui absolvuntur a reatu originalis et actualis, ita 
quod a diaboli non possunt amplius teneri, nisi forte se ei voluntarie 
subiiciant et nova [fol.47.v.A] contra eos scribantur chirographa. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod est proprie loquendo culpa, nec poena, sed 
est reatus consequens culpam, qui est obligatio ad poenam, quae quidam 
dicitur chirographum, in quantum tenet obligationem respectu poenae et 
rationem memorialis respectu culpae praeteritae. Culpa enim frequenter 
transit actu et remanet reatu sicut pater in sanctis Patribus, qui detinebantur 
in limbo, in quibus delendum erat originale quantum ad culpam sed adhuc 
remanebat in eis reatus propter quod janua erat eis clausa. 
Ad illud vero quae ultimo quaerebantur patet responsio per ea quae 
dicta sunt in principio huiuc responsionis, sicut patet pertractantis.  
 
Quaestio 3 enim quaeritur utrum per passionem liberati simus a potestate 
diabolica et videtur quod sic. Apocalypsis 20: ‘Vidi angelum descendentem 
de caelo et apprehendit draconem, qui est diabolus.’ Sed per istum angelum, 
sicut sancti exponunt intelligitur Christus. Si ergo ab isto angelo in eius 
passione est religatus diabolicus, videtur quod amiserit super nos posse. 
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Item quando diabolica superavit primum hominem per consequens 
superavit totum genus humanum. Ergo pari ratione videtur, cum superatus 
est a Christo, superatus sit a toto genere humano. Ergo per passione Christi 
totum genus humanum liberatum fuit a potestate diabolica. 
Contra Ephesios 9, ‘Non est nobis colluctatio adverus carnem et 
sanguinem sed adversus principes et potestates sed adversus mundi rectores 
tenebrarum harum’.12 Ergo adhuc daemones nos impugnant, ergo a potentate 
diaboli liberati non sumus. 
Item, potestas diaboli in duobus consistit, scilicet in obsessione 
corporum et excaecatione mentium, sed post Christi passionem adhuc multi 
a diabolo fuerunt obsessi, multi etiam fuerunt gravissime excaecati, ergo et 
cetera. 
Respondeo dicendum quod diabolus ante passionem Christi 
duplicem habebat manum, scilicet attrahentem qui erat potentas trahendi ad 
limbum etiam iustos et impellentem quod erat potestas praecipitandi in 
malum sive per [fol.48.r.A] astutiam sive per violentiam. Prima manus, 
omnino fuit ei amputata per passionem, quia nullem iustum potest ad 
limbum trahere, nam per passionem Christi deletum est chirographum 
peccatum Adae. Debilitata est per passionem Christi est per quam lumen 
caritatis contra fraudulentiam diabolicam astutiam et adiutorium virtutis 
contra diabolicam violentiam. 
Ad primi contra dicendum quod quamvis nobis incumbat pugna non 
tamen elongamur a victoria, nisi interveniat nostra negligentia, secundum 
quod dicitur in 1 Corinthios 10, ‘Fidelis Deus, qui non patietur, vos temptari’. 
                                                   
12 Sic. The reference should be Ephesians 6: 12. 
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Super id quod potestatis, sed faciet cum temptatione etiam preventum ut 
possitis sustinere. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod hoc non potest quis nisis ex culpa sua vires 
tribuat, sicut faciunt illi qui faciunt Christi conceperint qui non humili 
sacramentis et sacramentalibus se subiiciunt, quae a passione Christi habent 
virtutem, non formidant diabolicam potestatem. 
 
Quaestio 4 enim quaeritur utrum per passionem Christi absolvamur a 
poena peccati et videtur quod sic. 1 Petri 2: ‘Peccata nostra pertulit in corpore 
suo super lignum’, quod exponens magister in littera dicit quod, ‘portare 
peccata nostrum’. Hoc est portare poenam peccatorum nostrorum, ergo et 
cetera. [fol.48.r.B] 
Item in tolerantia poenae plus ordinatur ad relaxationem poenae 
quem ad delectationem culpae si ergo per passionem Christi sic iustificatio a 
culpa sicut super ostensum enim multo fortius fit poenarum relaxatio. 
Contra, ‘Resurrectio resurrectio13 Christi est causa nostrae 
resurrectionis’, ut dicitur in Glossa, ad 1 Corinthios 15 III, sed per 
resurrectionem nostram habemus liberari a poena et miseria. Ergo videtur 
quod Christi resurrectio, non passio, liberet nos a poena. 
Item omnis prima poenalis est, si ergo per passionem Christi liberati 
sumus a poena, videtur, quod non iam sit poenitentia, sed hoc falsum, ergo et 
cetera. 
Respondeo dicendum quod passio Christi liberavit nos a poena 
temporali et ab aeterna et ab ea quae est inter utramque media. A temporali, 
dum virtute illius donantur nobis peccata, non solum quantum ad culpam et 




reatum poenae aeternae, sed etiam quantum ad dimissionem poenae 
satisfactoriae, sicut fiat in sacramento baptismi. Ab aeterna quia dum per 
passionem Christi gratia nobis impetratur, enim per quam culpa demittitur, 
debitum mortis aeternae nobis relaxatur. A media inter utramque etiam 
liberat, scilicet a carentia visionis Dei, quod etiam si fuerit ad tempus propter 
gratiam repertam in eis qui detinebantur in limbo, deberet tamen habere 
aeternitatem, habito ad peccatum Adae. Unum quantumcumque passio 
fuisset ei subtracta, nisi Deus ad remisset aliam viam. 
Ergo ad primium contra dicendum quod sicut [fol.48.v.A] 
iustificationem, potest attribui passioni ratione termini a quo, scilicet 
amotionis mali et resurrectioni ratione termini ab quem, scilicet collationis 
boni. Sic etiam glorificatio, quae est liberatione a poena utrique potest 
attribui sed ratione liberationis a poena attribuit passioni. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod passio Christi quicum est de se liberat a tali 
poena quia secundum quid dicitur in littera, ‘in baptismo omnis poena quae 
pro peccato deletur, penitus relaxatur,’ sed cum homo peccata iterat, reddit 
se indignum tanto beneficio, et ideo per passionem non remittitur ei tota 
poena sed minoratur, sicut dicit magister in littera. quantum decet et expedit, 
salva divina justitia. 
 
Articulus 2, Quaestio 1 enim quaeritur utrum solus Filius sit redemptor, 
et videtur quod sic. Apocolypsis 5, ‘Redemisti nos, Deusm in sanguine tuo.’ Si 
ergo solus Filius pro nobis sanguinem nobis fudit, solus filius nos redemit. 
Item ille solus nos redemit, qui pro nobis satisfecit, sed filius pro 
nobis satisfeceit, ergo et cetera. 
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Contra magister in littera, ‘Redemptor etiam aliquando Pater et 
Spiritus Sanctus dicitur in scriptura,’ non dicit nisi verum ergo et cetera. 
Item illius enim redimere, cuius est per redempta per cuius dare. Sed 
Pater dedit Filium suum pro redemptione generis humanam, secundum 
quod dicitur Johannes III, ‘Sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum 
unigenitum daret.’ Ergo Pater nos redemit nos, ergo solus filius est 
redemptor. 
Respondeo dicendum quod opus redemptionis dupliciter alicui 
acuit attribui, aut sicut principali auctori, aut sicut exsequenti. Et utroque 
modo competit Christo, [fol.48.v.B] inquam, Deo competit sicut auctori, 
Christo vero homini sicut exsequenti et cum ergo dicitur redemptor, hoc 
potest dupliciter dici. Aut ab auctoritate redemptionis, aut ab auctoritate 
simul et exsecutione. Si primo modo, sic non tantum conpetit Filio, sed etiam 
Patri et Spiritui Sancto, quod indivisa sunt opera Trinitatis. Si secundo modo, 
sic respicit humanitatem, quae assumpta est a solo Verbo, et hoc modo 
conpetit soli Filio et hoc est quod dicit magister in littera, ‘Redemptor 
aliquando Pater et Spiritus Sanctus dicitur, sed hoc propter usum potestatis, 
non propter exhibitionem humilitatis. Nam secundum potestatis simul et 
obedientiae usum Filius proprie redemptor dicitur,’ et post concluditur. 
Est igitur redemptor, in quantum Deus potestatis usu, in quantum 
homo, humilitatis effectu. Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem 
propositam et ad rationes ad utramque partem. 
 
Quaestio 2 enim quaeritur secundum quam naturam Christus sit mediator 
et quod secundum humanam videtur. Augustinus, De Civitate Dei, 
‘Mediatorem inter nos et Deum mortalitatem oportuit habere transeuntem et 
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beatitudinem permanentem,’ sed utrumque horum competit Christo 
secundum humanam naturam, ergo et cetera. 
Contra Christus est mediator non per privationem sed per 
positionem, sed medium per positionem medium per participationem 
utriusque exivi. Ergo non potest esse mediator et nostri nisi per hoc, quod est 
Deus et homo. Ergo mediator est secundum utramque natunam. 
Respondeo cum mediator dicat officium reconciliationis et 
mediator debeat differre ab illis quos reconciliat et Christus secundum 
divinam naturam sit ille cui fit reconciliatio, dicendum quod non potest 
Christus esse mediator secundum divinam naturam, sed secundum 
humanam, in qua potest reconciliare [fol.49.r.A] diversas proprietates, in 
quibus communicat cum homine. Habebat enim iustitiam et innocentiam, in 
qua communicat cum Deo et mortalitatem, in qua communicat cum homine, 
et dum mors conjungitur iustitiae, in eodem confoederatur homo peccator et 
mortalis Deo iusto et immortali. Reconciliati enim sumus Deo per mortem 
hominis innocentis. Concedendus est igitur quod Christus est mediator 
secundum humanam non. 
Et ad contra, dicedum quod medium et mediator non dicitur solum 
per participationem utraque naturae et etiam per convenientiam in 
proprietate et Christus secundum humanam naturam, hic proprietates 
convenientes divinae naurae pariter et humanae 
 
Distinctio 20, Articulus Unicus, Quaestio 1 enim quaeritur utrum alio 
modo et cetera. Supra egit de passionis efficacia. In hac vero parte agit de 
passionis congruentia. Dividitur autem ista pars in duas. In quarum prima 
comparat passionem Christi ad causam, propter quam passus est. In secunda 
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ad causam, a qua fuit passio Christi. Christus ergo et sacerdos, idemque 
hostia et cetera.  
Prima pars dividitur in duas, in quarum prima ostendit, quod modus 
istae redimendi, scilicet per passionem, valde fuit congruus et rationabilis, 
ostendens, quare isto modo, scilicet per passionem humani, genus redimere 
voluit. In secunda ostendit, quod alio modo. si voluisset redimere potuisset, 
si enim illi tres in causa veniant et cetera.  
Similiter secunda pars dividitur in duas. In quarum prima inquirit, a 
quo sit passio Christi ostendens secundum creditus fuit a primae a seipso a 
iudeis. In secunda vero inquirit, utrum fuerit bona, vel mala, ibi: ‘Et fuit actus 
Iudae et Iudaeorum malus.’ Sive, ut melius dicatur, inquirit illarum 
differentiam poenes bonitatem et malitiam. [fol.49.r.B] Subdivisiones autem 
partium manifestae sic in littera. 
Quaeritur utrum congruum fuit, humanam naturam a Deo reparari 
et videtur quod sic. Per quatuor suppositiones, quae elici possunt ex dictis 
Anselmi in secundo Cur Deus Homo. Prima est haec: nullatenus decet 
summam stabilitatem permittere suum propositum infirmari. Secunda est 
haec: nullatenus decet summam benignitatem per peccato unius hominis 
totam posteritatem eius sempiternaliter dampnari. Tertia est haec: 
nullatenus decet summam sapientiam nobilissimam creaturam permittere 
fraudari universaliter suo fine. Quarta est haec: nullatenus decet summam 
virtutem permittere, servum suum ab alio in sempiternum iniuste detinere. 
Ex prima arguitur sic: si non decet Dei propositum infirmari et Deus 
proposuerat hominem perducere ad beatitudinem, et perduci non habet, 
quamdiu manet in statu ruinae. Ergo indecens est, hominem in tali statu 
reliqui. Ergo ab oppositis decens est, ipsum reparari. 
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Ex secunda arguitur sic: non decet summam posteritatem 
sempiternaliter dampnari pro peccato unius hominis, sed tota 
sempiternaliter dampnaretur, nisi reparationem interveniret. Ergo, et cetera. 
Ex tertia arguitur sic: non decet summam sapientiam permittere, 
universaliter nobilissimam creaturam fine suo fraudari, sed nisi reparatio 
interveniret,omnes homines essent fine suo fraudati. Ergo, et cetera.  
Ex quarta arguitur sic: non decet summam virtutem permittere, 
servo suos iniuste et violenter ab adversario detineri, sed nisi reparationem 
interveniret. Ergo, et cetera. 
Contra, si indecens fuisset, genus humanum non repararo et 
inconveniens, et quodlibet minimum inconveniens, sicut dicit Amselmus in 
primo Cur Deus Homo, [fol.49.v.A] est Deo impossibilis, ergo fuit 
impossibile, Deum genus humanum non reparare. Ergo ut Deus non 
reparavit genus humanum propter misericordiam, sed potius propter 
indecentiam, quod non reparavit ex liberalitate, sed ex necessitate. Quod si 
verum est, non tenemur ei ad tantas gratiarum actiones, quod inpium est 
dicere. 
Item, nobilior creatura est angelus quam homo, et est propter 
beatitudinem factus, sed non decuit Deum relevare a suo lapsu. Ergo nec 
decuit reparare genus humanum. Ergo, et cetera. 
Respondeo dicendum quod, per omnem modum, congruum fuit 
genus humanum reparari. Ex parte opificis, cum ex parte operis. Sed 
congruitas ex parte operis pura congruentia est, ita quod non ponit 
necessitatem. Necessitatem sed non inevitabilitatis, quae dividitur in 
coactionem et prohibicationem, sed necessitatem immutabilitatis, quae 
consurgit ex stabilitate et immutabilitate divinae dispositionis. Haec autem 
427 
 
non arctat divinam potentiam ad oppositum, sed eam determinat ad tale 
propositum. Unde Anselmus in secundo Cur Deus Homo, ‘Cum dicimus, 
aliquid Deum facere, intelligendi est, quod hoc facit necessitatem servandi 
honestatem, quod necessitas non est aliud quam immutabilitas honestatis’.  
Secunda, ex his quae dicta sunt, patet responsio ad propositam 
quaestionem. Si enim quaeritatur, utrum congruum sit, reparari genus 
humanum. Concedendum est simpliciter, quod si vero quaeratur, utrum 
necessarium non est simpliciter respondendum sed distinguendum, ut supra 
patet. 
Ergo ad primum contra dicendum quod non sequitur si Deus reparat 
ex necessitate suae immutabilitatis, quod propter hoc non [fol.49.v.B] 
reparat ex liberalitate suae benignitatis, haec enim simul possunt stare. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod quamvis angelus nobilior sit creatura, non 
est tamen adeo ad reparationem idoneus, sicut homo, propter modum 
labendi et propter statum hominis lapsi. Homo enim poenituit, angelus vero 
obstinatus fuit; homo totaliter, angelus particulariter cecidit. Homo per 
alium, angelus non per se ipsum et haec sunt quae faciunt angelum ad 
redemptionem unius idoneum. 
 
Quaestio 2 enim quaeritur utrum magis congruum fuit genus humanum per 
satisfactionem reparari quam per aliam viam et videtur quod sic. Illa via 
magist conveniens fuit ad reparationem generis. In quam servatur ordo 
divinae iustitiae et divinae sapientiam et praesidentiam divinae potestatis. Et 
honorificentia divinae magestatis.14 Haec aut omnia magis sequantur cum 
malum punitur, quod cum malum reliquitur impunitum sed cum peccatorum 
                                                   
14 Sic. Presumably ‘maiestatis’. 
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reparatum per satisfactionem. Malum punitur cum satisfactione relinquitur 
impunitum ergo haec via magis fuit conveniens. Ergo, et cetera. 
Contra modus ille magis convenit reparationi generis humanam in 
quo homo magis astringitur ad amandum et laudandum Deum sed si Deus 
culpam hominis reliquisset absque omni satisfactione et poena. Esset magis 
laudandus ab homine. Ergo, et cetera. 
Item modus ille magis congruit reparationi generis humani. In quo 
magis eruditur homo ad executionem divini mandati et immitationem. Sed 
homo decet remittere et condonare alii et poenam si ergo Deus debuit dare 
homini exemplum perfectionis [fol.50.r.A] patet et cetera, 
Respondeo dicendum quod si Deus culpam non dimisisset sed 
medicam exegisset non manifestetur eius miseria. Si vero omnio dimisisset 
nec satisfactionem exegisset non manifestare eius iustitia, si ergo iste divinae 
condonet sunt in divina opera secunda de magis congruebat humanam 
naturam reparari, per satisfactionem, quam per aliam naturam. 
Ergo ad primum contradicendum quod illud falsum est. Plus nullum 
nos astringitur ad amorem et laudem Dei hic quod dedit unigenitum suum 
per nobis, quem si absque hic condonavisset nobis culpam et poenam. Multo 
nullo magis fuit quod Deus per nobis mortem subiret, quantum quod 
poenam nostram condonaret. 
  
 
